transacting aesthetics

edited by Sebastian Stankiewicz
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A still increasing interest in aesthetics and also diversity and complexity of aesthetic studies can be noticed over the last couple of decades. The 19th International Congress of Aesthetics, which took place in July 2013 in Krakow, is the latest among 21st century congresses of aesthetics, plainly testifying to that appreciation. Congress meetings have always been a place for sharing ideas or exchanging standpoints, but also an opportunity for recognizing a current state of affairs in a discipline and for making more or less overall recapitulations, assessments, or diagnoses. The monograph *Transacting Aesthetics* is a kind of moderate undertaking aimed to show, amidst a variety of proposals, one of the pictures of the discipline revealing itself from papers delivered in Krakow; albeit far from attempting to be complete or exhaustive.

The volume title, *Transacting Aesthetics*, being a paraphrase of the Congress’s main topic *Aesthetics in Action*, emphasizes something active, dynamic, interactive, operative, participative, but also something what is malleable or in action, in progress, undergoing operations and whose boundaries cannot be circumscribed. The continuous form of the verb is to reflect an unaccomplished and unfinished state of affairs, whose description can be prepared only in the form of temporary reports or transactions. These characteristics entail an account of a domain of aesthetics in the sphere of “in-between” or “in flux”. According to many papers presented in the course of the Krakow Congress and especially those collected in the following volume, it seems that ways of approaching aesthetics have become more complex. Emergence of new scientific tools and methodologies, new artistic and aesthetic phenomena and/or new sources of aesthetic reflection make aesthetics an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary sphere, wherein disciplinary convergences are privileged; reshaping the domain into a field being subjected to permanent transacting.
The volume is divided into four parts presenting a transactional character of contemporary aesthetics and its continuously changing subject-matter. In the first part the intention is to focus on reflection referring to “Transgressing the Disciplinary Boundaries”; gathered papers emphasize or suggest metaesthetic issues implying an interdisciplinary approach. Part two and three are devoted to aesthetic categories to which are given transactional approaches: “Transacting Aesthetic Experience” and “Transacting Aesthetic Values”. The last, forth part is devoted to “Aesthetics in the Sphere of Society, Politics, and Ethics.”

The volume starts with a section Transgressing the Disciplinary Boundaries, devoted to metaesthetic reflection concerned with the issues of broadening, shifting, or intertwining disciplinary perspectives. The papers collected here present overtly or suggest interdisciplinary approaches. The first paper written by Adam Dzidowski “Applied Organizational Aesthetics: Managers as Designers, Architects, and Artists” tries to employ concepts and methods developed in aesthetics, to theory and practice of organizational or management studies, hitherto based on insufficient methods of structural functionalism, neglecting phenomenological approach.

Many of the speakers participating in the 19th ICA Krakow 2013, seemed to affirm the widespread thesis that contemporary aesthetics should be concerned with active exploration of old and new domains of human practice and knowledge present in different cultures, going beyond the traditionally predetermined research boundaries, and should it carry on this in terms of a process and an activity. Even though the thesis is not new (having being voiced repeatedly at least since the end of the 20th century and the dawn of the 21st century) this predominant conviction appears nowadays to be taken as granted, becoming a persistent research platform within aesthetics and an important feature of aesthetic investigations. It appears to be no longer a transitory state of affairs, but through its durability it signifies something more long-lasting.

Furthermore, it can be perceived that some issues concerning subject-matter of aesthetics have been abandoned or challenged and those changes are accompanied by an emergence of a quite new research attitude. Manifold contemporary aesthetic accounts and issues undertaken by aestheticians very often show up that we should not rely on separations any longer but we need to challenge traditional exclusive standpoint of aesthetics by means of permanent inclusive attitude. Encouraging complex, multidimensional, and interdisciplinary approaches, such inclusive attitude seems to be attuned to the phenomenon observed by many aestheticians and scientists from other domains, which is, the omnipresence of the aesthetic factor within different life spheres and scientific disciplines, where it has not been encountered until recently. It revealed that acting or thinking in
categories of separation makes it difficult to grasp the complexity of any phenomenon, and old divisions – if misconceived – serve rather as a tool of constraining our abilities to “make sense” of things. Revealed ubiquity of aesthetic factors can be traced within humanities as well as scientific domains. Sometimes the factor plays a supporting role in the background of affairs but often it appears crucial to understanding the very subject-matter of those disciplines.

Summarizing, both characteristics – the persistent research platform, based on the notions “activity” and “process” and inclusive attitude – are important assumptions of many papers presented in the course of the Congress, and especially those gathered in this volume. Both features refer to the contemporary way of thinking about aesthetics and of approaching it. And the continuous form of verbs is not coincidental here.

Sebastian Stankiewicz
PART ONE
Transgressing the Disciplinary Boundaries
1. Introduction

Sociocultural processes play a vital role in building the competitive advantage of modern enterprises. Their importance is undisputable, but the key aspects are often misunderstood. The reason lies in the very basic paradigms and methodological approaches to organisational studies. It is worth mentioning that although modern social theory has turned to phenomenologically inspired approaches, managers, employees and customers are still taught to live in a world of structural functionalism. This normative approach, in which maintaining the status quo through quantitatively understood objectivity is the essence of organisational efficiency, is no longer sufficient. Intersubjective social interactions, cultural codes and intangible assets such as knowledge, are increasingly responsible for the competitive advantage of modern enterprises. That is why many concepts that have been so far restricted to highly reflexive areas of social sciences (such as social constructionism or symbolic interactionism) must now play an important role in the organisational science. One of the issues that reappears in culturally-oriented organisational studies is the evolution of organisational aesthetics.

2. Organisational aesthetics

It is now frequently acknowledged that aesthetic objects, judgement, attitude and experience play a significant role in almost all aspects of managerial practice. Not only as a part of general aestheticisation of the world and transdisciplinary evolution of “aesthetics beyond aesthetics”, but also because all major, polysemantic meanings of aesthetics, namely perceptive (aesthetic), cultural (artistic) and beauty related (callistic), have their relevant impact on modern organisations. Consequently, the studies on organisational aesthetics are concerned with: 
Adam Dzidowski

– the artefacts and symbols shaping organisational culture, corporate identity, management hierarchy and communication;
– the physical space of an organisation and its impact on organisational relations, employees’ satisfaction, creativity and efficiency;
– the internal and external image of an enterprise, as well as its perception by stakeholders and general public;
– the image of a manager as an artist, the beauty of social organisation and the search for management inspiration in art.

Organisational aesthetics is regarded as a one of the most inspiring approaches to organisational theory, along with critical realism, complexity theory, social networks theory, actor-network theory or organisational identity construct. Despite the fact that the notion of organisational aesthetics widely appeared in 1980s, there are many historical examples of organisational aesthetisation. The cases of Arts and Crafts, Shakers or Bauhaus show how profound an influence aesthetical values can have on design paradigms, manufacturing processes or even postulated social models. Nowadays, many enterprises also attempt to manifest their corporate values and beliefs by establishing their own corporate identity. Companies like Apple, Ikea, Dyson or Swatch are easily recognisable because of distinctive aesthetic characteristics of their products and services.

3. Applied organisational aesthetics

As was mentioned, the influence of aesthetics is not restricted to visual identity (logos, colour schemes, stationery, publications, products, packaging, vehicles etc.). It spans through corporate architecture (premises, manufacturing plants and office space design), human resource management (uniforms, dress codes, office space adaptability and personalisation) and even financial activities (data visualisation in annual reports) and knowledge management (the use of infographics, presentations or prototyping). It means that organisations are no longer considered as aesthetically neutral and that aesthetics could be used to conceptualise an organisation as a form of creative expression, prone to various aspects of human perception, interpretation, reception and reaction. Aesthetics is not limited to the traditional philosophical concept that deals primarily with the understanding and the appreciation of beauty and our ability to judge it. Consequently, organisational aesthetics cannot be limited to the analysis of existing organisations, as it is commonly used, but should serve as a formative tool, as aesthetics in action. Applied organisational aesthetics designates an innovative practice in which organisational artefacts, space and creative engagements are used to shape the processes of organising and management. Applied organisa-
Applied organisational aesthetics...

Organisational aesthetics is not an abstract concept but a process in which organisational elements and their interactions are formed through sensory, perceptual and artistic perspectives. The essence of all these practices could be encapsulated in three dimensions – design, architecture and art.

a. Design

The first dimension that reflects the concept of applied organisational aesthetics is directly derived from the notion of “applied arts”. Applied arts designate the idea of making everyday objects aesthetically pleasing. The notion was originally used to separate the design and décor from the fine arts, since the latter were regarded as the only source of beauty and intellectual stimulation. However, this distinction is no longer valid. First, nowadays the notion of design is used instead of the idea of applied arts. Second, the concept of design has evolved and expanded beyond the mere decorative functions. Today, design is defined as a cognitive process that could be understood in at least three perspectives:

1. Design as problem-solving activity (postulated by Herbert Simon).
2. Design as reflective practice (postulated by Donald A. Schön).
3. Design as construction of representations (postulated by Willemien Visser).

All these approaches are valid within organisational terms. First, modern design is regarded as a mental attitude towards problem solving, when designers try to reconcile restrictions and requirements, often within so called “wicked” or “ill-defined” problems. Second, design is reflection-in-action, in which doing and thinking complement each other and combine product desirability, technological feasibility and business viability in order to deliver meaningful user experience. Third, design should be treated as knowledge-in-action, as an iterative and embodied activity during which representations (specifications) are generated, transformed and evaluated, until they are precise and concrete enough to be transformed into a final product or service.

Within this context, design has influenced processes and strategies of modern enterprises. The so called “design thinking” is an approach that reflects these developments. Design thinking describes the situations when designers bring their methods to the business environment and managers use them to translate customers’ needs and wants into innovative products and services. Based on empathy, observation, engagement, interaction, prototyping and testing, design thinking allows development of coherent and distinctive products, processes and strategies in the same manner as artists and designers create their unique works. Most of all, the goal of design thinking is to create meaningful interactions, by integrating five levels of product.
1. Aesthetics – Sensorial layer (How the product looks)
2. Interaction – Behavioural layer (How the product feels)
3. Performance – Functional layer (What the products does)
4. Construction – Physical layer (How the product is made)
5. Meaning – Mental layer (What the product means)

This perspective adopts not only creative methods used by designers, but also their sensibility. Design thinking emphasises designers’ passionate mindset, an attitude in which constraints and failures are not the reasons for distress, but an opportunity to create something remarkable and new. The idea behind that approach is to foster innovation by bridging analytical and intuitive thinking, usually resulting in abductive thinking (not seeking the best explanation, but always trying to find some explanation, in order to push the problem solution forward). That pragmatic philosophy makes close resemblance to John Dewey’s works and is especially interesting from the point of applied aesthetics. Dewey’s ideas about the process of inquiry (Logic: The theory of Inquiry, 1938) makes close resemblance to Design Thinking, whereas the concept of aesthetic experience (Art as Experience, 1934) could be used to reconcile the dualisms between analytical and intuitive thinking. Just like in the design related processes, the process of inquiry is induced by an imbalance, uncertainty and ambiguity. The importance of recognising the significance and integrity of all aspects within the given situation, makes an experience a crucial process of every inquiry. Consequently, every inquiry has its own aesthetic quality, because the experience satisfies us emotionally and intellectually when it is meaningfully integrated. That is why aesthetic experience, understood as an immediate integrative quality, is an intrinsic part in any evocative inquiry. From the design thinking perspective, the relationship between inquiry and aesthetics is even more apparent. First, aesthetic experience is interactive, as it is inherently linked with the practice of making and perceiving. The act of designing is intrinsically aesthetic because the ultimate answer to the question of production lies in the perceived qualities of the created representations. Furthermore, aesthetic experience is embodied, meaning that physical elements are the important medium for externalising ideas. That is why the ability to experiment with sketches and prototypes is crucial both for artists and designers. Finally, just like design thinking, aesthetic experience is integrative. It is an experience carried to its full by the aesthetic quality that drives it into completeness.10

All the outlined issues show the formative potential that aesthetics has within various levels of organisational practices. While on a functional level applied aesthetic is reflected in design practices, in order to relate it to higher levels of organisational construct, namely structure and strategy, design perspective is not sufficient.
b. Architecture

In order to apply aesthetics to the structural dimension of organisation, it is necessary to use the concept of architecture. Architecture is traditionally associated with the design and construction of buildings or other physical structures, but recently the notion has been adopted to describe the activity of designing any kind of system. A similar evolution occurred within the idea of organisational architecture. In one sense, organisational architecture could refer to architecture literally, as an organisational space (corporate premises and office space), while in another sense it refers metaphorically to organisational structure (task allocation, coordination and supervision). Both these perspectives closely refer to the semiotics of architecture, presented by Umberto Eco who distinguished between the “denotation” of a building (its utilitarian function) and the “connotation” of a building (its symbolic meaning). Throughout the evolution of the contemporary approaches to organisational design, both aspects of organisational architecture have faced substantial changes. The concept of organisational structure (connotation) has advanced through functional, divisional, matrix, networked, virtual and fractal approaches, reflecting the reorganisation of entrepreneurial processes and sources of competitive advantage. Concurrently with that, the principles of organisational space arrangement (denotation) evolved from Taylорist offices, through Bürolandschaft, Action Office, Cube Farms, to networking and casual working places, reflecting the changing corporate cultures and the essence of modern, knowledge-based work.

It is only recently that related problems have been concerned in a complete manner, within the so called “spatial turn” in organisational science. The most known approaches include Foucault’s notion of disciplinary space and Bentham’s Panopticon, as well as Lefebvre’s concept of social production of space, that proceeds in three overlapping dimensions: conceived, practised and lived. The latter approach was developed further by many authors including Dale and Burrell with the ideas of enchantment, emplacement and enactment or Taylor and Spicer investigating how organisational spaces are practised, planned and imagined within the space understood as physical distance, materialised power relations or lived experience. The issues of organisational architecture were also presented in the works of Kronberger and Clegg, concluding with the Hillier’s idea of generative building and fluid architecture that reflects the powerful, changing and bidirectional role of architecture in shaping social structures.

All these concepts reflect the changing role of organisational architecture, as it tries to support the driving ideas of the knowledge economy, which are reflected in the concepts of individual and organisational flow. The state of individual flow...
is often regarded as the ideal form of employees’ motivation. The notion proposed by Mihály Csíkszentmihályi\textsuperscript{18} depicts an optimal state of intrinsic stimulation, the ultimate autotelic experience, where a person is fully immersed in what they are doing. Concurrently, organisational flow is based on the idea of agile adhocracy, the structureless organisational design that operates in an opposite fashion to bureaucracy. The notion was popularized by Alvin Toffler\textsuperscript{19} and in many industries proved to be the ultimate form of organisational structure, taking on the form of virtual, fractal and boundaryless organisations. In philosophical terms, organisational flow could be referred to Zygmunt Bauman’s idea of liquid modernity,\textsuperscript{20} where one can shift from one social position to another, traditional patterns being replaced by self-chosen ones and nomadism becoming the main trait of modern human being. However, the degree of self-awareness and mindfulness that is required in the deconstructed organisational designs is unprecedented and very hard to attain. Consequently, the Karl Weick’s idea of sensemaking\textsuperscript{21} becomes a very relevant issue within personal and organisational life.

It appears that corporate architecture could be the common ground for these often conflicted ideas. While modern organisational structures are becoming more blurred, complex, temporary, nomadic and virtual, the organisational spaces are growingly responsible for workplace identity, social dynamics and sensemaking. Therefore, modern spatial solutions should be rooted in the promotion of spontaneity, direct relations and organisational narration, while ensuring the individuality of particular employees and their working style. Offices should foster the adaptation of its functions both in the time and space aspect. In the time aspect, they should correspond to various stages of project teams’ work, like group meetings and personal work, social life and private retreat. In the space aspect, modern offices should break with the static and linear character which preserves hierarchic relations and routines, for the benefit of an active journey which inspires employees to new concepts and facilitates interactions with others.\textsuperscript{22} Examples of such an approach to office space design are reflected in the aesthetics of modern offices in hi-tech industries (including Google or Facebook, see: http://officeal.com/ or http://www.thecoolhunter.net/offices/). They have colourful furniture, playrooms, hammocks, relaxation zones and similar solutions whose purpose is to stimulate the employees’ creativity and interaction. The employees are also allowed to draw on the walls, bring paintings and sculptures, and freely rearrange the furniture. This way companies enter into visual dialogue with their staff and make them actively shape the corporate aesthetic experience. The architectural choice for corporate headquarters could also designate corporate brand identity on the functionalist-experimental continuum, where the perceived type of architectural design (disruptive, expressive, balanced or solid)
shapes the perceived levels of competence or excitement.\textsuperscript{23} It reflects the duality of modern aesthetics appreciation, where both harmony (balance, peace, simplicity, completeness, authenticity) and excitement (adventure, provocation, challenge, surprise, discontinuity, strangeness) are valid sources of aesthetic experience. The second approach is especially valid in applied organisational aesthetics. Just like change is necessary to prevent anaesthesia, perfection cannot be achieved by endless repetition of beauty, it is also essential to create meaningful competitive differentiation and save companies from counterproductive replication of the existing structures. The remaining question is how to study change and its ultimate form, the continuous flow, from the aesthetically-oriented perspective. The answer might be found in the works by Gilles Deleuze who was dealing with the notions of wrenching duality of aesthetics, virtuality and multiplicity, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, rhizomes and the flows themselves,\textsuperscript{24} namely all troublesome ideas related to contemporary organisational design.

c. Art

The last level of aesthetic application is strategy. As it turns out, art could be a very relevant element of innovative business models, because:\textsuperscript{25}

- art and artists stimulate us to experience more of what is going on within us and around us,
- art disturbs, provokes, inspires and puts us in touch with our creative self,
- artists can stimulate us to broaden our skills and our flexibility of response,
- the role of the arts is to stimulate and legitimise our own aesthetic sense,
- Artistic training, workflow and reception can serve as a reference for understanding what it means to lead and manage.

Many practical applications of these postulates could be found in the so called artistic interventions. An artistic intervention is established when an organisation enters into a collaboration with an artists (actors, painters, choreographers, poets, composers etc.) to use their capacity to subvert and challenge routines, mindsets and traditional management processes.\textsuperscript{26} These involvements contribute to the enhancements within group work, team integration, conflict management, creative thinking and personal development. The principles derived from the theory of art or Gestalt laws of perceptual organisation (Prägnanz), can be directly translated into the functions, structures and strategies of modern organisations. It is illustrated by the list of aesthetic criteria which can be applied during the analysis of organisational strategy:\textsuperscript{27}

- Contrast: How can we differentiate ourselves?
- Depth: How can we succeed on many levels?
Focus: What should we not do?
- Harmony: How can we achieve synergy?
- Integrity: How can we forge the parts into a whole?
- Line: What is our trajectory over time?
- Motion: What advantage can we gain with speed?
- Novelty: How can we use the surprise element?
- Order: How should we structure our organisation?
- Pattern: Where have we seen this before?
- Repetition: Where are the economies of scale?
- Rhythm: How can we optimize time?
- Proportion: How can we keep our strategy balanced?
- Scale: How big should our organisation be?
- Shape: Where should we draw the edges?
- Texture: How do the details enliven our culture?
- Unity: What is the higher order solution?
- Variety: How can diversity drive innovation?

Of course, these characteristics cannot serve as a sole and universal approach. However, they could be useful when analysing the perception and trying to attribute the meaning to the issues like order and proportion of the organisational structure, rhythms and motion within office space, patterns and harmony of employees' behaviour or scale and shape of the relationships' networks. It should be noted that aesthetic dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency are neither objective, nor official, but are often used, even among scientists. They can be found in the thoughts of Paul Dirac ("It is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit experiment"28), Werner Heisenberg ("You may object that by speaking of simplicity and beauty I am introducing aesthetic criteria of truth, and I frankly admit that I am strongly attracted by the simplicity and beauty of mathematical schemes which nature presents us."29) or Henri Poincare ("The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he studies it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is beautiful."30). These quotes clearly show that aesthetics shapes the mental processes even within a strictly scientific domain and that aesthetic categories could be treated as heuristics or even the signs of the right solution.31

Conclusions

Despite many relevant and meaningful ideas, the aesthetisation of organisational practices gives rise to many doubts. They are particularly focused on the issue of anaesthetisation, the notion postulated by Wolfgang Welsch32, meaning in-
difference to excessive and common aesthetic impulses. The authors referring to Welsch’s ideas take account of excessive excitement at the sensual and phantasmagoric aspects of corporate visuality whose purpose, in fact, is to promote increased productivity and consumptionism,33 whilst falsifying the image of reality and corrupting the deep meaning of aesthetics.34 That is why a deeper understanding of organisational aesthetics, both in its reflexive and applied sense is needed. This could provide a new cognitive perspective in organisational development and help to understand changes in organisations as the effects of changes in stakeholders’ perception of reality. Ultimately, it could help to distinguish between the meaningless organisational veneer and the meaningful organisational beauty, in search of organisational sublimity.

Notes


ADAM DZIDOWSKI –

Email address: adam.dzidowski@pwr.wroc.pl
Affiliation: Wroclaw University of Technology (Poland)
New Aesthetic Objects, the Challenge to Aesthetics

Introduction

The expanding use of digital technology has been increasingly recognized as worthy of interest in aesthetics, becoming pervasive and even, perhaps, common. While there have been numerous discussions on the effects of digital technology on artistic production and aesthetic evaluation, until recently there’s been little discussion of the digital as an aesthetically interesting functional entity acting independently of our normal concerns. In 2011, James Bridle introduced the term “New Aesthetic”\(^1\) to describe the increasing proliferation of visual languages consisting of self-generative computational structures; this was followed by Bruce Sterling’s 2012 article in Wired.com\(^2\) further developing its impact in social, political, cultural and artistic terms, describing a set of heterogeneous digital objects. Neither Bridle nor Sterling, however, engaged the philosophical implications of this conflation of the digital and the real. In some sense, the New Aesthetic is merely an effort to describe what we already recognize, use and appreciate. The New Aesthetic has been described as “a vibe, an attitude, a feeling, \textit{a sensibility}”\(^3\) as an indication at almost an essentialist level of specific artistic and design tendencies and practices. It can also be argued that advocating an increasing awareness of the inescapability of digital manifestations opposes the continuation of aesthetics in the traditional sense that finds itself incapable of accounting for objects that are self-generative and substantiating. Because manifestations of the New Aesthetic are based in computational language, algorithms and self-replicating systems of code, it seems necessary to question whether traditional accounts are viable in response to its objects.

The New Aesthetic has also been dismissed and labeled as a superficial identification of artistic practices that have already taken place; for critics there is nothing new about New Aesthetics. “It posits an aesthetic turn… brought
about itself through a ‘new nature.’ Note the case of Sandy Island: an island of such name was “discovered” by James Cook in 1774 and noted in a whaling log of 1876, but was labeled as “Existence Doubtful” by the Australian and French Hydrographic Services as recently as 1979. Even though its lack of existence was reported nevertheless the World Vector Shoreline Database, a data set developed by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the standard reference for scientific global coastline data, continued to publish its existence while converting to digital charts, continuing the existence of a error through a misplaced faith in the digitalization process. This error continued to propagate until late 2012, at which point Google Maps, the National Geographic Society, and others removed it. What is fascinating about this, besides the comedy of errors, is the self-substantive and persistent existence of this error, of the digital existence of a non-existent island, that was the result of the digitalization of information and, hence, the creation of the possibility of an aesthetic experience which didn’t exist. The New Aesthetic is both a description of objects and a set of objects; in either case, their persistence at an aesthetic level is sustained by their digital nature, which allows for the repetition of the error. This is discomfiting because the digital acquires and sustains its own independent reality, begging the question: “What is it about the New Aesthetic that makes you so damn uneasy?” With a detour through Kant, it is arguable that the objects of New Aesthetics require a new approach. Benjamin Grosser, an artist and composer working in New Media, writes: “The pixel is the fundamental unit of digital imaging, a square representation of a single color… the construction of digital images alters our perceptions of reality. Does computer-mediated vision change how we see without computers?” The answer seems to be yes.

**What is the New Aesthetic?**

James Bridle describes it as a heightened awareness of the digitalization of the world, in both the productive and experiential sense. “The New Aesthetic is not a movement, it is not a thing which can be done. It is a series of artifacts of the heterogeneous network, which recognizes differences, the gaps in our overlapping but distant realities” as a conflation between the real and the digital in an effort to render the digital real as well as a rejection of the nostalgic and the possibility of an interpretative experience, manifesting itself in disparate examples. For Bridle, the New Aesthetic is a posture, a mode of receptiveness to these senses of artefactuality. Bruce Sterling adds that it is “an eruption of the digital in the physical” representing a seminal moment in contemporary culture:
New Aesthetic Objects, the Challenge to Aesthetics

This is one of those moments when the art world sidles over toward a visual technology and tries to get all metaphysical. This is the attempted imposition on the public of a new way of perceiving reality. These things occur. They often take a while to blossom. Sometimes they’re as big and loud as Cubism, sometimes they perish like desert roses mostly unseen. But they always happen for good and sufficient reasons. Our own day has those good and sufficient reasons.9

Despite such grandiosity of Sterling’s claims, one point is particularly accurate: “The “New Aesthetic” is a native product of modern network culture”10 found in the mathematics of the digitalization process rather than through a directed human effort and, because its native origins are so radically heterogeneous to our common understanding of the origins of human culture, the New Aesthetic represents a radical transformation of the world in a manner seemingly unintelligible to earlier generations. Referring to Bridle’s collection of images at new-aesthetic.tumblr.com, Sterling notes: “Look at those images objectively. Scarcely one of the real things in there would have made any sense to anyone in 1982, or even in 1992. People of those times would not have known what they were seeing with those New Aesthetic images.”11

The New Aesthetic is beyond our control. Marius Watz, an electronic and computational design artist, posted on his Tumblr feed that:

Heavy use of algorithms is bad for you. That is, it is if you wish to consider yourself a computational creative capable of coming up with interesting work… You cannot lay claim to ‘owning’ any given algorithm (or hardware configuration), unless you have added significant extra value to it.12

Strangely, though, Watz is increasingly recognized as an artist utilizing algorithmic imagery, and he writes about how coding itself should be regarded as an art form similar to the traditional objects of artistic production. For Watz, code is not neutral: “Algorithms provide the means to produce specific outcomes, typically through generative logic or data processing. But in the process they leave their distinct footprints on the result… “speaking” through algorithms, your thought patterns and modes of expression are shaped by their syntax.”13 Art created by Watz is dependent on more fundamental algorithms, and his own creations are flavored by the footprints of the preexisting syntax beyond his control. This relinquishing of control appears in one of the best manifestations of the New Aesthetic: the Decim8 app for the iOS system. Rejecting Instagram’s nostalgia for the analog in favor of a destructive process, Decim8’s developer Kris Collins notes: “FILM IS DEAD ... And yet many camera apps still insist upon attempting simulations of that long-past era. We say NO to artificial nostalgia, pushing forward in the digital realm with different forms of creative...
destruction.” Programs like Decim8 favor the randomization of imagery and embrace glitches as manifestation of the digital nature of the medium and its interface specifically invites a relinquishment of control by prominently displaying a “Random” choice rather than guiding the use to navigate a menu of option to assert control over the final product. With the rise of “New Aesthetics” even recollection itself is increasingly an impossibility. Given such circumstances, does hysteria ensues as a product of a frustrated Imaginary discursive formation in the breakdown of the dyadic relation of correspondence? ADILKNO (The Foundation for the Advancement of Illegal Knowledge) writes that new instances of aesthetic manifestations are merely instances of vague media in the sense that “their models are not argumentative, but contaminative. Once you tune in to them, you get the attitude.”

A Kantian Detour

New Aesthetic objects resist easy categorization because of their variety, an issue Sterling identifies as a problem when he states:

It was grand work to find and assemble this New Aesthetic wunderkammer, but a heap of eye-catching curiosities don’t constitute a compelling worldview. Look at all of them: Information visualization. Satellite views. Parametric architecture. Surveillance cameras. Digital image processing. Data-mashed video frames. Glitches and corruption artifacts. Voxelated 3D pixels in real-world geometries. Dazzle camou. Augments. Render ghosts. And, last and least, nostalgic retro 8bit graphics from the 1980s… There’s lots, they’re all cool, and most are rather interesting, and some are even profound, but they don’t march together.

Because of the variety of digital processes and the effect of algorithms, New Aesthetic objects appear almost like the detritus of our digital life, passing quickly out of our consciousness. Even the term “New Aesthetic” is problematic. Are we talking about a definition of the perception of beauty or are we talking about an inherent, intrinsic element worthy of consideration? Are the products identified because we label them as such or because they are inherently New Aesthetic? There is a sense that New Aesthetics is a design fiction precisely because digital technology is incapable of making aesthetic judgments, that it is insincere or, more accurately, incapable of being sincere, but there’s also a sense in the objects themselves are self-generative, creating standards of efficiency, that becomes mathematically beautiful through their self-sufficiency. Furthermore, is the New Aesthetic merely the product of one person’s interests- James Bridle’s- and are we merely wallowing in his responses? Where any discussion ends up is at
a point of polarity, between what we do and what we observe, with no obvious resolution. An unlikely source of clarity, though, might be in Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*, specifically in his discussion of teleology.

In some respects, New Aesthetic objects fit neatly into Kantian aesthetics; New Aesthetic objects contaminatively necessitate a disinterested perspective through the pervasive nature of their presence and the intuitive means by which we understand them. New Aesthetic objects’ function makes our assessment of their aesthetic quality irrelevant because the presentation of their functional and aesthetic natures is, while frequently intertwined, nevertheless necessarily separated. The very presentation of New Aesthetic objects through Tumblr and other social media websites illustrates this; such websites are not “curated” in the traditional sense of the word but collected, and most presentations of these objects are done with their links intact, a catalysis directing the viewer towards the object in its original state. Kant writes: “By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws” yet, in the case of the New Aesthetic these laws do not appear necessary but contingent while remaining necessary. Kantian beauty serves as a mediating link between nature and freedom in a transitory sense lacking self-sufficiency, existing as a mediation between the appearance of nature and the opportunity for freedom. Because beauty is only for humans, Kant avoids a discussion of what nature is until his discussion of teleological judgments. What happens when the opportunity to make a judgment of taste eludes us or, even more poignantly, is an impossibility? While “a judgment of taste… calls a thing beautiful only by virtue of that characteristic in which it adapts itself to the way we apprehend it” New Aesthetic objects do not adapt but require our adaption to their conditions and purpose. Equally so, New Aesthetic objects resist the Kantian notion that they must be lacking purpose in order to be universally posited as beautiful simply because their form, with its radical presentation of its digital origins, is its purpose. In some respects, the transcendentalism which many of the German idealists who followed Kant sought- in opposition to Kant’s limitations on judgments as merely being the mediation between and freedom- is countered by examples of New Aesthetic art resisting intuition while also abrogating such mediation.

Kant’s notion of teleological judgment might describe New Aesthetic objects as natural objects, represented in such a manner that the law-likeness of their particular determinations agrees with the appearance of purposes; there is no opportunity for the free play of imagination in its relation to intuition and, therefore, there is no available freedom, but there is a judgment in relationship to an intended purpose. “For if we want to investigate the organized products
of nature by continued observation, we find it completely unavoidable to apply to nature of the concept of intention, so that even for our empirical use of reason this concept is an absolutely necessary maxim.”^{19} In the case of New Aesthetic objects what can be intuited about their intention is, at best, the nature of their origins; this, however, is still entirely alien to our nature, deriving from self-sufficient algorithms that are impossible to submit to reflective judgment. What we arrive at is almost an indeterminate indeterminacy when attempting to make aesthetic judgments about objects that appear to be determined freely. The objects of the New Aesthetic not only resist being opportunities of taste but are antithetical to taste itself, resisting the standard unity of the supersensible^{20} that is aesthetic judgment, because of the alien self-generative nature of their digital manifestation in the world, while being an opportunity for teleological judgment.

Kant writes: “all our art finds itself infinitely outdistanced if it tries to reconstruct those products of the vegetable kingdom from the elements we obtain by dissecting them, or for that matter from the material that nature supplies for their nourishment.”^{21} Apparently art is a poor substitute for natural objects. The principle of teleological judgments of nature as to their self-purposiveness is, quite simply, argues that any effort to judge the natural purpose of a thing based on its intrinsic form is dependent on its natural form; to put it another way, when an object appears to our experience to be efficaciously purposive it is because it appears to be a means by which a purpose is achieved as an intrinsic quality of the object, and thus

we arrive at no categorical [but only a hypothetical] purpose if we disregard the internal form and organization [of a blade of grass], and consider instead extrinsic purposive relations as to what use other natural beings make of the grass… this condition (namely, the existence of a thing as a final purpose) is unconditioned and hence lies wholly outside a physicoteleological consideration of the world.^{22}

A teleological judgment regards an object only in terms of its efficient presentation of its purpose, what Kant refers to as its “intrinsic purpose.”^{23} While this is problematic, Kant argues that it is a necessary judgment in order not to explain objects but simply to be able to cite their types: having either extrinsic purposes - wherein an object is a means towards an end in a causal connection that is real - or intrinsic purposes, wherein an object is organized to reveal itself as itself in a causal connection that is ideal. Artificial objects, for Kant, can’t be accounted for in this fashion, but only natural objects because their purpose is self-contained “since the thing itself is a purpose, it is [therefore] covered by a concept or idea that must determine a priori everything that the thing is to contain.”^{24}
There are, however, other objects that meet a second requirement, which might allow for New Aesthetic objects to be judged teleologically. Kant writes:

A second requirement must be met if a thing that is a product of nature is yet to have, within itself and its inner possibility, reference to purposes, i.e., if it is to be possible only as a natural purpose, without the causality of concepts, which rational beings outside it have. This second requirement is that the parts of the thing combine into the unity of a whole because they are reciprocally cause and effect of their form. For only in this way is it possible that the idea of the whole should conversely (reciprocally) determine the form and combination of all the parts, not as cause- for then the whole would be a product of art- but as the basis on which someone judging this whole cognizes the systematic unity in the form and combination of all the manifold contained in the given matter.

Whereas the first requirement leads us towards a relation of the object to a causality of ends, the second is purely reflective and leads us towards a causality of self-evidency. Where we end up is with this maxim: “Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing in it is gratuitous; and the example that nature offers us in its organic products justifies us, indeed calls upon us, to expect nothing from it and its laws except what is purposive in [relation to] the whole.” As a reflective judgment, and not as a determinative judgment, it allows us to reflect on objects of our experience even to the point of making judgments of beauty, in that our cognitive powers are able to transcend the specificities of the object, whereby the entirety of nature as a system is considered and judged as a whole. What if the existence of the object is predicated in its lack of purpose or, even, opposition to purposiveness itself while simultaneously seemingly participating in both? Kant thus claims that the intuition of moral purposes as a substantiation of nature itself is necessary: “The sensible world must accordingly be regarded as so constituted in its particular structures that the realization of such moral purposes within it is not condemned to fail from the outset. Thus a connection of nature and freedom in particular structures is practically necessary.” But what if it’s not? What if we can still return to an object that confounds our freedom to judge it while appearing to be a potential aesthetic judgment? Thus we can make determinate, teleological judgments about New Aesthetic objects.

Regarding New Aesthetic objects reflectively, any judgment must discover a priori the purposiveness of nature revealed in teleological judgments while simultaneously being an engagement with their aesthetic nature. This is not necessarily paradoxical but feels even more contrary to human experience; nature reveals itself essentially as a revelation of itself for human intuition and
understanding, and art objects reveal themselves as revelations of the free play of human reflexive judgment, but objects that might be considered New Aesthetic objects participate in both processes in a way that ends up being surprisingly unsatisfactory. In this sense, though, New Aesthetic objects are not available in a free and harmonious fashion but as teleologically driven, and the freedom only is available in our understanding; for the objects of New Aesthetics such freedom is difficult to intuit and, therefore, even more difficult to understand because they are artificial objects, but their self-sufficiency begins to abrogate such artificiality; equally, though the free play of the aesthetic is disinterestedly available, because there is revealed a teleological purposiveness to the regarded objects we are left with an interested position that denies the possibility of the aesthetic. Where we end up is with two terms often employed in the discussion of the New Aesthetic: disruption and augmentation. Thinking about their relationship to Kantian terms becomes instructive and interesting, even if it adds a little to the confusion. One the one hand, Kantian aesthetic judgment is nothing more than a disruption of the presence of the object, an intrusion of the free play of human imagination, intuition and understanding onto the object judged, an addition to its existence that disrupts its previously unobserved and unjudged state. On the other hand, Kantian teleological judgment is nothing more than an augmentation of the presence of the object, as assertion of its existence as a metaphysical statement of its existence, almost a reified and self-generative presentation of the evidence of its own existence. New Aesthetic objects don’t seem to fit in easily in either form of judgment.

Conclusion

Bringing in Kant and his anthropocentrist philosophy may seem at odds with the New Aesthetic, because so much of the New Aesthetic seems allied with object-oriented ontology with its emphasis on the deprivileging of human relations and actions on the world in favor of equal consideration for all interactions, but it is arguable that Kant’s critique of teleological judgment is closer to object-oriented ontology’s notions of the preservation of finitude (where relations cannot be described as a complete knowledge of an object) and withdrawal (where objects cannot be exhausted by their relations because they are always present at-hand). Evidence of this can be found in the aesthetic and teleological consideration of code itself, which is easily lent to object-oriented ontology in that code is almost always larger than humanly comprehensible and is, therefore, prone to aporia or gaps beyond the control of human intervention or relation, but which is also present for aesthetic consideration in and of itself while being a presentation of
New Aesthetic Objects, the Challenge to Aesthetics

itself as itself. Illustrating this neatly is the work of Aram Bartholl, a German artist exploring the eroding boundaries between the digital and the analog world, who stated in an interview: “Pixels seem to be unsatisfied with their binary existence and have decided to jump into the tangible universe.”28 Objects that are identifiable as members of the New Aesthetic seemingly deny any satisfaction and, therefore, exist in a state beyond our standard aesthetic expectations. Arjen Mulder brings many of these issues to a point when he writes:

All the signs indicate that technological art will succumb to current social pressure and becoming something useful to people and the economy. In the process, we will lose part of what I will call the intellectual life of our times: the extent to which we are able to be conscious of the present. Artists are not creative in the sense of constantly coming up with new content. Rather, they change the form, the medium, the framework. In their hands, form is elevated to method, media becomes co-creators, and blueprints turn into diagrams.29

While disagreeing with his claim that technology will succumb to social pressure, Mulder’s point regarding the continuing evolution of cocreativeness seems valid. It is pointed out that the very nature of the New Aesthetic is paradoxical, in that it “attempts to document the ‘reality’ of this condition- the ubiquity of computational processes- [yet] it remains caught in the computational regime itself… [it] does not reflect on its own status as media… [and is] more accurately described as desubjectified, or partial.”30 What can be understood by this is that the processes whereby the New Aesthetic identifies objects is itself a relegation of such objects outside of the attitude of the New Aesthetic; no longer immediately present but now mediatedly present, such objects have been disengaged from the subjective to the objective, historicized rather than continuously present. This irresolution is one of the sources of discomfort and the newness of the New Aesthetics – there is still something new here, but something new is clearly here to stay.

Notes:
4 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Ibid., p. 18.
7 http://new-aesthetic.tumblr.com/about.
8 Sterling, Bruce, 2012.
9 Ibid..
10 Ibid..
11 Ibid..
13 Ibid., p. 13.
15 ADILKNO, (The Foundation for the Advancement of Illegal Knowledge) (1998)
Zoeltjes PRodukties, Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), http://thing.desk.nl/bilwet/adilkno/
TheMediaArchive/04.txt.
16 Sterling, 2012.
19 Ibid., p. 280.
20 Ibid., p. 15.
21 Ibid., p. 250.
22 Ibid., p. 258.
23 Ibid., p. 251.
24 Ibid., p. 252.
25 Ibid., p. 252.
26 Ibid., p. 259.
27 Düsing, Klaus, “Beauty as the Transition from Nature to Freedom in Kant’s Critique
html.
30 New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, p. 15.

SCOTT CONTRERAS-KOTERBAY –
Email address: koterbay@etsu.edu
Affiliation: East Tennessee State University (USA)
The Digital turn: The Computational nature of contemporary Imagery

Contemporary visual culture is a result of the digital turn. It is deeply rooted in digitally-driven processes which determine final outcomes as various types of digital imagery: pictures, motion pictures, computer-generated imagery. While the significance of this turn may be compared to the impact on culture that Gutenberg’s printing press or TV broadcasting had, Marshall McLuhan claimed that “The medium is the message”¹ and, with this in mind, I would argue that the influence of contemporary software and hardware on image aesthetics is even more fundamental. From the position of New Aesthetics, it is clear that the cultural role of the particular image is of secondary importance for the conditions of its formation; no matter whether it is a work of art, a work of a creative industry or even a commercial image, and regardless of the content of the image, similar computational processes do occur. Hence, software and hardware solutions used in the very process of producing digital images as well as its very computational nature strongly influence aesthetic strategies.

It is no longer sufficient to study contemporary visual phenomena in terms of classical aesthetics. The digital nature of contemporary imagery requires media studies, software studies and, in general, a digitally informed approach to the humanities and cultural production. The aesthetics of digital images is a consequence of constant, real-time interaction between many software and hardware layers necessitates an awareness of the many layers which digital images are composed of at both an ontological and an aesthetic level. What we usually perceive is the final outcome of their activity: the digital image displayed or projected on the screen. By studying only the layer closest to us we ignore the existence of other layers and their influence on the aesthetics of the images.
In this light, David M. Berry argues that one should avoid screen essentialism – that is, a screen-centric approach in image analysis as the privileged site for research. He writes in *Philosophy of Software Code and Mediation in the Digital Age*: “Without an attentiveness to the layers of software beneath this surface interface we are in danger of further screen essentialism.” Berry uses this notion in his studies of computational code ontology, however the analogy is valid also for digital image aesthetics. Conditions of producing computer-generated imagery involve complex hardware and software layers that should be taken into account in its aesthetic analysis, one cannot remain at the level of the screen. This emphasis on the specificity of the nature and experience of digital imagery continues in Lev Manovich’s *Language of New Media*, wherein he enumerates distinct qualities of the computer-based images:

Computer-based image is discrete, since it is broken into pixels. Computer-based image is modular, since it typically consists from a number of layers whose contents often correspond to meaningful parts of the image. Computer-based image consists from two levels, a surface appearance and the underlying code (which may be the pixel values, a mathematical function or HTML code). Computer-based images are typically compressed using lossy compression techniques, such as JPEG. Variability and automation, these general principles of new media, also apply to images. For example, using a computer program a designer can automatically generate infinite versions of the same image which can vary in size, resolution, colors, composition and so on.

Manovich’s analysis proves that digital imagery is a result of the real-time interactions between various technologies which function on different ontic levels. Each of the layers influences the ultimate result – a displayed digital image.

Computer-generated imagery is a result of complex software and hardware interaction and, therefore, one should not be limited to perspectives typical to traditional aesthetics or media studies. I think that a software studies approach is a necessity in this context, because software itself deeply influences digital image aesthetics. In his recent book: *Software Takes Command*, Manovich argues that a computer should be considered as an umbrella, which works as a structure for producing various types of media. Following the same logic that the first designers of creative software and GUI did – for instance, Kay and Goldberg thought about computer as a new metamedium, a basis for other media creation – Manovich writes:

(...) within the computer metamedium, all previously existing and newly invented mediums share some common properties—i.e. they rely on a set of common software techniques for data management, authoring, and communication.
Contemporary digital aesthetics is therefore a computational aesthetic based on media software – its limits and capabilities. By limits and capabilities I mean their interfaces, the tools, and the techniques they make possible for accessing, navigating, creating, modifying, publishing, and sharing media documents i.e. creative software ecosystems equipped with standardized presets, image processing tools (GIMP, Adobe Creative Cloud), image encoding and decoding standards (MPEG, JPEGG etc). There is hardly any element of software and hardware which is neutral for the final aesthetics of the image.

Digital image being a type of a software medium follows the same logic as other computer data does. Manovich writes that: “it is a medium simulated [and processed] in software as a combination of a data structure and set of algorithms.”

Media software introduces a new logic of media hybridization and interaction. As Manovich puts it:

> Translated into software, different types of media started acting like species within a common ecology—in this case, a shared software environment.

By allowing a certain degree of simplification one could propose an equation: digital media = algorithms + data structure. If contemporary computer-generated images are software, digital aesthetics is a software aesthetic such that the algorithmic nature of digital media treated as its material cause is crucial for its aesthetic and cultural status. To this end, the authors of the first book on the New Aesthetic write:

> Algorithms are a technical aspect of the medium within which the New Aesthetic is being created, used, disseminated and remediated.

David M. Berry proposes a perspective similar to Manovich’s software-oriented standpoint, yet rather than focusing mainly on software ecosystems, Berry studies another ontological level of digital media existence – the software code. He reconceptualizes code in a notion of a super-medium. Berry argues that “code unifies the fragmented mediums of the twentieth century (tv/film/radio/print) within the structures of code.” Code is not just a simple “container” or “transmitter” of other digital mediums, it radically changes and transforms the way we create and perceive them. Manovich says that media is software. Following the same logic one can argue that on a basic ontic level media is code. Code is present both as an underlying structure of media software and as a stream of data transmitting computer-generated images. Berry points out that code and software are not dichotomic agents:
(...) code and software are two sides of the same coin, code is the static textual form of software, and software is the processual operating form.\textsuperscript{13}

Media software is equipped with various algorithms which enable real-time transformations of data. Therefore, digital images are cultural artifacts which are based on processuality. Using Manovich’s language analogy, algorithms can be compared to verbs and data structures to nouns.\textsuperscript{14} We can also say that algorithms are syntax and data structures are lexical or semantic structures. By using certain commands one can manipulate each property of digital image – the value of every single pixel can be modified.\textsuperscript{15}

One may think that along with media software capabilities came a new era of cultural creativity and aesthetic variability. To some extent, it is true. However, as Manovich observed, contemporary digital images are products of software ecosystems, which offer certain pre-determined templates and cross-media processing and editing tools. This is characteristic not only for digital imagery platforms. Adobe Creative Suite (Creative Cloud) ecosystem provides certain filters and templates, which are applicable across all digital media types. One can use the same color template or effect in Adobe Premiere (video editing), Lightroom (photography software program), Photoshop (graphics editing program) or After Effects (digital motion graphics, visual effects and compositing). That is why an aesthetics of patterns begins to emerge and dominate contemporary visual culture.

Computer-based creative tools demand a new approach to individuals working in the creative industries. Digital image as a work of creative process is a result of constant interaction between its creator and digital tools used in the process. In the vast majority of cases these tools are designed by developers and programmers and not by the artists themselves. Therefore Manovich observes that after the softwarization of the imaging technologies the very definition of the artist has changed:

The artist was no longer a romantic genius generating a new world purely out of his imagination; he became a technician turning a knob here, pressing switch there — an accessory to the machine.\textsuperscript{16}

Manovich also describes one of the reasons behind popularity of templates of image processing tools:

The amount of labor involved in constructing reality from scratch in a computer makes it hard to resist the temptation to utilize pre-assembled, standardized objects, characters and behaviors readily provided by software manufacturers — fractal landscapes, checkerboard floors, complete characters, and so on.\textsuperscript{17}
Thanks to algorithms each and every digital image is a programmable piece of data, which undergoes quantization and discretization – it is composed of many pixels which have different chrominance and luminance. On the surface level these properties are perceived as building blocks with different brightness and color. As a result of compression and processing tools digital images can be displayed in various resolutions with different level of details. As Manovich points out, a single digital image can be a combination of many layers, even several thousands. Different types of media can be added as layers both lens-based visual content and computer-generated one. Motion pictures and video games are examples of layered image. All these processes occur on ontological level of digital imagery that is hidden from our perception. As Lev Manovich puts it:

(...) behind the screen lives a whole separate world with its logic, aesthetics, and dynamics.18

However, much the final aesthetics of the digital image is a direct result of the existence of layers of underlying dynamics, in viewing the final image we are not aware of them. They come to the foreground in breakdowns of the normal artistic process. Therefore, The New Aesthetic in order to reveal the grain of computation is focused on such breakdowns: image processing artifacts, glitches, aberrations etc.

There are at least two situations where softwarization of digital imagery is revealed and we begin to realize the computational character of digital imagery. The first case is where miscalculations in signal processing do occur and result in compression errors, image artifacts, glitches, low-resolution, color aberration etc. In the second case the creator or artist decides to reveal a grain of computation in his creative works. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that we understand a tool e.g. a hammer, not in its normal use, but when it is broken – we then see what it should be – when it is missing. Using Heidegger notions, without taking into account the underlying layers of digital imagery and concentrating on the screen essentialism we treat is from a ready-to-hand perspective – we are not able to theorize much about it. Instead we should consider it as a present-at-hand being, this approach would allow us to reveal its hidden properties. The New Aesthetic follows Heidegger’s logic – it is not concentrated not on typical imagery, instead, it focuses on “broken”, “miscalculated” digital images.19

**The New Aesthetic**

The question arises: How to study contemporary images in a way that takes into account their layers of computational structures? The New Aesthetic proposes to
do this, through its interest in both layers of digital imagery – the computational one, which reveals the softwarization of digital images, and the cultural one, which brings new aesthetic canons which did not exist prior to the digital era.

The concept of the New Aesthetic was initiated by James Bridle on his blog in 2011 where he started to gather images and things that seem to approach a new aesthetic of the future. There is hardly any single definition of the New Aesthetic; it is a practical and theoretical Internet-based movement whose participants are of multidisciplinary background. One common characteristic of the New Aesthetic is that it deals with increased human-technology interaction which is mediated by computational media and technological artifacts. On his blog, Bridle gathered an impressive collection of images and photographs from all over the Web which he felt were related to the New Aesthetic in one way or another. Adding to Bridle’s work, Bruce Sterling gives, some examples from Bridle’s online collection:

- Information visualization.
- Satellite views.
- Parametric architecture.
- Surveillance cameras.
- Digital image processing.
- Data-mashed video frames.
- Glitches and corruption artifacts.
- Voxelated 3D pixels in real-world geometries.
- Dazzle camouflage.
- Augments.
- Render ghosts.
- And, last and least, nostalgic retro 8bit graphics from the 1980s.

The New Aesthetic is also related to Object-Oriented-Ontology, digital privacy, digital identity and human-computer interaction studies. However, in this paper I am going to concentrate on the area which concerns aesthetics of the digital image.

**Digital Aesthetic Patterns and the Aesthetics of Digital Error**

Bruce Sterling, David M. Berry, James Bridle are interested in two areas of enquiry. The first one is unveiling aesthetic patterns of computational origin, which exist outside of the digital universe. The second one is tracking and describing common aesthetic patterns in digital imagery that Manovich would describe as software or computational media. As Bruce Sterling puts it:

> Above all, the New Aesthetic is telling the truth. There truly are many forms of imagery nowadays that are modern, and unique to this period. We’re surrounded by systems, devices and machineries generating heaps of raw graphic novelty. We built them, we programmed them, we set them loose for a variety of motives, but they do some unexpected and provocative things.
The New Aesthetic is interested in mapping digital aesthetic patterns present not only in the digital universe but also in the physical reality. Bridle points out:

I started noticing things like this in the world. This is a cushion on sale in a furniture store that’s pixelated. This is a strange thing. This is a look, a style, a pattern that didn’t previously exist in the real world. It’s something that’s come out of digital. It’s come out of a digital way of seeing, that represents things in this form. The real world doesn’t, or at least didn’t, have a grain that looks like this. But you start to see it everywhere when you start looking for it. It’s very pervasive. It seems like a style, a thing, and we have to look at where that style came from, and what it means, possibly. Previously things that would have been gingham or lacy patterns and this kind of thing is suddenly pixelated.²⁴

David M. Berry emphasizes the importance of a pixel as an aesthetic pattern. It reveals the computational nature of digital media, the role of discretization and quantization of the image (pixels) for its aesthetics. However this property is visible only after intentional unveiling of these properties by creators (low-res CGI) or by signal processing errors. Normally we are surrounded by high-res images (HD and Ultra HD motion pictures, advanced 3D graphics, retina displays etc.) therefore this very atomization of the digital image is transparent to us. Discretization of the image allows manipulation of it at its fundamental level. We are modifying the visual content itself by changing values (color and brightness) of each pixel or a group of pixels which. Berry writes:

Actually it is no surprise that we see a return of 8-bit retro – it could perhaps be described as the abductive aesthetic par excellence, inasmuch as it enables an instant recognition of, and indeed serves as an important representation for the digital, even as the digital becomes high-definition and less ‘digital’ by the day.²⁵

What is even more important, theoreticians and practicians of the New Aesthetic argue that pixelization as an aesthetic pattern has already came out of the digital universe, and it has found its place in the architecture, street art and other contemporary creative works.²⁶

New Aesthetic is also interested in glitches and signal processing errors that result in image artifacts and deformations. If pixelization as an aesthetic pattern revealed the “grain of computation” in digital media, glitches and errors unveil both the very fact of media softwarization and limitations of these processes. In Software Studies, A Lexicon in a chapter entitled “Glitch”, Olga Goriunova Alexei Shulgin write that:

In electrical systems, a glitch is a short-lived error in a system or machine. A glitch appears as a defect (a voltage-change or signal of the wrong duration—a change
of input) in an electrical circuit. Thus, a glitch is a short-term deviation from a correct value and as such the term can also describe hardware malfunctions.\(^{27}\)

With this operative technical definition, from the aesthetic perspective, glitches “can be claimed to be a manifestation of genuine software aesthetics”\(^{28}\) as they reveal the computational nature of the digital image. Both low-res pixelated images and glitches are rather marginal phenomena in comparison to common contemporary aesthetics (images displayed in high resolution with millions of colors), however they allow us to break away from screen essentialism and make the softwarization of digital image clearly visible.\(^{29}\) The glitch, being a direct result of algorithmic error, unveils the degree of software’s influence on aesthetics of digital image. Goriunova and Shulgin write:

> Just as digital technologies and software mediate our experience and engagement with the world, often invisibly, so the ‘digital’ and ‘software’ is itself mediated and made visible through the representational forms of pixelation and glitch.\(^{30}\)

**Digital aesthetics of augmented space**

New forms of human-technology interaction and presence of digital aesthetic patterns in the physical world studied by the New Aesthetic may support Lev Manovich’s idea of augmented space. In the *Poetics of Augmented Space* Manovich defines augmented space as a new kind of physical space where dynamic data are overlaid over the physical space.\(^{31}\) He perceives manifestations of this layer mainly in tracking and localization tools, new forms of wireless communication and in art and architecture as well.

According to Manovich there are four areas where digital imagery strongly influences and blends with the physical sphere:

> First, contemporary urban architecture – in particular, many proposals of the last decade that incorporate large projection screens into architecture and project the activity inside onto these screens. Second is the use of video displays in certain kind of contemporary spaces where communication of information to public is the key functions: trade show design, company showrooms; airports and train stations. The third is the best of retail environments. The fourth is the multi-media design of music performances.\(^{32}\)

All these installations use screen of various sizes, LED displays, fiber channels or projector to superimpose many kinds of images on the physical reality (in urban and public space). As authors of *Urban Screen Reader* write:
Urban screens of various scale – from the small handheld screens of mobile phones to the large screens dominating the streetscapes of global cities – exemplified a new urban paradigm produced by the layering of physical space and media space, resulting in what has been variously called 'Hertzian,' 'hybrid,' 'mixed,' 'augmented' or 'stereoscopic' space. One can say that aesthetics of augmented space has a dialectic nature. In the early days of consumer computing the Graphical User Interface was designed to simulate the physical environment of an office (folder, trash or desktop metaphors). Nowadays digital aesthetic patterns are (pixelization, modularity) emigrating to physical reality both as displayed images (public screens) or as art installations or realizations of architectural projects.

**Conclusion**

The New Aesthetic emphasizes the computational nature of contemporary digital imagery. By focusing on searching patterns, glitches and signal processing errors the New Aesthetic highlights this fundamental property of digital images which is usually hidden beneath state of the art visual content. Every day we perceive motion pictures, digital photographs, 3D graphics etc. and we are seduced by its aesthetics (level of details, colors) not thinking about conditions of its formation. Digital images are result of complex hardware and software interactions which fundamentally influence their aesthetics. The New Aesthetic reminds us about its limitations and unreliability. This is extremely important in the computer-driven age that we live in. The authors of *New Aesthetic, New Anxieties* write:

The New Aesthetic, in other words, brings these patterns to the surface, and in doing so articulates a movement towards uncovering the „unseen“, the little understood logic of computational society and the anxieties that this introduces. From this position it is clear that contemporary digital images should be analyzed from at least two perspectives. The first approach would focus on the cultural role of various types of digital media – pictures, motion picture, 3D graphics. The other one would concentrate on the computational layer of the digital image, considered as a file, stream of data or image displayed by digital screen or projector. I agree with Manovich, that both the cultural layer and the computer layer influence each other, therefore one cannot study the cultural status of digital images in isolation from its computational nature.
Notes:

8 Ibid., p. 124.
9 Ibid., p. 207.
10 Ibid., p. 310.
13 Ibid., p. 15.
14 Lev Manovich, Software Takes Command, p. 211.
15 Manovich writes: „Animating any parameter only takes a few clicks. The process works the same regardless or the element and parameter type. Thus, it is equally easy to change over time the position of a shape, its color, or the intensity of a light.” Ibid., p. 310.
16 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media, p. 131.
17 Ibid., p. 191.
21 Authors of the New Aesthetics, New Anxieties write: „Those who have felt obliged to enter the debate about the New Aesthetic come from philosophy, from new media art practice and curation, from interaction design or from the digital humanities. But almost no one has passed on the opportunity to say something; nobody has
just shrugged with indifference and said 'they can't be bothered.' “David M. Berry, Michel van Darte, Michael Dieter Michael et al., New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, p. 18.


23 Ibid.


28 Ibid., p. 111.


30 David M. Berry, Michel van Darte, Michael Dieter Michael et al., New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, p. 43.

31 Lev Manovich, Friendly Alien...

32 Ibid.


34 David M. Berry, Michel van Darte, Michael Dieter Michael et al., New Aesthetic, New Anxieties, p. 41.

ŁUKASZ MIROCHA –

Email address: mirocha.lukasz@gmail.com

Affiliation: University of Warsaw (Poland)
1. Introduction

This essay will focus on philosophical aesthetics and videogames. An obvious reason for applying the former to the latter is because of the ubiquity of videogames today. Despite their status as the most popular worldwide art form, videogames have been given little attention in the field of aesthetics – see for instance recent articles by Phillip Deen and Aaron Smuts. While these scholars and others have made headway in developing aesthetic theories of videogames, the approaches vary drastically in method and scope. Ian Bogost for instance has developed a unique methodology in order to “stay true” to the special qualities of videogames. Meanwhile Deen has found pragmatism to be sufficient for an aesthetic theory which encompasses videogames’ aesthetic qualities satisfactorily. I propose that George Dickie’s Institutional Theory of art is another existing aesthetic philosophy that accommodates videogames within the field of aesthetics well.

I will quickly sketch the outline of this essay. In part 2, I clarify what I mean by a videogame and I state the importance of videos and games as components of videogames. In part 3, I present some reasons supporting my claim that videogames are the world’s most popular art form. I also explain their importance not just in terms of mass popularity, but also in their growing presence in art galleries and scholarly publications. In part 4, I present the institutional theory of art and then interpret the videogame (“gamer”) world according to the theory. Part 5 contains responses to criticisms pertaining to the institutional theory and to videogames as artworks. Finally, part 6 consists of the conclusion and important remarks about the essay’s consequences.
2. Defining a Video Game

For the sake of clarity on the topic, I shall begin by attempting roughly an answer to the question: what is a video game? Working through the constituent elements of videogames, as they developed over the years is a way to formulate a general description of what videogames are. First, let me note that there is a discrepancy in the word itself: is it “video game” or “videogame?” Generally scholars use the second option and I will follow in that tradition. Using one word also differentiates videogames from a game which might contain video but which is not a videogame. For instance there are games which are to be played in small groups but which run on a DVD, in a DVD player. I contend that these are not videogames for the reason that they are primarily marketed as board games and, more importantly, they lack the most distinguishing feature of videogames: interactivity. Clicking through sequences of discrete videos does not a videogame make. We will look more closely at interactivity later.

While it does seem that all videogames do contain games, they need not contain video. For instance, some of the earliest videogames are now referred to as interactive fictions. The first was Adventure (a.k.a. ADVENT, a.k.a. Colossal Cave Adventure), made in the mid-seventies by Will Crowther.3 Interactive fictions display only text on the computer screen. The player must then enter commands using the keyboard such as “get,” “take,” and “look.” The videogame/interactive fiction then responds to these commands. For instance, this is the traditional beginning to Adventure: “You are standing at the end of a road before a small brick building. Around you is a forest. A small stream flows out of the building and down a gully.” One of the possibilities for the player is to type “enter,” which prompts a new message from the videogame. There is no video present in such works. Well into the 1980s these videogames were popular; eventually containing pictures, drawings, and then video.4 Even today, interactive fictions are released to the public – usually created by independent and singular videogame designers.

Interactive fictions were very popular, but alongside them were the influential video arcade games such as Pac-Man and Tetris. These videogames combined not only the interactivity and text of early interactive fictions, but also interactive video, cut-scenes, sound effects, and music. By interactive video I mean the chomping Pac-Man which the player manipulates using controls – which vary according to the devices a player physically operates. Interactive video is the major difference between games with videos incorporated in them, and videogames. By cut-scenes I mean the traditional video sequences that play between certain levels in Pac-Man and where the player becomes a passive viewer. These separate artistic elements are combined in videogames which is why I am unconcerned if videogames may be
lumped into the art category of “multimedia works” along with films. Simplistically speaking, films combine photographs (thousands of them) with sound effects and music. The last two are neither sufficient to make a film nor are they necessary. Yet, films by and large contain these three elements. In other words, these are the three common or general elements of films. In the same way, videogames have many elements that are not necessary (as interactive fictions show) but videogames today by and large contain text, interactive video, cut-scenes, sound effects, and music. I submit these as the general elements of videogames.

If video is not a necessary or sufficient condition for videogames is the game component the necessary condition of videogames? I think that it is – though we are to keep in mind that video, music, sound effects, etc., remain extremely common and important general elements of videogames. In order to define a game, I turn to the book Reality Is Broken by Jane McGonigal, which gives four necessary and sufficient conditions for a game: one or more goals, rules, feedback systems, and voluntary participation. Goals provide a sense of purpose, orient player participation, and create that sense of “progression” through the game. The overt goal in Pac-Man is to beat each level the game presents. However, getting the highest score possible is another goal in Pac-Man. Beating levels and getting high scores are two possible goals in Pac-Man and they are also examples of feedback systems. A feedback system informs the player of about achieving goals. Points and high scores are obvious examples of feedback systems. Rules don’t just create order; they force limitations on achieving goals. The result is in fact positive: “…the rules push players to explore previously uncharted possibility spaces. They unleash creativity and foster strategic thinking.” Adventure does this especially well because of the diversity of combinations of actions the player can make. Finally, voluntary participation, “And the freedom to enter or leave a game at will ensures that intentionally stressful and challenging work is experienced as safe and pleasurable activity.” It establishes a kind of background psychological safety net to (mis)fortunes experienced in the game.

The game component of videogames looks much like the game component of traditional games like Blackjack, Bingo, “Monopoly”, Soccer or tag. Yet unlike these traditional games, competition is not essential to videogames – a common misconception about them. In many videogames, there is no necessity in competition with others. Much of what players do in Adventure is just try out new tactics and see what happens personally.

The foregoing statements have been attempts at defining videogames. At the very least, these attempts have fostered debate if they have not clarified the topic. With this accomplished I proceed to the larger issue in this paper of how videogames fulfill the definition of artworks.
3. The World’s Most Popular Art

I will begin by supporting the first claims in my introduction. There are three very important reasons why videogames demand aesthetic attention. The first is their worldwide popularity. The second is their increasingly frequent appearance in art galleries. The third is their growing presence in scholarly publications. On the first, videogames demand artistic and scholarly attention because they are the most significant art form of our time. The significance of the popularity of video games is made clear by Nic Kelman:

In the past years, consumers have spent more on video games than they have on films. By the end of the year, the game industry will eclipse even the music industry in gross revenues, and by 2008 it will be making more than both music and film combined. Even if we take these numbers as only the roughest of guides, they tell us something important: video games are now the de facto dominant art form in the world.6

Kelman’s book was first published in 2005 and his statistics were a little too optimistic. That being said, the video game industry has surpassed the music industry in revenues and will undoubtedly surpass the film industry both globally and in the United States. While the film Spiderman 3 brought in $59 million in ticket sales on its opening day, the video game Grand Theft Auto IV (2008) made $310 million on its opening day.7

Jane McGonigal’s statistics in her book are also telling. The US has 183 million active gamers (people that spend on average 13 hours a week playing video games) and 5 million extreme gamers (on average 45 hours a week) (3-4).8 Some further statistics clear up common misconceptions about gamers too. 97 percent of youth play video games, 40 percent of gamers are women, one quarter of gamers are over 50 years old, and the average player is 35 and has been playing video games for 12 years.9

The second reason why videogames demand aesthetic attention is their increasingly frequent appearance in art galleries. Philosopher Aaron Smuts believes videogames are art according to all major art theories, including the institutional theory.10 One of the supports for his (albeit short) institutional case includes videogame exhibitions in prominent art museums. He cites: “ArtCade: Exploring the Relationship Between Video Games and Art” at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art in 2001, and “BitStreams” at the Whitney Museum of American Art in 2001. The most recent and prominent exhibition is “The Art of Video Games” at the Smithsonian American Art Museum which opened March 16, 2012. This is just the first stop of the exhibit before it heads to nine
other U.S. museums over the next four years. The exhibit strongly promotes the artistic nature of videogames:

*The Art of Video Games* is one of the first exhibitions to explore the forty-year evolution of video games as an artistic medium, with a focus on striking visual effects and the creative use of new technologies. It features some of the most influential artists and designers during five eras of game technology, from early pioneers to contemporary designers. The exhibition focuses on the interplay of graphics, technology and storytelling through some of the best games for twenty gaming systems ranging from the Atari VCS to the PlayStation 3.¹¹

Obviously the creators of the exhibit feel that videogames are much more than just mere entertainment. Videogames have a history of artistic evolution involving the purposive interplay of graphics, technology, and storytelling. There is also a growing trend of artists moving from the traditional arts into videogames. The Chinese artist Feng Mengbo is one important artist known primarily for his videogame based exhibitions in art galleries – such as “Feng Mengbo: Video Games” at the Haggerty Museum of Art November 1998 to January 1999.¹² Deen provides the example of Cory Arcangel; featured in MOMA, the Whitney, and MCA Chicago.¹³

The third reason video games demand aesthetic attention is because of their growing presence in scholarly publications. Articles specifically on the aesthetic nature and value of videogames have appeared in *Aesthetics On-Line* (the official website of the American Society for Aesthetics) and *Contemporary Aesthetics*. The journal of cross-disciplinary research *symplex* dedicated a complete volume to gaming and theory.¹⁴ Furthermore, *Game Studies* is an international peer-reviewed journal dedicated solely to videogame research. There is also no short supply of books on the subject. There is philosopher Grant Tavinor’s book *The Art of Videogames* (2009) and linguist James Paul Gee’s books: *Why Video Games Are Good for Your Soul* (2005), *Good Video Games + Good Learning* (2007), and *What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy* (2007). Finally there are the others which I have referenced earlier in this paper.

### 4. Bringing Videogames into Aesthetics: the Institutional Theory

George Dickie’s institutional theory of art can be used to classify videogames as artworks; they would consequently become fitting objects of aesthetic study. Over many years Dickie has refined his institutional theory from its first appearance in *Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis* (1974). His fullest account of
the new institutional theory of art appears in his book *The Art Circle: A Theory of Art* (1984). In it, he overhauls the theory, picking up the pieces of the original and reinforcing it in lieu of significant criticisms.\(^{15}\) I will now sketch the new institutional theory of art as Dickie describes it in *The Art Circle*. Dickie believes that art has an “inflected nature” which means that the most primitive terms used to define art “presuppose and support one another”.\(^{16}\) One cannot define art in more basic terms than artwork, artist, and public because these terms presuppose one another. They reveal a circularity when we try and define art, but Dickie feels that this circle is not a vicious one.\(^{17}\) We have all we need to adequately describe the artworld with these inflected terms.

The circularity of art terms reveals the institutional nature of art. First, Dickie goes to great lengths to show that the idea of one of these things – e.g. an artwork, an artist, or a public – existing apart from the others is incomprehensible. There is always a background or an “essential framework” for the production of art.\(^{18}\) Even in cases of obscure or reclusive artists they always have some notion of an audience.\(^{19}\) Second, the way we learn about art at a young age includes the connections of artworks to artists and to audiences/publics. Children make objects that are called art, these are displayed on a wall or refrigerator, and the children are called artists. “We are taught about agent, artifact, and public all at the same time, and this is no accident for the various artworld elements do not exist independently of one another.”\(^{20}\)

The following are Dickie’s definitions of the essential terms of art:

(I) An *artist* is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art. (II) A *work of art* is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public. (III) A *public* is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some degree to understand an object which is presented to them. (IV) The *artworld* is the totality of all artworld systems. (V) An *artworld system* is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an artworld public.\(^{21}\)

Since my focus is the inclusion of videogames into aesthetics, I will not challenge or explain every one of these definitions. I will do so only insofar as there is tension between videogames and the essential terms as Dickie gives them. (I) Some videogames like *Adventure* are made by an individual but most of them are made by teams ranging from a handful to thousands of people. Videogame production is analogous to film production – and Dickie remarks on films implying that they are artworks.\(^{22}\) There are independent videogames made by a handful of people on a small budget like *Braid* (2008), *Super Meat Boy* (2010), and *Fez* (2012). Then there are videogame companies that have
international staffs making multiple videogames at one time like EA Games and Blizzard. Not everyone who participates in making a videogame is an artist – which accords with Dickie’s explanation that a carpenter is not an artist despite perhaps making sets. Dickie explains: “What the artist understands is the general idea of art and the particular idea of the medium he is working with.” This definition requires that artists create artworks intentionally, but Dickie adds that not everything in an artwork need be intentional. This prevents him from falling into the intentional fallacy – i.e. that the meanings of a work depend on whether the artist intended them.

Just two examples of well-known videogame artists are Shigeru Miyamoto and Ken Levine. Undoubtedly, these two understand what their works are, and crucially participate in their creation. They have also been internationally honored as influential artists. Miyamoto has long worked for Nintendo, creating some of their best games (financially and aesthetically speaking) including the Super Mario Bros. series (over 20 titles), Zelda series (over 15 titles), and many more familiar lines. Levine founded Irrational Games with a few other videogame designers. His games include System Shock 2 (1999), Bioshock (2007), and Bioshock Infinite (2013). Both Miyamoto and Levine have overseen all aspects of the creation of many of their videogames – taking them from the conceptual stage, through production and finally to release. The title of such a role in the videogame industry is “lead designer” and is analogous to a director in film or theater. To clear up any confusion, while the game industry does not usually make use of the term “artist” for many of its creative roles, we should not take this as a sign that these designers are not artists. We find similarly that the job titles in theater do not make use of the term artist – instead opting for director, producer, actor, screenwriter, etc. The same is true of the film industry. Returning to Miyamoto and Levine, both have been recognized as influential artists and received awards and praise from the artworld. They also both have games featured in the “The Art of Video Games” exhibit.

(II) Videogames are artifacts. By artifact, Dickie means “a product of human making.” We need not become embroiled in the difficulties of the artfactuality of artistic objects like Duchamp’s “Fountain” because videogames are not artifacts in the sense of “ready-mades” or “found art.” They are artifacts in the standard sense of being purposely crafted from components/elements. Some of these components are recordings of traditional art, such as the soundtrack to a game which may be recorded from a real performance by a symphony – performing pieces specifically composed for the videogame no less. Other components are computer programs that control the physics, lighting, or camera angle in a videogame. The artistic consequences of the interactions between such components
are part of what makes a videogame of aesthetic value. Dickie never states that artifacts need to be physical objects. This is because anything like a play or a dance performance – both normally considered works of art – are not concrete physical entities per se. “The play” is a series of particular physical elements that occur in an allotted space over a certain time. If an ambulance blares outside during the performance, it is not taken to be part of the play itself – though it occurred concurrent with the artistic object identified as the play. In addition, after the allotted time “the play” does not remain in that space – the sets are stored and the actors leave the theater. Similarly playing a videogame is an aesthetic experience that takes place over time and maybe over many electronic devices. Just as plays vary slightly due to the shape and size of stages, videogames may also vary slightly between machines. Otherwise, the great majority of a videogame’s programs, recordings, narrations, etc., remain identical between devices.

When Dickie writes that artworks are artifacts “of a kind” he means specifically artifacts to be presented to an artworld public. (III) The videogame artworld public is well established. In the days of *Adventure*, the “public” was tiny because of the few devices to play the games on and the lack of information and communication about these games. Now there are so many videogames, game companies, and gamers, that entire companies are forming around videogame criticism, review, marketing, and appreciation. Dickie states that members of an artworld public are not just random collections of people, but members fulfilling roles that require knowledge of the medium much like the artists have.\(^25\) One of the influential resources for videogame criticism is *The New York Times*, which now publishes a section on “Video Games” under “Arts.”\(^26\) Another is the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) which since at least 2006 has presented annual awards for videogames with many individual categories.\(^27\) There are myriad annual international conferences and expos for gamers and game designers. One of the most influential is the Game Developers Conference which in 2012 hosted 22,500 game professionals.\(^28\)

(IV) We may ask the reasonable question: are videogames thought of as part of the totality of the artworld? Despite his criticism of the institutional theory, Phillip D. Deen sees it as a significant achievement that videogames became eligible for funding from the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts in 2011.\(^29\) The presence of videogames in *The New York Times*, BAFTA, and the art museums listed earlier is further support for the status of videogames as part of the general artworld. While videogames artistically draw upon many of the traditional fine arts, we also find that there are examples of the stream flowing the other way. There have been multiple instances of world-renowned orchestras holding live concerts of exclusively videogame music; e.g. the Japan Philharmonic and the
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London Philharmonic Orchestra. There have also been numerous literature and film adaptations of videogames.

(V) Finally, the current framework for the presentation of videogames is analogous to the framework for films. There are large studios which massively distribute their videogames across the world, like EA. They also fund huge marketing campaigns in order to generate hype for their videogame releases. These kinds of videogames clearly fall into the category of “mass art” – a category of art that has recently garnered attention in aesthetics. Then there are independent videogames that appeal to a much smaller group of people. Special websites and organizations try to facilitate the creation and distribution of independent or amateur-designed games. Importantly, many independent videogames are made freely available on the internet without knowledge of whether they will be popular or not. It seems difficult to apply the label mass art to these games which might go completely unnoticed. The most revolutionary change in the videogame artworld system is the creation of App(lication) stores and web based videogame stores like “Steam.” App stores that supply videogames to mobile devices provide the ability for designers of independent games to market to a potentially huge public. The same goes for Steam (created by game company Valve) which is a service that provides all types of videogames for immediate download often at discounted rates. Services like these have created a current golden age of independent gaming.

With the foregoing analysis of the applicability of the institutional theory to the videogame artworld, it is easy to see the ease with which videogames fulfill each of Dickie’s terms. It is difficult to see any severe conflicts between the theory and the reality of the videogame artworld. In fact, I expect it to be impossible to dismiss videogames from being artworks given the presented definition of the institutional theory. The major criticisms leveled against the institutional theory center on the wide scope of it. That is what I turn to next.

5. Addressing Criticisms

In this section I will reply to three major criticisms I have encountered to the institutional theory and to videogames as artworks. Dickie’s institutional theory of art is meant to distinguish art from non-art. The first criticism I have faced is that the theory is too broad and accidentally admits non-art. If this is true, then videogames have not achieved the status of art just because the institutional theory admits them as such. For instance, one professor reacted considering: if videogames are art according to Dickie’s definitions, is there anything in the institutional theory barring games like baseball from being art? In many ways
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baseball appears similar to art in terms of having a public, but I contend that it fails to fulfill the definition of an artist according to the institutional theory. Dickie makes the important point: “What the artist understands is the general idea of art and the particular idea of the medium he is working with.” This is what Dickie means by his definition of an artist, and in this sense baseball players and coaches are not artists. None of them need to have any clue what art is in order to play baseball. In addition, baseball itself is not a game geared toward having players or coaches that know art. Well before it would, it would be far more concerned with their ability to win games.

Interestingly, we might apply the same point against videogames and argue that they are not works of art according to the theory. Do videogame designers know what art is? Are videogames geared toward the development of artists? Answering these questions involves knowing what kinds of videogames there are and how they are used. There are videogames which teach children to read, replicate card games, form collaborative teams to solve world problems, teach hand-eye coordination, or make players take part in an elaborate and complex fictional storyline. The designers of at least hand-eye coordination videogames need not know what art is. Such games would not qualify as artworks then.

Another example is videogames meant to replicate sports. Theoretically, the designers of such games need only know how to replicate baseball as closely as possible in a digital medium. However there is an interesting problem when we consider replication in a medium as something many other arts like sculpture and painting already do. The mimetic theory of art is after all a viable theory, even if many philosophers of art dislike its constraints. Capturing reality in the digital medium is a continuing struggle in the videogame industry – just as it is a struggle in film, photography and painting. Undoubtedly people that attempt to capture reality in art are still artists though. Otherwise, there are many videogames that intend to be stylized rather than realistic, such as Minecraft (2009) and World of Goo (2008).

Another point to make on the question of whether videogame designers know what art is, is that Dickie does not want to commit the intentional fallacy. Just because the people who make artworks may or may not have intended them to be art, does not mean that artworlds cannot see them as masterpieces. There are many components of the videogame artworld system I have already mentioned which perform this act of artistic appreciation of past videogames – one example being “The Art of Video Games” exhibit. There are also undoubted artists in the videogame artworld such as Levine and Miyomoto. They both incorporate the art styles of famous writers, painters, film directors, and other videogames into their own creations. The awards and appreciation these two have received demonstrates
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the desire in the videogame artworld for more designers of their ilk. It may be that the greatest difference between traditional games and videogames though is that the former cannot incorporate the latter:

[Whereas sport can be the subject of art, art could not be the subject of sport. Indeed, the very notion of a subject of sport makes no sense.” In this way, the distinction between sports and video games is profound. As such, video games are much more plausible candidates for art than are aesthetic sports or chess.]

Like most forms of art, there is nothing videogames cannot incorporate or be about.

A second criticism I have encountered is that most or all current aesthetic theories cannot properly understand or express the aesthetic qualities of videogames. The primary quality referenced is that of interactivity. Ian Bogost and Phillip Deen level such criticisms – though Deen argues pragmatist aesthetics is satisfactory. Deen even says that the institutional theory “effaces their [video-games’] particular nature.” One counterargument I have to such stances is that several art forms have long utilized interactivity. Examples include interactive art exhibitions, interactive museum pieces, galleries that display art made by the public or its patrons beforehand or immediately, plays that involve audience participation, many avant-garde works like John Cage’s “4’33,” and so on. Yet many aesthetic theories have success interpreting these as artworks. Such critics would have to specify that the particular form of interactivity in videogames is fundamentally unlike the interactivity displayed in any of these examples. While I would agree interactivity is at the heart of artistic videogames, and that this interactivity may even be different than what is found in most other art forms, I think it excessively critical to assume it is nothing like interactivity elsewhere in the arts. As for Deen’s short criticism of the institutional theory, my reply is that he has overlooked its versatility. Dickie’s definition at least is meant to incorporate all art, and only exclude non-art. There is nothing about interactivity in videogames which contradicts the theory nor is there anything in the theory which limits the nuances of interactivity that occur in playing and appreciating a videogame. In addition, Dickie intended the institutional theory to utilize “open definitions” for the inclusion of future art and its evolutions.

A different, recurring criticism of the idea that videogames are art is that videogames are immature, primitive, and played entirely for amusement rather than intellectual and aesthetic development. In order to respond, I want to turn to the issue of how videogames are used, which influences our understanding of the videogame artworld’s impetus for the growth and evolution of artists. Videogames can be viewed in a narrow sense – such as being merely a means of wasting
one’s time. This is true for all art. All art can be viewed in the narrow sense of wasting one’s time between “more significant events” in one’s life. For a person endorsing this viewpoint, artworks are mere decoration and videogames brief amusement. No philosophers of art would disagree that this person’s view of art is egregiously limited. It severely misunderstands most of the work that goes into art – from the perspectives of the artist, the artworld public, and aesthetics. Yes it is possible for this person to buy art, experience it, and even talk about it, but they will have little to say and their input in the artworld will be minor at best.

There are those who play videogames for mere amusement, but they are like people who see all painting and sculpture as mere decoration. They misunderstand much of the work that goes into videogames. The proper way to play videogames aesthetically is to scrutinize everything which is being presented to you and your reactions – just as the proper way to read poetry is to carefully read, think, and reread every line. Close playing, we may call it, is what all of these videogame experts have been doing. The videogame scholars, videogame exhibit curators, videogame critics, and videogame designers have all performed this close playing and it is what sparks their work. If you haven’t attempted close playing, you won’t know what any of these people are on about. Severe critics of videogames as artworks I believe have never attempted close playing.

If we held a Pac-Man competition, the competitors probably wouldn’t be engaged in aesthetic considerations of Pac-Man. They would be using the game in a purely competitive sense – which means to use it for the purposes of winning the competition. If that is all videogame designers want, they would not bother adding cut-scenes to provide Pac-Man with the narrative that it has. Ken Levine and his team at Irrational Games would not have put so much work into building player empathy with the characters of BioShock by making them rounded and believable characters. Nor would they have bothered forming the ethical system in the game which presents the player with harsh moral choices and their later consequences. Smuts has realized this writing: “Unlike video games, non-electronic games such as poker and football are just rules of play: they describe penalties and goals. Electronic games are different in that they are much more than rules: They include narratives, graphic design, characterization, dialogue and more.”35 But I have to disagree when he later says that videogames “are essentially competitive.” Not only is competition but one element in videogames, it is wholly absent from many recent games. Portal (2007), Scribblenauts (2009), Dear Esther (2012), Lunar Flight (2012), Quantum Conundrum (2012), and the Mist series (1993-2005), were not made to be competitive – to name but a few examples. They are competitive only the sense that there are challenges the player faces. Players can boast to one another about what they have done.
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in these videogames, but the games do not contain high scores – the common feedback system of competition. Nor do these videogames contain fighting or killing. In fact collaboration between players is essential to videogames like *World of Warcraft* where players can only progress through the game with the support of other players.

6. Conclusion and Consequences

I would like to conclude by overviewing some of the important consequences of the points made in this essay. There remain difficulties in interpreting the aesthetic nature and qualities of videogames. Interactivity and embodiment deserve careful attention and continue to generate fruitful analyses by scholars. Meanwhile some proposed difficulties – such as the stance that no videogames are really art, or that current aesthetic philosophies are insufficient to scrutinize them – are not adequately grounded by satisfactory rationale. That the institutional theory considers videogames to be art results in a faster and smoother inclusion of videogames into the artworld system. One obvious consequence is an increase in aesthetic considerations of videogames by a more diverse audience including art critics, art historians, curators, collectors, scholars, aestheticians, artists, and art appreciators of all kinds. Another consequence is the qualitative and quantitative value of videogames when they are considered artworks. There are also important matters that are not intended to be consequences of this essay. That frameworks like the institutional theory readily encompass videogames *does not* mean that all videogames are *good* art. As I have mentioned, some videogames do not actually meet the criteria of art according to the institutional theory (though their number is small). Undoubtedly, most videogames also vary in their artistic brilliance or their artistic failures. There is good art and there is bad art, thus there are good videogames and bad videogames – which may be assessed using various criteria developed by the videogame artworld. The confusion of a theory of art with a theory of criticism I think underlies the remarks we have seen by Deen on failures of aesthetic theories when applied to videogame interpretation. The institutional theory (and other aesthetic philosophies) is a theory of art, but it does not dictate how exactly videogames ought to be assessed in terms of their artistic qualities – in other words it first dictates whether something is art or not. Deen believes that the institutional theory limits aesthetic qualities but I find no evidence that it does. In fact, it points us toward the gamer world – not some other artworld like painting or sculpture – for informed theories of videogame criticism that evaluate the aesthetic qualities of videogames “from within the medium itself.”36 If a particular videogame is...
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widely played by gamers, acclaimed by videogame critics, and is placed in several art galleries, it clearly is considered a good work of art. In fact the first two lead into the likelihood of the third happening. That important transfer highlights the most obvious path from a good videogame to a good work of art according to the artworld system as a whole. We should even notice the likelihood of contention between the various constituents of the artworld system as outlined by George Dickie. The institutional theory does not seek to compress any art into immovable eternal categorizations. It is dynamic and I think it succeeds in grasping the conflicts which keep the artworld energetic and evolving.

The institutional theory provides (1) the criteria of separating things into art and non-art and it provides (2) possibilities for pinpointing theories of criticism within particular artworlds. This essay focused on the first, while a future project worth undertaking would be an analysis of the second. That would consist of examining the various theories of videogame criticism which are present in the gamer world.

Appendix

A mimetic aesthetic exhibited by *MLB 12: The Show*
Can Video Games Find a Home in Aesthetics?...

A surrealist aesthetic exhibited by *World of Goo*

A cubist aesthetic exhibited by *Minecraft*
Notes:


4. *Mystery House* was one of the first interactive fictions to use images. As computing power increased and computer games became larger data files, they included more complicated media.


9. Ibid., p. 11.

10. Smuts, “Are Video Games Art?”


16. Ibid., p. 79.

17. Ibid., p. 77.

18. Ibid., p. 82.

19. For more, see Dickie’s reply to Beardsley’s Romantic artist criticism of the institutional theory in Chapter IV, pp. 49–68.

20. Ibid., p. 83.

21. Ibid., extracted from pages 80-82 with my italics added.

22. Ibid., p. 9.

23. Ibid., p. 80.

24. Ibid., p. 36.

25. Ibid., p. 66.


Can Video Games Find a Home in Aesthetics?

29. Phillip D. Deen, “Interactivity, Inhabitation, and Pragmatist Aesthetics”.
31. See McGonigal’s videogames like *World Without Oil*.
32. See Appendix for images of these two videogames.
33. Aaron Smuts, “Are Video Games Art?”.
34. Phillip D. Deen, “Interactivity, Inhabitation, and Pragmatist Aesthetics”.
35. Aaron Smuts, “Are Video Games Art?”.
36. Phillip D. Deen, “Interactivity, Inhabitation, and Pragmatist Aesthetics”.

COLLIN POINTON

Email address: collin.pointon@marquette.edu
Affiliation: University Marquette (USA)
The Hybrid Outputs of Art through Science and Technology: Bio-technological Art

Introduction

Today, in our advanced high-tech era, the scope of art, science, and technology has been expanded with the hybrid outputs of creative insights through new high-technologies as well as biotechnology related Art.

Recent advances in science and technology have provided new approaches, methods and media for new types of artistic attempts. Since the revolutionary aspects of creativity, the boundaries of arts have been expanded through interaction between art, science, engineering, with aesthetical concerns of collaborative (cross- /inter-, multi-, transdisciplinary) approaches of creative insights.

The intersecting domains of creative insights have been leading as innovative forms of hybrid outputs through the mutually incorporated attempts in the field of arts, science and engineering. One of these challenging attempts has been emerging with the collaborative explorations of biotechnological researches and artistic creativity which is so-called Biotechnological Art.

Biotechnological Art or Biotechnology related artworks attempt to engender research at the intersections of art, science and engineering by revealing (releasing) the science laboratories through the tissue culture, genetic engineering, and artificial life.

This paper will focus on the hybrid outputs of contemporary approaches in art through the biotechnology related Artworks in the late 20th and early 21st century.

What is Biotechnology?

Although it sounds like a new term to refer to recent discoveries in the genetic science of biology and engineering of our era, biotechnology has its roots back to the Agricultural Revolution around 8000 BC.1 Humankind used biotechnol-
Hülya Toksöz Sahiner

ogy in selective breeding of animals or selection of seeds in the production of agriculture, food and medicine to develop new ways of life since the very beginning of human civilization. Throughout world history, apart from biotechnology, aesthetical approaches were the other progressive anthropological aspects of human civilization.

First, it is necessary to briefly mention the meaning and the roots of Biotechnology:

Biotechnology is a branch of biology which is the scientific study of life or living matter in all its forms and processes. Biological improvements and research, including biochemistry, molecular biology, cellular biology, the cell physiology, evolutionary biology, and ecology, have always been possible with technological and creative tools and applications. The term “biotechnology” was first coined in 1919 by Karl Ereky, a Hungarian agricultural engineer referring the raw materials and products which are produced through a variety of techniques with the aid of living organisms, applied immunology, and development of pharmaceutical therapies and diagnostic tests. In the late 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century, biotechnology has expanded to include new and diverse sciences such as genomics, recombinant gene technologies. According to the recent text of UN Convention on Biological Diversity; “biotechnology means any technique that uses living organisms or their products to make or modify a product, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.”

The Impact of Biology in the Context of Art

In respect to the reproduction of life, the pillars of science, technology and art have always maintained an interrelation to each other in respect of experimentation and creativity. The science of biology in particular has been visually inspiring for artists with the intriguing aspects of living structures, and observations of the natural world. They explored the intersecting domains of humans and nature from anatomical studies, wildlife and botanical illustrations, to the biomorphism in art, engaging the realm of aesthetics and art with traditional media, including painting, sculpture, printmaking and drawing, employed to represent the different ways of life forms.

Using living matter as a medium, Bio-art pushes the typology boundaries from the historical array, currently the efforts of contemporary artists go further to employ the technology based biological researches as the tools of art. Generally, counted under the umbrella of new media art, Bio-art is expanding, as artists realize new and inventive ways of utilizing living matter in art that producing artworks with the toolbox of biotechnology.
However, the impact of biotechnology in the context of art has been only for few decades. These biotechnology related artworks have been released with the ingenious efforts of some courageous individuals such as painters, photographers, filmmakers, scientists and biologists who are so-called Bio-Artist. These Bio-Artists have incited by the creative aspects of the systems and resources in science, and technology. They explore the nature of living beings in order to recreate them, and the distinguished feature of the habitual environment while exchanging their studios for medical laboratories or vice versa. They support their hybrid outputs through biological and technological innovations for possible futures of life the revolutionary endeavors of these artists also challenge us on our relationship with life.

Contributions of Bio-Artists: Incorporating Biotechnology into the Art

Working with scientists and engineers, some of the artists have dealt with the biological matter as the medium itself, such as the live tissues, living organisms, life forms, bacteria, microbiology, and molecular biology. Some others employed scientific processes including bio-technology in stem cells, DNA, tissue and genetic engineering, plant breeding, transgenic and ecological reclamation. They all applied the techniques ranging from molecular and cellular biology and technology including such as genetics, molecular research, production of micro eco-systems, plant tissue engineering, neurosciences, microscopy, and reproductive technologies through living issues.

These artists transformed living tissue and even their own bodies into works of art, and also employed neuronal algorithmic systems, telematics, cybernetics, and the simulation systems to investigate aspects of the biotechnologies such as genetics, evolution, artificial life and robotics through digital sculpture and displayed products of new media installations produced in laboratories, galleries, artists’ studios, or virtual spaces.

In this study we will give credit to some creative approaches to the artistic challenge seeking hybrid outputs of genetically modified organisms through molecular engineering. In general, hybrid refers to an offspring resulting from cross-breeding. Although the term originates from biology, the contemporary usage of the word was subsequently employed in linguistics and in other scientific and cultural theories in various academic disciplines. In science, a hybrid is the offspring of genetically dissimilar plants or animals, especially produced by breeding or grafting different varieties or species. Hence, considering hybrid outputs in art through biotechnology, we shall not only mention the cross-
breeding art-making interventions, and interactions through cross-, multi- or trans-disciplinary media, but also consider the cross-breeding living matter applications within biotechnological research as an art form.

Using living matter as a medium, hybrid art projects have been realized through biotechnological intervention by some inventive approaches. We may put forward some of the frontiers of artistic creation and scientific innovation.

Beginning in the late 1970s, George Gessert is considered to be one of the pioneers of bio art. George Gessert has focused on the overlap between art and genetics. He breeds irises and other plants. Gessert has widely exhibited a series of installations of hybrids and documentation of breeding projects in the United States, and his writings have appeared in many journals, including *Art Papers, Design Issues, Northwest Review, Art Week*, and *Hortus*. He is currently *Leonardo*'s editorial advisor on art and biology.7
Gessert creates his artistic irises by hybridizing wild varieties and discarding the undesirable results. He is especially interested in plant aesthetics and ways that human aesthetic preferences affect evolution. Gessert calls his practice “genetic folk art,” and his work points to the way nature is interpreted—even authored—by humans. His focus has been mainly on irises and other ornamental flowers.

Breeding irises as an art form, George Gessert examines the role that aesthetic perception has played in bio art and other interventions in evolution. He discusses the inspirational issues involved in using DNA in art. He has been breeding plants since the late 1970s, concentrating on the native irises of California and Oregon. He has also bred other ornamentals, including daylilies, streptocarpuses, nasturtiums, and several kinds of poppies. He has exhibited live hybrids, as well as documentation of his breeding projects. His installations sometimes invited audiences to participate in making aesthetic decisions that affect the lives and deaths of plants, and these decisions remind some people of eugenics. He hybridized for the pleasure of working with plants and because hybrids are various, astonishing, and wonderful in themselves.

Gessert emphasizes the traumas of the Holocaust and of the eugenics movement were still with us, and he tried to remember those wounds when he brought the genetic issues into galleries.

Gessert also raised the problems of hostile environments of traditional galleries and museums exhibiting organisms, nonhuman creatures that were not
designed to accommodate nonhuman life. Except for museum courtyards and atriums, most galleries are architecturally designed to protect canvases from rain and sun, and prevent birds from nesting in sculptures. This presents obstacles to displaying living works while questioning if this kind of work served for any kind of awareness: Did it aestheticize the biological revolution? Would it speed the commodification of life? Could living things in galleries help remind people that all forms of life had intrinsic value? Could we play some role other than tyrant in the community of life? Could we develop an art of evolution? He states that “I do not have answers to most of these questions. However, I never would have asked them if I had not begun to examine the aesthetic aims of ornamental plant hybridization”.11

According to Gessert: “For most of the twentieth century, the primary aim of hybridization in the United States, and probably in most other countries as well, had been to create saleable organisms. Certain visual formulas work. Doubles and ruffles sell. As a result many highly bred plants had come to look alike: they are double or ruffled, or both. But other approaches to breeding were possible, at least if one sees breeding as an art. One could breed plants as a way of getting to know them. One could emphasize qualities distinctive to particular breeding complexes. One could seek integrity of form. Breeding could even bring back into gardens and cities some of the visual qualities of wildness. There is no contradiction in breeding for wildness. After all, we're part of it, too.”12

Natural Selection, Eugene, Oregon, 1994 by George Gessert

Hybrid 488, Hybridized 1990, first bloom 1994

[computer-printed handwriting, paper, inks, Cibachrome prints], Science and the Artist's Book
An exhibition by the Smithsonian Institution Libraries and the Washington Project for the Arts
Some of the courageous attempts of these contemporary artists have been expanding the experimental and innovative aspects in genetic issues, embodied cross-breeding, transgenic life forms, and fabricated animal models as hybrid art forms have been through some biogenetical interventions of the breeding of animals and plants. These attempts were envisioned in his essay “Curie’s Children”13: back to 1980’s, by Vilém Flusser stating the art’s role would be to inform nature in the immediate future, which is menaced not only by explosions both nuclear and demographic, but equally by the explosions of boredom... Projecting an immediate future of the multicolored fauna and flora as in Disneyland; moved with revolutionary change of the relationship between humanity and the biological environment into the field of esthetics with the creation of plant and animal species.” Suggesting “the molecular biologist would be the Disney of the future… Molecular biologists may soon be handling skin color more or less as painters handle oils and acrylcs. Then the internal dyes of animal and vegetable biology may acquire an artificial living beings, living artworks like blue dogs with red spots, or phosphorescent colors radiate horses.”

According to him “The Disney of the future might perhaps compose an enormous color symphony, evolving spontaneously through endless variations (mutations), in which the color of every living organism will complement the colors of every other organism, and be mirrored by them... A gigantic living work of art, -a tropical ocean colored like terra firma organisms -of the next generation world yet unimaginable, was definitely possible… The genetic information transfer of deep-sea coloring into the inhabitants of the earth’s surface would almost become feasible.” He was also attributing this kind of attempt as a land art, since the interventional aspect of this kind of painting of nature, but of a much more complex type than the one we know. Instead of wrapping rocks in fabric or shoving them around with bulldozers, we may be able to compute and compose a complex living game made by approaches claims of / these art

**From Breeding to Transgenic Art**

Concerning the artistic interventions into life forms as in cross species, through the combinations of animals and plants we need to talk about transgenic art14 of Eduardo Kac. Kac has been working mostly on his transgenic art project since the 1990’s. His transgenic art is an approach in biological art specifically seeking to cross species by means of genetic manipulation, or to transfer synthetic genes to an organism, in both cases creating new, unique living beings.

In his futuristic proposal “Transgenic Art”, 1998- he proposed “Transgenic art as a new artform based on the use of genetic engineering techniques to
transfer synthetic genes to an organism or to transfer natural genetic material from one species into another, to create unique living beings.” According to him; “Molecular genetics allows the artist to engineer the plant and animal genome and create new life forms.”

However Kac sees a clear distinction between breeding and genetic engineering. “Selective breeding is a long-term technique based on the indirect manipulation of the genetic material of two or more organisms. Manipulating the natural processes of gene selection and mutation that occur in nature indirectly, breeders are unable to turn genes on or off with precision or to create hybrids with genomic material so distinct as that of a dog and a jellyfish. In this sense, a distinctive trait of transgenic art is that the genetic material is manipulated directly: the foreign DNA is precisely integrated into the host genome.”

Kac follows as; “Every living organism has a genetic code that can be manipulated, and the recombinant DNA can be passed on to the next generations. The artist literally becomes a genetic programmer who can create life forms by writing or altering this code. With the creation and procreation of bioluminescent mammals and other creatures in the future dialogical interspecies communication will change profoundly what we currently understand as interactive art. These animals are to be loved and nurtured just like any other animal. As we try to negotiate current disputes, it is clear that transgenetics will be an integral part of our existence in the future. It will be possible, for example, to harness the glow of the jellyfish protein for optical data storage devices.”

He suggests that “artists can contribute to increase global biodiversity by inventing new life forms… From the perspective of interspecies communication, transgenic art calls for a dialogical relationship between artist, creature/artwork, and those who come in contact with it…”

For Kac, the first manifestation of his transgenic art was Genesis17 (1998/99) at the Ars Electronica festival in Linz, Austria, in 1999, explores the intricate relationship between biology, belief systems, information technology, dialogical interaction, ethics, and the Internet. The initial process in this work was the creating a synthetic gene- an “artist’s gene” was produced by translating a sentence from the Book of Genesis into Morse code and then converting this code into DNA base pairs according to a conversion principle specifically developed for this work. Cloning of the synthetic bacteria into plasmids and their subsequent transformation into fluorescent bacteria that emit cyan and yellow light when exposed to UV radiation (302 nm).

Genesis involved through the Web, participants could turn on an ultraviolet light box in the gallery and mutate the bacteria. The entire set-up was located
in an ultraviolet protective enclosure, thus making the bacteria harmless to the visitors in the gallery.

*Genesis* had original DNA-synthesized music by composer Peter Gena. The music is generated live in the gallery and streamed on the Web. The parameters of this multi-channel composition are derived from bacterial multiplication and mutation algorithms. The selected bacteria displayed in the gallery with the UV source, in a protective transparent enclosure were safe to use in public. The mutation of the synthetic gene occurred as a result of three factors: 1) the natural bacterial multiplication process; 2) bacterial dialogical interaction; 3) human-activated UV radiation.\(^{18}\)

*Genesis,* 1999 by Eduardo Kac, Installation view of Transgenic artwork linked to the Internet.

*Genesis* was commissioned by Ars Electronica 99 and first presented online and at the O.K. Center for Contemporary Art, Linz, from September 4 to 19, 1999.

Courtesy of the artist, Photo: Otto Saxinger.

The gallery display enables local as well as remote (Web) participants to monitor the evolution of the work. Remote participants on the Web interfere with the process by turning the UV light on. The energy impact of the UV light on the bacteria is such that it disrupts the DNA sequence in the plasmid, accelerating the mutation rate. The left and right walls contain large-scale texts applied directly on the wall: the sentence extracted from the book of Genesis (right) and the Genesis gene (left).\(^{19}\)
Realized in France, on April 29, 2000 and first presented publicly in Avignon as a “transgenic artwork, “Alba” came about from the crossing of the genes of a jellyfish and a rabbit embryo, and is the first living chimera. Green Fluorescent Protein Bunny “Alba” was created by French scientists who injected green fluorescent protein (GFP) of a Pacific Northwest jellyfish “Aequorea Victoria” into the fertilized egg of an albino rabbit. Kac explains his in his text “GFP Bunny” is created with EGFP, and glows with a bright green light (maximum emission at 509 nm) when illuminated with blue light (maximum excitation at 488 nm). Under ordinary environmental conditions she is completely white with pink eyes not green."

Exploring the relationship between man and contemporary science Eduardo Kac is interested in the Transgenic art to place genetic engineering in a social context in which the relationship between the private and the public spheres are negotiated rather than a life challenge with the genetic purity notions and biodiversity. According to him “the project not only comprises the creation of the fluorescent rabbit, but also the public dialogue generated by the project and the integration of the transgenic animal into society.” “Transgenic art is not about the crafting of genetic objets d’art, either inert or imbued with vitality. Such an approach would suggest a conflaction of the operational sphere of life sciences with a traditional aesthetics that privileges formal concerns, material stability, and hermeneutical isolation. Integrating the lessons of dialogical philosophy and
cognitive ethology, transgenic art must promote awareness of and respect for the spiritual (mental) life of the transgenic animal. The word “aesthetics” in the context of transgenic art must be understood to mean that creation, socialization, and domestic integration are a single process. The question is not to make the bunny meet specific requirements or whims, but to enjoy her company as an individual (all bunnies are different), appreciated for her own intrinsic virtues, in dialogical interaction.”

“GFP Bunny”, 2000. Transgenic artwork by Eduardo KAC Alba is shown glowing green, illuminated with blue light (UV light, maximum excitation at 488 nm).

A transgenic artwork „The Eighth Day” presents an expansion of biodiversity beyond wildtype life forms developed between 2000 and 2001 at the Institute for Studies in the Arts, Arizona State University, Tempe.

„The Eighth Day”. brings together living transgenic life forms (GFP plants, GFP amoeba, GFP fish, and GFP mice), and a biological robot (biobot) in an environment housed under a clear 4 foot diameter Plexiglas dome, as a self-contained artificial ecological system. All of the transgenic creatures in „The Eighth Day” are created through the cloning of a gene that codes for the production of green fluorescent protein (GFP) expressing the gene through bioluminescence visible with the naked eye. The piece investigates the new ecology of fluorescent creatures being developed in isolation in laboratories, seen collectively they form the nucleus of a new and emerging synthetic bioluminescent system.”24
Looking through the yellow filter, the viewer sees an ecology of glowing creatures: mice, plants, amoeba.
Through another yellow filter, positioned at a lower level, the viewer also sees the glowing fish.

A participant on the Web points the biobot’s eye towards the transgenic plant.
http://www.ekac.org/8thdaymorepicts.html, Photo: CameraWerks

Another Transgenic Art example is „Natural History of the Enigma” flower genetically engineered through molecular biology as a new plantimal life form by Eduardo Kac between 2003 and 2008, and first exhibited from April 17 to June 21, 2009 at the Weisman Art Museum in Minneapolis.
“Natural History of the Enigma” series called „Edunia“ is a hybrid of Petunia and artist’s DNA which expressed in its red veins. The Edunia has red veins on light pink petals and a gene of him is expressed on every cell of its red veins, i.e., my gene produces a protein in the veins only. The gene was isolated and sequenced from my blood. The petal pink back ground, against the red veins are seen, which is evocative of my own pinkish white skin tone. The result of this molecular manipulation is a bloom that creates the living image of human blood rushing through the veins of a flower. By combining human and plant DNA he brings forth the realization of the contiguity of life between different species. Partially flower and partially human, “Natural History of the Enigma” is a reflection of our shared heritage in the wider spectrum of life in a visually dramatic way (red expression of human DNA in the flower veins), indicating the redness of blood and the redness of the plant’s veins.25

**Conclusion**

Innovative insights have been great challenge for the evolution of life through the pillars of art, science, and technology engaging the realm of aesthetics with the intersecting domains of nature and human. Yet, from the anatomical studies, wildlife and botanical illustrations to the biomorphism, artists have been employing traditional media, including painting, sculpture, printmaking and drawing to represent / search the different ways of life forms. However, today’s contemporary artists have gone further pushing the boundaries of the conven-
tional approaches researching / intervening the living matter itself through the advanced biotechnologies.

Today there are many remarkable artists and scientists dazzled by the futuristic and aesthetic possibilities of intervening the living matter as the medium itself such as the live tissues, bacteria, living organisms, and life forms through high-technologies and scientific researches with the results of hybrid outputs as art forms.

Some of these artists have been limited to biological matter itself, while some others are employing the scientific processes including bio-technology in tissue engineering, plant breeding, transgenics and ecological reclamation. Some of these artists also employed the telematics, cybernetics, and the simulation systems to investigate aspects of the biological sciences such as evolution, artificial life and robotics through digital sculpture and new media installations produced in laboratories, galleries, artists’ studios, or virtual spaces.

For almost thirty decades some of the innovative artists have been exploring with genomics and other bio-matter metaphorically and literally became part of the artist tool. Outside the scope of their studio, these artists worked in the science laboratories involving the biotechnological interventions ranging from tissue culture, genetic engineering, and artificial life techniques to blend the possibilities of aesthetic expression providing a new set of approaches for a possible new art forms in the future.

As Vilém Flutter envisioned; perhaps “the genetic information transfer of deep-sea coloring into the inhabitants of the earth’s surface -a tropical ocean colored like terra firma organisms - as a gigantic living work of art would almost become feasible of the next generation world yet unimaginable, may be definitely possible”.

Among the seminal efforts, two remarkable names; George Gessert, and Eduardo Kac have been working in the laboratories through biotechnological researches with the aim of more colorful, oceanlike futuristic dream land. Their courageous attempts on genetically modified organisms and the cross-breeding living matter applications have been resulted with the hybrid outputs of both aesthetical insights and biotechnological researches.

In this paper I tried to present some of the pioneering approaches of new types of artistic strains with experimental insights through the biotechnology provided innovative examples of life forms.
The Hybrid Outputs of Art through Science and Technology...

Notes:

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
14. Transgenic art is a term coined by Eduardo Kac himself.
19. Ibid.
21. EGFP is an enhanced version (i.e., a synthetic mutation) of the original wild-type green fluorescent gene found in the jellyfish Aequorea Victoria. EGFP gives about two orders of magnitude greater fluorescence in mammalian cells (including human cells) than the original jellyfish gene. http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny.html.
Hülya Toksöz Sahiner


HÜLYA TOKSÖZ SAHINER –

Email address: hulyatoksoz@gmail.com
Affiliation: Istambul Kemerburgaz University (Turkey)
PART TWO
Transacting Aesthetic Experience
Among many theories of aesthetic experience the theory of Virgil Aldrich’s from his *Philosophy of Art* (1968) suggests that aesthetic experience doesn’t just happen, that in seeing something as art the spectators actively seek and maintain aesthetic mode of perception. Aldrich explains aesthetic experience through *aspectation* – a process of seeing an object or an event through aspects that in turn transform casual perception into aesthetic experience. Aldrich describes it as a special kind of perception in which objects are *prehended* through the aspects; what is seen or heard is *animated by aspects instead of qualified by observable characteristics.* In this view aesthetic experience is not simply looking or hearing things, but seeing or listening as. Aesthetics experience occurs by following aspects, which add up to form the subject(s) vision of it [e.g.: aesthetic object]. In Aldrich’s theory aesthetic experience is distanced in so far as the percipient looking at something doesn’t try to see it in its physical state, as an object (a material thing) with objective qualities. Rather he has *objective impressions.* The percipient doesn’t claim to see the object as having certain qualities but sees it through impressions, which are nonetheless objective (not imagined). But at the same time *prehention,* as Aldrich calls this special way of perception through aspects, is getting closer and more intimate with the object. Taking this view we must further realize that the *aspectation* is also based on careful attending to the object. In listening we are focusing on the sounds and following their presentation, carefully seeking to know more about them or rather about the way they are. In areas such as music making and listening to music, in dance, singing and other artistic activities,
listening is the foundation of those activities. But this listening (listening-as) is far from “normal”, everyday listening experience. This listening is both silent and vocal. It is specific and open to all (events, objects, elements). And in so far this listening I am talking about is close to or may even be seen as a model for aesthetic experience/aesthetic perception. Let me explain this better through examples, first more general and then more specific.

II.

In listening-as we are silent as we give way to sound, we welcome and wait to receive it. But listening-as can be vocal too, in more than one way. There is a special kind of attention known to singers, in which they are adjusting their vocal cords thinking of sounds to be sung. Listening through singing is also possible. In harmonic singing in choirs the listening to one’s sound and to the sounds of others is essential. In music making the listening forms the main part of performance or at least it should. Listening-as is focusing on sound as perceived through the whole body and [sometimes at the same time] it is spreading the attention far and wide apart for possible inclusions. Thus listening is both attending and adjoining. This listening is different from everyday listening and hearing both in scope and in intensity. In the experience of music, with which I am concern the most, listening is a skill developed constantly even if partly unknowingly through planned exercises, personal experience and cultural exposure. In music listening is inclusive and analytical but it is also enriched through personal emotional experience. In trying to understand what this listening-as is we need to acknowledge the whole range of this mode of perception. And in order to do that I would like to turn to theories of ecological acoustics and finally to the practice of deep listening developed by composer Pauline Oliveros.

III.

Perception is essentially exploratory, seeking out sources of stimulation in order to discover more about the environment.\(^4\)

In theories of ecological acoustics listening as such is seen as a web of complex processes in which not only ears but truly the whole body actively participates. Most of all listening is seen as flexible and adaptive. In ecological theory of perception (Gaver 1993) attention is placed on organism’s active engagement with environment. In adaptation to its properties and in seeking to discover its potential good. In this view a human organism resonates to its environment

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\(^4\) Perception is essentially exploratory, seeking out sources of stimulation in order to discover more about the environment.\(^4\)
and in this process an organism is a self-tuning system, adapting and changing to be able to respond and resonate to more and more events.\(^5\)

Resonance is not passive: it is a perceiving organism’s active, exploratory engagement with its environment.\(^6\)

In an ecological approach to perception, perception changes or adapts in time. We are learning to perceive\(^7\) or in another words in time our perception becomes more and more accurate; discerning more details, establishing differences between similar elements in a given group of data. Being in an environment and being exposed to its behavioural patterns affects the receiving sensual systems of an organism, reinforcing its ability to receive and differentiate. Ecological approach views perceptual learning as progressive differentiation, perceivers becoming increasingly sensitive to distinctions within the stimulus information that were always there but previously undetected.\(^8\)

Of course in listening to music we are not focused on the underlying structures of sounds just as we are not concerned with the events that caused them [or most of time we aren’t]. We listen to the music for the music’ sake and so we listen to the sounds as sounds. Thus far our listening to the music is reduced listening – to use the term proposed by Pierre Schaeffer in context of electronic music – it is divorced from the analysis of the physical sources of sounds. We could also use the term musical listening as distinguishing listening-as from the everyday listening, by which William W. Gaver means listening which is [inherently] focused on events [and objects] that are meant (or signaled) by the sounds we hear. In musical listening\(^9\) the listener is focused on the sounds themselves, on the structures not as ontological elements or stimulants from the environment but as [aesthetic] objects.\(^10\)

IV.

The organically unified and bodily character of listening-as can further be seen through reference to practice of deep listening originated by American composer Pauline Oliveros (b. 1932). Pauline Oliveros was interested in listening throughout her career. From the 80s she has been creating and leading the practice of deep listening later on organized through Deep Listening Institute.\(^11\) As Ms Oliveros explains, her music and all her artistic life is founded on listening. It is listening to the outside (the nature, the world, the particular surroundings, the reverberations of particular surface, spaces, the targeted objects) and to the inside (the self, the organism, the functionality of one’s organism, the sounds of mind or the imagined sounds). The practice of deep listening leads to music but
in the same time and within this particular tradition it leads to being together, to learning, to healing and to growing.

The deep listening as defined by Pauline Oliveros means attending to anything in any possible way. In publication *Deep Listening: A Composers’ Sound Practice* she explains:

Deep Listening for me is learning to expand the perception of sounds to include the whole space/time continuum of sound – encountering the vastness and complexities as much as possible. Simultaneously one ought to be able to target a sound or sequence of sounds as a focus within the space/time continuum and to perceive the detail or trajectory of the sound or sequence of sounds.\(^\text{12}\)

She continues:

When I arrive on stage, I am listening and expanding to the whole of the space/time continuum of perceptible sound. I have no preconceived ideas. What I perceive as the continuum of perceptible sound and energy takes my attention and informs what I play.\(^\text{13}\)

In 1971 while teaching in San Diego University Oliveros composed *Sonic Meditations*. This composition is in a form of instructions for exercises meant both for experienced musicians and people without music education. It is composed of 25 meditations on attending to and performing sound. In explaining this piece Oliveros wrote:

While one’s attention is focused to a point on something specific, it is possible to remain aware of one’s surroundings, one’s body, movement of all kinds, and one’s mental activity (in other words remain aware of inner and outer reality simultaneously). Attention is narrow, pointed and selective. Awareness is broad, diffuse and inclusive. Both have a tunable range: attention can be honed to a finer and finer point. Awareness can be expanded until it seems all-inclusive. Attention can intensify awareness. Awareness can support attention.\(^\text{14}\)

In this commentary listening is explained as both attention and awareness, as concentration and expansion. It is also defined as mental and thus intentional and as bodily and spontaneous. Elsewhere Oliveros explains:

Deep listening is a form of meditation. Attention is directed to the interplay of sounds and silences or the sound/silence continuum. Sound is not limited to musical or speaking sound, but is inclusive of all perceptible vibration (sonic formation). The relationship of all perceptible sound is important.\(^\text{15}\)
Let me quote the text of instruction from the first meditation called “Teach yourself to fly” of aforementioned *Sonic Meditations*. It reads:

(...) Begin by simply observing your own breathing. Always be an observer. Gradually allow your breathing to become audible. Then gradually introduce your voice. Allow your vocal cords to vibrate in any mode which occurs naturally. Allow the intensity to increase very slowly. Continue as long as possible naturally, and until all others are quiet, always observing your own breath cycle. Variation: Translate voice to an instrument.\(^{16}\)

This example is very telling. It is at the same time a relaxing exercise and a wonderful opportunity for a musical piece. This example also presents the importance and complex nature of listening (to music). In contrast to hearing (music) listening is a process based on differentiating and inclusion. Within this piece the listening is done through the singing. It is listening through voice – vocal listening. There are many other possible examples of this kind of listening. In playing an instrument or in improvising on an instrument one needs to induce and sustain this kind of careful and intense listening.

Even if deep listening as proposed by Pauline Oliveros is a more radical and extended practice, it shows us the limits or perhaps the ideals for “musical” listening.\(^{17}\) Just as deep listening is intended to heighten and expand consciousness of sound in as many dimensions of awareness and attentional dynamics as humanly possible,\(^{18}\) listening-as is attending to sound(s) as creating soundspace and leading to various shapes and colours, attending to sounds as meaningful if not communicating meaning and most of all attending to aspects and minimal perceived qualities of life.

Often in listening to music we are told that the piece we are listening to is, say, resonating with all kinds of sound timbres, colours and shapes. That it illuminates the listening space with different events, imagined elements and happenings but it doesn’t happen by itself, it is we who in careful and intense listening are bringing this music to life as it will only be through listening-as that music will appear in all its splendour.\(^{19}\)

**Notes:**

3. Ibid., p. 25 and others.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
9. See William W. Gaver, „How Do We Hear in the World. Explorations in Ecological Acoustics“, *Ecological Psychology* 1993, 5 (4), p. 286. „(...)it is possible to hear any sound in terms of its source (everyday listening) or in terms of its sensory properties (musical listening)“.
10. “The environmental events that gave rise to the particular connections and weightings in the system (or the synaptic links in the brain) are manifest relationships in the concrete physical world. The subsequent “tuning” of the network (whether artificial model or actual brain) is the result of exposure to those real events— their trace, or residue. That trace, and its reactivation, is experienced as a dynamic state of the network and thus a state of mind—an awareness of real-world relationships“. Eric Clarke, *Ways of listening*, p. 31.
13. Ibid., p. XIX.
15. Pauline Oliveros, *Deep Listening*, p. XXIV.
19. Ibid.
I will argue that one of the typical experiences in modern art consists in aporetic temporal experiences. These experiences will be defined as aporetic in virtue of their anti-narrative quality and their potential for disturbing or short-circuiting dominant models of living temporality.

To argue this, I will first introduce the importance of narratives in modern culture and, complementary, of anti-narrative art. Second, in order to argue that anti-narrative art deserves attention, I will mention some examples on anti-narrative artistic expressions from the Avant-gardes onwards. Then I will briefly turn back to narratives to make explicit the inherent relation between narration and the experience of time. The conclusion regarding anti-narrative art is that it may break typical experiences of time mediated by narratives. Afterwards, I will describe some sorts of aporetic experiences of time that anti-narrative art may provoke.

Finally, I aim to show through a couple of examples that these aporias emerge as the experience of an artwork.

1. Introduction. Time and Narratives in Current Culture

Modern societies have developed powerful structures for imposing a temporal social order, making them thus more productive and secure. These structures apply to different human spheres. One of them is the control of time in human lives, as Arendt and Foucault have shown. In addition to this, technological progress has contributed itself to change human experience (Benjamin), abolishing the experience of present-ness and history (Virilio, Huyssen). A different but complementary dimension in which temporality is strictly determined is our wholly evolving media world. Here the perception of (temporal) phenomena is
also controlled by very powerful technological devices: slowing down, freezing, repetition, serialisation, real-time event-isation (Derrida, Ch. Gere) are some of the modes of perception without which we could not even underpin our current vision of reality.

In this context, narratives are at stake again. However, it seems that recent studies in narrative have shifted from literature and art to mass media and rather institutional places of public life. Van Peer and Chatman assert that,

Narratives continue to play a central role in our societies. They play a crucial role in a number of social institutions, such as the press, the courts, the doctor's office, corporate headquarters, and capital buildings.²

Yet, if there is a recent work that has studied how narratives have overwhelmed public communication and social relations, this one is Salmon's Storytelling. In his perhaps a little bit apocalyptic book, he analyses how the techniques of storytelling have gotten into marketing, advertising, management of personal emotions, economy, communication, politics, and even military training.

In this context of social dominant narratives, in which subjectivities are subjected to predetermined social models of time, I suggest shifting the perspective. It is possible that the so-called “narrative turn” from the sixties onwards have taught us more about narratives in mass media and politics than about art and literature. Regarding much of the art made in the last decades, narratives could rather be useful to understand the anti-narrativistic impulse in art and its subversive potential.

2. Anti-narrative art retrospectively

In order to argue that the category of anti-narratives can help us to understand the critical function of art in relation with social models of time, I will sketch a genealogy of anti-narrative art.

Recent publications have shown how Avant-garde artistic experiments were fighting against a dominant model of time. As an alternative to capitalist model of progress, the Avant-garde created many experiments with marginalised temporalities and created different means of experience. Worthy and popular examples of these are the Fauves and German Expressionists, but more clearly anti-narrative expressions are a significant part of Avant-garde film in the twenties. Let us mention here Camera Eye (1924) by Dziga Vertov, the swimmer Taris, Roy de l’Eau (1931) by Jean Vigo, the abstract forms moving in Opus I to IV (1921–1925) by Ruttmann and the obscene plate twirling around in Anemic Cinéma (1926) by Duchamp.
Art Breaking the Experience of Time

Another and very productive moment concerning different and creative experiences of time in art goes from the sixties to the seventies. From Andy Warhol, John Cage and Minimalism, to performance art and first installation artworks like those made by J. Jonas, D. Graham and Nam June Paik, art has embodied new means to experience time in surprising and disturbing ways. Douglas Crimp had already paid attention in 1977 to such new artistic modes in terms of performativity and temporality. More recently, Pamela A. Lee (2006) and Charlie Gere (2006) have pointed out the relations in terms of oppositions that these art phenomena have with their social and technological contexts.

The examples here are also inexhaustible, but I will just refer to Douglas Crimp’s article “Pictures” published in October, 1979. We can have a look for instance at one of Jack Goldstein’s works, such as The Jump. The work is a short film shown as a loop but with a structure of continuous repetition. After analysing this work, Crimp concludes that

(…) in each of Goldstein’s films, performances, photographs, and phonograph records, a psychologised temporality is instituted: foreboding, pre-monition, suspicion, anxiety.

Douglas Crimp observes in a footnote that all of the works discussed in his essay might work with the conventions of different genres. The process frustrates a narration in order to make evident some of the conventions of communication media.

As we can see from these examples, we can affirm that some works of art can be described as anti-narrative, because they use or make reference to narratives but interfere in the very act of their construction. Doing this, they seem to put into question some social ways of experiencing time.

3. The inherent relation between time and narrative

To understand why anti-narratives put into question concrete models of social time by means of deconstructing narratives, I will refer to Paul Ricoeur’s vast work about this issue.

Paul Ricoeur, through his hermeneutical and pragmatic ascendance, has managed to defend a complex model of experience in which a general or dominant mode of apprehending art and reality is underpinned by the temporal structure of narratives. Basically, in his Time and Narrative the French philosopher has argued that:

a) human experience of the world understood as a pragmatic world consists in a temporal experience articulated narratively.
b) reciprocally, narratives are conformed only through a specific temporal structure.

c) this reciprocal relation between narratives and time leads Ricoeur to assert that narratives are the only consistent (sic) means of understanding human time and of experiencing it.

Narratives mediate our construction of the world and, therefore, quoting Ricoeur, “time becomes human to the extend that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence”. In another passage, he states that “there would not be thought time if there were not narrated time”. We do not have a consistent experience of time if this is not narratively constructed.

Taking this into account, my thesis is: when a work makes collapse the narrative structure of a work, it produces us an aporetic temporal experience that makes clash the underlying elements of the action. Consequently, it can make us experience the conflicts underlying our modes of understanding the world, human action and our inner identity.

4. Aporetic experiences of time

Ricoeur, to demonstrate that there is no way to experience time apart of narratives, describes in the “Epilogue” of his vast work Time and Narrative three sorts of aporias that have ineluctably arisen whenever philosophers have theorised about time. I will retake these aporias in order to define a taxonomy of aporetic experiences that emerge when there aren’t any narratives to reconcile them. Here we will see how, without reconstructing certain experiences by means of narratives, general notions related to common reality, personal identity and moral values can collapse.

The first aporia: the cosmological and the phenomenological perspective

The first aporia arises with the comparison of two types of temporal experiences, that is to say, on the one hand those experiences linked to external nature and on the other hand those related to our inner world.

Through our body, we feel as being part of a nature whose temporality appears immense, unfathomable and regular. In this nature we see movement and change, and, therefore, we articulate a temporality defined as a succession of states. Time, as Aristotle taught us in his Physics that time is the measure of motion. From the perception of repetitive natural phenomena arose the ancient
conception of cyclical time. Aristotle added to this view the metaphor of time as a line, in which each state of a phenomenon occupies a point, and each point represents a moment in relation to which we place a before and an after. This understanding of time is called by Ricoeur the cosmological perspective and provided in different aspects the model of time to classical and modern physics.

The psychological experience of time challenges the cosmological approach. Through close observation of our perceptions and of our consciousness, we realize that all that happens to us and all our thoughts occur in the present time. Present time is always our present or, at least, the present of a subjectivity. This present extends into two directions: the past that passes and the future that has not yet arrived. Our own consciousness seems to “distend” – as Agustin of Hippo first argued - into those places of time, losing intensity as far as going in the past through memory and in the future due to expectation. This present time is no longer lived as succession, but as duration.

Ricoeur calls this approach the phenomenological perspective.

This perspective does help us to understand some important elements of time that lack in the cosmological perspective. Let me just mention some of them. In the ineluctable march of nature, phenomena are not ranked in terms of more or less significant events. From this phenomenological standpoint, subjectivity plays no role in the cosmological perspective, and the notions of present, past, and future have neither any significance. Another intrinsic problem of the cosmological theory is the impossibility to find a definitive, invariable movement to set the rule of time. And just to mention a last problem, without a subjective scale, it is not possible to decide how long an instant lasts, whether a second, a day or a year.

I will not go deeper into this point. What I want to stress is that both experiences of time are: taken alone, incomplete for what we understand as time; taken both together, aporetic, since they would joint contradictory elements. It happens the same with the second aporia.

Second aporia: unity vs. plurality of times

The second aporia litigates between the unity and the plurality of times. It arises from the contrast between, on the one hand, our usual way of thinking time and talking about it as one and unique, and, on the other hand, the radical difference between the experiences of the past, the present and the future. Regarding these three dimensions of time – called by Ricoeur the three time ecstasies – we can observe that our immediate experience of the past is only possible through memory. Our experience in present time is generated by perception, and that of
the future, by expectation. How is it possible that the time is one if the experience covers three types of structurally different times?

Ricoeur’s analysis of this problem in some philosophers like Kant and Husserl make us understand another transcendental problem. Let us just mention how Husserl deals with it. Husserl tries to constitute a continuity between protentions (expectations of a coming time), present perceptions and retentions (immediate past). For this, he provides an explanation on how the first is transformed into the second and this one into the third without breaking the continuity of the flow. However, following Ricoeur, Husserl acknowledges that, from this continuity it cannot be ultimately derived the concept of a unitary form of time understood as flow. Husserl’s effort of building one singular type of time from that plurality of times is acknowledged as unsatisfactory.

To the aporia of a collective singular forms part the possibility of experiencing the same phenomenon across different timings simultaneously and to interpret it in various scales. You can see a scene in slow motion or frozen time, perceive in it new qualities and be aware of its original temporality. Likewise, a brief phenomenon as the falling of a leaf can be perceived in temporal levels of meaning: its literal reality, the annual arrival of autumn, the final phase of a life or even the decline of a civilization. The problem with using multiple frames at once is the difficulty of defining the definitive reference frame from which we construct and compare the other frames.

However, a more urgent problem than the border between the three ecstasies of time is to decide which one of them has more weight in characterizing an event. Some people always appeal to history, others describe its current state and some others cannot but understand it through the future consequences that may result. The problem again consists in articulating the three temporal views in a coherent approach.

Third aporia: thinking about time being determined by time

The third aporia concerns the possibility of thinking and representing time. It emerges from the impossibility of our being able to experiencing time directly and consistently.

The aporia acknowledges that any attempt to think and represent time is determined by time itself. What tries to constitute time is already made up in the constitutional process and thus already presupposed in the operation of constitution. In this sense, it is said that time is inscrutable.

We can deduce the inscrutability of time by means of becoming aware of our own historicity. We do it through the consciousness that our thoughts are
articulated by concepts and metaphors that carry a previous history as well as archaic meanings.

Aristotle, for example is influenced by the ancient Greek concept of time as something that surrounds everything. Augustine thinks about time in relation to the notion of the divine eternity and also inherits from the Hebrew the multiplicity of its names. Kant and Husserl, with their transcendental method try to avoid archaisms. Both end up in an instance of mind that should constitute time, but it finally seems to be constituted by it. In Husserl, for instance, emerges the problem of whether consciousness is the basis of this flow of sensations or if instead this flow of sensations is the basis of consciousness.¹⁰

### Narrative solutions to the aporias

As we have said before, Ricoeur’s central thesis states that narratives provide a consistent reply to these aporias. To the aporia produced by the clash between both cosmological and phenomenological perspectives, narratives —fictional and historical— provide a practical but consistent experience. I will not go deeper into this, since I am interested in the aporias rather than in the solution. However, it will be useful to know that for Ricoeur, even the problem of identity has some sort of solution by means of referring to narrative identity. I will retake later this interesting point with Martí Ansón’s artwork.

Narrative theory also provides a solution to the second aporia between the unity and the plurality of times. Ricoeur however, recognises only an imperfect mediation. The solution does not describe an experience of a whole time but the possibility to unify the three ecstasies of time – present, past and future – that is to say, to build this unity from this part. Ricoeur finds the solution in a social human action that includes the past as historical consciousness, the present as time we live in and human action in society as orientated to the future.

Regarding the third aporia, we should ask if it does make any sense, however, to ask whether the narrative responds to the inscrutability of time, that is to say: do narratives provide a representation of what cannot be represented? Perhaps should we better ask something such as: are there representations of time that show the non-representational nature of time? Ricoeur suggests that novels such as *À la Ricerca del Temps Perdu*, *Mrs Dalloway* and *Der Zauberberg* show the limits of representing time in some very specific moments, when they try to communicate a sort of atemporal experience.

In my opinion, Ricoeur’s analysis founds its limits in assimilating these experiences to non-temporal experiences, that is, to metaphors of eternity. It would be more fruitful to think on them as aporetic temporal experiences, many of
which could also be called, anti-narrative experiences. My statement is that the experience displayed by many of post-modern artworks – and probably much more than only post-modern- provoke a temporal aporetic experience in order to produce a problematic experience. Thus this aesthetic experience focuses on some of those ontological, epistemological, and moral problems not resolved by non-narrative artworks.

In the next section I will try to show this through two examples.

4. Two examples of anti-narrative aesthetic experience

Finally, I will show the productivity of this analytical frame by means of analysing a couple of current works of art. I will first try to bring a critical account of William Kentridge’s *The Refusal of Time* presented last summer at the Documenta 13. Then I will have a look at a work made by the Spanish artist Martí Ansón. I have intentionally selected two very different works that play with the limits of narratives and show opposite ways to deal with time and its problems. In addition to this, the first work shows a literal reflection of the nature of time and on the modern will to control it through technology.

William Kentridge’s *The Refusal of Time* has a surplus of means and ideas, yet very suggesting ideas. Five screens, very well scored music, and a big machine similar to an accordion that seems to breathe compose the installation.

As it occurs with other works made by Kentridge, different scenes are combined, or alternate, and are confronted without letting us configure a clear whole. Some scenes allude to objective time, like the first one showing a metronome and some comic sceneries with astronomers watching the stars, big public clocks like Greenwich’s, and a man wearing a bouncy inflated suit dancing with a woman. A scene repeated in a loop with the very same artist walking over a chair alludes to cyclic models of time. Some other scenes, such as the parody of a woman having an affair just after her husband has left home, could allude to velocity or lack of time. Reaching the end, an off-voice talks about modern science and technology of time and significantly about the age when great colonial powers like France and the United Kingdom were investing many efforts to establish a global system of chronological time.11

Only coming to this point, these final statements let the beholder understand which is the main character of the work, that is, the ascendance and hegemony of time as measured time, of time as *chronos*. This model of time, however, finds its counterparts in a more humanised, funny and subjective experiences of time.
Art Breaking the Experience of Time

Multi-Screen Video Installation
Taking this into account, the installation seems to dramatise a dialectic or confrontation between different models of time and their corresponding experiences. We can confront these experiences by means of our first two aporias. Some scenes offer the experience of an objective, ruled, repetitive time; other scenes show a more spontaneous, unpredictable, subjective march of events. However, in this ambiguous dialectic or narrative, chronological time threatens to prevail while the subjective world disappears from the images.

This does not seem to be the last sense of the work. There is not at all a narrative and the experience must be defined, owing to the fact that it is more than ambiguous, contradictory and disorientating. Lacking a narrative, there is not the possibility of configuring an experience of time. However, the final scene, which functions as a coda, could offer a feeling of reconciliation. All the characters of the previous scenes appear like shadow-figures in a procession and dance in a frenetic rhythm to the right wall. During a while, this kind of funeral procession of phantoms gives a last chance to people and their spontaneous temporality. But at the end, a cosmic black hole absorbs one by one all the characters. Then the work ends. That black hole seems to phagocyte all other times and their conflicts. When the lights turn on, more questions than answer arise, and like the very same installation: we do only have the certainty that all these conflicts between times will re-emerge for all over the time.

As a last example, I would like to make a brief reference to one of my favourite works made by Martí Anson: *The goalkeeper's fear to the penalty*, from 2001. This work, inspired by one of Peter Handke’s novels, creates a typically Duchampian ambiguity. The story of the goalkeeper ends with him remembering the popular situation of the penalty: the goalkeeper knows that this player tend to shoot to the right, so he should jump to the right. Immediately he also thinks, however, that the player can suspect the goalkeeper’s thought, and then, as a reaction, he would shoot to the left; consequently the goalkeeper changes his mind and decides jump to the left. But the goalkeeper doubts again: if the player guesses the goalkeeper second decision, the player would change and shoot to the right. This argument could have no end, and the funny and interesting point is that, if the player finally shoots to the right, it could be because he always shoots to the right or because he has rethought and changed his action twice, fourth, six or more times.
Anson’s version of the medieval paradox on the Buridan’s ass creates a paradoxical and stressing situation. Both player and goalkeeper are moving, so the climatic moment of the narrative that any match represents is supposed to come immediately. But the action is permanently suspended, delayed. The elements described by the logic of action – agent, motivation, goal, circumstances, etc. – seem to collapse and the narrative fails, leaving us only with the feeling of dread and non-sense. When everything is going to happen, nothing happens. Maximum expectation is corresponded with minimum action for an eternity. The temporary structure of this narrative collapses in the confusion between the agent’s motivations and expectations, between the goals and the circumstances. This indeterminacy between past, present and future shows that all actions, which build narratives and personal identity, are, at the end, contingent. There is no deep causality between our personal past, present and future. In the work, the goalkeeper’s anxiety, which is also the player’s anxiety, is transmitted to the beholder. And our anxiety with this work shows, also in a humorous way, the never-ending depth of the foundations of our morality.

To conclude, some observations derived from these examples. None of both works fulfil the conditions of a narrative. However, through its ambiguity, Kentridge’s *The Refusal of Time* stipulates more specific elements through which we can understand contradictory modes of understanding time. In opposition to this, Anson’s minimal work begins with a banal situation that instead takes us to a more abstract reflection on the foundations of human action. If narratives represent or express human condition in its “natural” means, we then should conclude that anti-narrative art is a radical, perhaps even an anti-humanist way of dealing with human issues.
In an age in which our lives are so determined by socially imposed narratives and temporal schedules, in an age in which individual and collective stories are being so hardly manipulated, a critical form of art that makes us experience time in a radical pre-formed way, seems to me still more significant. Perhaps it means a claim to re-appropriate our time.

Notes:

1. This paper was written as result of the research project “Aesthetic Experience and Artistic Research: Cognitive Aspects of Contemporary Art” (FFI2012-32614), funded by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO), main researcher Gerard Vilar, 2013-2015. A previous and shorter version under the title “Time and Narratives. Anti-narrative Art” was presented in the VII Workshop on Aesthetic Experience: Truthfulness and Value in Art held in Valencia in November 2013. A more complete version is being produced under the title “Aporetic Experiences of Time in Art”.


3. Goldstein: The Jump, 1977, a fragment of what was screened in the installation to be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqwIXywZzg


5. I deeper develop this in my article “Paradoxical Experiences of Time”, still not published.


8. In a longer paper I develop in more detail Ricoeur’s analysis of narratives as a Mimesis of the world as a human action, language and imagery: these structures are subverted by such aporetic artistic experience and become object of aesthetic reflection.


10. Ibid., p. 1027n.


12. A short fragment to get an idea of it can be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dqff_RO6dbo

POL CAPDEVILA –

Email address: pol.capdevila@upf.edu
Affiliation: Pompeu Fabra University (Spain)
Direct Experience and Artistic Value: 
A Consequence of the Ideal Appreciator Theory

From a contemporary, Human point of view, the responses of suitably idealized appreciators are presented as tracking, or even determining, facts about artistic value. According to this view, artistic value is determined by the judgment of the Ideal Appreciator. Let us call this view the *Ideal Appreciator View*.

Although this view is useful in explaining certain frameworks of artistic value, it seems to have some problems explaining ordinary, mediocre appreciation. Ordinary people (including me!) do not have a wide knowledge of art history and sometimes lack the kind of aesthetic sensitivity necessary to judge the true value of a work. In that sense, we are not Ideal Appreciators. Furthermore, in some cases, we intentionally appreciate artworks in a different way from Ideal Appreciators.

In this presentation, I would like to consider the relation between our ordinary appreciation and ideal appreciation. In the first section, I overview some existing positions on the Ideal Appreciator View. In section 2, I take up some points from a recent discussion on the so-called Acquaintance Principle, which says, broadly speaking, that judgments of artworks must be based on direct experience of them. In section 3, introducing the idea of “Blameless Appreciation,” I suggest that we consider our ordinary aesthetic judgment as a matter of degree rather than subject to a strict binary paradigm. The concept of an Ideal Appreciator is still valuable in this revised paradigm. In section 4, I pick up the case of what I call *B-taste*, in which our mediocre judgments utilize the concept of an Ideal Appreciator in a comparative way. Positing an imaginary and Ideal Appreciator, we, as ordinary people, assess our own appreciative manner and change our commitment to it. Our judgments are assessed not binomially (“correct” or “not correct”) but gradually (more appropriate or less), and the fact that we do such assessments suggests that we may need to re-think our views on aesthetic judgment.
1. Some positions on the Ideal Appreciator view

As previously mentioned, the Ideal Appreciator View says that artistic value and even some aesthetic features of artworks are determined by the judgment of an Ideal Appreciator. One of the traditional representatives of this line of thinking is David Hume. In his “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume presents what he argues are the necessary conditions of an Ideal Appreciator:

1. Delicacy of perception and imagination
2. Practice and experience in a particular art
3. Faculty to compare
4. Free from prejudice
5. Good sense

Recent philosophers have discussed whether these conditions are sufficient or not, but today I shall not enter into the discussion. The questions I would like to deal with today are:

- How does an Ideal Appreciator relate to our ordinary evaluative judgment?
- What is the role an Ideal Appreciator play in our ordinary evaluative judgment?

Before tackling these questions, we will need to examine the differences between extant Ideal Appreciator Views. Many philosophers seem to believe that there are actual, living Ideal Appriciators, while others think that the Ideal Appreciator is an imaginary, hypothetical, or theoretical construct. (We might be able to read Hume’s “On the Standard of Taste” in light of this latter perspective, but this is beyond the scope of our current project.)

Those who believe that the ideal appreciator can exist in the real world tend to believe that there can be more than one Ideal Appreciator. (Theoretically, one could argue that only one true Ideal Appreciator exists in the factual world, but no one advocates this view.) Among those who believe in a plurality of Ideal Appreciators, there is a further division: some argue that the judgments by Ideal Appreciators are ultimately the same, while others purport that their judgments vary. Malcolm Budd and Matthew Kieran are proponents of the latter, defining Ideal Appreciators more loosely. James Shelley, on the other hand, interpreting Hume, argues that real critics’ judgments always converge. According to Shelley, Hume says that true judges might show different sentiments, but they will never disagree.

Whether we take the Ideal Appreciator as a real entity or not, all Ideal Appreciator Views seem to have one concern. It is a concern about the explanation for our ordinary appreciation. It is certain that we can loosen the conditions for being an Ideal Appreciator in order to gain closer access to Ideal Appreciators. Taking this approach, we might accept a friend of ours who is movie-goer as an
Ideal Appreciator of movies. We may think that her judgment is true and correctly identifies the properties of films. But even if this is the case, what about our own judgments? If we adopt a strong Ideal Appreciators View, it would follow that non-experts’ ordinary judgments are always insufficient, since, compared to an ideal critic, ordinary people’s judgments are necessarily defective. Moreover, if we define the Ideal Appreciator as a strictly theoretical prototype, all real people’s judgments will be insufficient. Even if non-experts’ mediocre judgments might accidentally be true, their judgments do not have conviction.

According to the Ideal Appreciator View, then, non-experts judge artworks in vain. At best, they can merely show their preference and the real value of artworks is unknowable to them unless they inquire of an Ideal Appreciators.

2. Acquaintance Principle and Aesthetic Testimony

I would now like to turn our attention to another familiar phenomenon. Many people think that if we want to evaluate artworks correctly, we must experience them directly. This view has a long history and its proponents include Immanuel Kant and Frank Sibley. Richard Wollheim picks up on this tendency and presents his Acquaintance Principle. Recently, however, given the emergence of non-perceptual or inaccessible artworks, many philosophers consider Wollheim’s principle too strong to be taken literally. They endeavor to weaken this principle, and thereby preserve its spirit.

Many philosophers say that the question of testimony is characteristic of the aesthetic field. When it comes to ethical behavior, contrarily, most people readily acknowledge that we can appropriately judge it through testimonies. In a court of law, we respect the testimonies of an eyewitness. Compared to ethical testimony, however, many philosophers say that aesthetic testimony is epistemologically weak. In aesthetic evaluation, we feel hesitant to accept others’ words straightforwardly, and it is plausible that without our own actual sentiments, any aesthetic judgment will be insufficient.

The conclusion reached in the previous section was that our mediocre judgments on artworks cannot grasp their true value without the aid of an Ideal Appreciator. This is a sort of Agnosticism of Artistic Value. Given this conclusion, the best way for non-experts to access true artistic value is to ask some ideal critics about the work. On the other hand, we accept the Acquaintance Principle as applicable even to ourselves, which seems a curious practice for, if the best way to assess artistic value is to inquire of the ideal critic, we should not need to see the work for ourselves. So, if our first-hand experience has some contribution to evaluative judgments, what is that contribution?
A very simple answer is this: although ordinary people’s judgments could never be veridical or justified, their judgments can get closer to the ideal judgment through direct experience. Let us assess this answer.

Before going into the assessment, we should describe some of the characteristics of aesthetic testimony. Many philosophers focus on the differences between ethical and aesthetic testimony, suggesting that aesthetic judgments made through testimony cannot be sufficient (at least, we feel some resistance to such judgments), while ethical judgments made through testimony can be sufficient. Why?

One possible answer to this question is to say that the direct experience gives us access to important feelings that testimony cannot convey. For example, bodily movement or temporal feeling cannot be communicated through linguistic testimonies, nor can the spatial sense of architecture be transmitted by pictorial testimony.

Of course, if we succeed in inventing some special testimony that manages to impart such feelings, testimony may gain some degree of epistemological value. We might, for example, convey the vividness of a picture by using a same-color photograph or the rhythm of a song by playing or singing it at the same tempo.

As Sibley stresses, however, in the aesthetic field, a small change in a part causes a drastic change in the final impression.10 For instance, since a slight fading of color weakens the vividness of a picture, curators will spend much money for its restoration. Likewise, a little bit of sound reinforcement has the potential to make a song extremely powerful. Therefore, what testimony can convey is at best information about the feeling of an artwork’s partial properties. Except in some special cases of conceptual arts, we cannot access the final and justified impression of artwork through testimony.11

3. An important difference between the Ideal Appreciator and the ordinary appreciator

For the Ideal Appreciator, direct experience is a very important and reliable way to evaluate artworks. Based on the whole impression given through direct experience, an Ideal Appreciator can judge the work’s artistic value. But what about the ordinary appreciator?

It is not generally agreed upon whether ordinary people can have appropriate aesthetic impressions by way of direct experience. Because they are lacking the right sensitivity or relevant knowledge, ordinary people sometimes have misguided impressions. Moreover, strictly reading the necessary qualities of an Ideal Appreciator, some might say that no human being’s judgment is ever sufficient. For ordinary people, direct experience is not a good route to true artistic value.
I do not try to refute the possibility of such an “error theory” of ordinary judgment. Even if the error theory is true, we will need to explain the phenomena of ordinary appreciation.

The concept of “blamelessness” is useful in explaining ordinary appreciation. In many cases, ordinary people who are not Ideal Appreciators judge blamelessly. The difference between “true” and “blameless” is important. By using the word “blameless,” we can explain ordinary appreciation even if it holds the possibility of fault. This approach shifts the problem of appropriate appreciation away from the true–false dichotomy to a matter of degree. In fact, people often say something like, “Her appreciation is more appropriate than his.”

It does not follow that we cannot say, “His judgment is false.” There are obviously faulty judgments (for example, misunderstanding of the category of the work, or mistaking of the author of the work).12

The borderline between “blameless appreciation” and “accusable appreciation” depends not only on the work itself but also on its social context. Therefore, the borderline might shift even if the work itself does not change. Before the invention of good reproduction equipment, people thought that films should be watched at movie theaters. Cinephiles often criticized the practice of watching movies at home. However, in the days of high-resolution TV monitors and high quality sound system, people who can afford it can “blamelessly” appreciate films at home.

Moreover, there might be cases in which “true” judgment is no longer possible but blameless judgments can be made. Losing access to a work would be one circumstance causing such a borderline shift. We cannot, for instance, directly watch an artistic event or installation that took place in the 1960–1970s; we can, however, judge them through videos or other documentations and we might admit some of our judgments as appropriate.13

4. B-taste

If we understand blameless aesthetic appreciation in terms of degrees of appropriateness, we can give more understandable explanations for ordinary people's evaluative judgments. As an example, I would like to take up the case of what I call B-taste. Although this type of judgment is very familiar to us, aestheticians do not pay much attention to it. Yet it poses an important problem for traditional aesthetics.

To begin with, I should clarify the concept of B-taste. We might say something like, “I admit that this work would not be received favorably, but I do judge this work as good.” B-taste operates in this sort of judgment.14 Sometimes we use the word “bad taste.” “Bad taste” is usually accusatory, referring
to preference for obviously bad things. “B-taste” is not accusatory, or even if it is, it is only so to the extent that the judgment deviates from that of the Ideal Appreciator.

Some aestheticians might say that B-taste is not a matter of “aesthetic judgment” but a mere manifestation or expression of preference. They would say that the statement should be rephrased as, “I admit that this work would not be received favorably, but I like it.” This is an oversimplification. Several types of judgment should be distinguished here:

1. Of artwork $X_1$, I evaluate it favorably, though I do not recognize myself as an Ideal Appreciator and I expect that Ideal Appreciators would not give it a high score.

   In this type of judgment, “I” recognize myself as a non-Ideal Appreciator. I do not have much knowledge of art history, and I cannot compare the work with other masterpieces in the art world. I acknowledge that my judgment is less appropriate than the Ideal Appreciator’s. This type of judgment might be accompanied by a feeling of inferiority. An uneducated artist might be likely to make this sort of judgment.

2. Of artwork $X_2$, I evaluate it favorably, and I recognize myself as an Ideal Appreciator. Although I know that many critics do not give it high score, I myself judge $X_2$ as good.

   In the second type of judgment, I believe that my appreciation is appropriate and legitimate. I am confident in my evaluation and in some cases, I might look down on the public evaluation. A competent critic would likely judge avant-garde pieces in this way.

3. Of artwork $X_3$, I evaluate it favorably but I know that my evaluation and that critics’ evaluations are different (that is, I recognize that critics give $X_3$ a low score, but I favorably evaluate it, or vice versa.) Even so, I think that both judgments are appropriate.

   In the third type of judgment, neither side determines the standard for the other. Moreover, each judgment is esteemed from the other side. Some might take this as a case of mere difference of sensitivity (taste), not of disagreement. As an example, people sometimes judge foods in this way. 

   In each type of judgment, the subject makes a hypothesis about an Ideal Appreciator’s judgment and, by comparison with it, assesses his own judgment. Her commitment to her evaluation depends on whether she consider her own judgment as the same one to the ideal or not.

Many philosophers would admit the second and third types of judgment as aesthetic judgments. What about the first? It is certain that the appreciator in the first case admits that her judgment is different from the idealized appreciator’s,
and to that extent, she recognizes herself as accusable. However, her judgment contains many features that invite us to call her judgment an aesthetic one.

This fact poses a philosophical problem for us. A Kantian might say that such a response is a mere expression of personal preference or sentiment. Even so, we must admit that such an ordinary response still seriously pays attentions in a discriminating manner to forms, qualities, or meaningful features of the work, and she attends to these features for their own sake. Moreover, in some cases, her judgment is accompanied by the claim that others who have sensitivity or taste similar to hers ought to judge or respond similarly. Compared to Kantian judgment of taste, the only feature lacking here is “the claim of universal validity.” That is, whether we admit her response as an aesthetic judgment depends on whether the claim of universal validity is a necessary condition of aesthetic judgment.

If advocates of the idealized appreciator view admit a plurality of Ideal Appreciators and a variety of judgments among them, they might also admit the first type of judgment as aesthetic judgment. The result is accusable but admissible aesthetic judgment. This judgment is accusable to the extent that the judgment is different from the Ideal Appreciator’s, but it might still be taken as a blameless judgment. This type of judgment has not previously been given the consideration it deserves. However, in the age of diversification of individual values, ordinary people seem to growing more familiar with this type of judgment. Analyzing it will not only guide us in considering the interpretive pluralism of artworks, but also suggest a way to examine the complicated and multi-cultural art world in which we live.

Notes:

5. Of course, I do not say that everything in ordinary appreciation is in vain—the ordinary observer derives pleasure through actual appreciation. Rather, it is in vain just
from the epistemological view. Some might further contend that we can access the real value of artworks through a plurality of testimonies by ideal appreciators. I shall not try to refute this view in this presentation.

6. “They cannot expect a determining ground for their judgment from proofs, but only from the reflection of the subject on his own state (of pleasure or displeasure), rejecting all precepts and rules” [I. Kant (1790), *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, (ed.) P. Guyer, (trans.) P. Guyer and E. Matthews, Cambridge U. P. 2000, §34].

7. “Merely to learn from others, on good authority, that the music is serene, the play moving, or the picture unbalanced is of little aesthetic value; the crucial thing is to see, hear, or feel. To suppose indeed that one can make aesthetic judgments without aesthetic perception, say, by following rules of some kind, is to misunderstand aesthetic judgment” [F. Sibley, “Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic” *Philosophical Review*, 1965, 74, p. 173]. For the implications of “aesthetic perception” as used by Sibley, see also J. Shelley, “The Problem of Non-Perceptual Art”. *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 2003, 43, pp. 363–378.

8. “A well-entrenched principle in aesthetics, which may be called the Acquaintance Principle, and which insists that judgments of aesthetic value, unlike judgments of moral knowledge, must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another” [R. Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects*, p. 233].


10. In “Aesthetic Concepts,” Sibley writes, “…by inductive procedures and intelligent guessing, [one] might frequently say the right things. But he could have no great confidence or certainty; a slight change in an object might at any time unpredictably ruin his calculations, and he might as easily have been wrong as right” [F. Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts”, *Philosophical Review*, 1959, 68, p. 432]; and “‘It would be quite delicate if it were not for that pale color there’ may be said about the very color which is singled out in another picture as being largely responsible for its delicate quality. No doubt, one way of putting this is to say that the features that make something delicate or graceful, and so on, are combined in a peculiar and unique way; the aesthetic quality depends upon exactly this individual or unique combination of just these specific colors and shapes so that even a slight change might make all the
difference. Nothing is to be achieved by trying to single out or separate features and generalizing about them” [Sibley (1959), p. 434].

11. Some might say that there are some conceptual artworks that can be conveyed via testimony. For example, some might think that we do not need to see Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing to judge it. (In fact, Rauschenberg himself, after completing the erase, said to de Kooning that there is no need to come to see this work.) Moreover, there might be an artwork that cannot be accessed without testimony. As to such a “strong non-perceptual art”, see D. Costello, “Kant and the Problem of Strong Non-Perceptual Art”. British Journal of Aesthetics, 2013, 53, pp. 277–298. I admit such a possibility, but will not expound upon it here.


13. Duchamp’s Fountain is also lost, so we can only experience it through photographs or replicas. Should we say that we cannot judge its value? But some consider Fountain conceptual art, which needs not be seen to be experienced, so the loss of the original does not affect our ability to make an aesthetic judgment.

14. The opposite may also be said: “I think this work would be appreciated favorably, but I do not judge this work as good.” The analogous explanation holds true for this sort of judgment as well.

15. We sometimes call a film a “B-movie,” but this is not internally related to B-taste. What make a B-movie “B class” are objective factors such as its budget or the number of theaters that play the movie. We do not need exercise our taste to distinguish an A-movie from a B-movie. In this paper, I use “B-taste” to mean that which judges things within the same category.

16. The case of a B-movie is explained in this way: Although a movie X might be highly evaluated in terms of some of its artistic properties, X tends to be ranked low in terms of other properties (e.g., budget or popularity of actors). We also evaluate things in this way when we talk of “B-class food.” Some foods might be ranked low in terms of price or regionality, but such factors merely show objective differences between A-class and B-class. So, calling a certain food “A-class” does not imply that it is more delicious than “B-class food.” Likewise, calling something a “B-movie” does not imply that it is not aesthetically worse than “A-movie”.

NORIHIDE MORI –

Email address: morinorihilde@hotmail.com

Affiliation: Yamagata University (Japan)
Richard Shusterman, in accordance with the tradition of American pragmatism, emphasized the importance of emotional experience in art perception. Experience turns out to be the most important effect of contact with art, which is understood without referring to conceptual knowledge. Shusterman claims that 'Understanding does not require verbal articulation: the right reaction, thrill or tingling might be a clear sign of understanding.' In his opinion art is the source of constant aesthetic sensations and because of that it should be present in our everyday life. What is important in this conception is the fact that experiences are formed when we encounter artworks. Such contacts with works of art (tools) are possible when for example an artwork constitutes part of our involvement in the realization of selected values in our everyday activities. Then our experiences are 'glued' to the work of art. In art galleries or exhibition halls we usually look at the exhibits from a distance and it is rare for the experience and the impression created to coincide.

I would like to point out, however, that direct (manipulative) contact with any object, not only an artwork, can be the source of experience. So how can we single out and identify the uniqueness of aesthetic experience? Shusterman’s theory does not provide an answer to such a question. The statement that experiencing an artwork triggers aesthetic reactions does not seem to be sufficient. We all do realize that a landscape or a way in which food is served can also be the source of aesthetic sensations.

If we assume that direct manipulative contact is the source of our experiences, then design is the field whose integral part, due to its specific characteristics, is the process of forming experiences. Because of this I will relate Shusterman’s theory to design, which I consider to be a form of art. Consequently, his conception will find its exemplification in design.
Let’s consider the chair, one of the most common objects. Chairs have been designed by famous artists, they form a part of the history of design but at the same time they are still widely used. For sure in a museum or an art gallery we get to know their aesthetic and artistic sense accompanied by intellectual reflection. There we notice their proportions, production date or materials; often we see the first sketches and subsequent versions together with the final one. Many of those chairs are still produced, but do we experience them? However, if their functional context changes and they are included in the sphere of our everyday life, our attitude to these objects will also change. Once we start using them, they will become tools which trigger experiences. Then emotions become all-important and our participation changes from distancing and intellectual into that based on experience and sensation.

Antonio Gaudi, like many other architects, designed furniture for his interiors. Some of his chairs can be seen in Museu Nacional d’Art de Catalunyana. One of them, designed for Casa Mila, is in the hall of Casa Fuster Hotel in Barcelona. Everybody can sit in it and feel the shape of the backrest, the profile of the seat and armrest, the smoothness of the surface. We can experience its proportions and compare them with our recollections from the museum. It is a very strong sensation. There is no information about this object, which would induce any intellectual reflection in an average user. We get to know the chair by sitting in it and confronting it with our body. It is perfectly shaped but too high for me.

Similar sensations can be produced by sitting in one of the galleries in Charles and Ray Eames’ lounge chair model No.670 from 1956 or Philippe Starck’s garden chair from 1990. You can feel how soft the seat is and how the back support is positioned in the Eames’ chair. Having seen this mythical piece of furniture in the photographs or in films I clearly remembered the characteristic position of its back support, which defined comfortable lifestyle in the post-war world. However, when I sat in it and confronted theoretical reflections with physical sensations I felt disappointed. The construction and the width of the back support determine the body position of the user. I felt dominated by its size and too soft seat. What happened was a clash between the theoretical reflection and the actual experience. I had a similar feeling when sitting in Starck’s garden chair. It is carefully shaped although hard; the cross sections of armrests resemble those of plush bourgeois couches. Beneath the inside edge of the seat Starck positioned a groove to channel rainwater. I knew he had been inspired by a plastic kayak, I knew the consecutive versions preceding the final one, I knew that apart from the chair a garden sofa had also been created. I knew that the comfort of the user is one of Starck’s priorities, so sitting in this chair was an important aesthetic
experience for me. It was participating in art by experiencing it. Both chairs are comfortable but for people taller than me. I was disappointed with my own sensations but at the same time I analyzed them from a distance.

The main street in Barcelona is paved with stones designed in 1926 by Gaudi. The stones, displaying the pattern of organic rhythms, can also be seen in the museum, but walking on them and feeling the bulges means a different form of participation. Gaudi also designed the benches, which are very popular with tired tourists. The benches are perfectly shaped and really comfortable.

The motif of palm leaves in Gaudi’s decorative fences can be admired in the museum. I believe that the inhabitants who regularly open and close those beautiful gates designed by the artist have rather different impressions from those experienced by just viewers and observers.

Duchamp’s bottle rack placed in a museum in 1914 caused a lot of comments. They resulted from two different approaches – that of an observer or a participant. A competent viewer was able to understand the artist’s message – he might like or dislike the artwork but he didn’t disrespect it. A participant got carried away by emotions, sometimes going to extremes of discrediting it. Each of the above mentioned objects carries the message about the times when it was created, about aesthetic tendencies or the artist’s preferences. It often has hidden senses understandable only for a careful and reflective user. The Eameses suggested a new, comfortable lifestyle in the post-war world. Starck focused on environment protection and comfort in the open air – his garden chair was durable, light, easy to move and shaped in such a way that rainwater flows from the seat.

Richard Shusterman rightly observed that physical contact with an artwork is the source of strong sensations, but are they aesthetic sensations? Design is a field of art which needs physical contact and so it leads to really powerful impressions. It triggers emotions which cause physical reactions such as a smile, quick breath, even shivers and finally the reflection – do I like it or not. Definitely cultural competence – knowing the history of an object, the life and work of the author – influences the perception. It creates the semantic aspect of objects even as banal as chairs.

A. Pałubicka claims that more and more often we take part in post-modern culture in an interactive and multimedia way. The above mentioned examples of participation in culture are aimed at generating sensations. That requires a change of attitude, turning the former observer into the actor actively involved in the event, also an artistic one. It is more and more visible. The author says that such a direct form of participation should be linked with the emergence of mass culture. One of its main characteristics is offering a new way of participation in culture and not only in the proposed subject matter.
First of all, the former viewer turns into the participant i.e. somebody directly involved in the action and experiencing the process of participation. She goes on to state that this form of participation has become popular in contemporary art, happenings of all sorts, performance art, body art, graffiti and also design – that is art in our everyday life. In such cases the artwork is not given before the artistic event. It is formed during the process of creating it by the artist together with invited former viewers, who become the actors and experience the event. The experiences created during artistic actions are not generally verbalized – they are pure emotions. Participating in an artistic event or using an aesthetic object on a daily basis make it possible to enrich the sphere of fleeting and one-off impressions.

The above mentioned model of participation should refer also to design. A car, a vacuum cleaner, a coffee machine, a chair, paving stones and other functional objects enrich our range of sensations. They do not need to be interpreted and, in order to use them, we do not need any specialist, rational knowledge or preparation in the field of culture or aesthetics. They give us a chance of acting in real time and space, generating the form of participation which turns us into creators of everyday life. Admiring a beautiful car in the street is an aesthetic sensation but it is a much stronger experience to travel in such a vehicle or to sit in a chair designed by Gaudi, the Eameses or Starck. The content of what we experience is real and authentic for us. There is nothing we are more sure of than our own experiences. They do not need to be interpreted but only substituted with new, different ones. New sensations are generated by new objects that we buy. A. Palubicka presents two contrasting models of participation in culture – the one involving experience and the intellectual one. The latter refers to interpretation and the artistic and aesthetic competence of the viewer. In European concepts intellectual interpretation and understanding of an artwork came before aesthetic sensations. They usually resulted from the interpreted communicative sense of a work of art and so the viewer’s experience was secondary to the aesthetic message. It was enough for the viewer to understand an artwork and not necessary to experience it. Art understanding and interpretation depended on the viewer’s artistic competence. So we can observe two approaches in Euro-Atlantic culture - that of an reflective observer and that of an experiencing participant. A. Palubicka believes that both attitudes influence the specific characteristics of European culture, for which she uses the term ‘European culture grammar’.

So, contrary to R. Shusterman, she does not favor the domination of only one form of art perception, but she is inclined to accept both the model involving experience and commitment and the intellectual form of participation. The
intellectual form of participation requires continuous improvement in general and artistic knowledge and the development of aesthetic and artistic competence. She focuses on the factual content and aesthetic qualities of an artwork – the factors which become unrecognizable when a work of art is encountered on a regular, continuous and direct basis.

In intellectual perception model sensations would be created by the viewer’s knowledge and competence.

Analyzing the examples presented it can be noticed that when we look at an object in a museum we are observers and we need the relevant cultural competence and knowledge to be able to participate fully and understand aesthetic and artistic meanings. We need to know the historical context and the aesthetic trends. It is the attitude of an observer. When we start using an object in our everyday life we substitute intellectual reflection with active participation. We are no longer observers, we are participants. What becomes all-important is emotions and experiences, but also the designer’s name. It could be called the designer’s or producer’s brand name, which is incorporated in the participant’s approach.

Anna Pałubicka claims the strength of Euro-Atlantic culture lies in the presence of those two complementary attitudes and ways of participation in culture. They correspond with two thinking patterns – one originating from the Greek tradition and based on dialogue and rational argumentation. The other pattern – phenomenological – originated from the Christian tradition and is based on images, revelations and the authority of the person experiencing those revelations, that is emotions and sensations. Each of the patterns generates different approaches and as a result different ways of participating in art. The first approach is reflective, pro-social, based on communication and using well known humanistic symbols with a distance towards one’s own experiences. The second approach – emotional – based on an image and sensation which generate feelings (sadness, joy, anxiety etc) is ‘aimed at achieving the established goals’. As Anna Pałubicka states, ‘In comparison with its past forms, contemporary European culture appears to be dominated by the attitude and the standpoint of engagement which limits the scope of possible reflection about the world. (...) The intellectual model of participation in culture is now overwhelmed by ‘sensual participation’ which stems from the practices of mass culture’.

Pałubicka is concerned to find that the participant approach seems to be more and more common and she refers to it using the term non-intellectual art perception. It seems that in Shusterman’s theory, originating from American tradition of pragmatistic philosophy, this non-intellectual form of participating in culture is given a top priority over art perception by means of interpretation and understanding.
Notes:


2. During my visit to Barcelona in 2011 in Vinçon Gallery, (Passeig de Gracia, 96) I sat in the Eames and Starck’s chairs. It was a really inspirational experience.


ELŻBIETA STANISZEWSKA –

Email address: elkastaniszewska@autograf.pl
Affiliation: University of Technology and Humanities in Radom (Poland)
1. Introduction and main claims

Both philosophical and psychological aestheticians who have accorded some aspect of emotion an important place in the domain of visual art (Peter Goldie, Helmut Leder, Jerrold Levinson, Paul Guyer, Martin Tröndle) have received little fundamental criticism from scholars who are cognizant of psychobiological emotion theory, laboratory experiments on human emotion, and affective sciences in general. This is quite unlike the relationship of music and emotion, regarding which there has been, in the past thirty years, a great deal of work and a certain amount of healthy cross-pollination.

The likely reasons are that compared to the effects of paintings and sculpture, music’s effects are closer to physiological and neural structures, and thus more amenable to controlled scientific study. This attracts to the work on music those psychobiologists and neuroscientists who also have a solid grounding in the scientific study of emotion.

However, in my main claims that follow, some comparisons to music are instructive:

A. Most representational visual art is not capable of inducing genuine emotions in the spectators because it does not engage sufficiently with their personal emotion-arousing associations and memories;

B. Because of the temporal and expressive differences from music, especially the static versus dynamic presentation, traditional visual art is significantly less able to induce emotions than vocal and “program music;”

C. Abstract art has no means to arouse genuine emotions, significantly less so than even absolute music, for it is deficient in expressiveness, compared to the latter; and
D. Some installations, those that skillfully combine psychophysical, statistical, and classical-conditioning properties, even though not capable of arousing “utilitarian” (or basic) emotions, may induce aesthetic awe, a component of Aesthetic Trinity Theory, on which I have done work, including experimental, in the past decade.¹

Here I will touch on some of the issues – aspects of emotion theory and emotion misuse – which set the stage for the full statement I am preparing in several forthcoming papers.

2. Emotivism

I have previously discussed emotivism as the current proclivity for excessive insertion of emotion and “feeling” into both scientific and lay accounts of mental life, needs, and motivation in daily behavior, in matters artistic and non-artistic.² This is a term that has nothing to do with “emotivism” of Ayer and Stephenson in ethics.³ In contrast to the emotivist attitude, in my sense, I have argued for the paramount importance of contemplation, analytical and technical skills, problem-solving and planning – in short, reason. Nevertheless, emotivism pervades much talk about art and it is an insufficiently recognized backdrop for many contemporary debates in aesthetics. Somewhat paradoxically, it seems to be a cognitive stance taken by many aestheticians, one that reflects an opportunistic acceptance of a quasi-ideological, anti-intellectual, cultural context.

3. Where are the loci of “emotion” in visual art?

Writing about emotion in visual art often leads aestheticians, art theorists, critics, and artists, to far-fetched, sometimes wildly romanticizing, claims and to “folk knowledge” imprecision.

A. Numerous alleged emotions have been suggested as visual artists’ stable personality dispositions; these have often been inferred arbitrarily by scholars, especially regarding the creation of particular artworks. (Related alleged dispositions are artists’ mental or physical illness and chronic alcoholism.)

B. It has been proposed that visual artists’ psychological make-up – somehow inferred (often through conjecture or academic striving) – causes them to behave irrationally in response to minor stressful events, thus influencing artistic output.

C. A scholar manages to locate “emotion” in the visual artwork itself and claims it to be a reflection of an artist’s enduring personality dispositions or an acute response to a life-event.
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Points A.-C. have to do with aestheticians’ reading of emotions into artworks by means of “biographical criticism.”

D. Artworks allegedly depicting emotions are labeled “expressionist” or “expressive of emotion.” Expressionism can be regarded as a continuum running from extreme referentialism to extreme abstraction. At the referentialist end, one may place the anguish of *Laocoön and His Sons* or the courage when facing imminent execution in Goya’s *El tres de mayo de 1808 en Madrid*. At the extreme abstract end, one may locate works by Pollock and de Kooning in which reds, blues, and greens are said to be psychologically standing for the emotions of violence or chaos, harmony or sadness, rejuvenation or new love, respectively.

4. A psychobiological view of emotion and contrasting views in aesthetics

The following view can be offered as representing a relatively commonly held psychobiological view of emotion:

Because the basic emotions – anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and perhaps only one or two others – guide and energize behavior in crucial life situations, they have been subjected to evolutionary pressures. Emotions are psychologically, physiologically, and metabolically costly and reserved for emergencies; when they occur, they are major events in human phenomenology. Key attributes of the basic emotions are that numerous bodily systems are involved, simultaneously and in tandem; that they are acute, occurring in “episodes,” with feedback loops; highly pronounced; readily identifiable and reportable by the experiencer; that they flood consciousness and are pan-cultural in terms of experience and expression; and that they have an unambiguous cause or object. They are to be distinguished from moods (elation, serenity), drives (hunger, sex), traits (introversion, generosity), and attitudes (hostility, tolerance).4

This view can be contrasted with those of some leading aestheticians who have written about emotion. Peter Goldie’s account is broad, but uncritically over-inclusive, and occasionally imprecise to the extent that would seldom be encountered in purely philosophical discourse.5 Both Goldie and Jerrold Levinson are on especially slippery ground when discussing the idea of “aesthetic emotions.” Because of their insufficient consideration of externally and internally oriented appraisals, and the monitoring and integration of information from physiological processes, these scholars find themselves having to accept the existence of literally hundreds of “emotions” – almost any conceivable state for which there is a word in a language. Also, some philosophers are given to introducing, on an *ad hoc* basis, fuzzy common-language terms, which are then used for theoreti-
cal purpose: examples, from Noël Carroll, an otherwise scientifically-minded philosopher, are “feeling,” “feeling-charged,” “feeling-toned” – and in this he has been joined by Levinson. With regard to his position on emotions being induced in viewers by visual art (as opposed to music), Levinson is evasive – and with regard to the effects of abstract art completely silent.6

To the claim that I have criticized the mentioned philosophers’ views by definitional fiat, the answer is that scholarship and science cannot advance in a common-language quagmire.

5. A critique of some relevant work in psychological aesthetics

Aesthetic emotion as the outcome of aesthetic experience (Leder et al.)7 In the “model of aesthetic experience,” Leder contends that such experience has two outcomes, aesthetic judgment and aesthetic emotion. While this is a simple restatement of the commonplace idea that all reception of art somehow deals with both cognition and emotion, in developing the idea, however, Leder makes unjustified assumptions and a number of instructive errors of commission and omission.

To understand the weakness of Leder’s argument regarding emotion as the habitual (allegedly unavoidable) result of viewers’ exposure to visual art, one must inspect the diagrammatic centerpiece of the article, the “model of aesthetic experience,” which is represented by a dozen of “boxes” connected to each other by one- and two-way arrows (“symbolizing the flow of information”). The terms inside the rectangles are members of entirely different categories, including perceptual processes, artwork descriptors (from complexity and symmetry to style and content), prior experience, and cognitive processes (implicit memory, declarative knowledge, mastering, art-specific interpretation, evaluation). The apparent thoroughness (mostly with regard to mental operations studied in hundreds of experiments by cognitive psychologists uninterested in the arts) is achieved at the expense of a meaningful conceptual organization. What is interesting is that only one box contains an emotion-relevant term, “affective state.” Furthermore, this “state” is claimed for the viewer essentially ad hoc, by simply declaring that throughout all of the heterogeneous processes, events, and states, there is “continuous affective evaluation.” It is not specified whether the object of “affective evaluation” is the artwork or the self. Nevertheless, from the “affective state” box out pops “aesthetic emotion.” The term seems here to be an unjustified add-on, imposed by habit and the prevalent emotivism.

In the narrative, Leder oscillates between a viewer in a laboratory experiment and one in a naturalistic situation. And there are puzzling and undefended
statements, such as: “We [assume] that the typical affective state when entering an art related situation, such as an exhibition, is positive.”

Moreover, we believe that the perceiver can continuously access the outcome of affective evaluation.” Why should such self-monitoring for affect be taking place in the “real world”? In the laboratory, such questions can indeed be asked of the participants but would likely lead to meaningless results, because of the participants’ evaluation apprehension, attempts to guess the experimenter’s hypotheses, and other well-documented sources of confounding.

Leder et al. continue in the same section: “In everyday life aesthetic experience is a time consuming process...” Yet a few lines later, they themselves cite the finding by Smith and Smith, to the effect that visitors at the Metropolitan Museum spend less than half a minute per artwork. Leder et al. conclude: “...visual and cognitive judgments are inherent in the processing which results in an aesthetic emotion and, if required, in an aesthetic judgment.” The claim for the existence of “an aesthetic emotion” is utterly unsupported.

Finally, even when referring to other researchers’ work, Leder et al. are casual in their use of the terms “arousal,” “mood,” “affect,” and “emotion” – precisely where this domain of inquiry needs justification and accuracy.

“Heart-pounding art”: emotion at an exhibition. Tröndle and Tschacher have recently claimed to have obtained direct empirical (physiological) evidence for the emotional impact of viewing artworks in a naturalistic setting. These researchers recruited 576 visitors (4.3% were the control group) at the Kunstmuseum St. Gallen in Switzerland. The participants agreed to wear an electronic glove with measurement sensors and a transmitter that sent physical-position and physiological data continuously to wireless receivers. There were only two physiological measures, skin conductance (palmar sweat) and heart rate. The participants’ path, length of stay in front of any one artwork, and total duration of stay were unrestricted. The experimental and control (gloveless) group underwent the same entry (demographics) and exit (evaluation of paintings and the experience) interviews and filled out the same questionnaires.

The methodological problems concern both the spatial-positioning and the physiological responses of both the participants (experimental and control) and nonparticipants. The awareness by visitors that they have been selected for research, even as controls, is bound to alter their behavior in comparison to unselected visitors: The participants are likely to take longer, ponder more
(especially in front of featured works by “more eminent” painters) and return to such works – to behave like students observed by their art teacher. This effect has been observed in numerous social-psychological studies. Yet there is no control in this research of people behaving truly naturally, by virtue of not being participants at all. Of course, there could not be such controls for the physiological measures, but there could have been for spatial positioning, by means of unobtrusive observation.

As for the differences between the experimental and control participants, one sees that the main goal was to demonstrate that wearing a glove did not interfere with the experience. The researchers found this and more – namely that wearing a glove made the museum visit significantly more inspiring and interesting than not wearing one. This old sociological finding suggests a possible source of confounding of the physiological data: People like being selected, especially for a scientific, “bio-electronic” study.

Turning to the evaluative and physiological results that were meant to demonstrate the emotional impact of artworks, one observes the following weaknesses in the argumentation:

A. Evaluations of the “emotional” aspects of the artworks were given during the exit interview, long after viewing, and were thus of limited reliability. As for the analysis of assessments, the only one of five factors that was related to emotion, “Negative Emotion,” had to do with what the work conveyed, not the participants’ own state.

B. The physiological information that is presented in the report is minimal (there are not even means and standard deviations for heart rate and skin conductance). Any discussion is provided for only five artworks (by Monet, Hodler, Arp, Uecker, and Warhol), which were chosen because they received the highest number of exit-survey assessments, with the range of 105-232 (so that despite the high number of participants, relatively few assessments were made). The level of the authors’ commentary disappoints: “The participants rated the aesthetic quality of Monet’s work [the indifferent Palazzo Contarini] significantly high... yet they did not consider this work as strong or stimulating” (meaning, one supposes, that there were no physiological oscillations from neutral); “on the contrary, [Günther] Uecker’s Antibild [Räumliche Struktur, Aggressive Reihung, 1974] was evaluated as a dominant work, which causes strong negative emotions with its aesthetic quality rated significantly negative.” The authors provide no physiological evidence at all for these “strong negative emotions;” it is well worth noting that Uecker had the strong descriptor “aggressive” prominently placed in the title of the work.

C. Nowhere is hyperbole more evident regarding viewers’ engagement with even “famous” artworks, and the absence of emotional impact of such artworks,
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than in the two psycho-aestheticians’ discussion of participants’ responses to the two Warhol’s, *Campbell’s Condensed Tomato Soup* (1962) and *Flowers* (1966). First of all, there are average viewing times of only nine seconds for *Flowers* and 10.5 seconds for *Soup* – and this is for people who know that their aesthetic behavior is being analyzed by experts. Yet in the face of such disdain for Warhol, Tröndle and Tschacher state: “It is apparent that the visitors were looking very closely at the works and that they had significant physiological reactions... we clearly see the reactions of the visitors reading the label of *Campbell’s Condensed Tomato Soup*... the physiological reactions are much higher [in front of this work than in front of *Flowers*].”14

This surely lets the cat out of the bag. The issue here is not “emotion” caused by viewing visual art, but the effect of realizing that one is finally in the presence of a famous (or notorious) piece of “popular culture.” If one could only take a photo and post it immediately on Facebook (me with Andy and *Tomato Soup*).

D. Tröndle and Tschacher are careful to avoid using the term “emotion” in their Abstract. Yet the call of emotivism overwhelms caution. On the basis of other facts that are presented, it is unjustified to claim that there was an emotional impact of encountering “art,” such that its magnificence took the visitors’ breath away. One is dealing here with minor physiological changes and of the rules of spatial movement well known to decorators of stores and shopping malls.

E. Despite claims to the contrary, there is nothing in this study to provide empirical support for the idea that visual artworks may produce emotions in viewers. At most one finds that moving about and encountering works one has heard of results in minor physiological fluctuations, which have essentially nothing to do with the emotional impact of artworks.

However, even when confronted with physiological findings – or, rather, non-findings – the emotivist media, in this case the *New York Times*, presented the research under the title “Heart-pounding art.” Although in the entire article by Tröndle and Tschacher there is no mention of “emotion,” this does not prevent the journalist from writing, in the first sentence, that the visitors were “emotionally affected.”15

If this were reporting about some other branch of scholarship, it would be immediately and firmly challenged. Emotivism, however, as the all-purpose pseudo-scholarly stance, apparently rules unchallenged.

6. Installations and the Aesthetic Trinity Theory

Traditionally conceived visual art is a poor elicitors of emotion. Such art, in general, is incapable of convincingly telling naturalistic stories (or allegories) in rich detail
that is necessary for viewers to create a network of mental associations to real-world emotion-inducing events, especially in their own lives. Paintings’ narration is neither broad, nor rich, nor deep enough. Many paintings may attempt to tell stories or allude to real-world or otherworldly events, but few stories, thus told, are able to induce genuine psychobiological emotional responses.

Abstract art is even less likely, and significantly so, to cause emotion. Symmetry, balance, color, novelty, complexity and many other factors (and their relative or complete absence) contribute to viewers’ evaluative and hedonic judgments, but are most unlikely to elicit emotions. When one hears of intense reds in a de Kooning, one should not substitute naive biography-based criticism and folkloric ideas about the power of redness for sound science. For there is precious little reliable empirical proof for a strong effect of color on people, and even if there is any effect, it would be on mood, not emotion. Moreover, such an effect would be dependent on very long exposure to large swaths of color in places like hospitals, kindergartens, or prisons. No wonder that Jerrold Levinson opted out of attempting to describe any reasonable means by which Abstract Expressionist works may induce emotion in spectators.

However, one should examine avenues other than paintings’ and sculptures’ narration by which visual art, broadly conceived, may have an emotional impact. Serious candidates are installations, which – to have their potential impact fully understood – should be analyzed in reference to at least three classes of stimulus (artwork) properties that have been long identified by psycho-aestheticians. These attributes to some extent capture the enormous stimulus scope of installations, from the hyper-realistic to the otherworldly to the interactive to the theatrical. Moreover, and significantly, the conscious or unconscious-intuitive use by artists of these three properties highlight the important possibility of powerful emotional effects that differ from the fundamental, psychobiological ones – and this is where aesthetic awe, as a part of, and defined in, my Aesthetic Trinity Theory, may come into play.

The first of the three classes of artwork stimulus properties is psychophysical, with its most prominent member large size or physical grandeur, an attribute used painstakingly by artists since antiquity to honor gods and kings. The present age of high technology and easy money has changed the methods and the themes. Three illustrative examples of works from the preceding decade that rely on the property of gigantism are the “artificial sun” of Olafur Eliasson’s The Weather Project (in Turbine Hall at the Tate Modern, London, 2003) and, even more so, Richard Serra’s stupendous abstract metal forms (The Matter of Time, 2005) that somehow seem to dwarf even Frank Gehry’s entire Bilbao Guggenheim structure into which they were placed. Serra’s huge steel shapes certainly
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dwarf Damien Hirst’s *Charity*, the seven-meter-high, six-ton sculpture of a girl in leg irons holding a broken and empty collection box.

The second class of relevant properties is substantively *statistical*, with members such as *rarity and complexity*. With regard to rarity, Hirst certainly outdid all competitors (including those using elephant dung on paintings) with his *For the Love of God* (at the White Cube gallery, London, 2007) – a human scull recreated in platinum and encrusted with over 8,500 diamonds. Hirst is also the clear leader in the use of the third, *ecological* (or *classical-conditioning*), stimulus property, which is defined in terms of positive and negative reinforcements associated with works of art. While Jeff Koons’s thirteen-meter-high *Puppy* (a floral sculpture of a cute West Highland terrier) may be a favorite on the positive-reinforcement side, Hirst wins on the negative side, the biologically noxious, with pickled shark, butchered animals in formaldehyde, and especially his *A Thousand Years*, in which maggots hatch in a closed glass vitrine, become flies, feed on a severed, bloody cow’s head, and try to continue their life cycle – although many are sadly executed by a Hirst-patented “insect-o-cutor.” New York City public health officials, in a characteristically vigilant pre-emptive move, banned Hirst’s *Two F***ing and Two Watching* (featuring rotting cow, bull, and calves) allegedly to avoid vomiting by visitors.

I concluded earlier that traditional paintings and sculptures, regardless of their content and form, do not reach far enough into the mental associations and memory systems of the viewer to induce genuine emotions such as anger, sadness, and joy. Installations, even those that skilfully utilize all three of the stimulus properties described above, are also unlikely to be powerful, versatile, and sophisticated enough to connect with the viewers’ respective associative networks and induce genuine psychobiological emotions. It is not enough to shock – the spectator is always *safe*. And even though, in my opinion, some of Hirst’s works address profound issues, their execution is too profane and sterile to produce anything but disgust – and many psychobiologists, for good reason, do not consider disgust to be a genuine emotion, because it is a reflex-like visual, olfactory and gustatory response.

Nevertheless, there seem to be installations, such as the previously mentioned Olafur’s (in Iceland you go by first name even in the phone book!) artificial sun, which combine aspects of all three stimulus properties so as to capture the quality of the *sublime*. In Aesthetic Trinity Theory, the prototypical (and independently defined) response to the sublime stimulus is *aesthetic awe*: a state that should not be considered a fundamental psychobiological emotion but rather a mixture (even if primordial) of joy and fear. Judging by the responses of many spectators at the Tate Modern, the artificial sun clearly produced aesthetic awe in them.
The effect was evidently facilitated by, or even dependent on, the gigantic space of Turbine Hall.

Aesthetic Trinity Theory incorporates a tripartite hierarchy of aesthetic responses (physiological thrills or chills; being-moved; and the rarest, and most pronounced and memorable, aesthetic awe – the response to the sublime). Aesthetic awe has been successfully used in a discussion of the effects of magnificent absolute music in exceptional performance settings. For various reasons that have been raised here, for visual art to have an emotional effect – though not on the fundamental emotions – one needs exposure to magnificent installations in exceptional settings.

Notes:

3. I am using the term emotivism in a quasi-sociological, cultural-politics, sense, which is only tangentially related to the “emotivist–cognitivist” dichotomy described by P. Kivy and it is entirely unrelated to this term as used by A. J. Ayer and Charles L. Stephenson in moral theory.
8. Ibid., p. 501.
13. Ibid., p. 88.

VLADIMIR KONEČNI –

Email address: vkonecni@ucsd.edu
Affiliation: University of California, San Diego (USA)
Since Immanuel Kant's paradigm shift, the philosophical perspective has been to consider perception not as a merely mechanical reception of sensory data, but as an activity in which conceptualization is involved in a certain way of constituting the world which is meaningful for us. This point of view has found its most complex development in the approach of the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and his Freiburg disciples. What is common to them is that there is in their works a significant focus on the problems of aesthetics, both in the broad sense, as the problem of disinterested, self-reflexive experience, and in the narrow sense, as the etymological meaning of the Greek *aesthesia* – sensuous perception. In this paper I would like to demonstrate how that these are two sides of the same coin and how the aesthetic experience reveals social conditioning of perception, or more precisely, how the unreflected conditions of habitual perception, including the social ones, are brought into the reflection in aesthetic experience. This I would like to demonstrate on the conception of structural aesthetics by the leading scholar of the Prague Linguistic Circle Jan Mukařovský, which has been elaborated on the background of both Kantian and phenomenological philosophies, in brief discussion with Kant, Husserl and Ortega y Gasset.

Since the point of view of this inquiry is the one of aesthetics, allow me to begin my argument with verses:

I hear what others cannot hear,
bare feet walking the batiste sheer.
Sighs beneath the letter’s seal,
to quaver strings, when string is still.
Leaving people, apart to be,
I see what others cannot see.
Love, which dressed in cheerful grace,
in lashes finds a hiding place.
Still with the snowflakes in its curls
I see the rosebush with blossom pearls.

If anyone said this in an everyday conversation, those close to him would probably be concerned about his sanity. What is remarkable is that for those exact same words said in an act of rhapsody, their author would no longer be considered insane, on the contrary, he might, for example, be awarded Nobel prize for literature, like the author of these verses, Jaroslav Seifert, was.

The question is, how is such a switch possible and what it tells us about our perceptual experience and our experiencing of perception. How is it possible that when someone tells us that he “hears what others cannot hear” in verses we are not concerned about his mental health but aesthetically pleased? It can be explained by the means of the conception of the structural aesthetics.

At first allow me to summarize what is substantial in Mukařovský’s aesthetics, then I will apply it to the verses of the poem in order to demonstrate how our perceptual experience in its conditioning can be approached from the point of view of aesthetics. About sensuous perception Mukařovský says:

“When we consider the thing accessible by senses, even its sensuous perception is determined by knowledge of its function. The contour of an object as well as its integration into spatial context often depends on this knowledge: e.g. the handle of a tool – if we are aware of its use – will be in perceiving of the thing interpreted – regardless of its actual position at the moment – as that part of object, which is habitually in front of us and which is therefore the point from which we start with grasping the contour. However when we are not able to recognize the handle whilst we are perceiving, it will be for us merely disturbing spit and the contour would be unsatisfactorily ambivalent.”

This description of perception means, that there is a certain a priori – a function – which frames the very process of gaining knowledge about the thing perceived. Objection could be made, that the knowledge of the use of any tool or other thing, is not at all a priori. That it depends on our previous experience with its use, that we learn how to use things. Muřovský is, however, using the term “function” in a much broader sense, than this purely pragmatic, which takes function as the way the tool fits its purpose.

In his paper “The place of aesthetic function among the other functions” Mukařovský defines function as “the mode of a subject’s self-realization vis-à-vis the external world.” It means that function is not only characterized by its purposiveness, but it characterizes the way human being exists. Human being
self-realizes through this basic frame of function, which allows us to constitute things as meaningful. This definition may be understood as an analogy to Husserl’s use of the term “function” in § 86 in Ideas vol. I. In the same study Mukařovský provides typology of functions, devised, as he says, purely phenomenologically.

In this typology he discriminates among four elementary types of functions. Two of them are direct, in the sense that in their case the subject doesn’t need any medium to its self-realization. Those functions are the practical and the theoretical one. And indeed neither for practice nor for knowledge is medium required. We can directly affect the external world without any tools – they only increase efficiency of our efforts – and the situation of the theoretical function is the same.

The second type are sign functions, meaning that in their case the self-realization of the subject requires the medium of the sign. Those are the symbolic and the aesthetic functions. In self-realization through the symbolic function, one reality is transformed into a sign of other reality, which cannot otherwise be accessed – the most lucid example Mukařovský uses is the doctrine of transubstantiation: through bread and wine as symbols we can exclusively experience the body and blood of Christ. What is important is the fact that a symbol essentially is what it symbolizes, bread is the body of Christ and wine is His blood. The aesthetic function also transforms the reality it dominates into a sign. But it is a sign sui generis – unparalleled to any other type of signs. The aesthetic sign, it means any reality against which subject has self-realized through the aesthetic function, is an autonomous sign with dual reference. Firstly it refers just and only to itself, hence its autonomy, secondly, as derived from the first, it refers as a whole to the whole of universe, or how Mukařovský also describes this second way of reference, it refers to the totality of experience of the recipient. Those two types of reference of the aesthetic sign are crucial for our inquiry. However we must delay for a while the general investigation of the function.

It’s been mentioned, that function, as a common name for four basic types of functions, is in a certain way a priori. Now we have to explain it. One way in which the functions are a priori derives from the fact that they belong not to any particular subject, but to subjectivity itself, to general subject. This general subject Mukařovský calls anthropological organization of human being which he defines as what “is common to all humans regardless of time, space and belonging to society.” That indeed indicates that anthropological organization precedes any possible experience as any existence can take place exclusively in time and space and generally in social context.

However this is not a priori in the strictly Kantian sense, because otherwise there are no doubt present our previous experiences with it. If we return to the first quotation about perception and function – we do learn how to use things.
Does this mean that contradiction arises? Of course it doesn’t. Mukařovský is not reducing humans to their anthropological organization, on the contrary, he is strictly focused on the situatedness of individual human being. What is functional in theoretical description of subject relationship to the world is in the manifestation of individual human existence called “attitude”. It doesn’t mean that function and attitude are the same thing. As Mukařovský points out on the example of the practical function, it determines the activity of a carpenter as well as a merchant or a diplomat. It is yet obvious, that their activities distinctly diverge whilst substantially it is the same activity. It is the same because their attitude, practical attitude, is in all instances governed by the practical function. What they diverge in are the means and tools they use. Though the energy of their self-realizing activity is the very same, its form can greatly differ. This form shapes the energy of function into an attitude as well as it shapes its means and tools. The term which denotes this form is norm. Mukařovský describes the connection of function and norm, which can be taken as the definition of attitude, in the following words: “The term norm is inseparable from the term function, whose implementation norm carries out. Forasmuch this realization assumes an activity towards a certain goal, we have to admit, that a limitation, which organizes such activity, itself has the nature of the energy.” Henceforth we can describe the dynamics of human existence. It’s the energy of our functional self-realization realized through “the regulative energetic principle,” as the norm is defined. Since we have said, that function could be understood as the frame for the constitution of the meaning, the norm can be considered as the concept, which makes this meaning meaningful. Mukařovský illustrates this discovery by the example of a forest. “It’s well known – and is often used in humorous literature, that people of different occupation, whilst dealing with the same matter, see it different: for woodman it is plant culture, for carpenter it’s stockpile of timber, for hunter it’s hiding for game and if we please for children it’s place where raspberries and strawberries can be found.” In a word – they all see the forest as they normally experience it. Within the dynamics of attitudes we can see a correlation of a priori of transcendental subjectivity and a posteriori of normatively regulated experience. Unlike functions, which are situated in anthropological organization that lies, so to speak, out of time, space and social conditions, norms are the exact opposite. They determine historical, local and social conditioning. We can further, thanks to characterization of attitude, describe the mechanism by which universal character of human possibilities is embodied into concrete vivid reality of individual being situated in distinctive historical, local and social conditions.
Since there are four elementary functions, there analogically have to be four elementary types of attitudes – practical, theoretical, magic-religious (two most common domains of symbolic function) and aesthetic. From this moment onwards we will focus only on the problem of aesthetic attitude as it is prerequisite to aesthetic experience from whose perspective we want to elucidate the problem of perceptual experience and experiencing perception and its social conditions.

_Pars pro toto_ for any object of aesthetic experience is the work of art. Mukařovský defines the work of art as an object “with the predominance of aesthetic function.” As such object can be experienced only in aesthetic attitude, there has to be a specific set of norms. There are four types of norms present in the work of art. First type of norms is that of a material used – we cannot do the same in oil or watercolours, in stone or bronze. The most explicit example can be made by pointing out to language, which is essentially a set of norms that differ from language to language, from time to time, from one social context to another. The second one is what we can call “technical norms”. Those are for example metric schemes in poetry or traditional musical forms – i.e. technical conventions taught in schools of arts. The third type represents those aesthetic norms which are older than the work of art, yet still considered actual at the moment of its origin. Those are partially fulfilled and partially breached unless the work of art is treated as passé or totally disregarded. These three types have a common nature, hence they are called _aesthetic norms in the strict sense_. However, the fourth type of norms present in most of the works of art is rather different, than those previous three ones. It includes all the other norms represented in the work of art. Those could be ethical, philosophical, religious, social, economic or any other norms, which shape the world of human life practice. They are of course not aesthetic by their nature, but they become aesthetic by the fact of the presence in a work of art. Or more precisely, they become aesthetic by being seen in the aesthetic attitude.

I have announced, that I’d like to show how both the broad and the narrow sense of the term aesthetic are two sides of the same coin and how from the perspective of Aesthetics the problem of perceptual experience and its social conditioning could be approached. Now, having summarized the core of aesthetic conception elaborated by Jan Mukařovský, we can explicate the questions with which we started, using the verses quoted at the beginning.

The lyrical subject of those verses tells us about his perceptual experience. He says that he hears and sees what the others cannot. Most importantly, he also mentions the condition under which he has this experience. “Leaving people, apart to be//I see what others cannot see”, he says. What is this condition? Is it merely contemplative solitude of a hermit or is it a more profound
kind of “leaving”? I suggest the second one. This “leaving people, apart to be” is more than the pursuit of solitude, it is a certain kind of a distance which defines aesthetic attitude. This leaving of people means distancing from what characterizes them as people. It means distancing from what is human in the sense how the term is used in Ortega y Gasset’s essay “The Dehumanization of Art”. As Ortega y Gasset describes the attitude of the painter, i.e. aesthetic attitude, it is the opposite of our normal everyday experience. Our everyday experience is that of lived reality, as Ortega y Gasset says, human reality. We are interested in it as in such habitual experience. We are interested in things, people and situations. However the painter in Ortega y Gasset’s example is inhuman as he is not interested in the man dying in front of him.

Our perspective in this paper, however, isn’t the perspective of Ortega y Gasset but it is that of Jan Mukařovský’s structural aesthetics. And we have said that the leading energy of the aesthetic attitude is the aesthetic function, which is purely human, as it lies in the anthropological organization of human being. That contradiction must be explained. As we’ve said, function is the energy of the self-realization of a subject vis-à-vis external world and it thus defines subjectivity in general. What makes this subjectivity concrete is an attitude understood as the realization of a function through a norm. We can therefore say that it is the norm what characterizes life practice. Norm is what makes the reality of experience human. Human reality is the reality of normalized (conceptualized) knowledge of the world. And this is what we are distanced from when lingering in an aesthetic attitude. Thus the condition of the lyrical subject of the verses is the condition of being in an aesthetic attitude which has been characterized as disinterested in that what makes reality human: the norms. But as we’ve also mentioned above, norms are indeed present in a work of art. It means that we have not dealt with the paradox yet.

The fact of the presence of human reality or that of concepts (norms in our terminology) in aesthetic experience is the reason for the critique of the middle-class taste of the 19th century, in case of Ortega y Gasset, or for excluding fine arts from pure aesthetic judgment in the case of Kant. Similarly Husserl, in his letter to Hugo von Hoffmannstahl, sees the presence of world existentials in a work of art as distortion of pure aesthetic state. However Mukařovský offers such description of aesthetic attitude, which makes all these objections irrelevant. “The Aesthetic function projects into reality such unifying principle of an attitude which a subject takes towards it. However such an attitude can only be projected into reality in that way in which this attitude, on its way to its projection, undergoes its objectivation through aesthetic sign.” As we have
mentioned, the aesthetic sign, in its double way of reference, was crucial for our investigation. Now we can elaborate this statement.

The first type of reference is the reference just and only to itself. In this case we are not – in our experience of such sign – interested in its context. When someone tells us about their holiday, we are interested in where they were, what they saw and what happened. We are interested in *them* and *their* holiday. And when we do not trust them as they may have the tendency to, so to speak, “tell stories”, what interests us is whether things happened the way we are told or not. On the contrary, this is what we are definitely not interested in when we read *Two Years’ Vacation* by Jules Verne. In that case, we are interested in the reading for its own sake. We are not interested in the existence of what the sign refers to, as we are in the first case, because the book we read (in an aesthetic attitude) as an aesthetic sign refers to itself, to what is written and how.

Beside this first way of reference, and also derived from it, there is the second one, which is the reference to the totality of recipient’s experience or, as it is also described, to the universe as a whole. The question is how to understand this second type. As the aesthetic sign arises in self-realization of a subject through aesthetic function, which can be understood as purposiveness in Kantian sense, in the first type of reference it leads to no sense, it has no purpose in Kantian sense. But what is obvious is that works of art, as far as we are able to appreciate them, have sense, no matter how ambivalent it can be. To answer that, we have to go back to the last quotation. It says that the aesthetic function projects into reality a unifying attitude, which the subject assumes towards it. This attitude Mukařovský sometimes calls overall attitude. And there lies the answer to the second type of reference of aesthetic sign. This overall attitude means that when a subject is self-realizing through aesthetic function, no constitution of sense is possible. Therefore aesthetic function attaches to itself all the other functions – practical, theoretical and symbolic – and through them it constitutes the sense in dialectical motion of the process of reception. However, in the aesthetic attitude the aesthetic function remains in the position of dominance, hence the sense which is constituted through its dialectical counterparts, the other functions, remains tentative and is not considered as something that exists. Mukařovský describes this as follows: “Aesthetic function alone is not able to constitute the full sense of the sign it creates – that is for its lack of purpose, but it is this purpose which relates other non-aesthetic functions to certain areas of or aspects of reality which are projected into those functions as their ‘content’. (…) Into an aesthetic sign, what a work of art is, those non-aesthetic functions bring the concrete content and thus they connect it with reality outside of it.” As far as the aesthetic function is decisive in the aesthetic attitude it can’t constitute the
sense, therefore it attaches all other functions and organizes them in the process of the constitution of the sense. And that is the reason, why the attitude which belongs to an aesthetic function is called overall. That is because all of the elementary functions are involved in it. Under the organizing force of the aesthetic function all other functions constitute the sense of what is perceived. Therefore the second type of reference of an aesthetic sign can be called reference to the totality of recipient’s experience, because all of the functions through which any possible experience can be established are present in an aesthetic attitude. In what way can this reference be also a reference to the universe as a whole is related to the problematic of norm and will be explained further.\textsuperscript{13}

Now we can finally turn to the problematic of norm, i.e. the conditions of reality experienced as human, and explicate how it relates to the aesthetic experience. The last quotation of Mukařovský describes the aesthetic attitude as a self-reflexive attitude in which the relation between subject and object is objectivised. It means, according to conclusions above, that in the aesthetic experience we are focused on the process of experiencing itself, objectivised by the aesthetic sign. It means inclusive of its conditions – the norms. Due to the first type of reference of an aesthetic sign, we are disinterested in the norms in what they mean in life practice – human reality – and such we can see (experience) them as norms – conditions in which reality is meaningful for us. In our everyday practice of life we do take the world as a fact. We exist in the world as in reality which is given to us through an untold set of norms, conditions, of which we are not aware, we do not reflect on their conditioning force. They are for us what we call the facts. The situation of such state can be described on the example of juridical norms. We do not reflect their existence until they are breached and we are either punished, as we broke the law, or want the law to be enforced, as we were affected by its violation. This unreflected life under conditions of law is called a decent life. On the contrary, in aesthetic attitude we are focused on them and their force. As the work of art oscillates between fulfilling some norms, to be understood, and breaching some, to be vivid, it provides us with the most important knowledge of ourselves – that we do not just live within the world, but, what’s most important, with it. That the world for us, human world, is not totally unchangeable fact we have to deal with, but that we can also re-figurate it, in a very profound sense, when we change the norms we use to understand the world, the norms within which we exist. In an aesthetic attitude we can see the conditions of our existence, from those elementary – conditions of perception – to those most complex – philosophical, political, social, etc. – according to the perspective provided by concrete set of norms represented by the work of art.
To See What Others Cannot See...

As the poem “Song about love” written by Jaroslav Seifert, from which we cited verses, lets us experience, in love we can experience even the impossible, because, as the last verse says: “The most beautiful, is the craziest one.” And perhaps, we can in an aesthetic experience, through the reflection on conditions of our existence it provides, realize that what we consider as natural is not natural at all but that it is a result of historical, local or social conditions we embraced and are no longer aware of. Maybe sometimes when we see something, it doesn’t mean it is so. It might be that we see it so because of social or any other conditioning. And that’s why we are capable of assuming aesthetic attitude – to see HOW we see – no matter if the level is the one of perception or the one of knowledge.

Notes:
1. All translations from Czech have been made by the author.
3. Ibid., p. 69.
4. Ibid., p. 77.
5. Ibid., p. 74.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 56.
8. Ibid., p. 127.
9. Distance, concretely psychical distance, is the condition for an aesthetic experience described by E. Bollough in his paper „Psychical Distance” as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle.
11. As we may see, the aesthetic attitude described by Mukařovský thus fulfils another Kant´s characterization of aesthetic judgement – purposiveness without a purpose.
13. According to what we said, the aesthetic sign could be understood in analogies with Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies. The first type of reference could be seen as “purposiveness without a purpose” (Kant) or as “modification of neutrality” (Husserl), the second type could be taken for “free play of the faculties” (Kant) or for “counter-noema” (Husserl).

JAKUB VOTROUBEK –
Email address: jakub.votoubek@seznam.cz
Affiliation: Charles University (Czech Republik)
PART THREE
Transacting Values
As is frequently observed, we live in an age of simulation. Replicas, reproductions, and digital images distribute art and artifacts far and wide. Indeed, simulation so permeates postmodern societies that some theories maintain that there is no longer any need to experience an object first-hand. Since there are no single, unique objects any more, the reasoning goes, the value formerly attached to being “in the presence” of the “real thing” has dissipated. Is this true? Does the experience of reproductions – copies, images, simulacra – satisfactorily supplant the experience of originals altogether? Is it simply retrograde to continue to value the presence of the real thing? I am going to argue that the answer is No – with due acknowledgement that every word in that italicized phrase, including “of” and “the,” is contestable.¹

There are certainly many reasons to applaud the multiplication and distribution of images. Many museums now make their collections available on websites, a boon to those unable to travel or who desire information quickly. Constraints of time mean that the virtual form is often the only one that we shall ever encounter. Moreover, some archeological sites, such as the basilica at ancient Sparta and Scotland’s St. Andrews’ cathedral, are being reconstructed virtually while leaving their material vestiges alone, a technique that actually benefits the preservation of the original substances. Perhaps the past is actually better rendered for us by means of the extraordinary simulacra that circulate information about its qualities, because the experience we can have by means of representations of all sorts is both available to many and superior in quality to encounters with whatever fragile fragments might still persist.

This last point is important, for it is easy to be misled about the material legacy that remains to us. Even if some original object is preserved – the Ishtar Gate, the Sistine Chapel ceiling, the Erie Canal terminus – it may require massive
restoration or even rebuilding, including replacement of missing or damaged components with replica parts. As they accumulate, those replacement parts become the objects we experience, even if we are right before an original site. As a consequence, we can easily fool ourselves about being in the presence of the real thing – if “real thing” means the exact original object.

In spite of the cogency of these considerations, however, I want to argue that simulacra or replicas can by no means supplant genuine objects, because the experience of the genuine is in principle not transferable to its representations, no matter what form they may take. In the work on this topic that I’ve done so far, I have collected numerous testimonies confirming this view, including this one: In early 2009 on the occasion of the two-hundredth anniversary of Abraham Lincoln’s birth, it was reported that:

When the Library of Congress put the original Gettysburg address on display, the line was blocks long. But when they submitted a “modern facsimile so accurate that the naked eye of an untrained person could not tell the difference”… there was no line. People wanted to see the authentic document, the one that Lincoln touched.²

I too would only wait in line to see the original – the genuine – Gettysburg Address. Or the real Hope Diamond rather than a paste replica, although I am quite sure I could not tell the difference. Or the actual Spirit of St. Louis that Lindbergh flew across the Atlantic; the extant fragments of the Ishtar Gate that once was a portal to Babylon; the original medieval walls that once protected the city of Krakow.

But why? Often there is no perceptual means to distinguish the original object from an excellent substitute. If one cannot tell just by looking whether an object received the touch of its maker, is its status as genuine still relevant, such that the original but not the copy is worth visiting? Does only the original broadcast an “aura,” to invoke Walter Benjamin’s famous term? Without the ability to distinguish original from copy, how could we tell which one has the aura? Or to put the question in more general terms, is there an aesthetically relevant difference between genuine object and good copy, such that the one but not the other evokes a particular kind of aesthetic encounter? I believe there is.

There are obvious historical differences that separate replica or fake from original, and there can be ethical ones as well, as with cases of forgery or willful misattribution. Because artworks and other artifacts are marketable, there certainly are economic differences to be reckoned with. But aesthetic properties seem to rest on the perceivable “surface” of objects – the way they look or sound, and the effects of their appearance on emotional response, imagination, or insight. If this be the case, the perceptual experience of an object encompasses
its aesthetic properties in their entirety. No perceptual difference would seem to entail no aesthetic difference.

Actual experience, however, puts this thesis to the test. Those visiting the Library of Congress cherish the opportunity to come face to face with a physical object that is identified as the Gettysburg Address. They are not there to read it. There is nothing to learn by seeing the paper that Lincoln wrote and no moral message to ponder that could not be prompted by other means. The only reason to view the Gettysburg Address is just to do so – to visit an important artifact penned by a compelling president. Therefore this example, and numerous others like it, invites exploration of the grounds for according homage to the real thing aesthetic standing – which, I believe, aptly characterizes encounters with the genuine. This variety of aesthetic standing is independent of quality of appearance or artistic status; it alludes to an encounter valued for its own sake – savored for what it is.

This claim about aesthetic standing obviously needs justification, and a complete defense would overrun the space I have at my disposal here. Just one observation: I believe that the experience of a genuine object – providing that is of sufficient importance to merit that label – has its own “feel,” a distinctive phenomenology. In the words of historian David Lowenthal, “The shiver of contact with ancient sites brings to life their lingering barbarity or sanctity, and merely touching original documents vivifies the thoughts and events they described.” To this sentiment I add an appeal: Imagine the difference between the experience of the Paleolithic paintings at Lascaux (which is now closed to visitors), in comparison with the effect of the same images from the reproduction cave erected for tourists at Lascaux II.

They might look the same. However, I speculate that underlying encounters with the genuine is the operation of another sense, the sense of touch, which philosophers from Aristotle to Bertrand Russell to contemporary theorists have considered the sense that, while not infallible, seems to give us the most reliable access to external physical reality. Touch provides a sense of being in the very presence of an object – within touching distance. The urge to touch is common when encountering objects singled out for their age and historical uniqueness. This is the case even though the reigning requirements now maintained by museums and other places where objects of rarity or age are kept usually prohibit touching their objects. In this circumstance, their very nearness stands in place of actual touch, and proximal acquaintance is the event to savor. This is not necessarily a great diminution of experience, for the role of touch in the experience of the genuine is almost entirely non-sensuous. That is, there is no special tactile sensation of the genuine in itself, and sometimes it suffices just to be nearby.
Just what is the appeal of being in the presence of an object, mere proximity with which is accorded value? It seems to be centered, at least in part, on the impression that the act of touching possesses a kind of transitivity – that by being in contact with an object, one becomes a link in a chain of touch that unites others who have touched the same thing – a creating hand, a historical event, past possessors – rather in the way that a magnet transmits its attraction through a chain of paperclips. This appeal can spread in many directions: it appears to connect us to a bygone moment, to bestow awe before venerable historical monuments, wonder at the continued existence of objects of great age, and sentimental attachment to souvenirs, keepsakes, and family heirlooms.

The impression of the transitivity of touch, however, is rather difficult to justify. The chain of paperclips occurs because of magnetism, not perceptually discernible in itself but known indisputably to be in operation. But what can we posit as the equivalent of magnetism for the transitivity of touch? The value I accord genuineness and the accompanying evocation of “presence” with art and historical artifacts may sound dangerously like what is termed “magical” thinking, whereby an object is irrationally endowed with a property that it does not actually possess, as is demonstrated in the worship of fetishes and relics and in superstitious practices, such as the King’s Touch or knocking on wood for luck. All of these phenomena are related to the problems that Benjamin pointed out with the notion of “aura.”

Magical thinking was first explored as a symptom of primitive mentalities and decried for its lack of rational justification. In his popular analysis of religion and magic of 1890, *The Golden Bough*, James Fraser identified so-called contagious magic, which describes a way of thinking that conceives of touch as imparting a quality from one object to another, thereon capable of being passed to the next generation of those who touch.

Contagious magic proceeds upon the notion that things which have once been conjoined must remain ever afterwards, even when quite disjoined from each other, in such a sympathetic relation that whatever is done in one must similarly affect the other.5

Embarrassingly enough, contagious magic turns out not to be confined to primitive or antique societies. It has turned up in contemporary psychological experiments and is now surmised to be a fairly widespread feature of certain kinds of affective responses. According to psychologists Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff, one form of magical thinking follows the same sort of “law” of contagion that Fraser remarked on, whereby the touch of one object imparts an indelible quality to another. It seems to operate on an intuitive principle that maintains that “when objects make physical contact, essences may be permanently
transferred.” This means that things once touched appear to retain the effects of that contact. With such objects, “their history, which may not be represented in their appearance, endows them with important properties.” This psychological phenomenon seems precisely to be at work in the distinction between the thrill one experiences before an object that one believes to be the real thing – that is, to have the history one believes it to have – and the interest taken in a replica so exact that it is perceptually indiscernible from the original.

Psychologist Paul Bloom also explores magical thinking in his popular book, *How Pleasure Works* (2010). Bloom claims that there is a universal, transcultural value for the importance that touch can impart to objects. This phenomenon is traceable to the tendency of the human mind to adopt what Bloom terms “essentialism,” that is, to believe that objects (both categories of objects and individual objects) have essences. Under certain circumstances most people believe – or behave as if they believe – that the essence of one object can transfer to another by means of touch. This accounts for the values that lead us to preserve certain objects from the past long beyond their use, for the histories of objects become part of their essence. For example, the essence of Chopin transfers to the musician’s piano, such that people revere the piano for the traces of Chopin that it retains. Of course, there are multiple layers of value assumed by such sentiments, including those that concern the value of the original object or person that generates the transfer of essence by touch. If the original is sufficiently significant, even fragments remain precious, providing that those fragments are really the “true” remains of the original.

The skeptic is likely to claim that the sense of presence that touch conjures up is merely a *projection* from the imagination of the beholder onto an object. Projection involves finding in some object an imaginary quality that is really in your own head, so the diminution of aura surrounding an object whose misidentification is discovered simply indicates a change of attitude. Genuine-ness therefore fails to qualify as an object of aesthetic encounters. If the skeptic is feeling indulgent, he might kindly allow that the experience so achieved might *feel* genuine and as such have its own value, but this worth is quite apart from any qualities to be found in the *object*. A second way to reach this conclusion would be to argue that while the cause of an experience may be different from what one thought it was, the nature of the cause does not affect the nature of the experience. With deception, *cause* and *intentional object* come apart. So according to this line of thought, we can keep “genuine” attached to experience but detached from aspects of the object that would warrant a change of aesthetic response.

In the skeptic’s arsenal is the undeniable fact that discovery that an object is not genuine depends upon information from purely “external” sources, such as
the historical record or an arrest for fraud. If the mistaken identity never comes to light, one might maintain that the value of that experience remains intact. This position would regard aesthetic encounters as self-validating, in effect endorsing the view that ignorance is bliss. I consider this a mistake, for one can be deceived about the object of one’s aesthetic attention. Once one admits the possibility of deception about the object of experience, then the importance of not being deceived – and therefore of having as one’s target a genuine object – is not only apparent but mandatory.

This is readily recognized if we shift focus for a moment away from aesthetic encounters and consider other sorts of intentional states with affective valence, namely emotions. Mistaking the object of an emotion demonstrably changes that emotion – and without prejudice. The cases most pertinent to compare with genuineness involve persons and the sentiments they arouse before and after the discovery of imposture. Romantic or filial love, for instance, changes radically upon discovery that the object of affection is not who he claims to be. (Many a plot of fairy tale or drama rides on this fact.) As with persons, so with experiences of objects that are sought because of the particular histories they are taken to possess. One can be in error about the identity of the object before one, in which case discovery of error brings about a change in affect. However, this is by no means necessarily a symptom of mere projection; it is a common characteristic of nonfungible intentional states – those directed at unique objects – in which category I would place aesthetic encounters of the sort in question.

In short, genuineness can in no way be considered a merely projected property. It is a literal property of an object that refers to the conditions under which it came into being. It is not a directly perceptual property, but we do not value things only because of their perceptual properties. Many things, including other persons, we also value because of what or who they are. The alteration of response when misattribution is discovered is very like the alteration of response in cases of mistaken identity. If some aura appears to dim, it is not because an object was previously endowed with projected fantasy, but because the discovery of error reveals that the encounter was with the wrong object. Aesthetic sentiment, like appropriately directed emotion, does not bestow qualities on its objects; it recognizes them. Now let me tie this disquisition about deception back to genuineness and the transitivity of touch.

The errors we are prone to make about objects come in at least two varieties: being wrong about the worth of a valued object, and being wrong about the identity of the object. Both confirm that genuineness must reside on the object’s side and never purely on the side of experience – no matter how pleasant the experience or how permanent the error. But the possibility of errors and of
deception presents real practical problems, including decisions about how to display and protect historical artifacts that are also part of a living environment. Although physical objects tend to be more durable than human bodies, they are just as much heirs to fortune as we are, and they may be important enough to keep intact through repair and restoration. One can order degrees of genuineness, from the first real thing, to that thing after it has been damaged and repaired, to the same thing that is later restored, then replicated, then reproduced… and so forth. Somewhere along the line the physical identity of the original object is left behind and the experience of the past that it evokes dwindles. Altering an object in order to preserve it from destruction or decay raises important complications about what counts as genuine and the role of touch in its encounters. How much change is too much? When does the past cease to be embodied in persisting artifacts, leaving only deception in its place?

These questions are dramatized by a distinction drawn in the early twentieth-century by art historian Alois Riegl. Riegl distinguished between the historical value of an artifact from the past and its age value. Historical value is full of cognitive significance, for by means of ancient things we can discover information about technologies that were formerly in use, ways of life, material culture, and many other aspects of life in bygone times. In order to retain an object's historical value, it may be necessary not only to preserve it for future generations, but also to restore it so that its original features are present again. Restoration involves repair and replacement of parts with good replica components, and the result might mean that the object with maximum historical value is, materially speaking, in large part quite new. Age value is different. An object with age value displays the wear and tear of time. It is noticeably damaged, perhaps in fragments, and any attempt to repair the object compromises its age value. Ironically, to preserve age value, one must allow the object to deteriorate. Therefore, age value is in principle of relatively short duration. However, it is age value that might well deliver the most intense aesthetic encounter with an object from the past, precisely because it manifests that past and the time that extends between then and now. Age value is more apt to generate a sense of presence and of being literally in touch with the past.

Quite apart from repairing structures so that they are not actually dangerous, how much restoration is optimum if the aesthetic encounter with the past is to be delivered? How much can the age value of artifacts be sustained in a place that also occupies a flourishing present? (For after all, we do not live in museums.) I don't have a principled answer to these questions. But there does seem to be a paradox of preservation that creates an unavoidable dilemma: the best restored artifact is also the one that is most likely to bring about aesthetic deception in the course of an encounter with the past.
Notes:


7. “A mere thing that has been touched by a special person gains value, which is one reason why people pay a lot for objects such as JFK’s tape measure.” Paul Bloom, *How Pleasure Works*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2010, p. 79.


CAROLYN KORSMEYER

Email address: ckors@buffalo.edu
Affiliation: University at Buffalo (USA)
From the point of view of the political aesthetics outlined in the paper, cities are complex embodiments of various forms of symbolic values and goods which play a number of instrumental roles, but are also endowed with autotelic status and for this reason cannot be fully reduced to their instrumental usefulness. For they play not only the role of external values for urban practices, but also the role of internal ones, and as such they must be perceived as constitutive for them. Accordingly, from the perspective of the political aesthetics, the city as a specific cultural formation is a place of creation, accumulation, transmission, distribution and consumption of cultural goods and symbolic values. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate their constitutive role for the practices of contemporary urban life, and to stress the importance of the principles of justice in them.

**Justice in the City**

The city may be understood as a complex embodiment of human excellence in various arts: planning, engineering, construction, but also in the political art of managing the social and moral life. At the same time the city was the birthplace of the arts and of their growth. Moreover, the arts, in a self-referential gesture, often turn their attention to the city itself in order to reflect upon it, depict it, and explain it. In other words, the city cannot be understood without reference to the arts, which have been its symbolic precondition, but also the arts cannot be fully understood without reference to the city, i.e. the milieu which made them possible. The above justifies the claim that the city is a work of art, but also that art is a work of the city. One of the subject of the political aesthetics in the sense delineated below is precisely this dialectic interrelationship of urban spaces and the arts as a means of understanding, description and formation of the city.
Symbolic Justice

Below I focus my attention on a theoretical framework of Political Aesthetics whose aim is to tackle the problems of justice in the social distribution of symbolic values. By symbolic values I understand the goods of knowledge, culture and arts, which are socially constituted and constitutive for the communities which create them, endowed with an autotelic status different from the natural and instrumental goods, and irreducible to them. On the theoretical plane these problems require the construction of a novel paradigm and methodology of political aesthetics, based upon a re-establishment of the role of philosophy in contemporary urban studies. They also involve an empirical diagnosis of the access of urban residents to symbolic goods in contemporary cities, and the formulation of a conception of social justice in access to symbolic goods.

Politics, ethics, aesthetics

The idea of the political aesthetics grows from a critical appraisal of the traditional views of this discipline which delimited its scope to perceptual cognitive processes, perception of the aesthetic values embodied in artistic objects or natural phenomena, or to specific subjective impressions generated by these objects. It also grows from a critical appraisal of the present political philosophy, which, in a search for the specificity of its subject, unduly delimits the scope of its interests. The aim of the political aesthetics is to retrieve the intimate connection between moral, political and aesthetic values, and to demonstrate its contemporary relevance. The relationship between them needs to be unveiled through the analysis of the seminal works in these areas, as well as of the moral, political and aesthetic practices. The stress laid upon the aesthetic sphere and its relationship with politics and ethics opens a possibility to formulate a theoretical apparatus for the description and explanation of the phenomena of aesthetisation of social and political life, especially in the contemporary urban spaces.

The Political Aesthetics

The political aesthetics outlined here is understood as a philosophical discipline investigating the processes of perception, disclosure and understanding of political problems arising in the spaces of human life, and embodied in political practices, patterns of human behaviour, customs and artefacts of culture. The task of the political aesthetics is to explain these problems, diagnose them, and to formulate possible practical solutions to them.
The Problem of Justice in Distribution of Symbolic Values...

The political aesthetics assumes that the socially informed ability of human orientation in the environment by means of perception cannot be reduced to the perception of the aesthetic aspect of the arts or natural objects, and encompasses all aspects of the perceptible in all spaces of human life. It also assumes that concepts and categories worked out by the traditional aesthetics – beauty, the sublime, symmetry, harmony, proportion, etc. – may be of great importance in understanding the phenomena social and political life. The task of the political aesthetics involves also a hermeneutics of perception necessary for the application of the traditional aesthetic ideals and values to the phenomena of social life.

A broad understanding of aesthetic categories enables a reinterpretation of many forms of human conduct as symptoms of a deep-seated need to organise the spaces of human life in accordance with aesthetic norms and requirements. Most especially, however, since it is assumed that aesthetic norms and values are the most common and particularly repressive means of control of social behaviour, it helps to explain the key role played by aesthetic categories in the constitution of divisions and distinctions responsible for exclusions, hierarchies and stratifications of societies, i.e. forms of social injustice.

The Concept of Space

Among the basic concepts of the political aesthetics is the category of space and its production; the conditions of its transformations; and the subjects taking part in, and affected by, these processes. The concept of space adopted here is, naturally, a socio-philosophical rather than physical one. The spaces of human life have to be understood as the products of the historically transforming social practices. This enables to view them as loci of continuous and wholesale transformation of human life. It seems to me that the following spaces need to be distinguished and analysed: the natural, social, public, private and intimate space, as well as the recently emerged cyberspace. The pluralist approach to the concept of space is meant to replace the dualist view of the problem, based upon the distinction between the “private” and the “public” spaces; these two categories of space are not precise enough to capture the complex social phenomena, and are not amenable to an adequate definition.

The spaces or spheres of human life, while they incessantly intersect, are distinct from each other: the social aspects of human life are not identical with their public ones, and both are distinguishable from the private and intimate spheres. The intimate space is a part of the private one, but cannot be wholly reduced to it for it is created by the needs which cannot be satisfied by activities in any of the remaining spaces.
The evolution of the forms of social life has generated norms which regulate the conduct of individuals within each of these spaces, as well as at their intersections. Individuals function in these spaces as formed by nature and culture. They enter them as individuals, and as members of communities. Each of these spheres has its own history, and is governed by its own norms, which require compliance to them. Actions done in each of them have moral and political consequences, and are subject to an aesthetic assessment, for aesthetic categories constitute an integral part of human orientation in the spaces of human life.

The Agonistic Nature of the Spaces of Human Life

The spaces of human life are to be understood as areas of an agonistic rivalry for the recognition in the Hegelian sense, which is entered by individual and collective subjects alike. According to this view, the spaces of human life are constituted by objective conflicts and oppositions, which account for their incessant dynamics. This feature of theirs may be exemplified by saying that a place once occupied by an individual in such spaces cannot be claimed as her permanent property, for while returning to it, she will often find it occupied, no less legitimately, by another person. It is this facet of the spheres of human life which turns them into places of ceaseless rivalries. This also means that functioning in them involves a continuous effort; to be in human spaces is to be prepared for a struggle for a place in them. From this perspective also the urban spaces are loci of the continuous and wholesale transformation of human life.

Spectacularisation of Social Life

In order to grasp the processes of spectacularisation, especially in their present forms, it is helpful to re-interpret of the controversial philosophical epistemological claim that to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). This principle, which has served to express radical epistemological subjectivism, enables one to interpret contemporary societies as dominated by the culture of visibility. Accordingly, one may say that in order to be in the contemporarily constituted spaces of human life is to be perceived in them. Many forms of the rivalry in social and public spaces are about being noticed by others; the rules of these rivalries thus constitute the rudimentary forms of the social distribution of goods. The spaces are thus continuously partitioned, and their partitions form the basic mode of the distribution of social goods. Due to the transformation of the nature of production and consumption, in virtue of which the material production is now increasingly superseded by the production of immaterial goods, the social life undergoes the
processes of spectacularisation. The emergence of the mass media in them is of paramount importance, for through the privileging of the culture of visibility, it leads to the aesthetisation of social relations and to the spectacularisation of politics.

**Commodification of Spaces**

The above has become a precondition of the commodification of symbolic goods on an unprecedented scale. In virtue of this development, the access to them is increasingly regulated by market mechanisms. The intensive commodification of public spaces, which in Western societies increasingly determines the forms of participation in them, is responsible for the fact that gaining access to these spaces, and functioning in them, involves an ever-increasing effort. Commodification is responsible for the alienation of individuals in the cities, and it affects the presence and perception of symbolic values in urban spaces. One has to stress also that the commodification and spectacularisation are obviously correlated: the culture of visibility makes the spectacles a much sought-for commodity, while the mass media make them easily marketable. As a result spectacles are now becoming the chief commodity of the contemporary culture, and the production of them is a fast growing industry.

**Distribution of the Symbolic Capital in Urban Spaces**

The social capital is usually understood, on the one hand, as a set of unique values generated by individuals through their involvement in social frameworks, and, on the other, as a set of capabilities and predisposition of individuals toward such a involvement. The symbolic capital in the sense adopted here includes all spheres of meaningful cultural products, capable of exerting influence on human consciousness and, through it, onto the material world. The symbolic capital is conceived as a basic part of the cultural capital with the intellectual capital constituting another its part.

From the perspective of the political aesthetics, cities are unique accumulations of various kinds of capital. The material capital is embodied in their urban infrastructure; citizens as individuals and groups are their human capital; in the urban conditions the human capital is being transformed into a unique social capital. The symbolic capital finds its embodiment in the material structure and infrastructure of cities; it plays a decisive role in the generation of the human capital, and it is crucial for the quality of human relationships, i.e. of the social capital. The specificity of the urban social capital is determined by the exposure of individuals to mutual influences unavailable in non-urban areas.
The political aesthetics thus presupposes a constitutive role of the symbolic capital in the creation of other kinds of capital. Its aim is to explain how material, human and social capitals undergo the processes of creation, transformation and reproduction in virtue of the role played in them by the symbolic capital in urban spaces. The factors active in the transformation of the symbolic capital are, as a rule, local; for this reason the symbolic capital cannot be universalized and performs exclusivist functions. A continuous diagnosis of the correlation between the inequalities in the access to the symbolic and the material capitals, and of structural inequalities in the processes of their transformation, have to be seen as an integral part of the task of the political aesthetics.

The perception of the city both as a work of art and as a cradle of arts has already received more than ample attention in various conceptions of political aesthetics. Some of them stress the fact that cities are places of a variety of forms of inequality which affect also the extent to which their citizens participate in cultural goods. The level of participation of individuals and groups, or classes, in cultural productions, embodied in education, arts and artistic culture, may be taken as a measure of the social access to symbolic values and of the degree of involvement in the creation of symbolic capital. Yet there is something to be added to this, for these issues have also a direct political dimension. The unequal access to cultural goods is as a rule additionally aggravated by the mechanisms of municipal subsidies for cultural productions. Their beneficiaries tend to be members of the local elites who, in virtue of their education and material status, do not need any additional economic incentives to enjoy arts, whereas the majority of the citizenry, especially the economically disadvantaged or otherwise deprived, are not among their beneficiaries. In effect, a lion's share of the taxes, which for the most part come from contributions of the lowest income groups, is being redirected in order to provide a sophisticated entertainment for the elites at the costs of the excluded groups. This widespread mechanism increases the severity of exclusions and significantly contributes to iniquities in many cities. These consequences of the urban aesthetic politics are yet another way to justify the claim that political aesthetic considerations should be an important element in understanding many aspects of urban life.
Introduction

“How can it be that something so culturally specific can at the same time exercise universal attraction?”1 – This can be one of the persistent questions of aesthetics. Here I would like to consider such a question concerning “universality” from the viewpoint of conservation of cultural heritage. The clue is its most global system, that is, the “Convention Concerning Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention” (“WHC”) of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”).

Why from WHC? Or, why does the conservation of heritages become a problem of aesthetics? It may be already acknowledged as a problem of aesthetics,2 but let me here explain.

The modern concept of conservation of heritage is thought to be generated simultaneously with the genesis of modern aesthetics. It is hard to settle when the history of conservation of heritage begins, but it is no doubt that the concept is very modern and the three reports on vandalism in 1794 by French bishop Henri Grégoire played an important role.3 During the French Revolution a significant number of monuments, edifices and cultural properties associated with the ancien régime were destroyed. Grégoire called this iconoclastic movement “vandalism,” reported its damage and appealed to stop (that was possible only after the Termidorian Reaction of 27 July 1794, that is, the end of the Terror). In the third report Grégoire asked: “because the pyramids of Egypt had been built by tyranny and for tyranny, ought these monuments of antiquity to be demolished ... [?]”4 The idea seen here “to de-politicize art”5 is nothing less than “disinterestedness,” one of the features of aesthetic attitude. Conservation of heritage needs to be based not upon the evaluation of the past regime, but upon
that of property as such. The concept of conservation of heritage was therefore generated with the formulation of aesthetic judgment.

But this paper does not concern the history of (the idea of) conservation, but WHC.

1. What is OUV?
1.1. Outline of WHC

WHC aims “to participate in the protection of the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value, by the granting of collective assistance”⁶. For this purpose, State Parties are charged with “ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage ... situated on its territory” and doing so “with any international assistance and co-operation”⁷. State Parties shall “submit to the World Heritage Committee an inventory of property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage” and “the Committee shall establish, keep up to date and publish, under the title of ‘World Heritage List,’ a list of properties forming part of the cultural heritage and natural heritage ... which it considers as having outstanding universal value”⁸. Thus, in order to be inscribed on the World Heritage List, a property needs to be of “Outstanding Universal Value” (“OUV”). However, WHC itself does not explicitly define OUV. Consequently the World Heritage Committee shall fix the criteria for the assessment of it occasionally. Now 10 criteria (6 of cultural and 4 of natural heritage) are prescribed in the “Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention” (“OG”).⁹

1.2. Genesis and Adoption of WHC

It is the crisis of the Abu Simbel temples in Egypt in 1959 that caused the genesis of WHC directly. The decision of the government of Egypt to build the Aswan High Dam was an event that would deluge a valley containing treasures of ancient Egypt such as the Abu Simbel temples. UNESCO then launched a worldwide safeguarding campaign. The Abu Simbel temples were taken apart, moved to a higher location, and put back together piece by piece. This success led to other safeguarding campaigns, such as Venice in Italy and Borobudur in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the Second Congress of Architects and Specialists of Historic Buildings, held in Venice in 1964, adopted the International Charter on the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (the Venice Charter) and requested UNESCO to establish the International Council on Monuments
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and Sites (ICOMOS), now one of the formal advisory bodies to the World Heritage Committee. Advised also by ICOMOS, UNESCO then prepared the draft of the “International instruments for the protection of monuments, groups of buildings and sites of universal value.”

The framework for the protection of natural heritages was, on the other hand, initiated by the United States and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, founded in 1948, also one of the formal advisory bodies to the World Heritage Committee). In 1971, IUCN drafted the “Convention on Conservation of the World Heritage,” which defines the World Heritage as “areas of outstanding interest and value to mankind .... Such areas shall be principally natural areas, but may include areas which have been changed by man.” The United States submitted this draft to the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (of June 1972 in Stockholm).

These two drafts were converged at the Special Committee of Government Experts that took place at UNESCO in April 1972 and the current WHC was adopted at the 17th session of the General Conference of UNESCO on 16 November 1972.

1.3. what is the Problem about OUV?

This process of adoption indicates that the phrase “OUV” is also a compound of “universal value” and “outstanding interest.” What then is the Problem about OUV? In a word, it is the problem caused by the increase of the number of sites inscribed on the List. Now, after the most recent (37th) session of the World Heritage Committee (of June 2013 in Phnom Penh), 981 properties (759 cultural, 193 natural and 29 mixed properties in 160 States Parties) are on the List. But at the beginning the List was supposed to be “limited (about a hundred sites whether in danger or not)” Indeed, in the initial years of the implementation of WHC, only famous sites that “everybody knows about” were some of the first to be inscribed on the List. So in this period there was little room for doubting OUV. After that, however, a variety of properties have been nominated, including those that received no fixed evaluation or were similar to sites that had been already inscribed on the List. The “Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World Heritage List”, launched in 1994, is the result of what the experts discuss on this problem, noting that Europe, historic towns and religious monuments, Christianity, historical periods and “elitist” architecture (in relation to vernacular) were all over-represented on the World Heritage List; whereas, all living cultures, and especially “traditional cultures,” were underrepresented. This realized on the one hand the
List reflecting cultural diversity. On the other hand, this brought an increase in the number of the sites to be inscribed on the List (partly because of the popularity of the World Heritage as an object for tourist consumption), which may not only lower its quality, but also transcend the managerial ability of the World Heritage Committee to support the appropriate conservation of sites. The problem of OUV emerged thus as a dilemma between cultural diversity and ensuring the quality of the List.

Of course, the World Heritage Committee has not just looked at this circumstance without doing anything. Since around the turn of the century, the Committee often requested that a special meeting of experts on the concept of OUV be convened and then two meetings of that kind were held: “Special Expert Meeting of the World Heritage Convention: The Concept of Outstanding Universal Value” in April 2005 in Kazan and “Expert Meeting on Benchmarks and Chapter IV of the Operational Guidelines” in April 2007 in Paris. In the former meeting, Christina Cameron, former chairperson of the Committee, argued in the keynote speech that the understanding of OUV should be shifted from “the best of the best” to “the representative of the best”. And the experts gathered together agreed to respect the paragraph 49 of OG: “Outstanding universal value means cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent protection of this heritage is of the highest importance to the international community as a whole. The Committee defines the criteria for the inscription of properties on the World Heritage List”. Moreover in 2008, ICOMOS published a report on this concept. It contains chapters on the development of this concept, based on official reports, analyses of characteristics, changes in the wordings and uses of the different criteria over the past 35 years, examples of sites listed under each criterion as well as explanations for the non-inscription of specific cases.

After all, the definition and application of OUV may be made by people and be subject to evolution over time, as the experts recognized in the Kazan meeting. If so, I may have no part to play there. But for instance, Sophia Labadi criticizes the 2008 ICOMOS report for “its limited analyses” and instead tries to theorize this concept by referring to concepts such as “reiterative universalism” (Michael Walzer) and “contact zone” (Mary Louise Pratt). This would mean, also as she says, that there is space for further work on the issue of this concept, including a philosophical one. So I will here try another contribution than hers, by referring to a key figure she does not mention, also in order to consider from the origin of the idea of WHC: Alois Riegl.
2. Riegl’s “double” Influence on WHC

2.1. “Age-value” and WHC

In “the Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin (Der moderne Denkmalkultus. Sein Wesen und seine Entstehung)” (1903), written as the preamble to the “Draft of a Legal Organization of the Conservation of Monuments in Austria”, Riegl, the then general conservator of the Imperial and Royal Central Commission for Researching and Preserving of Monuments in Austria, established the modern principles of conservation by classifying and systematizing the values that monuments may possess and then by answering why monuments should be conserved. First, he divides the value of monuments into “commemorative” and “present-day” one and assigns the main part of his study to the former.23 Then he divides the “commemorative” value into “intentional” and “unintentional” one. The former may be the etymologically original one because “monument” derives from the Latin verb “monere” (to remind) and thus etymologically means “anything reminding”,24 but Riegl points out that “when we talk about the modern cult and preservation of monuments, we are thinking not about ‘intentional’ monuments, but about ... monuments of art and history.”25 That is, something can possess value as a “witness of history” and thus become monument, even if it had no intention of reminding anyone of anything. The value of monuments is, however, restricted not only to historical one. Riegl divides “unintentional” value of monuments further into the “historical” and “age-value (Alterswert).” He explains the latter as a value that “springs from our appreciation of the time which has elapsed since it was made and which has burdened it with trace of age”:26 in short, a value of oldness only because of being old. Thus he explains these three values of monuments, namely “intentional commemorative,” “historical” and “age-value,” as “three consecutive phases of the generalization of what a monument means” (ibid.).

When taking Trajan’s Column as an example, as Riegl himself did, it was created at first explicitly to commemorate Trajan’s victory in the Dacian Wars, then preserved because it contains useful information about the Roman Empire and may now (at the time of Riegl) be preserved simply because of being old, as a kind of “ruin”.27

These values of monuments may sometimes conflict with each other. It is characteristic of Riegl as conservator to prefer “age-value” as the aim of conservation. “Modern preservation will have to reckon above all with this [age-value].”28 “From the standpoint of age-value ... one should be concerned with the constant representation of the cycle of creation.”29 Consequently, “[o]nly one thing must be avoided: arbitrary interference by man in the way the monument has developed”.30
This theory of monuments has an influence on the conservation practice after the second half of the 20th century,31 above all on the Venice Charter32. Here I quote some articles from the Charter:

It is essential to the conservation of monuments that they be maintained on a permanent basis.33

The conservation of monuments is always facilitated by making use of them for some socially useful purpose. Such use is therefore desirable but it must not change the lay-out or decoration of the building. It is within these limits only that modifications demanded by a change of function should be envisaged and may be permitted.34

The process of restoration is a highly specialized operation. Its aim is to preserve and reveal the aesthetic and historic value of the monument and is based on respect for original material and authentic documents. It must stop at the point where conjecture begins, and in this case moreover any extra work which is indispensable must be distinct from the architectural composition and must bear a contemporary stamp. The restoration in any case must be preceded and followed by an archaeological and historical study of the monument.35

So the principles as shown here are “conservation as permanent maintenance (rather than social use)” and “minimum restoration based on credible resources for the aesthetic and historic sake, if necessary,” which can be traced back to Riegl’s theory of monuments. It can therefore be said to have an (indirect) influence on the genesis of WHC (via the Venice Charter and the establishment of ICOMOS). Moreover, OG requests that “[t]o be deemed of Outstanding Universal Value, a property must also meet the conditions of integrity and/or authenticity” (Paragraph 78). Also from here we can hear the repercussions of Riegl’s theory.

2.2. “Age-value” As “Universal” Aim of Conservation

However, I have no intention of belonging to the “Riegl-cult”.36 The mantra of “do not restore but conserve!” is attributed not only to Riegl, but also, for example in the 19th century, to John Ruskin, who argued in the “Anti-Scrape” movement that restoration “is a Lie from beginning to end” and advised that “[you should] take proper care of your monuments, and you will not need to restore them”;37 or, among the contemporaries of Riegl, to Georg Dehio, in whose text the mentioned mantra exists directly.38 A comparison between Riegl and Dehio on conservation is of importance here. What separates Riegl from Dehio, in spite of the same mantra in the same time?
“We conserve a monument,” Dehio said, “not because we consider it beautiful, but because it is a piece of our national life. To protect monuments means not to pursue enjoyment, but to practice piety. Aesthetic and even art-historical judgments change, but here an unchanging criterion is found.” What he kept paradigmatically in mind corresponds therefore almost to “historical value” in Riegl. And it is characteristic of Dehio to find the aim of conservation in “national life (nationales Dasein).” It was possible and even self-evident for him to do so, because he spoke from the “periphery” of the German Empire (Königsberg and Strasbourg), as Michael F. Falser points out. On the other hand, it was not possible and self-evident for Riegl, who lived in Vienna, the capital of the multiethnic state Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. So he criticized in “New Stream in the Conservation of Monuments (Neue Strömung in der Denkmalpflege)” (1905) Dehio’s theory for “national egoism (Nationalegoismus).” For Riegl, the “historical value” can never serve as a common aim of conservation because of diversity of historical views each of the nations in the Monarchy possessed. He needed a more common aim that everybody can “feel” (rather than “understand”) than the “historical value.” It is, so I would like to emphasize, not foresighted but inevitable or ad hoc for him to set up the aim of conservation on the “age-value.”

In introducing the “age-value,” Riegl emphasizes its “(aesthetic) universality”:

We have distinguished historical monuments form intentional ones as a more subjective category which remains nonetheless firmly bound up with objects, and now we recognize a third category of monuments in which the object shrunk to a necessary evil. These monuments are nothing more than indispensable catalysts which trigger in the beholder a sense of the life cycle, of the emergence of the particular from the universal and its gradual but inevitable dissolution back into the universal. This immediate emotional effect depends on neither scholarly knowledge nor historical education for its satisfaction, since it is evoked by mere sensory perception. ... The universal validity, which it shares with religious feelings, gives this new commemorative (monument) value a significance whose ultimate consequences cannot yet be assessed. We will henceforth call this the age-value.

I would like to make a proposal to apply this theory of the “age-value” to the problem of OUV, that is, to consider Riegl’s “double” influence on WHC, not only on the idea of authenticity, but also on that of universality.

**Conclusion**

It is one of the biggest problems in the recent implementation of WHC that the recommendations of the advisory bodies concerning inclusion on the List,
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which is supposed to be “based on objective and scientific considerations”, are often overturned “diplomatically” by the World Heritage Committee. Do the properties inscribed in such a way possess the truly “universal” value? The problem of OUV requests a reflection on what the World Heritage Committee should be. It should not be a mere place of diplomacy. Aesthetics (as the theory of aesthetic judgment) must contribute to this purpose.

Again, I have no intention of belonging to the “Riegl-cult”. His theory has also limitations. He could systematize values of monument only “intuitively” (maybe because he was art historian). As mentioned above, however, OUV is now fixed through in-depth discussion. It will be necessary to examine whether and how “discursively universal value” is possible.

Notes:

5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., Article 4.
8. Ibid., Article 11.
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12. As of September 2012, 190 States Parties have ratified the World Heritage Convention.


17. UNESCO, Keynote Speech.

18. UNESCO, Assessment of the conclusions and recommendations of the special meeting of experts (Kazan, Russian Federation, 6-9 April 2005) established by Decision 28 COM 13.1, WHC.05/29.COM/9, 11 Dec. 2013 <http://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/5828>. The report cites from the 2005 version of OG, but there is no difference between the 2005 and the 2013 version concerning the paragraph 49. By the way, does this paragraph, above all the phrase “so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries”, help to understand OUV? In other words, does to be “exceptional” connote “to transcend national boundaries”? Even if it is synonym of “outstanding,” the adjective “exceptional” cannot mean “universal.” It seems to me that the experts concentrated only on “outstanding,” not on “universal,” and it is one of the disadvantages of treating cultural and natural heritage together and thus compounding the phrase “OUV” from “universal value” and “outstanding interest,” as mentioned above.


20. UNESCO, Assessment.


22. Ibid.

23. “Present-day value” is, on the other hand, divided into “use-” and “art-value,” which is further divided into “newness” and “relative art-value.”

24. Also in German, “Denkmal” consists of “denken” (to remember) and “Mal” (mark). “A monument in its oldest and most original sense is a human creation, erected for the specific purpose of keeping single human deeds or events (or a combination thereof) alive in the minds of future generations” (Alois Riegl, “The Modern Cult of...

25. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 32.
28. Ibid., p. 34.
29. Ibid., p. 33.
30. Ibid., p. 32.
34. Ibid., Article 5.
35. Ibid., Article 9.
37. John Ruskin, *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, London 1849, p. 180f.. On the other hand, French architect Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc (the article “restauration” in *Dictionnaire raisonné de l’architecture française du XIe au XVIe siècle*, 1866) was a typical figure among the contemporary of Ruskin that is positive for restoration.
39. Ibid., p. 268.
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42. Riegl, “The Modern Cult of Monuments”, p. 24. Forster and Ghirardo translate the German adjective “allgemein” and its derivative into “general,” but I cite here with the modification into “universal.”

43. Such a theory of universality can be further traced back to that of “universality deduced from disinterestedness” in §6 of Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790).


45. The dichotomy “intuitive - discursive” derives also from §59 of Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

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TAKASHI SUGIWAMA –

Email address: takashisugiyam@yahoo.co.jp
Affiliation: University of Tsukuba (Japan)
1. I would like to begin my presentation with a simple question. “Who is Plato?” The answer is not difficult. “He is a philosopher (in Greek, *philosophos*).” But he is not *merely* a philosopher. He is one of the most influential philosophers in Western Civilization. Alfred North Whitehead said: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” Plato is philosopher of philosophers, king of kings in the realm of philosophy. But I have another answer. “He is a *philokalos*” which means “lover of beauty.” What means that he is *philokalos* rather than *philosophos*?

First, Plato did not compose his works in the form of philosophical argumentative thesis or dissertation. With his works, he could not earn his doctorate [Ph.D.] in our academic system. A Professor may tell him: “I think your work is rich in philosophical points, and your work is beautiful. But the problem lies in writing style. It is not appropriate to the philosophical dissertation at all. If you want to get an academic title in the university, you have to completely rewrite your thesis strictly following the standard rules for formatting academic papers. Your work is like a drama or a poem at most, however philosophical it is.” Ancient biographer Diogenes Laertius said: “Aristotle remarks that the style of the (Plato’s) dialogues is half-way between poetry and prose.” (III 37) Some says that Plato wanted to be tragic poet when he was a young boy. He knows well the attractive power of poetry and the charm of artistic beauty. His beautiful works could attract a lot of people to philosophy. But academic scholars sometimes neglect the aesthetic value of Plato’s works, focusing their attention mainly on the argumentative aspects.

Second, Plato devotes a great part of his dialogues to beauty. In some regard, beauty is the most important concept in Plato’s philosophy. So Plato is a philosopher of beauty; his philosophy is a philosophy of beauty and aesthetics “if
aesthetics is the philosophical inquiry into art and beauty." Generally he is considered a philosopher of the Form (Idea), especially the Form of the good. (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα; Republic 508e2–3) In the Republic, Plato describes the sun as the offspring of the Form of the good. (Republic 508c-509a) In a very similar way that the sun makes physical objects visible and generates life on earth, the good makes all other universals intelligible and provides being to all other Forms. The Form of the good is the ultimate object of knowledge (epistêmê) that humans can successfully pursue or approach with dialektikê, philosophical reasoning. But how is the Form of the good? Plato may answer "It is beautiful". It is like the beginning of the Bible: “Then God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light. And God saw that light was beautiful." (καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεός τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐγέρθη ὁ θεός τὸ φῶς εἰς τὸ καλὸν. Genesis 1:3–4) In the Timaeus, Plato says in a similar way: “When the creator of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity be beautiful.” (ὅτου μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεὶ, τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύνασιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζεται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν. Timaeus 28a-b) This passage implies that the beautiful things are the embodiment of the Ideas, especially of the Form of the good.

2. Even though it is true that, in Plato’s philosophy, justice, truth, equality, beauty, and many other Forms ultimately derive from the Form of the good, I think the Form of beauty should be considered as important as the Form of the good, or more important than the Form of the good. In Hippias Major, Plato shows a discussion between Socrates and Hippias, the conclusion of which is contrary to the Republic’s position: “The beautiful is the cause of the good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα αἴτιόν ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν. Hippias Major 296e-297a) “If, then, the beautiful is the cause of the good, the good would come into being through the beautiful.” (εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ύπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν.) “From what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.”(κινδυνεύει εἰ ὃν εὐρίσκομεν ἐν πατρὸς τινος ἰδέα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Hippias Major 297b) In this regard, Plato thinks the Form of beauty is more important than the Form of the good. So he ought to be entitled ‘philosopher of the Form of beauty’ rather than ‘philosopher of the Form of the good’. He is a philokalos.

In the Symposium the theme of which is Eros, Plato says: “Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances, from observance
to beautiful learning, and from learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to know the very essence of beauty. In that state of life above all others a man finds it truly worthwhile to live, as he contemplates essential beauty.” (ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἅπαντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπί τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπί τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὃ ἔστι σῶσθαι ἔνας ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῶσις αὐτῷ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλὸν. ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ἔφη ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη, εἴπερ ποιεῖν τὴν αὐτήν καὶ τῷ γενεσίου, θεωμένων εὐτυχώς τὸ καλὸν 211c) This passage implies that without the knowledge of the Form of beauty the philosophy cannot be complete, and the life cannot be worthwhile enough to live.

In the Republic, education is defined as “a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day” (ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν. 521c) “the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth.” (αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστών μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ᾽ ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν. 525c) Education is also defined as “the ascension to reality” (τοῦ ὄντος ἐπάνοδον). These educational conversion and ascension can be confirmed to be “true philosophy.” (φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ. 521c) This (philosophical) education consists of “the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being” (μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἀπὸ τὸ ὄν. 521d) For example, geometry which is “the knowledge of that which always is, and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away.” (ὡς τοῦ ἁμα ἂν γιγνομένου, ἄλλα ὅποι τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου καὶ ἀπολλυμένου.) The geometry “would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward.” (ὁλκὸν ἄρα, ὡς γεγοναί, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀληθείαν εἰπὲ ἂν καὶ ἀπεργαστικοῖς ψυχόσφοις διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω σχεῖν ἂν νῦν κάτω ὅποι δέον ἐχομέν. 527b) On the summit of the ascension or in the end of the education, “the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the Form of the good” (τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόις ὀράσθαι. 517b) In this way Plato underlines the Form of the good. But he calls it “kallipois” (=beautiful state; Republic 527c) rather than “agathê polis” (= good state) the city-state with this educational idea and program.

3. Plato uses the word philokalos only twice while the ‘philosoph-‘ stem words are employed 357 times in his writings (109 times in the Republic). Its first appearance is in the Phaedrus. In this dialogue, Plato compares the soul to “the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer.” (συμφύτῳ
δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. 246a) Thus educational ascension is connected to philosophical flight of the soul. The souls that are called immortal can proceed steeply upward to the top of the vault of heaven and behold the things outside of heaven: “the colorless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned… and which is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul.” (ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης μόνω θεατή νῦ, περὶ ἦν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος. 247c-d)

In the following passage, we find the word ‘philokalos’: “the soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature.” (ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλείστα ἱδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ή φιλοκάλου ή μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ. 248d) In this passage, “one of loving nature” (ἐρωτικοῦ) can be understood as philos, lover of wisdom by the aid of the passage from the Symposium: “Wisdom has to do with the most beautiful things, and Love is a love directed to what is beautiful; so that Love must needs be a lover of wisdom (φιλοσ, and, as such, must be between wise and ignorant.” (ἔστιν γὰρ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρως δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλὸν, ὥστε ἅναγκαιν ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. 204a)

And in the Phaedrus “one of a musical nature” (μουσικοῦ τινος) can be also considered a philosopher based on the following passage: “Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment” (Ὁμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὖ ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ συντέθηκε) “if he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them.” (εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ᾗ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδείξει, οidepressον ἔπωνυμιαν ἔχοντας δὲ λέγουσθαι τὸν τοιούτον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων) A poet such as Homer, if he has true knowledge about what he writes, is not merely a poet, but more than a poet. Who is he? Socrates continues: “I think the epithet “wise” is too great and befits God alone; but the name “philosopher,” that is, “lover of wisdom,” or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man” (τὸ μὲν σοφὸν, ὥς Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἤμοιγον μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν: τὸ δὲ ἦν φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτον τι μᾶλλον τε ᾧ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι. Phaedrus 278b-d) That means that poet can be a philosopher.

In the Republic in which Plato vehemently criticizes poets like Homer and Hesiod, we can find a possibility that the poetry can occupy the same place as
philosophy does, on the condition that, by rejecting mimetic art but following philosophical dialectic, the poet becomes a philosopher and arrives at the knowledge of the reality about human beings and gods as much as philosophical ruler does. Stanley Rosen says “the philosopher-king must take the place of the poet or, stated more cautiously, of the supervisor of those narrative poets who are allowed to remain, as for example the makers of noble myths (377b-c, 460b). This is to say that even the rule of philosophers cannot make no entirely without poetry.”

Finally, “philokalos” is associated intimately with “philosophos”. Philokalos, in other words, ‘one who loves the beautiful’ (ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν) “sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below.” (τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμμηνησκόμενος, πετρώτατε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ, ὄρνθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν. Phaedrus 249d-e) So he suffers pain when feeling the disjunction between his actual situation and his desire to fly upward to the top of the vault of heaven. And he is often regarded as mad. Is there any solution to him in this world? Plato answers: “a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine.” (δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ᾽ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἣν τοὶ εἰδέν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ υπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαιμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως, διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πετροῦσα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια: πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεὶ ἐστὶν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οίσπερ θεός ὃν θείός ἐστιν. Phaedrus 249b-c) In these passages, the recollection of philokalos who loves the beautiful is not different from philosopher’s inquiry into the Forms.

4. Why is beauty more important than any other Forms in Plato’s Philosophy?
Because beauty has a privilege that any other Forms do not have: beauty, Form of beauty, shines the brightest. “Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other Forms which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness…” (δικαίωσθήσῃς μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχάς οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὔδέν
ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἒκονται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος: κάλλος δὲ τὸτ’ ἦν ἱδέειν λαμπρόν… Phaedrus 250b) “Beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses” (περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὡσπερ εἰπομεν, μετ’ ἐκεῖνων τε ἐλαμπτεν ὁν, δεὐρὸ τ’ ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐρχεται αἰσθήσεων) “beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen and loveliest.” (νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἐσχε μούραιν, ὡστ’ ἐκφανέστατον εἴναι. καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον.) That implies that only the Form of beauty can be felt by human sense, especially by the eyes; the Form of beauty stimulates par excellence human senses and then the human soul to recollect those things which our soul once beheld, and to behold the real being and Forms by the eyes of mind.

Plato continues his simile of soul’s flight: “As the effluence of beauty enters him (= philokalos) through the eyes, he is warmed; the effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were before hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting, become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul; for it was once all feathered.” (ἰδόντα δ᾽ αὐτὸν οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης μεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θερμότης ἀηθῆς λαμβάνει: δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐθερμάνθη ᾗ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμυκότα εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσῃ δὲ τῆς τροφῆς φύσει ἄρδεται, ἔρασας τις ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδος: πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτῆ.) According to this simile, the beauty enables a person to fly upward by providing the wings. So only philokalos, lover of beauty can be a true philosopher, for only he has the wings of philosophical inquiry to ascend to the real being and the world of the Forms.

5. The second appearance of the word philokalos is in the Critias which contains the story of the mighty island kingdom Atlantis. This legendary kingdom attempted to invade Athens but failed due to the ordered society of the Athenians. When the gods were taking over the whole earth by lot according to its regions, Hephaestus and Athena, “agreeing in their love of wisdom and of craftsmanship” (ἀμα δὲ φιλοσοφία φιλοτεχνία τε ἐπὶ τα αὐτά ἐλθόντες), took for their joint portion Athens, in which “they planted as native to the soil men of virtue and ordained to their mind the mode of government.” (ἀνδρας δὲ ἀγαθοὺς ἐμμυσησαντες αὐτόχθονας ἐπὶ νοῦν ἐδεσαν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν)
At that time there dwelt in Athens the citizens who were occupied in the handicrafts and in the raising of food from the soil, and the military class which did not possess any private property. As for the Athenian husbandmen, they are “genuine husbandmen who made husbandry their sole task.” (γεωργῶν μὲν ἀληθινῶν καὶ πραττόντων αὐτὸ τούτο) “They were lovers of beauty, and of good nature” (φιλοκάλων δὲ καὶ εὐφυῶν)

Athens described as such is very similar to the ideal-state depicted in the *Republic*. The classes are divided according to their functions in the state. And all the members are principally demanded to do only one task. In the *Republic*, Socrates represented by Plato says: “To begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task and another for another.” (πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται ἐκαστὸς οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὸς ἐπ’ ἄλλου ἔργου πράξει) “And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and more beautifully when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things (to the others.)” (ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾴδιον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καρπῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ) Therefore husbandmen should make husbandry their sole task. Only if so, they can best accomplish their task, and be considered ‘genuine husbandmen’ “The husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if he is to be beautiful.” (ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς έοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται έαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύην, οὐδὲ τάλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν)

In this passage, to do successfully one’s own sole task qualifies a husbandman to be ‘genuine’ (alēthinos) and ‘beautiful’ (kalos). That means that a ‘genuine’ husbandman has to exactly know what he has to do and who he is in his state and society. All children in the platonic ideal state are educated and trained to know ‘in what field they are best’ and ‘for what occupation they are fitted’. In other words, they are educated to know how to be ‘beautiful’ in his occupation in the state, for instance as husbandman or craftsman, as soldier, legislator, musician, poet or king. Whenever they are eager to know what his own task is, in terms of Platonic philosophy, the *Idea* and the *Aretê* of his task, they are eager to know what is the beauty that should be embodied in his task and action, they are philokalois.

6. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that beauty is not merely an important theme but the most important theme in Plato’s philosophy. His philosophy is a philosophy of beauty, or aesthetics in a sense. If we reconsider his philosophy as such, and Plato as philokalos rather than philosophos, we can find more abundant significance and a new point of interpretation for his works and thought. In this
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regard, Plato's ethics consists in studying the beauty of human actions and moral character; Plato's politics consists in pursuing beauty of political constitutions and laws – in fact, Plato’s ideal state can be conceptualized by the word “kallipolis” as in the Republic; Platonic physics studies the principle of beauty realized in the nature or the physical world; Platonic astronomy searches for the secret of the beauty represented by the celestial bodies; Platonic metaphysics consists in studying the beauty itself, its essence and various phenomena of innumerous beautiful things. So his aesthetics, if we are allowed to use this term, is not a branch of his philosophy, but the center of his philosophy, or his philosophy itself.

Notes:

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4. Hippias Major 297b. From this conclusion, Socrates deduces an unpleasant conclusion (297b–c): “that the father is not the son, and the son not father.” (οὐτέ ὁ πατήρ υός ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ υός πατήρ) “And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.” (οὐδὲ γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενον ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὖ αἴτιον) “Then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful.” (οὐδὲ ἂρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλὸν) Evidently, this conclusion does not please both Socrates and Hippias, but it is not reasonable for them not to accept this conclusion for this reason. Strictly speaking, since the good and the beautiful are not the same, and since the one is different from the other, the beautiful is not good but beautiful, and the good is not beautiful but good.

HEON KIM –

Email address: kimcho@snu.ac.kr
Affiliation: Seuol National University (Republic of Korea)
Transmediality and Aesthetics of the Technological Sublime

Introduction

Digital technologies offer a plethora of new expressions, encodings of existing objects and processes, but most significantly, they generate new phenomena. In what follows, I propose to consider practices of new media art taken within the context of two discourses: transmediality and the sublime.

The context of inter- and trans-medial studies is valuable as it is concerned with the methodologies for exploring border relations between media, differences in modes of perception and material production. I see the concept of the sublime as a strategy to incorporate the debate around the idea of transmediality in a specific historically grounded aesthetic and epistemological discourse. On the one hand, the sublime implies the romantic quest for the unachievable ideal, the incomprehensible absolute, and on the other hand, it exemplifies the negative order of representation, opening a discussion of the profound social, political, and ultimately ethical aspects of art in general and in its contemporary, technologically mediated variants.

The key point of connection between the two discourses to be pursued here is the affective qualities of the experience of the border (of transition across media borders) and of the potential realm beyond the closed loops of these borders. I explore possible connections between the concept of the beyond and the idea of the “in between” space of electronic transmission, challenging the presupposition about computation being the most objective and neutral means of translation between different media languages.

What kind of meaning does this translation produce on the level of phenomenological and aesthetic inquiry? What is in this transfer or transposition from one medium to another, in this interstice created by transmedial operations?
I will first define the theoretical framework and distinguish most relevant directions and concepts to analyze the crossover between the discourses of transmediality and the sublime. I will then focus on one particular exemplification, the multimedia performance work “Bodytext” by Simon Biggs, Sue Hawksley and Garth Paine.

**Approaches to transmediality**

Inter/trans-mediality, as well as the related field of multimodality is a heterogeneous and porous zone. The traditional historical debate concerning distinctions between different kinds of arts and their languages goes back to classics like Aristotle’s “Poetics”, or Lessing’s “Laocoon”. Yet it still serves as a necessary ground for further aesthetic inquiries, namely, about the work of senses, i.e. vision, hearing, olfactory senses, taste and touch. Distinctions between the senses constitute the basis of perception, and directly affect another core problem of aesthetic investigation – representation. The senses provide a mechanism for creating both mental images of reality on the basis of data from the outer world, and at the same time images for the outer world, i.e. artistic representations (one can say that senses are the first media). Since media deal with material forms, the issue of mediality arises at the level of representation. The differences between media are, thus, still connected to the differences in senses and other mental structures.

The concept of transmediality, describing relations between different types of media representations, brings into question the status of media borders, as well as - and that is at the core of our interest – of the zone between the media. Regardless of ontological or structural approach, there is no doubt that these borders exist. For instance, Axel Englund describes these border relationships in topographical terms, where borders are clear delineations. Irina Rajewsky recognizes the constructed nature of media borders, but advocates for keeping the tangibility of “medially-bound frames” at work as it is distinctness and specificity of the borders and references between them that allows/inspires/stimulates complexity and diversity of intermedial artistic practices. Because intermedial forms are so different, Rajewsky distinguishes specific “intermedial qualities”, particular “ways of crossing media borders” that can be seen in application to three major groups of transmedial phenomena: transposition (e.g. film adaptations of literary texts), combination (e.g. opera, film, mixed-media forms), references (references in a film to painting, or in a painting to photography, etc.). A preliminary clarification of this can be seen in Rajewsky’s reference to Werner Wolf’s distinction of “intra-” and “extracompositional” relations between...
different media. The “meaning” here is associated with the special tensions between medial characteristics that come into play only when all the elements are equally present and active.

Rajewsky and Wolf, among others, provide a valuable methodology for inter/transmedial studies, but do not argue specifically about the new media practices. Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin in their well-cited theory of remediation distinguish two motives, or tendencies, characteristic particularly to relations between old and new media – “tribute” and “rivalry,” i.e. the imitation or re-contextualization of an old medium into a new one. Both tendencies – however mutually exclusive they are – seek the same: to exceed the limits of representation in order to intensify the experience of what is beyond representation, of the ungraspable real. It has been a perennial struggle of art throughout all its history and, according to Bolter and Grusin, “resonates with the twin preoccupations of contemporary media: the transparent presentation of the real and the enjoyment of the opacity of media themselves”, what they name as the logics of transparent immediacy and hypermediacy. It will be important to return to these characteristics in relation to experiential aspects of particular artistic strategies, but first let us set the ground for explanation of relations between mediality and mental structures, and specifically the cognitive processes behind transmediality. I believe the concept of the sublime can help to address these concerns in a powerful way.

Sublime effects within transmediality.
The technological sublime

In its most significant account by Kant the feeling of the sublime is produced by a breakdown of the accord between imagination and understanding. It thus points to the existence of the unconceivable and unpresentable, something that exceeds our capacity for sensible comprehension, opening up as “the beyond of representation”. We have no concept in mind when we experience the sublime. Representation (for instance, in a form of art) is something given in experience, thus, through the experience of the limit of representation, the beholder encounters the limit in its ontological sense. As George Hartley put it, “The key point is that the beyond of representation is representation’s own beyond. That is, the beyond is nothing but the effect of the limit internal to representation itself”. Representation (for instance, in a form of art) is something given in experience, thus, through the experience of the limit of representation, the beholder encounters the limit in its ontological sense. The feeling of the sublime is the experience of liminality, i.e. of being-on-the-border, knowing and unknowing,
real and impossible. George Bataille called this state an “interior experience” (a “voyage to the end of possible of man”); Maurice Blanchot – “limit-experience” (“putting [one]self radically in question”); and Michel Foucault wrote in one of his latest works, “[t]ransgression forces the limit to face the fact of its imminent disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes … Transgression, then, is not related to the limit as the outside to the inside…but rather their relationship takes the form of a spiral… Transgression contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being – affirms limitless into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence to the first time.”

Overcoming the limits and affirming limitlessness is similar to the description of transmediality, and corresponds closely to the idea of trans-, or intermediality being a precondition to all mediality. According to Lars Elleström, the connections between media are essentially so tight, that “media cross each other, rather than border each other”. This allows the presupposition that the ‘outside’, or ‘beyond’ of one medium is already another medium, therefore the mode of transgression and liminality is inherent within the media. Elleström asks: “Where do we find the ‘gaps’ that intermediality bridges?” - implying that these gaps already are crossed by relations with the other media. (This is also what W.J.T. Mitchell meant by his statements that “there is no visual media” and that “all media are mixed media, combining different codes, discursive conventions, channels, sensory and cognitive modes”.) This heterological perspective originates within broader social and political theories of the late twentieth century, and brings to fore position of the marginalized and the “other”. Recognition of alterity creates first of all a deeply transformative emotional effect, initially a pure perceptive shift, it then aggregates its critical not only aesthetic, but also ethical and political underpinnings.

If Rajewsky and Lund describe qualities of intermediality, modality analysis proposed by Elleström is helpful as it demonstrates that the ground for affective attitude towards media relations is already within the constitution of media themselves. The emotional intensity of the experience of transmedial relations may be attributed to the complexity and density of these relations. Yet, in its essence the very process of mediation itself can be described through effects of alienation, distancing and transcendence. The sublime effect experienced in relation to artistic (or any other type of) production is principally different than the one in relation to nature. Thus, a concept of the technological sublime should be introduced.

A medium – a tool, a technique – lies at the origin of human creative activity. The concept of the sublime, in its initial introduction by pseudo-Longinus, and in interpretation by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, is closely related to techne.
Techne is part of *poiesis* and is instrumental in making representation of nature, *mimesis*, to be not a mere copy of nature, but something that “unveils nature as *logos*,” i.e. as the universal order of things, as knowledge. The quality of sublimity comes with *techne*, but only insofar that it reflects something beyond the control of the human, some logic superior to human mind, and yet, being already in nature.

The *techne* (and media as its material and product) is, thus, crucial for understanding the ambiguous nature of the sublime (as a mixture of pleasure and displeasure, ecstatic enthusiasm and sense of overpoweredness). In his famous account of the sublime, Lyotard distinguishes two important modes of sublimity in art. On the one hand, emphasis is placed on “the powerless-ness of the faculty of presentation,” “the nostalgia for presence” – what we know as a romantic quest. He labels this mode “melancholia.” And on the other hand, we have the mode of sublimity in art that Lyotard calls “novatio,” or “daring”, which places emphasis on “the increase of being and the jubilation which results from the invention of new rules of the game, be it pictorial, artistic, or any other”.

Indefatigable exploration of new technological methods in the twentieth century art, that also prepared the current state of pervasive media hybridity, which allowed Roberto Simanovsky to call transmediality the ‘avant-garde’ of contemporaneity, is an especially illustrative case of “novatio,” or the technological sublime. The techno-sublime provokes a special tension between the contemplative and active modes of human consciousness. Technologies are the product of mind activity, and yet they become something autonomous and then can only be looked at and not controlled, thus serving as an exemplification of both the power of human reason and its limitations. Created and navigated by the human, it produces a sense of closeness and safety, and yet, it reserves space for the unpredictable and uncontrollable: the viewer (or the user) does not know the exact mechanism of the electronic operations and this is what makes the encounter with the opportunities of artificial intelligence/ digital reality so thrilling and uncanny.

Whether it is called ‘technological’ or not, the term sublime has been successfully appropriated in the context of media studies: Vincent Mosco and Rodney J. Giblett have presented accounts (correspondingly) on the political economy of the digital sublime and the connections between the sublime and communication technologies; while Jon McCormack and Alan Dorin introduced the idea of the ‘computational sublime’ in relation to generative electronic arts. The appropriations continue within other more specific areas of science and technocultural studies.
Digital technology: translatability, codification

The core technological condition that has defined the nature of transmediality since the late twentieth century is a computer. Language of computer systems is principally different than of other media, since it is based on electronic code that allows new type of translation – algorithmic. Information from any medium can be translated into the language of computer data, electronic formats and processing methods. It becomes the zone shared by all media, the abstract ground for their communication. It is the principle of Alan Turing’s Universal Machine that serves as the main reference point for the argument about potential ubiquity (and power) of computability/programmability and translatability of media. This is the argument of digital essentialism: code serves as a fundament of a system, exists “below” any contingent interfaces. Due to its purely formal qualities, numerical language (especially the binary code) is considered to be the ultimate universal language, allowing us to connect and translate elements of one symbolic system into another. Lev Manovich positions ‘transcoding’ among the main principles of new media and defines it simply as ‘translat[ion] into another format’. Code, thus, provides ground for hybridity not only of media, but also of the senses involved in producing and perceiving these media.

How do these characteristics inform the affective dimension of code? What kind of aesthetic attitudes are involved? One condition for such affective reactions towards coded structures and processes could be the above mentioned potential ubiquity of codification: potentially, everything can be coded and translated. This ‘everything’ is not given at once, and thus there is some amount of uncertainty and unpredictability imbedded at the core of code as a signification instrument. Codification itself can be seen as a procedure of transgressing the borders of individual and specific material existence and creating a purely symbolic, totalizing expression. Yet, there are still latent ties left between these two realms: the symbolic implies something taking place, some particular material and sensible event. The sublime effect in relation to the encoded is caused exactly by this implication, by the reference to something inexpressible and unrepresentable.

“Bodytext”

Performance “Bodytext” by media artist Simon Biggs, dancer Sue Hawksley and sound artist Garth Paine is a work that explores the issue of media translatability via digital code and the sensory effects of such translations produce. “Bodytext” is an interaction between a dancer and a computer system, engaging speech, real-time motion tracking, voice recognition, projection and granular audio synthesis.
According to the artists, “The acquired speech, a description of an imagined dance, is re-written through projected digital display and sound synthesis, the performer causing texts to interact and recombine with one another through their subsequent compositional arrangement. What is written is affected by the dance whilst the emerging recombinant descriptions determine what is danced.” The piece “investigates how memories are embodied and signified, addressing how media can be used to record complex data sets and thus function to preserve or disturb a sense of self.” This disturbance of the self is what interests me in this performance the most, and it is a direct result of the process of translation between different levels and modalities: movement is captured both in words and as electronic data, both texts play a role of inscriptions, yet, in one case it is a relation between natural language and a living organism (body), and in another – between the machinic code and a produced sound, image, and in the end, body movement. The result of these operations of translation, transcription and transduction is a dynamic apparatus, defined by neither a human element, nor an electronic, but by both. It is an interplay of a brain, body and digitally augmented environment.

The initial text is pronounced by the human performer and can be described as “body stories”. These are discrete phrases, personal associations that the dancer has with particular movements. There is also another category or words that can be interpreted both as physical movements and as computer instructions, i.e. commands: “shift”, “enter”, “cut”, “go to sleep”. Dance itself live-codes the computer. These words indicate the imperceptible border between the human and the machinic realms, and it is this that allows the potential feeling of the sublime in relation to this piece. Identified via the voice recognition technology, these words serve as switches of modes within the machine. All the phrases, besides the commands, stay meaningless within this system. They become one indistinguishable piece of data, which means that they are attributed only certain formal qualities and values that, in their turn, can stand for many other types of data elements, i.e. can potentially be translatable to multiple languages.

There are many accounts today that describe ways in which embodied expressivity constitutes meaning (Merleau-Ponty, M. Hansen, B. Massumi and others). One of the problems particularly relevant in this case is how this meaning can be transferred and reconfigured through other media. Trying to find an answer to this question, philosopher Brian Rotman argues for the alternative to symbolic notation in a form of body movement capturing. “… contrary to withering the body or leaving it behind, it will be by uniting with it – merging, augmenting, capturing, and reengineering it – that technology may render our present alphabetic dispensation archaic.” Whereas notation relies on the relational structure of
(prior) differences between the discrete elements, capture presents “a continuous topological model of posteriorly given internal differences.” Differences are captured during one continuous move of enactment that, in its turn, is always charged with certain experiential modality, and this is where, as we'd like to see it, the room for sublime appears. For Rotman, the gesturo-haptic is still a form of writing, but its specificity is that it “exceeds the textual”, exceeds everything that has to do with “the interpretative activities of deciphering”, everything that is determined “in advance of its action”. Its ‘exo-textuality’ is defined through a mediating technology that “traffics” corporeal events. Thus, it is not only the object of representation that is claimed as unrepresentable (the ineffable, prespeech of Artaud, etc.), but the very means of this representation, the digital capture medium, that operates beyond representation, and thus, on the level of affect.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, the productive challenge for a human in this tuning in to the “inarticulate”, in being able to hear all the random acoustic events or observe the visual trace of the indistinguishable movements (as follows from Rotman) is in making sense of it. The new meanings arise in the moments of a shift. The twist, which is worth exploring, is how generativity of code always goes hand in hand with human affective interpretive abilities, one triggering the other. In the end, it is the human who is capable of recognizing the differences, yet, the discoveries (whatever they are) made in the process of these interpretations would not be possible without the work of the computer. Materiality thus cannot be specified in advance; rather, it occupies a borderland – or better, performs as connective tissue – joining the physical and mental, the artifact and the user. Embodied textualities collated with the logic of digital code acquire new meanings that exceed and challenge traditional notions of textuality, since the very locus of signification becomes shifted and reshaped. From the perspective of the human, it means that digital computer is a medium that can both disassemble and reassemble what is considered inarticulable (indistinct/undistinguishable and indiscrete because of its nonsymbolic nature), i.e. to give it life in the other order of things. It is this otherness that indicates the effect/moment of the technological sublime.

The concept of the ‘interplay’ that the artists use to describe the processes of translation and transduction is not a trite one, if taken in the context of the idea of an apparatus – a productive exchange between a human and a machine. Emergent in this interplay are the new subject-positions, new selves capable of new types of experiences, operations and compatible connections.
Notes:

14. The enthrallment with early industrial creations, as noticed by David Nye, the author of the American Technological Sublime (1994), was a result of the “pchant for thinking of the subject as a consciousness that can stand apart from the world and project its will upon it” (my emphasis). “Those operating within this logic embrace the reconstruction of the life-world by machinery and experience the dislocations and perceptual disorientations caused by this reconstruction in terms of awe and wonder, and, in their excitement, feel insulated from immediate danger”, David Nye, Technology Matters: Questions to Live With, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2006,
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16. Creating visual representations of that which is beyond the visible, capturing the emergent phenomena as they emerge is also an urgent task in today’s natural sciences, as acknowledged by Roald Hoffmann, Ian Greig, and Elizabeth Kessler in *Beyond the Finite: The Sublime in Art and Science*, eds. Roald Hoffmann, Iain Boyd Whyte, Oxford University Press, 2011.


20. Ibid.


KSENIA FEDOROVA –

Email address: ksenfedorova@gmail.com

Affiliation: University of California Davis (USA), Ural Federal University (Russia)
1. It is very important to stress at the very beginning of our work that the sublime for Kant is not a quality of the object. And when we judge a phenomenon as sublime it is only improper use of the category of the sublime. Even the category of the beautiful is not objective, but reflective: what is beautiful cannot be determined objectively, derived from some concept of the object or made dependent upon the immediate relation with the object in terms of the pleasantness. Nonetheless, in the judgment of the beautiful we express ourselves as if the object judged is beautiful in itself and as if it is created purposively for us. For Kant, the beautiful lies in the reflection upon the form of the object and the feeling of pleasure is aroused with reference to the concrete form of an object, as if its purposiveness were based on some definite concept. What we have in the sublime, on the other side, is more likely some kind of projection of our inner disposition, so the purposiveness must regard the form of the subject and not that of the object. Kant defines the sublime as “disposition of the mind”,1 “a movement of the mind connected with the judging”2 or simply, the use that the faculty of judgment makes of some objects, and not the object itself. Instead of prescribing a definition to the sublime objects Kant, when he wants to be more precise, uses the expressions such as “the object serves for the presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mind”.3 In fact, what is sublime in the experience of the sublime is the very subject of the experience, who discovers the potency of the noumenal. Therefore, if in the beautiful the subject reflects the form of an object, could we conclude that in the sublime what is reflected is the form of the subject? The sublime is a self-reflection of the subject which, in the encounter with the certain natural phenomena such as calm immense oceans, starry sky or storms and volcanic eruptions, reaches the awareness of its own supersensible nature in the form of the Ideas of Reason. If we take into con-
sideration that the form of the subject, namely, the form of its interiority is time, because time is the universal condition of all phenomena and the constitutive framework for every representation that necessarily belongs to our inner state, then self-reflection of the form of the subject in the sublime necessarily includes its temporal dimension. Time underlies the way in which representations are collocated in our mind, that is to say, time as pure intuition, or subjective a priori form of our inner sense regards the pure relationality between representations in terms of succession, simultaneity, or permanence. Because of this universal and relational character time is pure irrepresentable interiority which cannot be perceived immediately in the experience, but nonetheless acts as the ground of all possible experience. Analogously to the exhibition of the irrepresentable Ideas of the reason, what comes forward in the experience of the sublime is an exhibition of the temporal core of subjectivity.

In order to examine the temporal value of the sublime (and the sublime meaning of temporality as well) it is necessary to analyze Kant’s paragraphs from his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. We can interpret the tension between apprehension (Auffassung) and aesthetic comprehension (Zusammenfassung) in the mathematical sublime as a fundamentally temporal tension between the tendency to the infinite succession and the instantaneous grasping of totality. Reason (Vernunft) gives the imagination the task of representing the absolute totality of intuitions in one instant. In the successive apprehension of intuitions the imagination goes on to the infinity, but as the progressive movement from one sensuous part to the other one proceeds, the application of the rational Idea of totality becomes more and more difficult, until it reaches the point of its real impossibility. Our apprehension is moving from one intuition to another one, but at the moment when the imagination needs to comprehend and encompass the entire successive series of sensory intuitions in one single perceptive representation, it then faces its own limits and lack. It is the case of the absolute huge and immense objects: there is no time to carry out and complete the operation of comprehension, because every new intuition in a temporal progress precludes the reproduction of what has been apprehended before it. Kant writes regarding the observation of a pyramid: “the eye requires some time to complete its apprehension… but during this time the former always partly fades before the imagination has taken in the latter”. It seems that the lack of time is inscribed in the synthetic operation of the imagination as its transcendental limitation. The imagination is temporally limited, traversed by the line of time, and its failure to satisfy the claims of Reason is actually the failure to schematize (temporalize) something that is beyond time, i.e. the Idea of Reason. Kant shows that the imagination is the victim of Reason that in a certain sense commits violence,
forcing imagination to do something of which it is not capable, that is, to represent the irrepresentable, to encompass the infinite and to construct a whole.

In the framework of this particular role that imagination plays in the sublime Kant speaks about the “regress of the imagination”: “... the comprehension in one moment of that which is successively apprehended, is a regression, which in turn cancels the time-condition in the progression of the imagination and makes simultaneity intuitable. It is thus (since temporal succession is a condition of inner sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of the imagination, by which it does violence to the inner sense ...”⁷ Briefly, in order to synthesize detached intuitions and grasp all of them as coexistent within a totality, the imagination needs to go against the natural, linear course of time (this is what Kant means by canceling the time-condition⁸) and in that way it does violence to inner sense (this inner sense in Kant is nothing but time as the universal form of interiority and hence of every representation). In the Critique of Pure Reason this violent deviation in the relation between subjective faculties was prevented by the systematic determination of the understanding which guides the imagination. Only with the aesthetic discourse of the third Critique does that which was covered up in the first Critique emerge on the surface: every sensuous unity is in some sense a result of the violence of the imagination which imposes the synthetic aggregation to a manifold and suppresses the irreversible extension of time in order to reproduce previous intuitions. That’s the role of the synthesis of reproduction in particular. What is Kant’s message is that the synthesis is not a “natural” operation, but rather an intervention. This could be envisaged only when the imagination liberates itself from the guidance of the understanding and experiences in turn the violence of the reason which requires absolute totality as the only acceptable measure of things. The sublime as reflection of our inner state, through free and disordered play between faculties, tells us something more about the functioning of the transcendental apparatus as such.

Therefore, the theory of the sublime is not a mere appendix, as Kant himself claims,⁹ or some secondary and less important aesthetical problematization. Furthermore, the question of the sublime is not only the aesthetic question, but one of the keystones of the whole Kantian system which deals with its main problem – the possibility of synthesis. It means, in other words, that Kant’s aesthetics provides a further answer to his principal and inaugural question: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?

In a certain sense, the treatment of the sublime is the direct consequence of the mode in which Kant grounds the synthesis in his first Critique. To put time as the general condition of synthesis, the form of interiority and all representations, and, on the other hand, figure time as a bridge which connects the
heterogeneous aspects of the same subject (schemata defined by Kant as Zeitbestimmungen), all this means actually to build the whole construction of the transcendental synthesis on a very precarious terrain. What Kant’s aesthetics, and the experience of the sublime particularly, shows us is the fragility of synthesis as such. Deleuze insists a lot on this chaotic, precarious, “aesthetical” territory of the entire Kantian transcendental construction (Kant in the Critique of Judgment became aware of the catastrophe). We could only add that the fragility of synthesis, brought to light in the catastrophic failure to synthesize the absolutely huge and the absolutely powerful, is a result of the inherent heterogeneity within the subjectivity and its incessant inner tension which has to do with the form of inner sense, that is – time.

In some sense, the violence done to inner sense, or what Kant calls subjective movement of imagination, actually opens up the perspective of the abyss of the subjectivity itself. And what is interesting here is again a Deleuzian look on the question – “time is out of joint” that is the formula which Deleuze uses to express radical change that happens with Kant. Time is out of joint because it became the interior limit and inner enemy, autonomized and formalized time, that is, it became transcendental condition and limitation. In the sublime, besides the power of Reason, the imagination encounters also the power of Time. Time discloses itself as a true absolute greatness and can be that abyss in which imagination fears to lose itself.

2. Slavoj Žižek in his interpretation of Kant’s imagination argues that the experience of the sublime marks the moment of a radical rupture and interruption in the linear temporal order. Such order is constituted by the schematism as a function of the application of the categories to sensible experience. The first Critique offers the linear temporal order as that order which allows imagination to schematize the categories and contribute to the constitution of the object of experience, as Kant’s doctrine of schematism demonstrates. According to Žižek, such schematized time is a homogenized time in which nothing really new can emerge, because it provides a framework for the repetitive experience ruled by necessary laws. This experience designates the scientific methodic truth for which the Critique of Pure Reason offers transcendental grounding, while Kant’s third Critique opens the space for extra-methodic truth. This space is what Kant in the Introduction for his third Critique defines as territory without domain. The territory without domain suspends mechanism of the schematism and “control” over the particular by means of universal laws thereby the subject of that territory reflects, in an aesthetic experience, the uniqueness of the event as exhibition of the freedom through subversion in the schematic order of time. The experience of the sublime is the experience of something non-ordinary and extra-ordinary,
felt (reflected) like an event ex nihilo. At the level of objective experience and cognition nothing can be created simply ex nihilo since the principle of causality, as a category of understanding, requires a previous state of conditions which necessarily produce an effect, following the schemata of temporal succession. However, since the sublime is a matter of subjective experience and “movement of the mind”, the fact that we feel some phenomenon as event – unexpected, unpredicted, compelling or transfixing – produces a rupture in the homogeneous order of schematized time. Such an event has a meaning of the liberation and emancipation from previous conditions, because something new “cannot be accounted for by reference to the pre-existing network of circumstances”.  

This liberation from blind causality concerns our transcendental freedom, and our moral supersensible destination, as Kantian dynamical sublime shows. The morality as the Law of Reason, which particularly intervenes in the dynamic sublime, is nothing but the emergence of our intrinsic freedom which breaks with natural causality and the linear order of time. As Žižek explains it: “We are dealing here with another temporality, the temporality of freedom, of a radical rupture in the chain of (natural and/or social) causality”. In this break we have to search for political significance and emancipatory character of the sublime. We can ask: is not a revolution the sublime experience of disruption felt like something historically new? Are the popular uprisings, civil riots, and social revolts the sublime openings of the historical new, of the unexpected, something “absolutely huge” and “absolutely powerful” with unpredictable consequences? We can ask also: when does the experience of the sublime occur in politics? One answer (and that is also Žižek’s answer) is: when people “risk freedom” against their immediate interests, profits and calculations in terms of costs and benefits, and when the impossible, due to the new temporal order, becomes possible.  

The relation between Kant’s sublime and political revolutions is not only conceptual but historical as well. Kant’s Third Critique is the work which has been written in the political atmosphere of the French Revolution, published in the 1790. So another question can be: is not the ambiguous character of the sublime (attractive and repulsive at the same time, pleasure in pain) an aesthetic translation of Kant’s own impressions and political attitude toward French Revolution? The harmony in disagreement should represent superiority of the subject of Revolution, who finally finds rational satisfaction and subjective purposiveness in revolutionary violence and terror. What is also interesting to notice is that another important name in the aesthetics of the sublime, Edmund Burke, is also the author of the famous conservative critique of the French Revolution. Can differences between Kant’s and Burke’s sublime be an indication of their political differences with regard to the revolutionary events?
Anyway, it is almost impossible to disregard the echo of the epoch of Revolutions in Kant’s work. One note from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, work as we said published during the second year of the French Revolution, seems to refer explicitly to this great event of “fundamental transformation of great people into the state.” Moreover, is not revolution in an other Kant’s text, namely, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, defined in terms of the unity between nature and freedom, which is exactly the program of his third *Critique*? In this late work of Kant, written in the 1798 when the French revolution had already showed its atrocities and dramatic outcomes, he notes that even if “the revolution of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in our day” brings misery and atrocities, nonetheless it finds “in the hearts of all spectators (who are not engaged in this game themselves) wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm, the very expression of which is fraught with danger.” The similarity between this description and the analysis of the sublime is obvious. The sympathy of the spectator for the revolution has cause in our moral disposition like the sublime, which recompenses, through the negative pleasure, the anguished breakdown of the imagination by elevating (*erheben*) us to the most profound realization of our rational nature articulated in the moral Law and the Idea of humanity. Revolution is moral because it is “the acknowledged duty of the human soul, concerning mankind as a whole”, and as such it signifies the realization of morality in history – the year 1789 as an application of Pure Practical Reason, as the Event of the morality of the Right. In some way, the experience of the sublime demonstrates the true political-ontological character of Kant’s ethics.

To understand better the relation between Kant’s sublime and political Event of revolution it can be useful to pay attention to Badiou’s work, and especailly his recent book *The Rebirth of History*.

In this study Badiou makes a few allusions to Kant; when he elaborates the question of intensification of subjectivity, as the constitutive factor of a historical uprising, he identifies such intensification with the concept of enthusiasm recognized already by Kant, and moreover, recognized by him exactly as the sublime feeling. Badiou does not aim to establish any interpretative connection with Kant’s aesthetics of the sublime, but we are convinced that such relation is a fruitful way for further analysis since Badiou’s considerations on the reawakening of History coincide to a great extent with Kant’s discourse on the sublime. Analogously to the sublime which confirms the power of the Idea of Reason and discloses our supersensible destination, a historical uprising for Badiou is only that event where the power of an Idea will take root and confirm itself. It is obvious that what connects the sublime with the rebirth of history is the exhibition of the Idea, of the infinite, of the irrepresentable, through the
moment of rupture and through the unforeseen emergence of something New. Badiou disavows riots that have only negative, violent and anarchic character deprived of any enduring truth. The accord with an Idea is needed in order to have a truly historical Event which opens the new emancipatory possibilities important for the collective destiny of mankind. The universal aspect emerges from the struggle and conflict, from violent rupture in the causal order that introduces a new temporality. However, like in the painful experience of the sublime, negativity is a way in which Idea exhibits itself. In order to carry out this negative exhibition of the infinite, the schematized order of time must be abandoned and suspended. Here arises another interesting point of contact between Badiou’s notion of historical event and Kant’s sublime which puts forward the actuality of the aesthetical experience in the framework of political theory: Badiou claims that “the invention of time”\(^{22}\) is necessary for establishing a continuity of revolutionary Event when its initial force peters out. Very similar to Žižek’s analysis of the Kantian sublime, Badiou puts the entire philosophical analysis of the rebirth of History in terms of a new and old-mainstream temporality. Organization or discipline of the Event which wants to preserve and in some sense institutionalize the new possibilities brought up by massive uprising is actually “the transformation of evental power into temporality”\(^{23}\) This new temporality is, according to Badiou, regarded as outside time, in the sense that it cannot be inscribed into the order of time prescribed by the previous world. The Event-historical riot made an irremediable break in time, against its causal linearity and predictability, subverting the relation between possibility and impossibility (what seemed impossible within one temporal order now after the rupture is possible), and after that “the invention of time” stabilizes the new coordinates in terms of new continuity. Is not this break in time exactly what happens in the experience of the sublime?

The emancipatory character of the sublime, hence, lies in its temporal rupture which opens a new horizon of great and universal impact, but this openness will remain counterproductive, or even destructive, if accord between historical imagination and political intellect is lacking – the accord which gives a form and consistency in order to make a revolutionary political event a model for others to follow. A sublime event, in order to produce far-reaching consequences with an universal and “objective” impact, has to find its proper sensus communis, its own language.

To conclude: It is not enough to consider the sublime just as the experience of the event of nature. The relation between man and nature has been changed since Kant’s epoch. Due to a complete Entzauberung of the world, the technological and scientific development of mankind that put nature under human
control, and made visible and accessible even the most distant and most unusual places on the Earth, nature certainly has lost its overwhelming, almost divine impact on man that challenged him to a heroic duel with nature. More humanized, that is, more subjected to man's power, nature has become less hostile. The gaze of the wanderer above the sea of fog from the famous Caspar Friedrich's painting today, at the beginning of the 21st century, will be definitely different. If sublimity before nature is eclipsed, it does not mean that sublimity as such has lost its meaning. Is then the sublime dislocated from nature to history, and to politics also? The aesthetics of the sublime in the 18th century can be viewed as a reaction to the prevailing mechanistic approach to nature at that time, so the only way to escape this deterministic vision, which follows the model of the perfect clock mechanism, was to offer another approach to nature, that of Kant's reflective judgment. This analogy is pertinent to our proposal of re-examination of the aesthetics of the sublime as a potential contribution to the political theory of emancipation. Nowadays the deterministic model is transposed from nature to a social reality that has succumbed to the logic of capital and managerial techne, so it becomes necessary to oppose another, alternative model of sociality (what is needed today is perhaps some kind of the Heisenbergian indeterminacy principle in the social realm). In that process of “denaturalization” of the society the aesthetics of the sublime can have an emancipatory role in the similar way it did in Kant's epoch. Interpretations of Kant's aesthetics that intend to ground political philosophy upon the category of sensus communis have already been suggested during the 20th century by different authors. But what we need today is maybe discovery of the political philosophy based on the concept of the sublime as a truly political category, and not only, as the keystone of entire Kant's project of transcendental synthesis which manifests itself in its true light in Kant's aesthetics.

Notes:
2. Ibid., §24, p. 131.
3. Ibid., §23, p. 129.
4. “All presentations, whether or not they have outer things as their objects […] belong to our inner state; and this inner state is subject to the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the condition of time". Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996, B51.
5. Ibid., B50 and B67.
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7. Ibid., §27, p. 142.
15. Ibid., p. 43.
23. Ibid., p. 70.

SAŠA HRNJEZ –

Email address: sasa.hrnjez@unito.it
Affiliation: Torino University (Italy)
PART FOUR
Aesthetics in the Sphere of Society, Politics, and Ethics
Modernity can be characterized by three dominant models: industrialism, capitalism, and nationalism, each of which controls respectively the technological, the economic and the governmental system. For its energy supply, the industrial model digs down into the entrails of the earth to pump out oil. Capitalism gets its energy source by keeping workers unskilled to ensure an oversupply of its labor force and maintaining salaries so cheap that they hardly cover their basic survival needs. Nation-states extract their energy from emotional affiliation and patriotic fervor to legitimate the political caste’s tax collection and social control.

Although the capitalist model was temporarily overthrown by socialist and communist regimes, it has certainly prevailed as the most aggressive and lucrative economic pattern for its privileged classes. In turn, the industrial model exhibits a spectacular success in controlling millions of people’s daily lives by the manufacture, distribution, consumption and imposition of lifestyles. No less successful has been the nationalist model deployed in both East and West, rich and poor, theocratic and secular societies and vehemently defended by the left and right parties as an incontrovertible value. The most diverse oligarchic, fundamentalist, dictatorial, democratic, or monarchic political regimes all adjust to the nationalist model at least at an ideological level. Since the nineteenth century, nationalism proliferated epidemically across all continents silhouetting states as didactic puzzles in a geography class. This model has been utilized also to nullify other identities and invent new ones ad hoc for political purposes. Is this subdivision of the planet into pieces of land through nation states really as natural as it seems?

A nation-state, according to the Webster online, is a form of political organization under which a relatively homogeneous people inhabits a sovereign state. How do we define these “relatively homogeneous people”? Are people
really homogeneous? In which terms? How much is “relatively”? What is clear, however, is that construction of a nation state already establishes a radical difference between rulers and ruled, subjects of power and subjected by power.

It is impossible to know how long this model will prevail, but it definitely is alive and kicking and spilling blood all over the world. What is there in this model that makes it so universal? What impels so many people to recognize themselves as members of a nation-state supposedly sharing common traits? Casting a vote every four or six years, participating in national surveys, holding a national passport or ID card, and taking the streets to protest, may be ways of expressing political, class or national identities, but these practices hardly seem to be enough to create something as omnipresent as a “national identity”.

The most obvious answer to these questions is that nationalism is based on a very primal instinct that humanity shares with several animal species: territoriality. Cats and dogs, fish, birds and primates all have a strong sense of marking territorial exclusivity. However, considering its huge spatial scale, nationality can not be directly experienced except as an imaginary projection, as argued by Benedict Anderson.¹ It results from drawing an imaginary line around an area in which certain communities are included and others excluded; a line drawn either by military force or by international agreements, but once delineated it appears to acquire a natural, almost quintessential status.

The phrase “national cohesion” always turns out to be desirable and politically correct for every party and every regime anywhere in the world. It is common to urge the population to reach such “national cohesion” as if it were a simple act of will or a magical incantation. Such a requirement is usually accompanied by words such as “promote”, “build”, “preserve”, “encourage”, “develop”, “erect” and “inculcate” this national cohesion, sometimes even associated with a term as strong as “cement”. All this ironically shows the degree in which national cohesion is far from spontaneous: it must be deliberately engineered and sometimes with great effort. But how? No one seems to have the manufacturing patent for national cohesions.

Anderson defined a nation as an “imagined political community – and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign.” He stated that “communities must be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (note here the term “style” to which we will return later).² This emphasis on the imaginary comes from the fact that, as mentioned earlier, that members of national communities can not really know or meet each other, but still imagine themselves as part of a community defined as “nation”.

How these imaginaries, rather than others, become generalized, reproduced and maintain plausibility is a question of hegemony. The idea behind it is that no
political action can be maintained indefinitely by brute force. It requires a degree of acquiescence by the masses. Despite the practical collapse of Marxism, Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” still remains relatively unscathed as an activity constructed by intellectuals who, while being part of the dominant political classes, become “persuaders” that develop and disseminate ideology among lower classes. He addressed the role of “organic intellectuals” and the relationship between politics and literary production. Louis Althusser contributed to this discussion by defining the role of the ideological state apparatus and their mechanism of “interpellation”, in which each person recognizes her/himself as a subject of and subject by the dominant ideology. However, Althusser does not elucidate how each person manages to internalize or identify with such ideology in everyday life nor does Gramsci sufficiently explain how these intellectuals manage to persuade the masses.

The point of my paper is to argue that the mechanism by which the nation-state model is supplied with cohesion is and has been aesthetic. By aesthetic I do not mean its restricted sense as a theory of art and beauty but all processes recruiting sensibility towards heightening and intensifying experience, in this case being part of a collective and imaginary national identity. Moreover, I must emphasize that my approach to the term “aesthetic” is purely descriptive, not evaluative, covering all phenomena associated to sensibility. The aesthetic dimension (not necessarily artistic which is a fraction of it) actually is the one responsible in achieving the realization and materialization necessary for enabling the experience of the national imaginaries that would otherwise be too arbitrary and abstract to perceive.

Communicative action or logical argument (proposed by Habermas) are not concrete enough to achieve this goal, while emotions evolve phylogenetically and ontogenetically long before reason, and are therefore more entrenched and powerful in motivating individuals. Precisely because of its abstract nature, the state constantly requires energy input in the form of emotional attachment granted by its members to maintain cohesion, legitimize tax collection for the maintenance of the onerous political caste. This commitment, however, does not arise spontaneously as gas does not flow on its own to the motor of a car. It needs to be extracted, processed and channeled. A huge amount of this tax collection, which does not end in politicians’ pockets, goes to the aesthetics of the state. Hence, aesthetics are to the nation-state what oil companies to the industry: both represent means of extracting and providing energy to their respective systems. Both also pollute.

There are many reasons why national cohesion can not be taken for granted: First we must consider the violent schismogenic tendencies (in Bateson’s term)}
that are typical of any society, such as class struggle inherent to capitalism. Second, “the nation” based on a single dominant culture as a symbol, necessarily subordinates other cultures creating conflict. This is where the role of the aesthetic dimension becomes crucial as a vehicle to deliberately pump emotional energy toward the ideal of national unity that can conceal dissension. It appeals to, or in Althusser’s term “interpelates”, participants’ sensibilities and provides emotional bonding to this imagined community by the creation and recreation of certain practices such as rituals and festivities.

As in literature, music, dance and painting, four registers are at play in the aesthetic construction of these national experiences: verbal, acoustic, somatic and visual.6

The aesthetic appeal of slogans like “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, the eloquent rhetoric at the National Assembly in Paris, La Marseillaise music sung through the streets Paris, the gestures and poise of prototypical characters like Mirabeau or the Marquis de Lafayette, the images and icons like Delacroix’s painting of Liberty Leading the People of France, all these components undoubtedly contributed to national fervour among the people towards the building of the nation state in eighteenth century France.

On the verbal we share not only a language but an idiomatic universe of common themes and expressions, including conversational genre styles and a version of the national history narrative. It is no coincidence that, as Anderson noted, the emergence of nation states concurs with nineteenth century American and European literature and novels with nationalist characters and heroes. With the expansion of the press and media, political figures have become characters in a daily national soap opera with tragic or melodramatic, farcical, comic, or the grotesque spectacle of political-and media symbiosis.

National ideology is expressed also through the acoustic register by national anthems and military bands, as well as the integration of vernacular music. Composers like Dvorak, Liszt and Chopin incorporated vernacular melodies to their musical compositions depicting nationalistic enthusiasm and patriotic fervor.

In the scopic or visual register, crucial are state’s architectural sites such as the Parliament and the Congress or government Palaces, all of which exhibit an aesthetics of monumentality and great solidity to produce this sense of power, inevitability and immutability. Flags and national emblems, symbolic sites, souvenirs, postcards, museums of national history, of vernacular arts and of fine arts must be added to this list.

Anderson brings the classic example of nationalism in the Unknown Soldier memorial.7 The cenotaph is an aesthetic construct designed to produce the emotional effect of admiration towards individuals who sacrificed for the
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homeland. To achieve this effect, a cenotaph should be monumental, imposing, classicist and perfectly symmetrical, made of durable and expensive materials like marble or granite. The huge Tomb of the Milite Ignoto in the Altare de lla Patria in Rome is undoubtedly the paradigm of cenotaphs. This construction was built to produce an intense corporeal experience to daunt us by its massive scale and perfect, static symmetry.

In the somatic or body register, apart from the dwarfing intimidating effects of totalitarian monuments, we can mention various sensory traditions such as local cooking and spices, folk dances, body language conventions (greeting kisses, friendly slaps on the back, eye contact or lack of it) and even the regional climate are also part of a corporeal aesthetics of place, although not deliberate or conscious. Sports heroes are today’s epic national symbolic figures. Pelé, Ronaldinho, Maradona, Figo and Messi are the contemporary national Garibaldis, Washingtons, Morelos and Bolívares. It is no coincidence, for example, that Mexicans converge to the Monument of Independence to celebrate the success of the national team or mourn its defeats. In the World soccer Cup people feel that their very dignity, even their manhood, and the honor of their tribe is at stake. Can anyone think of a better display of collective national identity?

To illustrate national aesthetics, London’s Remembrance Day ceremony is a well calculated show designed to arouse patriotic emotions. In 2005, 20 veterans used lights to send a message from the roof of the Royal Greenwich Observatory by the River Thames to the Horse Guards Parade at the Whitehall monument: the message read: “War turns us to stone. In remembrance we shine and rise to new days”. The Cenotaph (or empty tomb) of the Unknown Soldier keeps a large coffin with the inscription The Glorious Dead. Two Douglas Dakota DC3 aircraft scattered three million poppy petals over London and the Thames bridges. The London Eye lit up in red during the commemoration. Formations of soldiers and members of the clergy, military bands and religious choirs marched, prayed and sang. The Bishop of London said a prayer, Queen Elizabeth, all dressed in a black suit and hat, deposited by correct gesture and manner a wreath of red poppies at the cenotaph. The Royal British Legion and all the English Parliament carried a paper poppy to symbolize the memory of soldiers killed in battle, a symbol inspired by McCrae’s poem In Flanders Fields. Everything performed in perfect harmony, rhythm and tone.

Aesthetics of patriotism has in every country its own choreographic deployment through parades, uniforms, ceremonies, its solemn, triumphant, or mournful military music, its flags, insignia, banners, hymns, marches, and slogans. Riefenstahl’s works for the NASDAP is a case in point, obviously. Nationalism and its aesthetic exhibition keeps exacting enormous amounts of taxes invested
in the aesthetic of power displays already since antiquity’s kings and pharaohs’ monumental constructions to the present architectural and ceremonial political shows.

Such vast multisensory exhibition of power eloquently illustrates that the arts are just a fraction, perhaps the most innocent, among many other aesthetic expressions way beyond museums, galleries and concert halls.

To sum up, nation states cyclically perform aesthetic deployments (the more totalitarian the state, the more overpowering its aesthetic display) to create the effect of national cohesion with props, staging, plots and characters, costumes, set design, lighting, music, and choreography for triggering emotional reactions and implementing a sense of solemnity, unity or awe that fuel nationalistic sentiments and collective adhesion. I am concluding with the biggest most precise aesthetic display of power I’ve seen in recent years: It is China’s 60th Anniversary Military Parade, particularly the Chinese Female Soldiers.8 Not only does the individual disappear here, but the human as well in this incalculable, colossal, almost cosmic machine uniformly deployed in synchrony by utter discipline and sacrifice of the personal for the collective. Seeing this display, Kant would not have hesitated in applying to it the category of the sublime: “We call that sublime which is absolutely great”; (§ 25) “notion of absolute greatness not inhibited with ideas of limitations (§ 27). The dynamically sublime is “nature considered in an aesthetic judgment as might that has no dominion over us”, and an object that can create a fearfulness “without being afraid of it” (§ 28).9

Notes:
2. Ibid., p. 6.
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KATYA MANDOKI –

Email address: kmandoki@gmail.com
Affiliation: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana in Mexico (Mexico)
As will have been widely known, the very notion (concept) of *aesthetics* has had a long and oft-dramatic history. In the ancient Greek and partly Roman tradition, *aisthetis* denoted all that was sensual, immediate, even primordial but deprived of the ontic permanency in sharp and distinct opposition to the immutable, rational sphere of ideas or concepts. In this sense *aisthetis* had nothing to do whatsoever with issues and problems we traditionally associate with the term in question. It was not until the innovative – both from the methodological and terminological point of view – proposition of Baumgarten and Balteaux that *aesthetics* was regarded as an independent branch of philosophy. Secondly, the term acquired a specific connotation in relation to the arts (poetry included) and Beauty (and to some extent to other transcendental values such as Unity, Truth or Good). What was more important, however, was the fact that aesthetics had been viewed as the philosophically valuable discourse by many important and influential philosophers of modern times, playing crucial role in their works.

Such was the case of vast and prolific work of both pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous (indirect and direct) authorship of Søren Kierkegaard. Not only in the opinion of the thinkers of the so-called existential persuasion to mention the most prominent ones, Shestov, Marcel, Heidegger and Sartre – the Dane was credited with blazing and a completely new trail in the uniquely philosophical anthropology. In other words, it was Kierkegaard who for the first time, in the history of European philosophy used the term *existence* in reference to the unique, inalienable hence inimitable and concrete entity: to wit a human reality. What really counts here is not, however, the term itself, but the total change of perspective brought about by the new word, hitherto unknown in this context. The essentialist *sub specie aeterni* approach of former tradition (platonic, aristotelic, scholastic, St. Thomas included with his celebrated distinction *essentia* –
existentia, Kant and Hegel) was to be superseded by the existentialist type of thinking. Suffice to say that due to this peculiar type of philosophical reflection focussing on human condition, Kierkegaard is rightly identified with the role of the unquestionable progenitor of the Movement. What the author of Either/Or did – using his ingenious way of addressing his readers as his equals – was to turn our attention away from the general, universal topics of all-embracing metaphysical system, full of unchangeable, immortal essences, and turn it to that which is unique, particular. In his Philosophical Fragments as well as Concluding Unscientific Postcriptum, Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus) declares philosophical war on all forms (overt or covert) of the abstract and general in relation to human beings. “Abstract thought – he states categorically – is sub specie aeterni, it makes an abstraction of the particular, of the temporal”.1

This – under no pretext – can be the approach designed for the study of man – individual den Enkelte, for man “thinks and exists and existence separates thought from being, keeps them successively distant from each other”.2 To put it differently, what Kierkegaard proposes here is that philosophy has to address itself to the concrete human being treated as the only valid subject matter of philosophical reflection. It stands to reason that this style of thinking (covering diverse experiences) will deliberately, self-consciously address the human situation as the philosophers themselves are involved – or still better – engaged in it. In this sense – philosophy loses its status of aloof, impartial investigation, thus making a philosopher a part and parcel of the theoretical job he is performing. One is then fully justified in referring to existentialism of all sorts as a kind of specific anthropology – whose aim is not to create an abstract theory of humanity as such (den Enkelte repeats time and again the Dame is not subsumed under a general, medial term) but to strive to reflect upon the individual, a concrete man in a concrete situation. In order to carry out (realize) this task Kierkegaard takes as a starting point his own existence. Instead of resorting to abstract notions he prefers (thinking that this is the only possible way to grasp the uniqueness of the individual being) an ostensive method. Presenting in the vivid, descriptive and emotional way individuals – along with their fabric of life, all ups and downs, thoughts, feelings, emotions and projects, with their past, present and future constituting the most adequate material for existential type of philosophical reflection. These epitomes – as we shall soon see – of certain existential attitudes will much better fulfill the dream of many philosophers bringing the particular to the union with the universal. Hence the importance and validity of such discourses as diaries, short impressionistic essays and apparently scattered notes, loosely connected with each other. As human life – says the Dane – is not endowed with prior to existence sense and meaning unless
we ourselves make it sensible (the systematic approach of Hegel is nothing but the raving of a priggish professor) we should take the whole responsibility for it. Provided if we decide to. Referring to his own way of life (some biographical facts play the fundamental role in the understating of his unsystematic philosophy), Kierkegaard proposes a kind of the blueprint for those who would like to achieve the only valid goal in life. Before we name it, we must point to a very important, critical fact concerning both his life and thought.

Kierkegaard – having overcome the crisis of faith (the so-called earthquake which might have led him – in his own words – to total perdition) made the “re-evaluated”, “purged” version of Christianity the content and existential motif of his existence. But it was not the rationalized type of religion as found in Kant and Hegel. In his adamant rejection of all forms of ratio in relation to faith the Dane resorted to those who propounded the direct contact with the Absolute Power or Magt as he called God. No ontological proof can make us true Christians – admonishes the philosopher. Needles to add, it was God that constituted us – beings that are finite, limited in their capacities and faculties and doomed to passing away. But there is always a flicker of hope, the sign of overcoming this dire human condition. All is in our own hands – it all depends on the right choice, option. So it is only through this celebrated leap into faith that human beings may or might come as closely as possible (although there is the infinitesimal, insurmountable abyss between us and God) to this Individual of all Individuals, thus making the unity of their personality a fact. According to Kierkegaard this selfood or Selv, our inalienable identity is the only true aim in our existence. In other words, as our original ontological composition is made up of three heterogenous elements (components) – a material, sensual body, a soul (cognitive and emotional powers) and the spirit – the ratio of the would-be unity we should strive for a state in which those three would be “reconciled”, to wit – each allotted, given its proper position (a role and a function).

The human tragedy, our sore, dire condition is caused by this imbalance – disproportionate array of those components. Kierkegaard’s philosophical mission is to make human beings aware that we could change this conditio humana thus securing for ourselves the unity which would be the modern version of the covenant with the Absolute. To realize this mission the Dane proposes his unique version of the human development or the lack of it – in the form of the presentation of the three stages, still better, spheres of human life.

The existential discourse Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous authors (diverse aspects, sides of his versatile personality) engage “themselves” into accommodates (attunes to) the very style of presentation to the subject matter they investigate into. Thus, the first stage, the most popular and rife amongst the vast circles of
the European population of the post-romantic era is the aesthetic one. Deeply versed in the history of philosophy and culture Kierkegaard resorts to the first meaning of the term, the meaning formed in the Antiquity. *Aisthetis* is the attractive sphere of the sensual. The Hegian immediate (all aspects of one's life unmediated by the reflexion), something left untouched, in the state of primordiality and pristine freshness of being the unique, the first, the particular. In relation to human existence it is our ever ready body (the matter, the hylectic aspect of ourselves) opening up onto ever new, unrealized, unsatisfied possibilities to experience diverse forms of pleasures. Hence, the Kierkegaard's aesthete's (the philosopher refers to both fictional and real personalities) epitomize the stance which is characterized by the “everlasting” pursue, chase after all forms of pleasure (the basest included). One of the pseudonyms speaks about beauty in the context of the life of an aesthete. Quite right. Manifold forms along with multiple manifestations of beauty attract the attention of aesthetes. No matter if one deals with the primitive, hedonistic personality of such degenerate aesthetes like the Roman emperors Nero, Caligula or Heliogabal – cruel and bloodthirsty monsters. They indulge in promiscuity and the fulfillment of the basest animal pleasures, good food, banquets, excessive drinking, hot baths and “indiscriminate” love-making. From time to time they may “switch over” to a higher level: music, poetry (praising their doubtful virtues and successes), pantomime or the fight of gladiators. But – as the astute critic of this mode of existential aesthetics underlines – they soon get bored and are fed up with all this “fuss”. The life of a hedonist aesthete is likely to lead to morbid, unhealthy satisfaction. The same holds true with a much more refined (Kierkegaard calls it “reflexive”) type of the aesthetic personality.

In the first volume of his masterpiece *Either/Or* – the book written from the aesthetic point of view in order to adequately render all valid, crucial aspects of being an aesthete – Kierkegaard plays games with readers, performs a kind of trick (Johannes Climacus describes *Either/Or* in *The Postscript* as “aesthetical” in the sense that the book itself is the concrete alternative, a choice) either aesthetics or ethics. That the aesthetics – “the funniest type of lore”, to quote Kierkegaard’s, Victor Eremita (“the publisher” of those two volumes) must/should be overcome in the view of the project of becoming the unity, the genuine Selfhood seems quite obvious. But in his existential aesthetics, Søren Kierkegaard shows multifarious aspects of the first – fundamental meaning of this term (word). As will have been remembered instead of using philosophical concepts, judgments, deductions – in a word – all these paraphernalia of a philosopher’s job, the Dane chooses the aesthetic way (thus “calling in” the second, more standard understanding of the term: denoting a branch of philosophy related to Arts – in
the Lessingian sense arts of time and space – literature, poetry and visual arts). Both his method and aim is self-evident. In order to help you, my brother – he seems to be saying – make the right decision, I shall defeat the aesthetics by dint of its own means. Then aesthetics will deconstruct itself – to refer to the contemporary language.

Writing within the literary context of the Post-romantic era (an aesthete is announced by the figure of the romantic ironist criticized in his early dissertation *On Irony*) Søren Kierkegaard will resort to such literary methods of narration as a kind of an introspective novel of sorts, a diary, impressionistic (sketchy) essays, literary analysis, “romantic” fables and tales. One can clearly discern the anti-hegelian stance in this. Philosophy (especially philosophy of man) cannot make false, unsubstantiated claims for totality. The “dramatic” history of the “papers” discovered by a mere accident is also “aesthetic” in the sense that all is nothing but mere, unpredictable chance. Thus, it is none other than a diary – implies Søren Kierkegaard himself – that is the best way to “show us in”, let us inside (to get the right sort of perspective) this mysterious world of intricate problems, dreams, wishes, hesitations, and complex philosophical states of the aesthetical mode of existence. From the unique testimony of the inner life (*Diapsalmata*) “a bundle” of notes loosely connected with each other we learn about this stage of existence.

A is the anonymous author standing for this attitude in life. In contradistinction with the hedonistic, primitive aesthetes this young Dane belongs to finely educated circles. Like Kierkegaard himself A is fond of music (Mozart), literature, poetry and drama. Time and again, he quotes philosophers and men of letters. Apart from his being an avid reader and *consomatur de la culture* A is an excellent writer and literary critic. His *The Unhappiest* can be compared with the best examples of romantic poetic prose while the essays on Mozart and the ancient tragedy are masterpieces of their own.

What is more important, however, is his sincerity, frankness and openness (made feasible due to the form of this particular *enoncé*). Although these existential intimations reveal the makings of a certain philosophy of life of reflexive aesthetes it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the main, essential traits, constituting the overall nature of this type of personality. Let us begin with the apparently positive, “constructive” aspects of this type of existence.

Aesthetes would like to stay free, hence what they hate the most is any kind of permanent (implying moral, ethical obligations) engagements. The strong critic of this stance, Judge William (in the second volume of *Either/Or*) makes a point here accusing his young friend A of shrinking, escaping from social, professional and familial duties. No permanent relations, marriage, family, children – no setting
down – is it not the “best” way leading one to alienation, loneliness and finally social and psychic decay? According to existential aestheticism life should be nothing but an endless, everlasting multitude of various possibilities. An aesthete would like to perform if we may use this metaphor – a kind of juggling, almost desperately trying to hold simultaneously all balls in his hands. This is an evident misconception of an idea of freedom, its blatant “abuse”, repeats William. It is rather an example of the romantic anarchy, acting at one’s own discretion which – as many cases do testify to it – is likely to lead to a personal catastrophe (disaster). In so far as the aim, the “project” part of this type of existence is concerned one must be aware that the reflexive aesthete would like to achieve happiness and satisfaction as all of us do. But still, he reduces the meaning of it. Happiness is identified by him with varied forms of pleasures. First come the sensual (“immediate”) ones. Both types of aesthetes would like to live in order to enjoy the never-ending sensations of all that is primordial, fresh, pristine. Be it a glass of good wine, an unexpected meeting with an interesting person (the category of interesting is so characteristic of aesthetic existence), fabulous sight of a sunset, delicate sea breeze... . Carpe diem – revel in less or more refined pleasures and let the show go on for ever and ever seems to be the epitome of his life outlook. In other words, the sociological portrait of the Kierkegaardian first type/stage of life boils down to a moneyed, well-to-do heir to solid fortune, a young guy freed from all burdens of every day, mundane problems, trying to enjoy every moment of such leisurely activities (as outings, going to sea resorts, taking girls for a “spin”, expensive inns and restaurants serving medium beef steaks and Indonesian coffee). Kierkegaard's lively, salty scenes from the life of aesthetes (e. g. The Diary of Seducer or Repetition) may even stunt, shock and cause bewilderment in today’s readers. This peculiar mixture of the sensual and more refined pleasures leading up to such high brow even “spiritual” activities as going to concerts, theater to see the latest première, intellectual gatherings (Heiberg's cénacle may serve here as the personal experience, recalled in many a page of the Kierkegaard oeuvre) all add to the unique atmosphere of the life of aesthetes. Then come the most refined, advanced in the life-aestheticism approach activities: writing poems, essays and what might be called using today’s terminology – the active formation of the cultural life (the fictional hero of this aesthetic adventure in life of Either/Or, A vel Johannes the Seducer belong to elite club devoted to highly spiritual if not morbid projects).

It is from both Diapsalmata and numerous essays in Either/Or, along with The Repetition, The Notion of Dread, and Stages on Life’s Way (the transcended aestheticism in view of the religious project) that we learn the whole truth. To cut the long story short: the aesthetic stage of life is an impossible, aborted
dramatic attempt at achieving the impossible, still better, the self-contradicting project. It is the unity, this most coveted (unconsciously) Selv through aesthetic means, aesthetics way of life. Søren Kierkegaard is quite open about it. Defending (obsessively) his misconstrued notion of freedom, this market personality. A and a legion of aesthetes shun the only possible choice they could make: the choice of themselves. Any resolute choice fills an aesthetic with fear and dread as his domain is everlasting juggling. Moreover, his attitude towards himself is characterized by a strong (but hidden) ambivalence: hate and love. In other terms, an aesthetic locates his apparent happiness outside himself: money, position, passing romances, carnal beauty, not “inside” himself. All in all these factors contributing to the happiness of aesthetic may one day perish leaving him in the most uncomfortable position. Moreover, being completely worldly-dependent the aesthetic’s freedom is a mere illusion. According to Judge William a young generation of frustrated aesthetes concentrate on one element only of the threefold substance of human being: the sensual, the carnal and the immediate. Thus in oft-chaotic, hectic, nerve and soul racking attempts at the inaccessible Selfhood aesthetes experience the bittersweet taste of prolonged defeat. Instead of freedom they face total determination. But this personal, if not, generation-like disaster assumes more devastating aspects: the interior, the spiritual part of human life is being totally affected. The man of the “cold”, “impartial”, indifferent, reflexive age is in an urgent need of a thoroughgoing change: the spiritual rennovation.

Kierkegaard was the first – before Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Amiel – to have revealed what might be called the ontological (although the psychological component has its due role) inner states. In his masterpiece The Notion of Dread (written by a “specialist”, an expert, the Pseudonymous Haufniensis) he analyzes the phenomena of dread and fear. Aesthetes experience these in the face of nothingness – the nothingness they were, are and will eventually become. Unless the right choice has been made – the choice to be oneself, to attain the Selfhood. Revelling in illusions, being prey to volatile moods, “engaging” in passing interests lead aesthetes to perdition. Our – given by the Absolute – essence will never be realized hence the authentic moods in the life of every aesthetic: melancholy and finally despair. The first is described by Kierkegaard in terms of a strife between body and Spirit. It is this noblest element in human beings which unsuccessfully tries to free itself from the shackles of corporeality. This is the innovative, original presentation of the overpowering, dark mood incapacitating all spontaneous activity – the infamous melancholy – the silent killer of the post-romantic generation. This hysteria of the Spirit is a tell-tale characteristic of existential aesthetics, but still worse is to come. Fourfold game with oneself, the cruel dialectics of being and non being oneself – the despair. As each Tilvaerese
(existence) of an aesthete is bound, rather doomed, to end in despair Kierkegaard devotes a special treatment to this phenomenon. The despair of finality and infinity do characterize the age of reflection. Both make the attainment of the Self impossible: either deflated or inflated Ego lead us astray – we never are what is designed, prepared for us by the Absolute. The false glamour, cheap “richness” of the aesthete’s life is deprived of any stability, permanence, it is like a series of floating notes in a melody, like a passing sensation of just declaimed poem, or a flicker of colors of a picture. That motif – to wit – of the aesthetic beauty provided by the world of art brings us to the second – more standard notion of aesthetics as presented (rather reconstructed) in the work of Kierkegaard. Let us briefly point to some essential themes. Existential aesthetics – as the first stage in human life is related to the philosophy of art (the second understanding of the term). Being antiheglian, paradoxically enough, Kierkegaard approved of some tenets of Heglian views concerning art, works of art and aesthetic values. In his first, non-pseudonymous dissertation devoted to irony, he allied with his opponent Hegel in the criticism of romantic poets – Tieck, Schlegel, Solger who used this powerful weapon in order to cut off all the relations with the reality in the name of artistic, poetic freedom imposing its own laws, norms on the transcendent world. Kierkegaard, a kind of a poet himself, resorting to artistic means, uses metaphors, oxymorons, spins his philosophical yarns like a true artist. Hence, in his pseudonymous works he turns to the artworld in order to sound more convincing. Look – he seems to be saying – art as a fine way of expressing of one’s thoughts, feelings, emotions may have a great say in human development, in our striving for attaining the most precious value: ourselves. Provided, that it will not be abused and its idea misconstrued. Art was the manifestation of the Spirit, authentic works of art showed this triumphant progress of the Absolute towards Self-Consciousness. Unlike religion and philosophy, art resorts to the sensuous, the immediate – stones, paints, sounds transformed by creative talents of artists. In this way the rational drive made itself present transforming the crude reality into a “rational” knowable structure. The main value of art was located in Truth rather than Beauty, the latter being defined as sensuous shining of the idea. Although Kierkegaard had never presented a systematic version of his aesthetic theory he shared most of the Heglian views on art (to be more exact it was the version of Heiberg’s heglism). Thus one can distinguish three levels of theoretical aesthetics in the work of Kierkegaard. The formal one underlined the enormous importance, significance of the celebrated congruence of form and matter, and the limits of its genre. Psychological aspect embraced the fundamental moods of existing individuals (angst, fear, dread, the sense of absurdity but joy and the spontaneity as well). The ontological (existential
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dimension) imposes upon various forms of art certain tasks, the revelation of the truth about human condition being the most crucial one.

Our existence should be treated in its own terms, it should never imitate the artworld (the tragic case of Don Juan – the opera and the real existence serves first of all as an equivocal warning). The project of unity may however be aesthetically strengthened – to put in that way. Such masterpieces like Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* point to the “author’s whole individuality – says Kierkegaard – as if it were the sea in which every simple detail is reflected”. But let us repeat once again: the poetic transfiguration – to use the Dane’s terminology – is not to resolve the onerous task of being oneself, that is of transcending the aesthetical in one’s existence.

Notes:

2. Ibid.

PIOTR MRÓZ –
Affiliation: Jagiellonian University (Poland)
The task of accounting for how persons, how subjects are made is one where the traditional Western divisions of ethics and aesthetics merge, and it is in this regard that non-Western, particularly Chinese, and even more particularly Confucian, insights have a distinct advantage. By having dealt with ritual ethically-aesthetically over such a long history on its own terms, Confucianism can address aspects of person-making in ways that surpass the more reactive efforts in contemporary Critical Theory.

Here the path is fivefold, going through the critical post-structuralist notion of I) becoming subject, subjectivation, and the accompanying idea of II) autonomy alongside (III) the classical Confucian idea of ritual, \( lî \), as well as contemporary notions of IV) subjectality, a Confucian/ Marxian-materialist approach to collective unconsciousness in social ritual and V) somaesthetic (bodily) cultivation. What results is an intercultural account of how two traditions, one newer and reactionary and the other older and speaking on its own terms, converge on an important issue for this era—understanding and broadening the radically A) relational, B) discursive, C) bodily, D) ritually-impelled self.

I. Subjectivation

The first key word here is subjectivation. Judith Butler follows Michel Foucault in using this term in describing how melancholy defines the emergence of subjects as they are induced to perform rituals in order to gain recognition from broader social forces. Butler specifically breaks her account down in terms of five key paradigms—Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness, Nietzsche’s Bad Conscience, Freud’s Ego, Althusser’s Interpellation, and Foucault’s Power-Resistance Dynamic. All of
these sources form her narrative of the body being turned on itself and trapped in a skin-tight prison, sentenced to go through ritual motions in order to get through the day, with the repetition itself bringing a meager measure of freedom in the form of rage re-appropriating the terms of the ritual/symbolic field.

Butler holds that a subject’s identity arises from external normativity, which initiates and takes up residence within the inner sphere of self-consciousness. In her view, what Hegel sees as the split between recognized master and recognizing slave internalized in Unhappy Consciousness, Nietzsche rearticulates in his notion of the Bad Conscience as a socially driven split of the self into tormenter and the tormented. Working from this convergence, Butler reasons that melancholy occurs as social forces form the psyche, with the social regulating the psychic sphere so that the subject’s conduct occurs within social norms. In both cases, social forces establish the layout of the mind, regulating it and negating socially unacceptable behavior. Therefore, in Butler’s reading of Hegel and Nietzsche, the social regulates the psychic, leading to an internalizing of society’s value. This enables the will to be tame enough to get by in society. The self, being so constituted, does not really possess its own will, but is formed in relation to others. Hence, in explaining the relational self, Butler writes, “the ‘will’ is not…the will of a subject, nor is it an effect fully cultivated by and through social norms.” She suggests instead that the will is “the site at which the social implicates the psychic in its very formation—or, to be more precise, as its very formation and formativity.” This signals that the subject is A) deeply relational.

Butler distills her notion of a will that formatively turns on itself with the help of Louis Althusser. Althusser sets a scene where a police officer yells “Hey, you there!” “You” turn around, recognizing yourself in this hail in a literal turn on self. The self, so recognized, guiltily submits before the law without reason. This plays out countless times in the subject’s life, where direct hails like “man,” “woman,” “white,” “black,” “straight,” and “gay” and indirect cultural messages hail the subject into being, into acting out a certain role, thus enacting and enabling the psychic constitution of particular subjects, highlighting B) the discursive character of subjectivation.

This scene, like Hegel’s Master-Slave antagonism and the imposition of Bad Conscience in Nietzsche’s Creditor-Debtor model, greatly influence the subjectivation model, but the scene is seldom reducible to two parties. Indeed, for Foucault, those granting recognition are themselves subjects, watching and surveilling each other in society’s grand, self-regulating, panoptical prison. Similarly pernicious effects result. The subject body unthinkingly turns on itself, disciplined and preternaturally ready to submit, be it to Althusser’s singular authority or that of innumerable, invisible, displaced, and paradoxically ubiquitous “Others.” The
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body that matters is the body that betrays itself for continued subject life. This calls attention to C) the bodily nature of subjectivation.

Before long, the subject ego is continually comporting the body to in order to achieve a dubious form social recognition. Taking up Foucault’s language, repetition is the basis for discipline, whether it be within physical prison walls or those figuratively built by society as a means of control. With this repetition, behavior thus becomes patterned and conduct becomes a type of ritual performance driven by a need to maintain a level of recognition and legitimacy. This shows subjectivation to have D) a profoundly ritualistic character.

This turning of the self back upon the self occurs in such a way that there is no inside or outside prior to the formative turn, because that barrier is precisely what is being formed. There is no core, no eternal soul that comes prior to the social implication of the psyche. Peeling back the onion only gets more onion and sifting through the sediment of past social relationships only yields more sediment. There is no redemption, in the sense of recovery of original essence or original soul, precisely because the soul is not a pre-given quantity, being instead always in the making. This marks a break with conventional notions of the soul, and in this the project becomes less about redemption and more about rehabilitation. Though Butler does not put it this way in her reading of Nietzsche and the imposition of slave morality, the implication is there—the challenge here is gaining, or perhaps regaining, a sense of nobility for this A) relational, B) discursive, C) bodily, and D) ritually-impelled subject.

In any event, Butler looks to Nietzsche’s Bad Conscience and Freud’s Superego dynamic for inspiration here, particularly as concerns the former’s remark “that bad conscience fabricates the soul.” For both Nietzsche and Butler this fabrication is “artistic” in nature. This means that the subject, the co-articulation of psychic form and somatic matter, is itself a work of art created by our moral life. In appropriating Nietzsche, Butler describes the subject “as a kind of necessary fiction, [being] also one of the first artistic accomplishments presupposed by morality.” Following Nietzsche, Butler describes bad conscience as “the instinct for freedom made latent.” She continues and, reminiscent of Nietzsche, claims that this form of self-consciousness is “a peculiar deformation of artistry.”

However, Butler does not adequately follow up on the link between art and freedom, neither within the context of her analysis of Nietzsche, nor within the broader scope of her general project. Regarding Nietzsche, it is almost as if her appropriation stops precisely at the second stage of what his Zarathustra calls the metamorphoses of spirit. That is to say, that Butler follows much of Nietzsche’s template regarding the assumption of society’s burdensome norms in the first “camel” stage and the subsequent contrarian denial of those values in
the second “lion” stage, but that she completely disregards the third stage – the child stage. Read in terms of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, this means that after saying yes to morality, and saying no to morality, there is no room in Butler’s view for a different type of redemption, a joy of saying yes to oneself, to one’s moral artistry, to spontaneity, and to the creation of new values for the self.

II. Autonomy

And so, the second key word here is autonomy. Butler’s account is all about how the subject is recognized and gains a very costly autonomy from the Other. And so, subjectivation, especially as presented by Butler, seems not just serious, but grim. For her, the subject has no real resources except those problematically granted by power structures and thus no way out, leaving only creative metonymy in the form of enraged resistance to twist already pre-given terms of discourse in order to expose the absurdity of social constructions like pink being for girls and blue being for boys or of race being presented as an objective fact.

Therefore in order to supplement, and not undermine, subjectivation theory, I propose looking at another possibility—an intercultural approach. Subjectivation is all about a body turning on itself in order gain recognition and status through embodying social norms and roles ritually performed in everyday life. Why not then look at a philosophical tradition, which is sensitive to A) the relational self, to B) discursively-formed roles, to C) the body, and to D) ritual performance and which has the added benefit of being more attuned to the artful side of subject life than post-structuralism? Why not look to other sources like Confucianism?

Stemming from the so-called “axial age,” the rough time period in which Plato and Aristotle were active, the still-living tradition of Confucianism set the stage for ensuing East Asian philosophical schools, furnishing much of the basic vocabulary, with its notions of role-based ethics, ritual, and family proving particularly influential up into the present day.

The benefit of Confucianism, spanning the classic and the contemporary, is that here it can do what the largely reactionary enterprise of critical theory cannot—that is, speak in its own voice about person-making. This sort of paradigm allows for looking at the relational self in terms beyond endless struggle and points to real autonomy.

Therefore, a historical reading of the key Confucian terminology relating to society and self will drive the first part of the investigation here, allowing for evaluation of the major debates within the Chinese tradition. Confucians have dealt with the issues at play here in fights with the Mohists and the Daoists as well.
as in quarrels within the tradition like the clash between Mencius and Xún Zī on human nature. Parsing these arguments with respect to the historical development of Confucianism can help anticipate major topics only recently emerging for critical theorists and point to novel senses of autonomy not determined by prevailing power structures.

III. Ritual Propriety – Lī 礼

And so, perhaps unexpectedly, the third key word is lī 礼. Unlike post-structuralism, which, as a new field, seeks to re-define terms like “body,” “power,” “subject” and so on, Confucian philosophy has developed on its own terms and has its own vocabulary for dealing with many of these issues, with lī being perhaps the most important here because of its A) relational, B) discursive, C) bodily, and D) ritualistic senses.

Lī means ritual propriety,9 broadly connoting everything from the subtly ritual-habitual to grandiose formalities. Lī is social grammar.10

Lī, as Confucius puns, provides knowledge of where to stand.11 Lī coordinates the where and when of social comings and goings. Lī attends to gesture and comportment. Lī describes how the players and the audience each take their various places, and act just so at just the right time. Lī forms a pair with yuè 乐, music, or more precisely musical theatre, with connections to all arts.12 Lī is both a social grammar and a social choreography.13 Lī encompasses the ethical and the aesthetic nature of A) the relational self.

Lī speaks to how language stands in society. Lī connects the regulation of cultural expression and of society. Lī expresses how B) the discursive climate defines how people live up (or down) to social role archetypes.14

Lī describes the body that stands. Lī relates linguistically to tí 体, the corpus, with a sense surpassing simple physical matter, pointing to the dynamic, ongoing arrangement of bodies.16 Lī grounds self-cultivation, xiūshēn 修身 in Chinese, literally habilitating the person, the body. Lī addresses the role of ritual in physical growth, coordination, and habituation. Lī works in relational processes, and thus deals with both C) “individual” human bodies and common bodies politic.

Lī provides knowledge of when to make a stand. Lī conditions social relations. Lī establishes bounds and bidirectional demands between ruler and advisor, parent and child. Lī refers to D) a role-based sense of appropriateness, including knowing when and how to call out inappropriate failure to fulfill a name or role.15

In sum, Lī points to the thread running through it all, and through Butler’s work as well—the artful process of cultural sedimentation and normative subjectivation.
This similar, though distinct, vocabulary opens up a new avenue for the body-focused approach to the A) relational, B) discursive, C) bodily, and D) ritually-impelled self of subjectivation, showing how society’s grand apparatus of normative rites, what Foucault might call power, might enable as well as constrain. Though Foucault and Butler do make this point themselves, their political commitments lead them to focus on the latter as expressed in notions like bodily subject life being a prison or discourse being composed of sign chains. Could there be perhaps another side to things here? Could rites, could lĭ, taken with a bodily and artistic sense, serve not just as a tool of power against the subject, but perhaps a tool for the subject’s self-cultivation?

IV. Subjectality – Zhūtīxing 主体性

Subjectality is the forth term here, and this neologism speaks to the historical roots of subject life and the use of collective cultural psychology as a tool to define human society. Subjectality is the neologism that contemporary philosopher Lî Zéhòu 李泽厚 crafts to translate the phrase zhūtīxing 主体性, literally “subject-body nature,” in describing ritual’s formative role in human social life and its artful use as a tool for human survival. Post-structural subjectivation does well in talking about technologies of the self, but subjectality gets at the techne behind the machine with its blend of premises from Marx, Confucius, and Kant.

Briefly, Lî uses Marx’s statements on the “humanization of nature” to explain how shamanistic art, music, and rituals were tools for social cohesion operating in the early material economy of human survival. Moving forward historically, Lî Zéhòu sees Confucianism as being particularly apt at describing and formalizing that cultural/psychological edifice sedimented in subject rationality. Finally, Lî turns to Kant and Marx in reconsidering the Confucian framework of “being inspired by poetry, taking a stand with lî [rites], and finding perfection in music” to describe how tools like ritual artifice form humankind’s supra-biological body, thus allowing for labor on an object, on a “noumenal humanity” akin to “Jung’s collective unconsciousness,” to provide an aesthetically structured source of internal freedom.

Here rather than just observing the sprawling artwork called society, the subject also participates, furthering the prevailing ritualized cultural psychology and thereby grounding recognition and social legitimacy. The ground being, for Lî Zéhòu, that humans naturally excel at artifice, at the art and craft of building society and culture in the deployment of labor and material. This approach gives hope that, if the species is naturally capable of the sometimes-dark artistry
behind the social formation of ritual normativity, individuals might then untwist this prior form of creativity and put it to work in daily subject life.

Subjectivation, while being useful in talking about the machinery of person-making, loses sight of what can be termed the techne behind the machine. Lī Zēhòu looks to this oversight with his notion of subjectality and the formation of collective ritual normative structures. Subjectality extends subjectivation by showing the constitutive role of artistic creativity in the unconscious rhythm of the everyday. This rhythm, this background hum of ritual practice, can become a symphony when properly attuned. This is what it means to refine lì in practices like *t'ai chi ch'uan* and the martial arts, where the body takes on a life of its own, as a different type of Other. In this manner, self-disciplined self-cultivation opens up novel modes of self-recognition.

Lī Zēhòu’s work on subjectality shows the need for subjectivation theorists to better address the aesthetic side of subject life in the ongoing creation of the social field. Though he is not directly addressing subjectivation theorists, Lī perhaps nonetheless surpasses the post-structuralists in responding to the following gauntlet thrown by Foucault:

*It must cease forever describing the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘suppresses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.*

Lī Zēhòu does precisely this in describing the historical material roots of subjectality. What is the upshot of this, then? Nietzsche anticipates the benefit of an approach like Lī Zēhòu’s. Though the bolder statements of Zarathustra on creativity as an ineffable, child-like, yes-saying spontaneity pose difficulties, Nietzsche points to how understanding the formation of social custom can bring a realistic, plausible possibility of self-growth. On the confinement of thought by language and social habit, Nietzsche writes:

*Only by forgetting this primitive metaphor-world…only through the undefeatable belief that this sun, window, and table might have a truth in itself, in short, that one forgets oneself as a subject, and indeed an artistically creating subject, does one live with any calm, security, and consistency: if one could get out of the prison walls of this belief for a moment, then “self-consciousness” would immediately be gone.*

And so, subjectality opens up the possibility of attuning oneself to the artistic fashioning of the long-sedimented and often unconsciously neglected world of signs, gestures, and cultural productions in which subjects emerge. If the sign
chains of discourse and prison walls of the subject’s body are understood as having been built, as a sort of artistic achievement of social technology, then society appears contingent, much like the self. The basis of power is recognition, and recognition requires repetition, and repetition requires a ritual performance so that the power structure of recognition might be embodied and internalized. If all of that is a human invention, what Foucault might call a technology of self, why then be limited to the unconscious performance of everyday normative rituals? Why not then explore the possibility of empowering subjects, especially in the bodily dimension, through consciously self-directed ritual?

V. Somaesthetics

Somaesthetics, the fifth and final key word here, and it refers to a pragmatic, intercultural approach to conscious bodily/somatic cultivation with the aim of broadening subject life. Somaesthetics is the signature paradigm of Richard Shusterman, an American pragmatist and intercultural philosopher. Shusterman’s paradigm resists the term “body” for its connection to oppositional mind/body dualism, opting instead to use the term “soma” to refer to what he calls “a living, feeling, sentient body rather than a mere physical body that could be devoid of life and sensation.”25 Though he does not present himself as a China expert as such, he quite aptly points out the way in which core Confucian vocabulary takes the integral role of somaesthetics as a basic premise, leading him to describe his own usage of “soma” in terms of the Chinese word for body, shēnti身, where he writes:

If the ti body in classical thought is closely associated with generative powers of physical life and growth and the multiplicity of parts (such as the bodies four limbs), the shen body is closely identified with the person’s ethical, perceptive, purposive body that one cultivates and so it even serves as a term for self. The concept of shenti thus suggests the soma’s double status as living thing and perceiving subjectivity.26

Likewise in his use of the term “aesthetics,” Shusterman simultaneously emphasizes soma as both perceiving as self-fashioning, as observer and artist, as it were. “I thus both am body and have a body,” as Shusterman says.27

When it comes to artistically cultivating the soma, Shusterman is interested in many practices including “various diets, forms of grooming and decoration (including body painting, piercing, and scarification as well as more familiar modes of cosmetics, jewelry, and clothing fashions), dance, yoga, massage, aerobics, bodybuilding, calisthenics, martial and erotic arts, and modern psy-
chosomatic disciplines like Alexander Technique and Feldenkrais Method. The connections here to li are obvious, as all of these approaches bring together ritual and self-cultivation, as are the connections to Foucault’s work on care for the self, both of which Shusterman references. The practices of interest to Shusterman all can provoke somatic awareness, albeit in different ways, but for him a similar effect obtains in a kind of family resemblance, namely a new sense of self in everyday relations. The thinking here is that as one is more attuned to the soma, unconscious habit becomes conscious practice. An example of this familiar to many can be found in the focus that many disciplines place on breathing and awareness of breathing. This is supposed to spill over to everyday life, allowing for conscious reflection on typically unconscious changes in breathing, say in states of agitation, arousal, etc., including those arising from latent feelings about race, sex, gender, and the like.

When conscious ritual bodily practice takes on a life of its own, genuine autonomy becomes possible with self-recognition not being wholly determined by the Master, the creditor, the power structures of the day, or the pejorative Other. And so, much like subjectivation, somaesthetic practice takes repetition and turns it into autonomy, though the mode of self-recognition here brings a measure of freedom from outside norms. While superficially similar, this is unlike Zarathustra finding grand spontaneity in embracing the eternal return of the same, as this program of somaesthetic self-cultivation points to perhaps a more realistic notion of free growth modeled on the social, affective, and cognitive play that recurring experiences of art, artistry, and artfulness generally bring.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, this approach does not completely solve the problems of I) subjectivation, but by providing a new sense of II) autonomy through conscious attention to how III) li, in the process of IV) subjectality, sediments in collective unconsciousness, V) somaesthetic practices can ameliorate the dilemma bit by bit.

The claim being advanced in this project is that by confronting the effects of I) subjectivation and obtaining II) newfound autonomy with conscious attention to III) li, IV) subjectality, and V) somaesthetic feeling, the subject goes past what Slavoj Žižek terms Butler’s “mere ‘performative reconfiguration’…within the hegemonic field” in appropriating the technologies of the self for use on the self, thereby restructuring the hegemonic symbolic order in something like the way that Žižek is after and setting a new direction for critical theory.

Moreover, a framework so built on the notions of subjectivation, autonomy, li, subjectality, and somaesthetics furthers the enterprise of intercultural phi-
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This approach advances intercultural thinking by pointing to a fruitful convergence being possible amidst supposedly disparate bodies of thought, and it does so, not out of intellectual vanity, but in its response to the genuine philosophical call to think through how the A) relational, B) discursive, C) bodily, D) ritualistic self might encounter itself anew as a work of art hewn in the medium of everyday practice.

Notes:
2. Ibid. p. 171.
3. Ibid. p. 66.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 67.
6. Ibid. (emphasis preserved).
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
12. Ibid. §16.5, §17.11; Ames, Roger T. *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, p. 74.
14. 孔子. 论语译注. §13.3.
19. Ibid., p. 67; 孔子. 论语译注. §8.8.
21. 李泽厚. 美学四讲, p. 75.
22. Ibid., p. 109.
The Aesthetic Life of Power: An Overview


29. Ibid., p. 131.


JAMES GARRISON –

Email address: james.garrison@univie.ac.at

Affiliation: University of Vienna (Austria)
1. Pevsner’s Radio Talk on the “Architecture of Washington”

This paper examines Sir Nikolaus Pevsner’s view on “democracy in architecture”. Ever since his student days in Germany, Pevsner, a twentieth-century titan in the history of architecture, art and design, had always believed that art should be functional, imparting meaning to the people for whom it is created. As for twentieth-century post-World War II civic architecture in the Western world, in his view, it was supposed to instill, or at least be capable of instilling, the ideal of democracy in the people for whom it was designed and built.

By “the designer”, Pevsner said, he meant “a man who invents and draws objects for use”;¹ and the purpose of these objects, whether they are architectural or industrial products, is, in one way or another, to fulfill contemporary needs. The contemporary needs of a society mirror its systems, its sense of values, its politics, its social life, its scholarship and, above all, the spirit of the age. Based on the notion of the link of the spirit of an age to the contemporary needs of society, and to the role of the designer in inventing and creating objects for use to fulfill these needs, Pevsner thus came to identify the act of design with the spirit of the age; and artistic creativity, whether it takes the form of painting, industrial production, or architecture, as the ultimate manifestation of the spirit of an age. And to him, the triumph of democracy was the spirit of an age, worthy of being manifested and celebrated in art and architecture.

Pevsner’s academic life, especially in its early stage, was hugely affected by the political and social preferences of the majority of the society to which he then belonged. Following his study at the Universities of Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt and Leipzig, since the winter 1929-1930, he had been a “Privatdozent” at Göttingen University. Although “Göttingen had nothing like the reputation for art history”² that the universities which Pevsner had attended as a student enjoyed, it is said
that his reputation as a young academic had contributed to Göttingen’s reputation for art history, as a result of which “some of Germany’s brightest students started enrolling” at the otherwise modest university. But Pevsner lost his academic position as a result of the “non-Aryan”, newly passed Civil Servants’ law, officially known as the “Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service”.

Pevsner himself lived in Britain during World War II, but lost his mother, who had remained in Germany, under the democratically elected but fascist government. She committed suicide in February 1942 in Leipzig, at the age of sixty-five, out of fear of her imminent transfer to a concentration camp. Having had such an experience of both an academic and personal life affected by politics, racism, and ostracism, his attention was naturally directed, if not compelled, to the question of how post-World War II architecture could convey the triumph of democracy over ultranationalistic absolutism.

Pevsner referred to the subject of democracy in architecture in one of his radio talks, “The Architecture of Washington”, broadcast in July 1947 by the Third Programme, a newly launched BBC radio station aimed at highbrows. In this talk, Pevsner raised the question of whether the most stunning, seemingly immutable public buildings with interminable frontages of giant columns in Washington, D.C. were appropriate architectural forms for monuments symbolizing the ideal of democracy and expressing the aspirations and industry of a society glorying in its democracy. Pevsner had his doubts about the ways in which the ideal of democracy was expressed through architecture.

Pevsner saw that “the shiploads of giant columns for the monumental buildings of Washington” were as trite as the mottoes on those buildings, evocative of civic pride. Written on Constitution Hall are the words “Let our object be our country, our whole country and nothing but our country,” and, on the wall of the National Archives, “The Glory and Romance of our history are here preserved in the chronicles of those who conceived and built the structure of our nation.” “Well, it is easy to be facetious at the expense of this kind of triteness,” says Pevsner, who then goes on to admit that the immense columns of those monumental buildings do in fact accomplish a very effective feat: inspiring the vast majority with a profound feeling of patriotism. Claiming that the majority of people are induced by “the shiploads of giant columns for the monumental buildings” and the trite mottoes to feel national pride, Pevsner asks, after all, “Does not democracy build for the many?”

In Pevsner’s view, architecture whose purpose is to impress the majority naturally assumes the forms of “borrowed monumentality”, viz., a rehash of the past glories of Greece and Rome. As for the plan of Washington, D.C., “it is really a variation of a type of plan that was invented for Louis XIV, especially at
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Versailles, and so demonstrates absolutism and domination.” For Pevsner, this is deplorable “... the Monumental is bound to turn towards the most permanent, immutable-looking”; and “a new style”, a style as unprecedented as the Modernism of the mid-twentieth century, cannot yet look immutable.

Of course, Washington, D.C. is not the only example of imitative architecture with “borrowed monumentality”. But it is definitely one of the cities where architecture which is a rehash of the past glories of Greece and Rome is widely appreciated and admired by many of the public as being emblematic of the triumph of democracy. The majority of people were and are even today pleased with these public buildings and monuments.

2. Pevsner on Democracy in Architecture

We come now to the point at which it is necessary to deal with what Pevsner saw as criteria for the expression of democracy in architecture. Pevsner suggests a whole new way that architecture can celebrate democracy. Pevsner, probably more than anybody in his field, was well aware that “the preference of the majority of human beings is not necessary for the good” and that the consensus of the majority can be utterly wrong.

In the early 1930s, Pevsner had witnessed first-hand in Germany that the taste and will of the majority could lead, in a “so-called democratic” manner, to the rise of a terrifyingly inhumane, anti-democratic regime of terror which had ultimately killed his mother. He also witnessed that, under this fascist regime, architecture had come to be treated as a mere tool employed to blind the eyes of an aesthetically naive people, a façade of spurious Classicism whose purpose was to invoke a sense of national and racial pride.

Pevsner was empirically convinced that “democracy in architecture” should not be “simply following the taste of the majority”; for, in the Third Reich, trite monumental buildings which borrowed from Classicism had been erected specifically to stir the masses: their seemingly immutable-looking exteriors did in fact satisfy the taste of the majority. The Pevsner Archive at the Getty Research Institute in California holds photographs of supra-monumental, quasi-immutable Nazi architecture, copies of which Pevsner clipped from magazines for reference. For him, they were all perfect visual proof of the error in believing that “the architect [is] supposed to show his social responsibility by following what the majority wants”.

Distrusting any decision based on the view and taste of the majority, Pevsner came instead to define “democracy” as the “public duty of helping people on to develop their faculties — mental and spiritual and also aesthetic”. Democracy thus defined entails that architecture finds new means of expression, both
aesthetically and morally functional, capable of helping people to develop their mental, spiritual and aesthetic faculties.

Rather than the principle of majority rule, what Pevsner emphasized is the architect’s social responsibility to erect architecture which can be instrumental in developing people’s individual, overall faculties.

According to Pevsner, one of the major obstacles to the architect’s ability to fulfill such a duty was the architect’s desire for praise and prestige. Pevsner was very critical of the idea that the main purpose of architecture was to display and put on parade the gifts of the architect. For him, architecture should never be an art which the architect practices primarily as a way to receive accolades from the public.

The most respected, well-known twentieth-century architects are rather bravely criticized by Pevsner for their desire to impress. Paul Rudolph was one of them. Rudolph’s design for the School of Architecture and Art at Yale was dismissed by Pevsner as being intended to “overwhelm the visitor with extremely heavy, extremely chunky blocks of concrete”. He claims that, at Yale, Paul Rudolph failed to “express the function of the building” and failed to evoke “what it is in the interest of a school to evoke”. Therefore, it seemed natural and inevitable to Pevsner that, when Rudolph resigned as the head of the School and left Yale two years after the opening of the building he had designed, Rudolph’s successor felt compelled to immediately begin redesigning the interior of the building. For Pevsner, the Yale School of Architecture and Art had been designed by Rudolph as a monument to himself, not as a building with the purpose of serving “the needs of many”: its staff and both current and future students.

For Pevsner, the key for resisting the architectural temptation to flaunt one’s talent could be found in the words of Walter Gropius in his 1961 explanation of his Bauhaus days: “How to dwell, how to work, move, relax, how to create the life-giving environment; these were what occupied our minds.” “This [Gropius’s statement] is to me precisely what ought to occupy the minds of all architects,” said Pevsner. And, if so, there should be no space for the architect’s ego to take over.

Philip Johnson once remarked to Pevsner, “Nikolaus, you are the only man alive who can still say functionalism with a straight face.” Pevsner, the defender of Functionalism, maintains that, “if an architect neglects function he neglects duty”, and goes on to say that a building designed by an architect “must not only function”, but “it must also look as if it functioned”. Rather than function which demonstrates the architect’s talent, genius and obsession with details, good architecture should evoke “the pure expression of function, the pure consideration of the duties of the architect toward the community”, not merely the idea of function as a manifestation of practicality.
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One more obstacle to the fulfillment of the architect’s duty, for Pevsner, is the arrogance of an architect who assumes that he or she knows precisely what the people ought to want. Pride in being a professional architect, a master who “embraces the consideration of the whole external surroundings of the life of man,” can lead an architect into the delusion that he or she is superior to the masses and therefore allowed to impose his or her view on the public.

If, however, architects seek to erect architecture capable of helping people to develop their mental, spiritual and aesthetic faculties, that is to say, a kind of architecture which truly deserves to be described as an “architectural celebration of democracy”, they will find their way, according to Pevsner, through a spirit of anonymity, of caring more about the practical, aesthetic and moral function of the work for “anonymous” people than about praise from the public and the taste of a majority which is prone to be aesthetically naive.

3. Democracy in Architecture and Architectural “Anonymity”

Although Pevsner never wrote a book or essay devoted exclusively to “democracy in architecture”, he touched upon this subject in 1972 when he delivered the Raoul Wallenberg Lecture at the University of Michigan under the title of “Architecture as a Humane Art”. The Raoul Wallenberg Lecture series was instituted late in the previous year in order to commemorate Raoul Gustaf Wallenberg, a Swedish national and a University of Michigan graduate in architecture, who is remembered today for his heroic and humanitarian act in Budapest, just before the liberation of the city. Wallenberg demonstrated his design ability through the production of fictitious-protective passports of his own elaborate design and created a city-wide relief organization for Jews with hospitals, nurseries, and soup kitchens in buildings flying the Swedish flag. Working around the clock with his creative inspiration, he is said to have saved up to 100,000 Jews.

In his lecture, Pevsner insisted on the importance of the architect’s awareness that what he designs, unless it is strictly intended for a private client, has the possibility of being used by “a number of people who are all anonymous”, and therefore the architect’s core social responsibility is “to create a building which is anonymous enough fully to serve the needs of a number of unknown people”.

As has been mentioned earlier, for Pevsner, Paul Rudolph had failed to realize this spirit of anonymity and instead intended the Yale School of Architecture and Art building to be a monument to himself. Mies van der Rohe at the Illinois Institute of Technology was, for Pevsner, the same. Rohe’s unrelenting pursuit of
Modernist details was, in Pevsner’s view, essentially another demonstration of architectural egoism. Pevsner believed that, if architects were serious in assuming their social responsibility to work creatively, yet humbly, for anonymous people, they were able to attain a truly architectonic celebration of democracy. The question of democracy in architecture finds, according to Pevsner, its best representation in the municipal housing architecture of Britain. A concrete example of such housing is the Roehampton Estate of Greater London Council, designed by Sir Leslie Martin and others in the 1950s, in which a wide variety of building types was either erected or preserved to house a community of 10,000. While “groups of ten- and twelve-story blocks” were newly constructed, “old people’s housing of one story, two-story cottages and terraces, duplexes, and so on” were also all provided; and “detached mansions from the eighteenth century and later, as well as other valuable old houses”, all evocative of the garden city movement in England, were carefully preserved. The buildings are quiet and anonymous in style, yet, with lawns and trees surrounding them, a humane, life-giving environment had been created, an environment which evokes neither the power and vanity of an autocrat nor an architect’s ego. Rather, variety has been the aim, with the environment of each inhabitant and the right to be different from others fully respected, and the need for anonymity served. The whole scheme has been worked out for the purpose of practicing democracy, viz., in Pevsner’s words, the “public duty of helping people on to develop their mental and spiritual and also aesthetic faculties”. Pevsner never doubted that, through the architectural challenge of practicing democracy, major threats to democratic society such as poverty and racial conflict could and would be roundly defeated.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that, if in fact the architectural design education of the University of Michigan played a significant role in the formation of Raoul Wallenberg’s vision and his courage in attempting to defeat the Third Reichian policy of racial genocide by designing fictitious passports and setting relief facilities, this, more than anything else, signifies that architecture can function, as Pevsner believed, to further the practice of democracy, and that architects should pursue their duty to help people to develop aesthetic, mental, and spiritual faculties.

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Notes:

3. Ibid., p. 179.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
11. Nikolaus Pevsner, Architecture as a Humane Art, p. 16.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 30.
16. Ibid., p. 35.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 23.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 17.
22. Ibid., p. 24.
23. Ibid., p. 40.

ARIYUKI KONDO –

Email address: kondoa@ferris.ac.jp
Affiliation: Ferris University, Yokohama (Japan)
Should moral criteria play any role in assessing pieces of art? In which way are ethical issues inscribed in literary works of art? Are there any ethical values in literature? Whether it is possible to be taught by art has been a question that has troubled philosophers since the time of Plato. In a way, one could argue that aesthetics, as a branch of value theory, began with Aristotle's defense of the cognitive value of tragedy in response to Plato's famous attack on the arts in the Republic. Cognitivist accounts of aesthetic experience have been central to the field ever since, although in the eighteenth century, it has been pointed out that aesthetic experience is important due to its emotional impact, precisely the opposite of what Plato criticized. Although one cannot doubt the fact that art can have a strong emotional effect on us, the question is whether it is possible for art to influence us in such a way as to contribute to our self-development and to our understanding of the world. In addition, the recent ethical turn towards art and literature redefines, on contemporary terms, the study of both ancient and modern philosophy by stressing the need to combine literature and the narrative arts into a common moral goal. My aim in this paper is to examine questions like these, focusing in particular on Nussbaum’s work on literature and the narrative arts in general.

In addition, I would like to discuss how politics and ideology influence art, not only in the theoretical domain of philosophy of art [e.g. politically motivated aesthetic theory, such as Marxist views about the arts (socialist realism)\(^1\) or moralistic accounts of aesthetic theory such as Tolstoy’s Christian art],\(^2\) but also in the practical domain of state educational policy. In a way, both these accounts are ‘consumer-oriented’ in the sense that, according to them, art is to be viewed from the perspective of the person viewing or hearing the work.\(^3\) In other theories, though, the central role is played by the person creating the
work; art is to be defined by reference to the creator’s feelings rather than to the feelings of the consumer, although it should be noted that the consumer’s feeling are also taken, to some extent at least, into consideration.

Indeed, novels, poems, ancient tragedies, plays, films – and even, although less often, paintings and sculptures – can affect people’s emotions and influence their actions, sometimes in ways that appear to do harm. A famous example of a poem that had an impact on human psyche but also on one’s beliefs and ideas about morality has been William Wordsworth’s (1770-1850) famous poem *Daffodils*⁴ that refers to artistic creation and aesthetic pleasure. This poem has, in a way, been associated with utilitarian theory, in the sense that J. S. Mill – as he says himself in his *Autobiography* (1865) – had his first nervous breakdown after he read it, since Mill realized for the first time, that there exists aesthetic pleasure and that not all is dependent upon Jeremy Bentham’s principle of utility and its maximization for the greatest good.

At the same time though, another question connected to the relation between art and morality is associated with the relevance of morality to imaginative literature and of imaginative literature to morality. This is an issue of long standing that goes back to Plato and Aristotle and has its roots to “the ancient quarrel between the poets and the philosophers”, as it is called in Plato’s *Republic*. According to Jerrold Levinson, this issue involves two questions:

First, how can fictional narratives, being neither true nor pretending to truth, afford moral insight, instruction, or improvement? How can they give us knowledge of human nature, or of anything else? Second, if imaginative literature has a moral dimension, does this open it to moral assessment, and if so, how does the moral assessment of literature stand to the aesthetic assessment of it?⁵

Art in general, and literature in particular, seems to be a source of real knowledge, of a moral one or of any other sort, given that imagining things a certain way, in response to a fiction, does not seem like any ground at all for thinking that they are that way. ‘Moral knowledge’ could be defined “as justified true beliefs about right standards for judging real human actions to be morally good or bad”.⁶ Thus, the question here is whether art is like philosophy in expressing universal truths. Of course, one will argue that literary works cannot assert moral truths; they can merely suggest moral truths. Literary works do not suggest moral truths in the sense that authors intend to suggest certain truths or in the sense that particular readers actually grasp these truths:⁷ “something is true even though the author may not intend it and be quite unaware of it, and even though the audience may be so imperceptive as not to grasp it”.⁸ Therefore, another question that arises, in relation to whether fictions are cognitive,
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is whether the cognitive force of fiction should be construed in terms of moral truths or rather in terms of moral beliefs. Literature may be a source of “genuine moral beliefs about real and not just fictional human actions” and “moral fictions may be even necessary components of any reflective person's attempt to articulate a satisfactory viewpoint”.9

Related to the above is the question referring to the role that works of art might play in moral education; a question again as old as Plato's Republic. As Noël Carroll points out:

Ever since Socrates met Ion, this has been the great quarrel between poetry and philosophy. For in his momentous effort to depose Homer as the educator of the Greeks in favor of his own tutor, Plato was at pains to argue that neither literature nor art could teach anyone anything, since teaching requires something to teach, namely, knowledge, moral or otherwise; and knowledge, according to Plato, was something that neither literature nor art had to offer. Moreover, this Platonic tradition, albeit modern variations adapted for different epistemological convictions, still persists.10

Noël Carroll in his paper 'Art, Narrative, and Moral Understanding' (1998), but also in his 'The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral Knowledge' (2002),11 has argued that fictional narratives can yield moral amelioration and that narrative is thus rightly subject to moral assessment, though there is no value to narrative per se. According to Carroll, literature and art can provide a source of knowledge and a contribution to education, especially moral knowledge and education with respect to the virtues. Literary works can be regarded as thought experiments that encourage conceptual discrimination of our virtue schemas through the imaginative deployment of structures of studied contrasts that function argumentatively. As he succinctly points out in the conclusion of his paper:

Since the knowledge in question is conceptual, it makes no difference that the cases are fictional. Since the education involved concerns the refinement of our grasp of virtue concepts, it is not best described as banal or platitudinous, but rather as affording added insight into what we already know. This need not always be taken as a mere repetition of familiar knowledge but can be an amplification or refinement thereof. Admittedly, much of the work of argument and analysis served up by art, especially art that employs virtue wheels, transpires in the mind of the audience. But in that respect, artworks function no differently than philosophical thought experiments. Thus, in the great and ongoing quarrel between philosophy and poetry, philosophy cannot win without undermining itself.12
Indeed, Carroll is sharp in pointing out that the very own practice of philosophy, its own way of arguing, is based on creating thought experiments, metaphors, myths, and allegories. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that one could argue back – in defense of Plato and the like – that philosophical thought experiments are not artistic creations; they are consciously made up cases aiming at clarifying a philosophical argument. Similarly, myths and allegories presented by philosophers – like for example the ones in Plato’s *Republic* – are purpose-written ‘good’ imaginary examples, or borrowed by literature or mythology, aiming at educating into virtue. So, in that sense, they are not at all like works of art whose intension is arbitrary.

In ‘Art, Narrative, and Moral Understanding’ (1998), Carroll also provides us with a very useful classification of the four views that have been formulated so far on the relation of art to morality which he labels *autonomism, Platonism, utopianism,* and *clarificationism* respectively. He defends the latter. According to Carroll, on the one hand, *autonomism* holds that art and morality are entirely separate and that the latter is irrelevant to the former. On the other hand, *Platonism* and *utopianism* both take art as a whole to be subject to extensive moral assessment; but a negative moral assessment as far as *Platonism* is concerned and a positive one in the case of *utopianism.* According to Carroll, “*Platonism* regards all art as morally suspect”, due to its essential features, while “*utopianism* leads us to presume that, in virtue of its very nature, art, properly so called, is always morally uplifting.”

Classificationism, though, the view that Carroll defends, maintains only that some narrative art, properly engaged with can deepen moral understanding, through clarifying the content of our moral categories and principles, and that such art is thereby both better morally and better as art. It is better art, according to Carroll, because it is ultimately more absorbing in virtue of its moral content.

According to a further classification made by Christopher Hamilton, accounts such as Carroll’s presented above, *classificationism,* can be termed as an imagination-based conception of the way in which works of art can be morally significant. Other imagination-based accounts are the ones presented by Martha Nussbaum and Frank Palmer. These are accounts of the relation between art and morality on which the moral significance of art lies in developing our imaginative capacity to be sensitive to the needs, emotions and moral qualities of other people. Hamilton thinks that this type of insight into the inner life of others is a characteristic of many works of art, and indeed an important part of their value as art. Hamilton, nevertheless, points out that such an insight is not always beneficial and it is for this reason among others that many works of art are deeply morally ambiguous. It does not follow, accord-
ing to Hamilton, that works of art – or the love of art in general – will make us better people, that they will morally equip us with compassion, sensitivity, and concern for others. Hamilton argues that, on the contrary, they might inspire the cruel to do evil.

Martha Nussbaum puts forward in her books *Love's Knowledge* (1990) and *Poetic Justice* (1996) an imagination-based conception of the way in which works of art can be morally significant which clearly lies, according to my opinion, within the utopianism camp, although Carroll does not quite think so. I would like, at this point, to examine briefly Nussbaum’s imagination-based utopian account which focuses mainly on the moral significance of literature.

More specifically, in *Love’s Knowledge*, Martha Nussbaum investigates into the connection between philosophy and literature, the relationship between style and content in the exploration of ethical issues, the nature of ethical attention and ethical knowledge, the role of emotion in deliberating and self-knowledge. Nussbaum also offers an argument in favour of a conception of ethical understanding that involves emotional as well as intellectual activity and gives priority to the perception of particular people and situations rather than to abstract rules, a conception which, according to Nussbaum, “finds its most appropriate expression and statement in certain forms usually considered literary rather than philosophical” which must themselves be included as texts within moral philosophy. Most importantly though, Nussbaum’s project in this book is to reorient moral philosophy and to sustain a distinctive approach to moral thinking and judgment that has ancient roots (mostly Aristotelian) but has been largely neglected in modern thought, by arguing that we should take literature, and the narrative arts in general, as partners in a common enterprise. Nussbaum also argues that emotion and love are key moral phenomena important to the good life. Nussbaum – following Stanley Cavell – argues that we should look carefully into the possibility that literature not merely presents values, descriptions and morally interesting cases, but also a complete standpoint about the good life, necessary to all who engage with the study of moral philosophy, but also important to moral education in general.

It should be pointed out though that Nussbaum’s *Love’s Knowledge* is mainly a collection of essays written at various points in time, not altogether agreeing completely with each other. These are bound together by Nussbaum’s ‘common project’ presented in her ‘Introduction’ which is mainly an auto-biographical account that provides us, nevertheless, with very interesting historical information about the study of literature and philosophical aesthetics, and in particular its reception by the Anglo-American philosophical tradition at the time that Nussbaum was a student.
The questions that Nussbaum poses throughout her book are many and of various sorts, interesting for both literature and philosophy, but mainly for moral philosophy and literary criticism. I will only mention some of these questions:

How should one write, what words should one select, what forms and structures and organization, if one is pursuing understanding? (Which is to say, if one is, in that sense, a philosopher?)

Literary form is not, according to Nussbaum, separable from philosophical content (as autonomism claims), but is, itself, a part of a content – an integral part of the search for and the statement of truth. But this suggests, again according to Nussbaum, “that there may be some views of the world and how one should live in it – views, especially, that emphasize the world’s surprising variety, its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty – that cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language of conventional philosophical prose, a style remarkably flat and lacking in wonder – but only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more allusive, more attentive to particulars”.

Further to the above, Nussbaum also makes an interesting point about love, the most important emotion in ethical theory, since it is our concern for others that makes us moral agents:

And what if it is love one is trying to understand, that strange unmanageable phenomenon or form of life, source at once of illumination and confusion, agony and beauty? Love, in its many varieties, and their tangled relations to the good human life, to aspiration, to general social concern? What parts of oneself, what method, what writing, should one choose then? What is, in short, love’s knowledge – and what writing does it dictate in the heart?

This brings us to another question posed throughout the book:

What does all this mean for human life? What possibilities does this recognize or deny?

Indeed, there are many interesting points raised by Nussbaum in *Love’s Knowledge*, the most important being, according to my philosophical preferences, her appropriation of Aristotle. Throughout *Love’s Knowledge*, Nussbaum is referring to an Aristotelian account of morality and moral philosophy, to an ‘Aristotelian ethical position’ which also borrows Stoicism and the eighteenth century moral sentiment theories, such as Adam Smith’s. The Aristotelian ethical position is of course in opposition to Plato’s theory but also to both Kantian and utilitarian theories.
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One of the most important features of this theory is the ‘ethical value of the emotions and the imagination’. Emotions involve cognitive structure and “beliefs about how things are and what is important”, as well as being “discriminating responses” to what is valuable, good, and proper. Affectivity is best put into play when controlled by the disciplined and essentially loving imagination of the novelist. According to Nussbaum, “practical reasoning unaccompanied by emotion is not sufficient for practical wisdom”. This is something that, according to Nussbaum, Aristotle also asserts. If emotion is prevented or excluded, not consulted as emotion, then this in, at least, “certain contexts will actually prevent a full rational judgment –for example by preventing access to one’s grief, or one’s love, that is necessary for the full understanding of what has taken place when a loved one dies.”

This is indeed a very interesting and insightful account presented by Nussbaum’s that I do not, unfortunately, have enough time to discuss here. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that this last point made by Nussbaum brings us back to the aforementioned question posed previously by Christopher Hamilton. It is not at all clear that art can not pose a threat to morality. Nussbaum is not merely arguing, as Hamilton does, that the novel can contribute to the life of virtue, but she is actually making a much stronger claim. She is arguing that the novel, by its very nature, rules out the possibility that it could cultivate a person’s cruel or wicked dispositions, claiming that the novel promotes mercy through its invitation to empathetic understanding, that it cultivates a moral ability that is opposed to hatred in its very structure. This is a strong utopianism position to maintain and its validity still remains to be seen or is, at least, in need of further philosophical and not mere historical argument that Nussbaum amply produces by making reference to the attitudes of the Ancients towards all forms of literature in general and tragedy in particular. But this would require another paper.

Notes:

2. Leo Tolstoy, The kreutzer sonata, 1889.
Eleni Leontsini

7. Ibid., p. 402.
13. Ibid., p. 127.
19. Ibid., p. 40.
24. Ibid., p. 3.
25. Ibid., p. 4.
27. Ibid., p. 41.
28. Ibid., p. 40.
29. Ibid., p. 41.
30. Ibid., p. 76.

ELENI LEONTSINI

Email address: eleon@uoi.gr
Affiliation: University of Ioannina (Greece)
JIA CHEN

Music as the Most Effective Means of Humanistic Education — A Cross-cultural Study on Xunzi’s Discourse on Music

Introduction
This paper is a philosophical examination of Chinese Confucian thinker Xunzi’s philosophical work Yue Lun (Discourse on Music) in which music was considered to play an indispensable role in appropriate educational, social and ethical formations. My discussion of Xunzi is undertaken from a cross-cultural perspective that put him in a dialogue with early Greek philosophers who also emphasized the indispensable role of aesthetics in general, and music in particular, in education.

In early (i.e. pre-Qin period)1 Chinese Confucian thoughts, music education had a long tradition of referring to a much broader range of cultural and art education than what nowadays might usually be included under the term “music”. Standing firmly in line with his predecessor Confucius, Xunzi developed Confucius’s concept of a culture of ritual and music into a fuller shape by elaborating on their origin from the root of human nature. For Xunzi, the function of ritual and music was to set a limit on everyone in the satisfaction of their natural desires. More importantly, the two further transformed evil human nature into cultural refinement by virtue of education. While arguing for a ritual and music education, Xunzi also precisely articulated the difference between ritual and music in terms of the way the two affected cultural transformation. As he argued, while ritual contributed to making social distinctions, music brought about unity and induced harmony in human relationship.

Ancient China is not alone in her insightful perception of the influence music can have on individual and society. In ancient Greece where Western aesthetic traditions originated, there is also an emphasis on the value of music in those writings of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. Neither of these two ancient traditions looks at music as merely an acoustic form of art. Rather, musical practices
are considered to bring embodied experience, educational implications and social relations into aesthetics.

Understanding music from this cross-cultural context, I argue that the educational implications of music consist of three levels: 1) music is a medium of communicating collective consciousness of the values that govern human life; 2) music expresses emotional principles of reasonableness; and 3) music provides an effective entry into social moral education.

1. Foundation of Ritual and Music: Human Nature

Xunzi (circa 307 BC—213 BC), lived in the Warring States Period (475 BC–221 BC), was one of the most important Confucian thinkers in pre-Qin period. Though less known to the West, Xunzi occupies an important place in Chinese philosophy for that he is a systematic thinker who extended the ideas and arguments of the concept of Yue Jiao (Music Education) developed by early Confucianists in pre-Qin period. In the two chapters “Discourse on Rituals” and “Discourse on Music” in his book titled after his name, Xunzi developed a theoretical analysis of the nature of ritual principles and music, as well as the relationship between two.

(1) Ritual

For those who are unfamiliar with pre-Qin Confucian tradition, it should be introduced here that there is a long tradition in Chinese Confucian culture and civilization in which ritual and music are interwoven in theoretical explorations as well as social practices. To give a simplified account, the cultural meme of this tradition of ritual and music was originated ever since the remote antiquity when the primitive practices of ritual and music had been widely observed in religious sacrificial activities in ancient China for holding memorial ceremonies for ancestors and gods. Music performed then was emerged as a “mixed form of art” which contained three main components: music, dance and poem (in singing songs). And ritual was inseparable from music since the link between two had an essential role in meditating the relationship between people and the society in order to meet the requirement of communal life at that time.

The distinctive contribution of Xunzi is elaborating on the origin of ritual and music from the root of human nature. According to Xunzi, “the nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired training.” Man was born with desires; when these desires couldn't be satisfied, there would inevitably be contention and thus disorder. The purpose for the ancient kings to establish ritual was to put an end
to this confusion and thus avoid disorders. The origin of ritual, therefore, was to set a limit on everyone in the satisfaction of their desires. For Confucian thinkers, ritual could be translated as ceremonies, rituals, or rules of social conduct. Xunzi’s interpretation of ritual as rules of social conduct emphasized two primary functions of ritual: the first is to regulate, that is, to provide regulation for the satisfaction of man’s desires as well as for the harmony of an ordered hierarchy of a social organization. Xunzi advocated for governing states based on ritual principles. According to him, “ritual principles have three roots. Heaven and earth are the root of life. Forebears are the root of kinship. Lords and teachers are the root of order… Were even one of these three lost, there would be no peace and security for man. Thus, rituals serve heaven above and earth below pay honor to one’s forebears, and exalt rulers and teachers, for these are the three roots of ritual principles.” This quote revealed the multiple connections between ritual and cosmos, human being and society. At the essence, ritual provided rules of conduct for governing the social organizations and maintaining social order. Therefore, ritual – including rites, ceremonies, and customary rules of living – held an indispensible place in Confucianism.

The second function of ritual is to nurture. The ancient kings established ritual and moral principles in order to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction. In the view of Xunzi, when a gentleman had been nurtured by ritual and moral principles, he would also be fond of ritual distinctions about “the graduations of rank according to nobility of baseness, disparities between the privileges of old and young, and modes of identification to match these with poverty of wealth, insignificance or importance.” This idea of nurturing one’s desires implied that a good social state consisted in an appropriate portion of different human desires. Xunzi did not seek to eliminate the human desires, but rather to moderate them and offer appropriate satisfactions.

(2) Music

The origin of music, according to Xunzi, was also based on a theory of human nature. He interpreted music as joyful emotion that man can not help but feel at times. This was both a necessary and an inescapable part of our inborn nature. In the chapter on music, he argued that “since man cannot help feeling joy, his joy must find an outlet in voice and an expression in movement. The outcries and movements, and the inner emotional changes which occasion them, must be given full expression in accordance with the way of man.” The ancient kings created the musical forms of the odes and hymns for the purpose of guiding the
expression of man's joy by the principles of the Way. Thus the function of music was to prevent human emotional expressions from becoming wild and disordered.

Xunzi introduced the following key words to describe features of music: joy, emotion, voice, expression, and the Way. When he made the important observation that music meant joy and expressed emotions, he exploited the fact that in Chinese, the character of music, was used for at least two phonetically similar words. One is yue, the performance of music and musical theory. Another word is le, referring to enjoyment and pleasures. Perhaps because of its association with music, ancient Chinese philosophers often suggested that music have a rudimental relation with human emotions.

As a temporal art, music related its ultimate goal to cosmic ontology – the Way. “He who curbs his desires in accordance with the Way will be joyful and free from disorder, but he who forgets the Way in the pursuit of desire will fall into delusion and joylessness.” What Xunzi meant by the notion of Way was a kind of humanity that embodied ethical and political principles. Since the ontological meaning of Way can moderate and direct desires, music attained a connection with morality. Here Xunzi expressed an ideal for Chinese philosophers, that is, the highest form of achievement for a person was becoming a sage. And the goal of a sage was the identification of an individual with the universe. A superficial reading of Confucianism might hold the view that it was concerned mainly with society, not with the universe; with the daily function of human relations, not with hell and heaven; with men's present life, not with life in a world to come. However, according to Confucianism, the daily task of dealing with social affairs in human relations is not something alien to the sage. Carrying on this task is the essence of a balanced development of one's personality.

The significance of discussing the origin of both ritual and music was to draw out the connection between what is of nature and what is of culture. In doing so, Xunzi developed Confucius's concept of a culture of ritual and music into a fuller shape since what underneath his negative view of human nature is a positive attitude toward a philosophy of culture. “Nature is the unwrought material of the original; what are acquired are the accomplishments and refinements brought about by culture. Without nature there would be nothing upon which to add the acquired. Without the acquired, nature could not become beautiful of itself.” For Xunzi, every valuable thing was the product of human effort, and culture was the achievement of human being. Human nature, too, should be cultured for otherwise it could not be good.

The role of ritual and music was to transform human nature to civilized culture by virtue of human effort with self-consciousness. The cultural transformation took place at multiple levels. On the social level, social relations were
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conceived as products of civilized culture. According to Xunzi, social relations were not gifts of nature, but achievements of human spirit. In this reading, ritual and music both offered refinement and purification to human emotion. And on the individual level, this cultural transformation was a personal educational growth from a natural being to a social being. The goal was to cultivate oneself as a moral person who not only possessed a benevolent personality but also performed appropriate actions in accordance with social ethical norms.

2. Difference between Ritual and Music

For Xunzi, although both ritual and music contributed to cultural transformation, there is a difference in the way they affect this transformation. He made this point nicely in the following quote: “Music embodies an unchanging harmony, while rites represent unalterable reason. Music unites that which is the same; rites distinguish that which is different; and through the combination of rites and music the human heart is governed.”

Ritual contributed to making social distinctions. In Xunzi’s view, man should have social relations and the ritual for these distinguishes her from birds and beasts. Ritual was essential for governing a state since it divided people into different social classes and rules accordingly, but it also had the disadvantage of severing the tension between different social groups. This is where music’s function of harmony excelled. A musical harmony had its expression in various occasions from the ancestral temple to the household and community:

When music is performed in the ancestral temple of the ruler, and the ruler and his ministers, superiors and inferiors, listen to it together, there are none who are not filled with a spirit of harmonious reverence. When it is performed within the household, and father and sons, elder and younger brothers listen to it together, there are none who are not filled with a spirit of harmonious kinship. And when it is performed in the community, and old people and young together listen to it, there are none who are not filled with a spirit of harmonious obedience.

Music brought about unity and induces harmony in human relationships. This arranged the social environment for moderation. According to John Kno-block, the English translator of Xunzi, social harmony had three bases: strict reverent care taken in the execution of one’s duties as a member of society; the development of bonds; and an attitude of obedience to those more senior to one’s self. By regulating music, the ancient kings aimed to “cultivate feelings of reverence in ritual ceremonies, of kinship between families and communities, and of obedience between young and old.”
Xunzi’s arguments of the difference between ritual and music were echoed later in another Chinese classic Li Ji (Book of Rites).\(^{13}\) It was reemphasized that ritual and music are two important governing means of maintaining an orderly and harmonious society. Ritual’s function, as noted above, was to secure the mean in man’s desire and thus to regulate an individual’s conduct. The function of music, on the other hand, was to regulate one’s emotion and so to purify her feelings in accordance with the right principle.

### 3. Aesthetic and Moral Goodness

Xunzi followed Confucius in defining the criteria of music as both moral and aesthetic goodness. In the *Analects*, Confucius detested the unorthodox music of the State of Zheng as it threatened the traditional music of the court. Xunzi offered his own interpretation of this idea: “Seductive looks and the songs of Zheng and Wei cause the heart to grow licentious, while the donning of court robes, sashes, and formal caps, the Shao dance, and the Wu song, cause the heart to feel brave and majestic.”\(^{14}\) These remarks illustrated an early Confucian belief that music is capable of affecting its audiences either positively or negatively.

The gentlemen utilizes bells and drums to guide his will, and lutes and zithers to gladden his heart. In the movements of the war dance he uses shields ad battle-axes; as decorations in the peace dance he uses feather ornaments and yak tails; and he sets the rhythm with sounding stones and woodwinds. Therefore, the purity of his music is modeled after Heaven, its breadth is modeled after the earth, and is posturing and turnings imitate the four seasons. Hence, through the performance of music the will is made pure, and through the practice of rites the conduct is bought to perfection… All the world becomes peaceful and joins together in the joy of beauty and goodness. Therefore I say that music is joy.\(^ {15}\)

The passage above expresses a significant thesis of Xunzi’s aesthetics that the world enjoys beauty and goodness together. According to Xunzi, musical performances are the means of guiding enjoyment.

Beauty and goodness is an important pair of concepts in the history of Chinese philosophy. Confucius was among the earliest thinkers who discussed this pair of concepts. There are some passages in the Analects where beauty and goodness are used interchangeably. Yet there are other cases when the two had different interpretations, for instance, goodness is referred to the content of something or a person’s personality; whereas beauty is more focused on the external form of a thing or a person’s appearance. It is thus clear that in Chinese classic philosophy, beauty and goodness could be rendered either differently or similarly. For
Confucius, goodness in general held a higher value than beauty: “The Master said of the shao music that it is both superbly beautiful and superbly felicitous. Of the wu music he said that it is superbly beautiful but not superbly felicitous.” The priority between beauty and goodness is the opposite in Mencius’ discussion, however. Xunzi brought this discussion to a higher level by arguing that the world joined together in the joy of beauty and goodness.

The uniqueness in Xunzi’s arguments is that his approach to the unity of aesthetic and moral goodness was not merely metaphysical. Rather he interpreted the unity as is achieved in the context of a musical performance. Of course this unity did not take place automatically. It is in musical appreciation that a magic scenario is created where people are allowed “to cultivate the self, to find a place within a historical tradition, and to benefit from relationships with others who likewise pursue the goods of artistic self-expression.” Music affected both individual and the state in multiple ways: for the former it balanced human mind and body; for the latter, it reformed social customs and manners. Proper music, according to Xunzi, sharpened the sense organs (“eyes and ears become keen”), enhanced mental conditions (“the temper becomes harmonious and calm”), and appropriately cultivated an individual’s personhood.


In this part, I will focus on a cross-cultural dialogue between pre-Qin Confucian discussions of music and those in ancient Greek tradition. I hope a comparison can show the ways in with Confucian aesthetics bear some relation to Greek aesthetics but also diverge in significant ways that may bring new ways for us to understand the role of music education.

(1) Music as a Medium of Communicating Collective Consciousness

At the origin of both traditions, music is considered not as an individual entertainment, but as an important medium of communicating collective values that governed human life. Perceived in this way, the development of music throughout history was affected by changes in the values current within the community. In ancient China, the consciousness of ancestors developed through different stages: from Heaven to the fate of Heaven, further to virtue, and finally, to music and ritual. During this process of development, music played a role of the medium of communicating changes in consciousness. The unique position of pre-Qin Confucianists in the history of Chinese civilization was due to its specific rec-
ognition of each individual as belonging to a larger part of the community. For Confucius, a person’s value of existence was achieved in the recognition of her social relationships. Xunzi, among all early Confucianists, articulated in a most systematic and explicit way the idea that what distinguishes a human being from animals is her social relations. The nature of human beings’ social relations, according to Xunzi, exemplified a combination of both the distinctions given by social classes and a unity that is required by an ultimate social harmony. These two functions were carried out by ritual and music respectively.

For the ancient Greeks, music functioned as a medium of expressing community consciousness as well. According to Werner Jaeger, the Greeks “established an entirely new set of principles for communal life,” and their philosophical development was formulated to “solve the problem of the individual’s place in the community.” At the core of the ancient Greek consciousness were a peculiar philosophical sense of the universal as an ideal whole, and a perception of the profound laws of human nature. Ancient Greeks believed that paideia, or education, embodied the purpose of the justification for the existence of both the individual and the community. For Greek ancestors, music was often found in myths and regarded as a medium to keep balance between human beings and nature. While Confucius extended the musical meaning of harmony to social implications, the early Greek philosophers, following Pythagoras’ interpretation, regarded musical harmony as fundamentally an outcome of numerical reality. The ancient Greeks believed that the harmony in music expressed a consciously pursued ideal of reason that governed the law of the cosmos. Holding an organic point of view of nature, they regarded any part of the world as an element in a living whole from which it derived its position and meaning.

There is an important difference between the two traditions, that is, a social vs. a numerical interpretation of musical harmony. The pre-Qin Confucian notion of harmony expresses a social and cultural ideal that provided each individual in the community with an ultimate value. Harmony is given a moral interpretation: to harmonize is to require respect for others without losing one’s own position and judgment. Social existence and nature were understood to be connected with each other, thus any change in heaven or in the cosmic order would be interpreted as reflecting a change in society.

Ancient Greek philosophers, in contrast, had been deeply influenced by the idea of “harmony in numbers” inherited from Pythagoras. Revealing that musical harmony was an outcome of certain numerical proportion, Pythagoras interpreted musical phenomena and rules using mathematical methods. He argued that number is the fundamental language of reality. Music, therefore, served as an image of numerical rationality. As Kathleen Higgins points out, “the
association of reason with measure—and indeed with numbers generally—was an innovation of Pythagoras and his school of thinkers... The Pythagoreans took the practical power human beings achieved by means of measure as evidence that number provided the secret code to the truth about the world.”

(2) Music Expresses Emotional Principles of Reasonableness

Although the influence of music to human emotion is commonly recognized in ancient Chinese and Greek traditions, the two differ in their understanding of the nature of musical value: for the ancient Chinese, it is emotive and social; for the ancient Greece, it is mostly rational. This reveals a fundamental difference in each philosophical view of the relation between reason and emotion.

As early as in ancient Greek tradition, a fairly tight boundary was drawn between reason and emotion which later had a profound influence in western discourse of philosophy, aesthetics, education, and so on. It was evident that in their discussions of music education, ancient Greeks focused particularly on the learning process through which rational thinking is gradually developed. Music, on the one hand, was encouraged as a tool to advance a person's rational thinking, and on the other, it was put on a limit for not to arouse unstable emotion.

The ancient Chinese, in contrast, valued more highly of the emotional joy obtained from music and its positive effect. Xunzi, in particular, analyzed the features of music based on its emotive nature. For him and other early Confucianists, music held the noblest balance between emotion and rationality. They suggested music education bring forth a transformative power to channel our moral feelings into right action. By virtue of it, a virtuous person had not only cultivated a strong will to be able to control herself, but also harmonized emotions to be able to choose to perform rightly. Unlike those who restrain their feelings by force, a virtuous person possesses good will and well-tuned emotions.

(3) Music provides an Effective Entry into Social Moral Education

Both traditions prioritized music education because it embodied the aesthetic idea that beauty produces good relationships. A simpler formulation of this belief is the unity of beauty and goodness. In ancient China, Confucian aesthetics grounded this belief on the juxtaposition of ritual and music. These two cultural tenets performed their functions and brought out the best in each other for a higher purpose of combining music education and moral education. It should be clarified here that the Chinese character “goodness” (shan) is “first a relational term” which means “good at, good to, good for” and only deriva-
tively an essential attribute. This point is nicely demonstrated in the following quote from Xunzi: “When music is performed, the inner mind becomes pure; and when ritual is cultivated, conduct is perfected...manners are altered and customs changed. The entire world is made tranquil, and enjoys the harmony of beauty and goodness.”

The ancient Greek philosophers also discovered the educational function in the idea of uniting beauty and goodness. Early in the 6th BCE, the Pythagoreans introduced the idea that music more than anything else served to purify the soul. The unity of beauty and goodness was also highly respected by Socrates since he argued that what is good must surely be beautiful. In the Republic, whenever Plato discussed aesthetic education, his concerns were always moral and political. It was from his dialogues that we learned the Greek word kalon, often translated as “beautiful,” can also be rendered as “fine,” and applied to a kind of value that is not exclusively aesthetic. In other words, Plato would not consider musical beauty or musical pleasure as an object for its own sake, independent of any moral or political considerations. With regard to Aristotle, beauty was discussed in relation to ethics. Aristotle presented us with an ethics of aesthetics in contrast to the ethics of utilitarianism. He argued the agent was moved by an act because of its beauty instead of its reasonableness. He gave us three examples of how the virtuous person detected beauty (kalon), arguing that all kalon actions shared a form that had to be grasped with the heart instead of mind.

There is also a particular reason that ancient thinkers considered music education to be so influential, for music contains a humanistic element that is conducive to the process of educating a person in her real and genuine human nature. This noble sense of humanism was expressed in its Chinese character that consists of two words—ren (人, refer to a person) and wen (文, translated as culture). The notion of wen originally meant “patterned, decorated, or to inscribe, to embellish”, and by extension, “culture.” It referred to things that were not mere necessities of existence, but which gave beauty and variety to civilized life and distinguished it from barbarism.

**Conclusion**

The contemporary world is experiencing unprecedented radical changes and young students today feel serious needs to re-contextualize traditional aesthetic ideas in the current society. A cross-cultural dialogue between pre-Qin Confucianist Xunzi and ancient Greek on the topic of music has revealed to us that both Eastern and Western traditions observe the importance of the aesthetic as well as educational importance of music at very beginning of their cultures.
Music as the Most Effective Means of Humanistic Education...

Their emphasis on music suggested that music be the most effective means of humanistic education, which I think is valuable for aesthetics and aesthetic education today.

Notes:

1. Pre-Qin Period refers to a long historical time in ancient China prior to 221 BCE when the very first feudal empire, the Qin Dynasty, united China.
4. Ibid., p. 58.
5. Ibid., p. 56.
7. Ibid., p. 117.
8. Ibid., p. 117.
9. Ibid., p. 177.
10. Ibid., p. 113.
11. Knoblock, *Xunzi*, p. 79
12. Ibid.
13. "Music leads to common union; *li* leads to distinction. From common union comes mutual affection; from distinction, mutual respect. When music predominates, there is weak coalescence; when *li* predominates, there is a tendency to separation. It is the business of both—*li* and music—to harmonize man’s feelings and give elegance to his outward manifestations…Music comes from within, and *li* acts from without. Music, coming from within, produces serenity [of the mind], while *li*, acting from without, produces elegance [of the manner]…Lawless people do not appear, feudal lords are courteously submissive; arms and armors are not practices; the five penalties are not used. On this account, the effects of music are realized. The affections of father and son are harmonized; the ranks between seniors and juniors are distinguished; then reverence prevails within the four seas. On this account, the Emperor practices *li*.” In *Li Chi (Book of Rites): An Encyclopedia of Ancient Ceremonial Usages, Religious Creeds, and Social Institutions*, trans. James Legge, New York: University Books, 1967, vol II, pp. 97–99.
15. Ibid., pp. 116–117.

19. Ibid., p. xix.

20. Ibid., p. xxii.


24. For Aristotle, this Greek notion means both beautiful and functioning excellently.

25. The word “ren” (人, person) here should be distinguished from another Confucian concept “benevolence” which is also spelled as “ren” and share the same pronunciation. The two words had the same pronunciation, but differed in writing characters.


Jia Chen

Email address: chenjia@fudan.edu.cn

Affiliation: Fudan University, Shanghai (China)
The prominence of the question of judgement in Hannah Arendt’s political thinking is a well-known fact, and several studies have been devoted to Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, where the enquiry freely interlaces Kant’s representation of the world as a spectacle (The Conflict of the Faculties) and his founding of aesthetic judgement on sensus communis (Critique of Judgement).

Over the last two decades, critical interest has mainly focused on Arendt’s way of putting the “world question”: the question of the world as a public sphere, as a *space of appearance*. In Arendt’s dealing with it, it becomes the question of the portrayal of a free/active citizenship, carrying out political freedom and equality through the medium of free speech (persuasion) and public common actions. Where the stress is laid on the unlike attitude of actors and spectators towards the world they belong to.¹ Most of these readings adopt an approach that might be loosely termed mimetic, dealing with Arendt’s tendency to differentiate human activities and create dichotomies between related subjects, like social and political dimension or just between actor and spectator. Useful and perceptive as some of these studies are, they are sometimes locked in a kind of tautology. Or sometimes, holding orthodox readings on moral or political philosophical doctrines, they lead to misunderstand independent-minded theoretical proposals. Particularly, this seems to be worth being dwelt on when the claim refers to Arendt’s theory of judgement, insofar as it turns to Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement to find the ground principle for politics, ending however – in accordance with such studies – by developing an aesthetization of political theory and political deeds.²

In the following remarks, I would like to give some hint of a possible reconsideration of Arendt’s steady concern to trace the features of a political (i.e. non-cognitive) way of thinking, acting and judging with a first suggestion.
That is, that notions like ‘appearance’, ‘form’, ‘common sense’, ‘taste’, ‘spectacle’ or ‘performance’ are not, in Arendt’s view, simply ‘aesthetic ideas’ conveyed from aesthetics to politics, but the very basis of her political theory. These threads can be sketched and gathered up through a more attentive reading of Arendt’s main works – from The Human Condition (1958) to The Life of the Mind (1978), from The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) to the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (1982) – from the starting point of Arendt’s conception of the world as a ‘space of appearance’, where phenomenological, aesthetic, performative, political events interweave with biological aspects of ‘birth’.

Far from contemporary ‘entertaining’ aesthetization and instrumental spectacularity of politics and society, Arendt’s “spectacle of the world” refers directly to human condition in a double perspective.

Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the world as a “public sphere” takes her, first of all, to focus on the “phenomenal nature of the world”, tackling a subject with strong theoretical implications: the way “being and appearing” coincide. As early as The Human Condition the world – i.e. the real which the human condition is a part of – is described in terms of “space of appearance”, but in The Life of the Mind her position is still clearer: what is real is what appears or is shown – “being and appearing coincide”.

The second relevant point emerging from Arendt’s idea of ‘the spectacle of the world’ is that there is a kind of ‘spectancy’ raising as self-exhibition, singular appearing of life, which Arendt fully describes in The Life of the Mind as a sort of ‘worldly’ dimension of life-being itself, a “urge toward self-display”. Related to human being, this “appearing-ness” does not just precede the ‘public sphere’ (as “togetherness and intercourse of men”), but it is already recognizable as a sort of ‘liveliness’ in both vita activa and vita contemplativa, in action as ‘beginning’ (which corresponds to “the fact of birth”) and even in thought as natural human exertion of energy raising ideas and imagining (also political) connections and relationships.

One of the main aesthetic-political foci of Arendt’s thinking of the world is the acknowledgement for the aesthetic nature of perception in most immediate and literal sense of aisthesis of a principle of reversibility underlining its plurality. Perceiving is always divided and shared at the same time – it is the possibility of “seeing and being seen”, of hearing and being heard. This means that the world as a “stage of appearance” consists of a plurality of viewpoints that, in becoming a “public space” (for the living person) also becomes a place for displaying and revealing the “who” (the actor) who makes herself/himself visible individually with deeds and words in real stories, and a theatre of public resonance for the events by means of the “who” (the spectator) witnessing and judging from all
sorts of different perspectives. An appearing (a worldly event) is produced by the actor, a viewpoint (a specified position) by the spectator.

It is worth noting that on this subject Arendt in *The Life of the Mind* suggests a performative extension of what is included under the heading of ‘world’, and a re-definition of the interchanges that give visibility to the act of sharing or having “in common”. The novelty (compared with *The Human Condition*) concerns the extension of the idea of world-ness as a space of appearance-apparition to the earth as well, to the point that Arendt actually defines “plurality” as the “law of the earth”, and foregrounds a ‘world-ness of the earth’ as a stage of apparition for the living *tout court*: living, sentient beings appear on the earth, each species has its own world and all living creatures are actors and spectators in it, in response to an elementary instinct of “self-display”. In this context real being becomes the “worldly property” of life in its simple appearance, as a body that gives itself to the perception of other living beings. In this case, then, the coincidence between being and appearing is registered as the ‘emergence’ of life. Appearing now takes on a transversal role. The earth is the stage for appearance *tout court*, of appearance and disappearance, birth and death of the living, while the world is an appearing-to, appearing insofar as it is offered to the bodies delegated to receive it. In this way each species has its own particular world, however rich or ‘poor’ it might be. What matters here is the “world-ness of living things” – the vital-sensible certifying of the reversibility of subject and object (I see and I am seen), actor and spectator.

The characteristics of public-ness, display and exhibition are not exclusive to human ‘political’ world-ness (the whole range of performative human activities, insofar as they are public exhibitions, words and gestures able to produce effects in shared praxis), but life itself as the scene of display and spectacle.

Towards political judgement

Focusing on the world and its political dimension Hannah Arendt displays two crucial ideas: the first is the world as spectacle, “phenomenal space created by men”, which regards the public sphere as existing only inasmuch as its reality can be witnessed and its value judged by a “plurality” of individuals who exchange the role of actor and spectator with each other (the spectator being the person who must see the action for it to become real). The second idea is that we need to promote a way of thinking, a *Denkungsart*, appropriate to the political, against traditional philosophical thinking, which is ‘monistic’ and all-absorbing.

Inasmuch as it depends on *action*, the world “appears” as individual or group *performance*, in the aggregations that are produced on the strength of and looking
for shared acts and words: this is what Arendt calls *Macht*, power. “The space of appearance,” she writes, “is formed wherever men share modes of discourse and action” in a “temporary agreement of many wills and intentions”, and, in this, it “anticipates and precedes any formal constitution of the public sphere” – that is to say, it precedes any form of government and any political morphology.

What the actor (the “who”) offers in the game of real-appearances is consigned to the “who” of actor-spectators and to their reactions and judgements. It is only in this exchange that, for Arendt, the political space or “in-between” takes form. Significantly, “power” and “judgement” share – but we might also say, they compete for – the origin or, rather, the matrix of the political: power, “a phenomenon originating in plurality” and judgement “a phenomenon originating in politics”.

For this reason, if it is true that the identity of the “who” who shows herself/himself can be grasped only as a narrative identity, we also need, however, to give an account of the actor’s present reality, and this is performativity, which cannot set aside the act of displaying intentions and opinions, through acts and words. That’s why Arendt underlines not only that Kant’s emphasis on the communicability of judgements of taste is based on his idea of a united mankind (living in eternal peace), but also that this idea must appeal to a world- or community sense, to make ‘mankind’ become real anew in specific situations and proofs.

On the other hand, in order to formulate a new (political) way of thinking Arendt’s first theoretical move is therefore to demolish the trick that leads to separating being from appearing, *aletheia* from *doxa*. A necessary stage in this is the exposure of the metaphysical and logical “fallacy” by which being is separated from non-being, and, so, from appearance too. Arendt’s second move is the suggestion that the political being is a being-of-appearance: in politics “being and appearance are the same thing”.

For Arendt, exposing the metaphysical fallacy of separating being and appearing has two implications of immediate interest for a theory of politics. First of all, a neutralization: it cancels any allusion to an “invisible hand” behind the scenes that guides the events of history, and so it also puts a brake on the flight from politics that would follow: if we admit an active “logic of history” behind us, we deprive the “political nature of history” of any power, turning it into a theatre of forces or ideas, rather than of actions and initiatives. The second implication is the idea that an absolute truth (the *aletheia* of the ancient Greeks) has no relation with human existences, and, so, still less with politics. Hence the need, for Arendt, to discover the premises and assert the truth of opinion, seizing the truth that is in each doxa and “speaking in such a way” that the truth contained in each person’s opinion “is revealed to him and to others.”

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Most important, then, is the opinion that displays, by voicing it, the difference in position that marks each person’s being in the world and makes it not only real but ‘active’, operative as a viewpoint on the world (and here I would add: a point of action in the world), given that, as the ancients already knew, decision (boule) and opinion gravitate around the same ambit of being – that is to say, on “what can be otherwise”.15

Insofar as it produces a doxa, a viewpoint is not the ascetic, ontological point of a constellation of bodies, but, rather, participates in the diversity and plurality of positions, setting itself in motion in discussion and in the conflict of positions: hence the mercurial character that Arendt attributes to the doxa. To take form, it makes use of the dynamic contribution of the imagination. It is in the laboratory of the imagination that there is an expansion of the initial position that can further aggregations and competitions of points of view. For Arendt, the alternative thus becomes one between perverse, obtuse and “unimaginative” opinions, which voice only private interests, and opinions that draw on the faculty of judgement.16

On this basis, it is clear that the procedure that leads to the formation of an opinion is in accordance with the second “maxim” of Kantian aesthetic judgement: if the opinion must not merely reflect my immediate condition, my initial situation and prejudices, if taking a position must allow to take a decision on the particular merits of a case or event in the world, this already presupposes a movement of mind that does not gloss over other possible points of view, but “visits” them – a broadening of mentality. This is what I would call the mercurial factor that activates the perspectives, compares them, and sets them talking to each other – that gives them, ultimately, political weight. The political activation of the standpoint passes via the doxa, but not without its aesthetic activation – not without the activity of a “representative” imagination that can compare and, to a certain extent, create connections between unlike situations or positions.

Arendt underlines the necessity to keep a strong element of differentiation between opinion and judgement – doxa is “partiality” and desire to appear, judgement “impartiality”, “universal position” of the judging spectator17 – in particular when judgement is supposed to proceed to action. Nevertheless, their co-belonging is equally undeniable in that judgement ‘educates’ opinion to form itself partly by looking at other people’s positions, and a doxa educates judgement to judge without forgetting its initial position – without seeking an “Archimedean point” outside the spectacle.18

In the course of achieving some degree of impartiality of judgement a close tie is maintained with “the particular conditions of points of view through which it becomes possible to reach ‘one’s general viewpoint’ instead of ruling a simple
'global view’ sustained by a sort of widespread “empathy” as a power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person's feelings.\textsuperscript{19}

**A doxa-ontology**

What needs emphasizing is that, in Arendt, the ontological mix of plurality and perspectivism starts from here too: not a plurality of interpretations, but of positions and situations, since the doxa is the natural place for displaying and, therefore, identifying positions, whether initial or acquired (by an individual or a group), on the basis of which we can start to act and judge.\textsuperscript{20}

For the reasons given, according to Arendt, the mutual distinction and differentiation of the places of the doxa – which, as we have seen, were thought of not as ordinary places, but as places that were, each time, appropriated as 'one's own', able to generate individual points of view – contain not only the positive sense of relativism, but the ontological status of opinion.

In fact, if the spectator who gives an opinion and judges is distinct from the self that thinks it is because the activity of the former has to move from one particular place and the activity of the latter does not, as it can be anywhere.\textsuperscript{21}

It is this ubiquity that can deprive the ‘who’ that thinks of any specific weight in the world of appearances. Therefore – going here beyond Arendt's view – rather than asking “where are we when we think?’ to explain the nature of a political thought, we should ask “where are we when we judge?’

Arendt claims that, to be able to open a perspective, anyone expressing an opinion also needs to reveal a “portion of the world”, to be in a place that can be described on the basis of specific conditions of existence and experience.\textsuperscript{22}

The etymological link between 'opinion' and 'to open' allows Arendt to translate “opinion” in terms of “what opens”, what, of the world, discloses itself “to me” in particular (\textit{dokei moi}). Not, then, supposed or arbitrary truth, or undifferentiated and undistinguished openness, both to positions and stances, but an openness that is situated and concerned. This, I believe, is the decisive passage that leads Arendt's perspectivism to define a plan of political ontology. The doxa is not just opinion, but a portion of the world that opens.

The basis in the doxa of appearing and acting described by Arendt explains how conflict, which is the cause and effect of difference of positions, is at the origin of the fundamental need to express oneself alongside the need for individualization and exhibition – as long as opinion retrieves its noble aspect as an attitude that is formed “in a process of open discussion and public debate”.\textsuperscript{23}

Arendt is deliberately challenging here - well aware of the fact that discussion and debate are more and more conditioned by the manipulative tenden-
cies of the media, with pre-packaged or spectacular ‘openness’ to discussion and a system of political representation that struggles to maintain its promise as a participatory democracy.

**Enthusiasm and common experience**

The public scene, therefore, is given way to the outcomes of actors and spectators (actions and opinions), to singular and group-being standpoints, to interlacing interaction among individuals under the (Kantian) principle of ‘common sense’ – reread by Arendt as a ‘community sense’ in the ‘enlargement’ of singular mentalities performed by ‘reflexive’ or even ‘enthusiastic’ judgement.

The two related movements, subjective for reflective judgement, inter-subjective for the ‘enthusiastic’ Kantian spectator judging (French) Revolution, converge in Arendt’s account of Kant’s political philosophy in the Lectures. Arendt examines Kant’s topic on French Revolution and republican politics from his essay “The Conflict of the Faculties”, turning her attention to the separation between political actors and spectators through which Kant demonstrates a morally based interest in disinterested spectators’ expressions of enthusiasm for the idea of a republican form of government. On this topic Kant says: “It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered”.

First of all then Arendt appeals to Kant’s aesthetic judgement as a theory of reflective judgement, that is, of those judgements where the universal is not given, but must be searched out of the particular. This requires, according to Arendt, an ability to think “representatively” to make the concern with the particular and the interest in universality and impartiality meet in an “enlarged mentality”, as “the power of judgement rest on a potential agreement with others”. In other words, the problem is, according to Arendt, “to see the faculty of judgement in its proper perspective”, i.e. “to understand that it implies a political rather than a merely theoretical activity”.

In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy Arendt lays emphasis in particular on § 40 from the first part of the Critique of Judgement, where Kant distinctly describes reflective judgement in the broader sense in the passages on sensus communis. There he relates reflective judgement to what he calls “a broad-minded way of thinking” (erweiterte Denkungsart) which seems to have a much wider application that in the restricted context of a critique of taste. The very reason of this broadmindedness is rooted in Kant’s appeal to a common equipment in
matter of human understanding, from where we can single out what he calls the "maxims of the common human understanding" and which are the following: "1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself."27

Only the second maxim, however, underlines the existence of different locations related to understanding itself and therefore the necessity of sharing it as a common dimension, i.e. the necessity to avoid idiosyncratic attitudes in thinking (judging). The stress on situatedness allows Arendt to consider this type of understanding as an attempt to orient oneself in the public world, to find one's way not only across stratified knowledge and prejudices (first maxim) nor making oneself free from contradictory demands (third maxim), but directing attention to viewpoints that can be shared through the exercise of an "enlarged mentality". Thus the capacity to judge turns out a "specifically political ability" insofar as it enables us to orient ourselves "in the public realm". A realm made of different situations, practices and conflicting perspectives.28

Not by chance in other words, first in Kant's emphasis on it but even more in its further 'political' elaboration by Arendt, the second maxim is related to a faculty, the faculty of judgement, which distinguishes that aspect of reason's task which is more related to world as public sphere, more deeply involved in differentiation and molteplicity of positions and situations. As Arendt points out, the criterion for judgement, indicated by Kant in the principle of its communicability, must prove a criterion to set new standards, starting from a particular judgement in a particular, 'situated' circumstance, to extend 'exemplarily' its possible validity.

**Actors and spectators**

With respect to the claim concerning the 'difficult' assessment of judgement in Arendt's political theory, we can now come to the remark that Arendt's political reading of Kant's reflexive judgement doesn't actually assume a divide between the standpoints of the actor and of the spectator, thanks to the appeal to a special kind of imagination. Imagination is here intended however not as a generic artifice to escape or ameriorate reality, but as a political-architectonic skill to "raise bridges" between different portions of the world, carrying on them different opinions but common hopes.

Before outlining the principle of a political "common sense" or a "community sense", everything in the suggested transition from aesthetic judgement to political judgement revolves around the imagination, in the "new role" in the dynamics of the faculties (stated by Kant in the Critique of Judgement) – that is to say, its freedom from any determining idea – and in its being embodied
in experience itself in its “most common” form, so that everything cannot be reduced disparagingly to an “aesthetic problem” but raises the question of a renewal of the very way of conceiving political philosophy.

For Arendt, Kant’s attempt in the *Critique of Judgement* to find a principle that must be potentially valid for every non-cognitive experience, which means for “the most common experience”, describes precisely that experience of ‘deciding’ between what we like and what we dislike, which “is to be found in every experience we have of the world”. It is therefore fundamentally important that the “exemplary validity” of the Kantian judgement of taste presents itself as a generalization that, unlike the “in general” of logical law and of abstraction, can be accomplished contingently and particularly, and even though, as Arendt observes, it “advances claims of validity”, this validity cannot be “coercive”. Judgement, a faculty that is, for Kant, “both innate and still to be acquired”, cannot be isolated from the community of those judging.

What makes Arendt’s political judgement very close to Kantian aesthetic judgement is the chance it puts forward to look for (instead of applying) a rule, the capacity to find one’s way in understanding the central political, historical, public experiences of one’s time.

Hannah Arendt undoubtedly deserves credit for bringing out the two political ‘resources’ that Kantian aesthetic judgement makes available: suggesting that judgement is always occasioned by a particular experience and is itself “singular” and that its necessity and universality can be grasped on the basis of a law that is not given but is “to be found”, because here it isn’t allowed any mediation of determinate concepts given in advance. According to Kant, to search the universal out of the particular means that a particular, situated, judgement, has to be proved to be detached and impartial enough to relate to other particular judgements and situations. In Arendt’s version of it, political judgement is thus revealed as – to remain with Kantian terminology – reflective, not determining, judgement, and so historical-critical and not prejudicial as it is constantly seeking unprescribable rules of co-existence once and for all. But it also discovers that, like Kantian aesthetic judgement, it can find agreement by using an *expansive power* unknown to logical, deductive judgement. With ‘expansive power’ related to Kantian “exemplary validity”, I mean a wide-ranging communication available when the “common sense”, the principle of communication itself, is put in motion by a singular given judgement.

Arendt grasps the expansive power implied in Kantian aesthetic judgement exemplarity as a power to enlarge, to expand, increase and strengthen the validity of a particular (its “certain specific validity”) making it effusive, open, through potential dialogue and agreement, without turning to a concept or a rule for subsumption, i.e. without performing as a lawgiving faculty.
In Arendt’s stress on situated-ness of political judgement however, there is a shift that makes exemplarity ‘travel’ from an event to another, and not only from a judging person to another. The different ‘places’ I must take into consideration exercising the capacity to judge as a specifically political ability (as a “representative” thought) are not only the others’ places or perspectives, but also the historical situations that can be connected through a single example ‘embodying’ (and not pointing at) a rule. Arendt’s attempt to stress not only the subjective, but also the objective exemplarity of the example prevents her from making clear the theoretical status of the example.\(^{32}\)

Nevertheless, through Kant’s maxim of “enlarged mentality” and his acknowledgement of “exemplary validity” for non-cognitive judgements, Arendt tries to look for a possible not-prearranged political fellowship in thinking to add to the fellowship in performing a deed. Now the ‘expansive’ power of judgement, the reach of a potential agreement with others, deals with both the aesthetic anticipation proper to representing and imagining other perspectives, and so extending a vision that would otherwise be too partial or selfish (second ‘maxim’, rule of conduct for Judgement in Kant), and the possibility that an event may acquire an ‘exemplary’ role, thanks to building a sort of web around it.\(^{33}\)

With the effect of giving theoretical-political breadth and justifying a possible extended validity of gestures and words exhibited and pronounced in and for their contingency. Because they must inevitably be a response to some specific urgency or historical event.

*Acting* as a start, a particular beginning of a political initiative by free aggregations of individuals and judgement (aesthetic and otherwise) as the particular-singular place for an evacuative stance to what happens, define therefore, in Arendt’s thinking, a tie that should be interpreted as a genuine ‘chiasmus’ of the aesthetic and the political, oriented towards contingency, performativity and exemplarity.

**Notes:**

1. See, for instance, Beiner’s remark that there is a shift in Arendt’s thoughts on judgement, which has led to the idea that Arendt develops two distinct theories or models of judgement. See: Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*. Edited and with an interpretive essay by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. According to this claim, a first model of judgement comes into play when Arendt analyses it as the faculty exercised by actors in order to decide how to act, while a second model comes out later, based on the standpoint of the non-participating
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spectator, who, deep inside the “life of the mind”, tries to recover meaning from the (often tragic) past. Which would lead Arendt to assume a divide between the points of view of the actor and of the spectator.

2. To this respect see G. Kateb, “The Judgement of Arendt”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2/1999, 208, pp. 133–154. In this case the assumption is that Arendt’s “misreading” of Kant (because Kant’s political theory is only available in his Sittenlehre) pushes Arendt toward a misreading of the phenomenon of politics, because of its “aesthetization”. I argue, against this claim, that quite convincingly Arendt’s indicates the phenomenological-aesthetic principle (appearing) and feeling (sensus communis) which inform politics as a dimension which has not to be divided from life, common action, responsible and farsighted judgement.


6. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 50–51, 170–172. Jacques Rancière is one of the main thinkers who have strongly considered the dimension of appearance as a political-aesthetic dimension. He underlines in particular the similarity between art and politics, in that both “construct fictions”, or material modifications of signs and images, and so also construct “relations” between what is done and what can be done. In addition, political or literary “utterances” “have an effect on reality”, as they not only define “models of language and action”, but also “regimes of sensible intensity” (Jacques Rancière, Le partage du sensible - esthétique et politique, Paris: La Fabrique, 2000, p. 62 f.). Rancière (like Arendt) looks for an aesthetic singularisation which shows political aspects – What he calls ‘politics of aesthetics’ are actually ‘regimes’ or strategies or “styles” of identification for political positions (Jacques Rancière, Malaise dans l’esthétique, Paris: Galilée, 2004, p. 31 f.).

7. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, p. 19 f. In The Human Condition we find a hint to a “physical, worldly in-between” (parallel to the “subjective” in-between which “consists of deeds and words”), referred however only to “some worldly objective reality”, overgrown with the latter (Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 182–183).


11. Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 75: “It is by virtue of this idea of mankind, present in every single man, that men are human, and they can be
called civilized or humane to the extent that this idea becomes the principle not only of their judgements but of their actions. It is at this point that actor and spectator become united”.


27. Ibid., 293. In addition to the *Critique of Judgement*, these maxims are also discussed in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Viewpoint* (Ak 7:200 and 228f.) and the *Lectures on Logic* (Ak 9:57).


32. On the issue of the example Arendt doesn’t remove any doubt about the choice to make between ‘reflective’ Kantian example and ‘determining’ example-schema to think an
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33. Arendt doesn’t relate explicitly the idea of ‘web’ to the faculty of judgement as an ability to frame a connective tissue between judging positions and events, but the term recurs very often in The Human Condition, on the issue of public relationships and of the world as a “common meeting ground of all” (Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 57, 181 f.).

ELENA TAVANI –

Email address: e.tavani@tiscali.it
Affiliation: University of Naples “L’Orientale” (Italy)
The genre of political theater, particularly Bertolt Brecht’s Marxist and epic theater, plays a significant role in the novelistic work of two writers: the Turkish-German author, actress, and director Emine Sevgi Özdamar, who writes in German and has become an important literary voice in Germany, and the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk, winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature. In Özdamar’s case the connection between writing prose and practicing political theater is obvious: She is not only a well-known novelist, but also a respected actress and theater director who emigrated from Turkey to Germany for political reasons and to study the works of Bertolt Brecht in Berlin. Orhan Pamuk, on the other hand, is currently Turkey’s most prominent novelist. Not all of his works are overtly political; but in his novel Snow (in the Turkish original: Kar) he addresses political themes that incorporate the genre of theater, especially Brechtian political theater, directly.

Emine Sevgi Özdamar

The second and third volume of her autobiographical “Istanbul-Berlin trilogy” Sonne auf halbem Weg, consisting of Das Leben ist eine Karawanserei, Die Brücke vom Goldenen Horn, and Seltsame Sterne starren zur Erde, particularly elucidate the role of political theater in her work.

The Bridge of the Golden Horn (1998), a novel with many picaresque elements, is divided into two parts: The first part plays primarily in Germany, and part two takes place in Turkey.

Part one, “Der beleidigte Bahnhof”, a reference to Anhalter Bahnhof in Berlin, shows the young aspiring actress leaving Istanbul to work at Telefunken, a radio lamp factory in Berlin. In the evenings she frequently visits the Hebbel theater.
across from the hostel, and she becomes friends with the “kommunistischer
Heimleiter”,¹ the young supervisor and his wife, as well as his friend Ataman,
who are theater enthusiasts and introduce her to Bertolt Brecht's writings and the
Berliner Ensemble in East Berlin, to which they cross the border. In East Berlin
they also buy records with songs by Brecht and Weill that later accompany her
throughout her travels. Participating in the student movement, she learns the
German language in the Berlin of 1968. Toward the end of part one, she receives
news that her mother is ill and returns to Istanbul.

The title of part two, “Die Brücke vom Goldenen Horn” – also the title of
the whole book – refers to the Galata Bridge that links the two European sides
of Istanbul. In Istanbul Özdamar studies drama and befriends some left-wing
students whom she meets regularly for intellectual discussions and movie view-
ings at an avantgarde film theater. Her world is a split one: She lives on the Asian
side of Istanbul with her parents, takes a daily boat to the European side for her
studies and discussions (since the Bosphorus bridge wasn't built yet at the time),
and returns back to Asia late at night. Later she and some of her friends leave for
the village of Hakkari at the eastern Turkish-Iraqui border to help the poverty-
stricken Kurdish population and stage a revolution. The army coup in Turkey
aborts her attempts, and she returns to Istanbul. Toward the end the drama
student is arrested, together with her fiancé, and accused of aiding the Kurds.
She spends three weeks in prison, is then freed with the help of her parents, and
upon her release she decides to return to Germany.

References to Brecht abound throughout the novel: In part one, when the
protagonist learns the word “Akkord” in the “Radiolampenfabrik” Telefunken –
a reference to the “Akkordarbeit” that women have to do at the factory –, her
friend Ataman responds with a quotation from Brecht’s Die Mutter: “Bürste den
Rock / Bürste ihn zweimal! / Wenn du ihn gebürstet hast / Ist er ein sauberer
Lumpen” (Brücke 91). In part two, “Nannas Lied” (“Gott sei Dank geht alles schnell
vorüber / A(u)ch die Liebe und der Kummer sogar. / Wo sind die Tränen von
gestern abend? / Wo ist der Schnee vom vergangenen Jahr?” (Brücke 183, 329)
provides consolation twice to the narrator: first, before an abortion in Turkey,
and toward the end, as she leaves Turkey for Germany. Many of the narrator’s
revolutionary activities seem inspired by Bertolt Brecht, or by the concept of an
engaged, political theater. At the “Schauspielschule” in Istanbul where the nar-
rator studies, one of her teachers is strongly influenced by Brecht’s epic theater,
and an acting exercise that she describes in detail is based on the film Kuhle
Wampe (Brücke 212). Later she moves to Ankara where she was offered a role
in a theater called the “Ankara Ensemble” (Brücke 298), a clear reference to the
Berliner Ensemble. This Ankara Ensemble, now directed by the “kommunistische
Heimleiter” whom the protagonist met in Berlin, also performed Brecht’s play *Die Mutter*.

*Strange Stars Gaze toward Earth* (*Seltsame Sterne starren zur Erde*), the third novel of Özdamar’s autobiographical trilogy, describes her direct participation in productions of Brecht’s plays. Written in the form of a diary and published in 2003, this novel deals with her life in divided Berlin in the late 1970s, when Özdamar worked as director’s assistant at the East Berlin theater *Volksbühne* to help produce plays by Bertolt Brecht, among others. In addition to Brecht, Else Lasker-Schüler shaped the writing of this novel. The novel’s title is a line from Lasker-Schüler’s poem “Liebessterne” (Love Stars). As an expressionist German-Jewish female writer who was persecuted by the Nazis during World War II, Lasker-Schüler also becomes a model for Özdamar who, as a young Muslim immigrant, is incredibly sensitive to Germany’s Jewish history and to the legacy of the Holocaust.

During this period, the protagonist lives in West Berlin with friends and commutes daily to East Berlin. She has a Turkish passport, a West Berlin residence permit, and an East Berlin visa. In a sense, she replicates her life in Istanbul in Berlin: The Berlin Wall has replaced the Bosphorus, and subways have replaced ships. Just as she used to live on the Asian side of Istanbul with her parents and take the boat daily over to the European side of the city for her studies, she now commutes daily to East Berlin from the West by train. As a non-German in this Cold War era, Özdamar frequently had closer access to East German intellectual culture than many West Germans did. In East Berlin, Özdamar gets to collaborate with renowned playwrights and theater directors, such as Heiner Müller and Brecht-pupil Benno Besson; and she works as an actress, a translator who translates Brecht’s plays into Turkish, and a stage designer.

**Orhan Pamuk**

When asked about his literary influences, Orhan Pamuk has mentioned many writers who shaped his novels: Franz Kafka, Thomas Mann, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Ivan Turgenev, Jorge Luis Borges, Italo Calvino. Bertolt Brecht does not usually enter this list, although Pamuk has discussed Brecht’s aesthetic theories and also integrated numerous references to Brecht in his bestselling novel *Snow*. In Pamuk’s novel *Snow*, published as *Kar* in Turkish in 2002 and translated into English in 2004, the genre of theater, particularly Brechtian theater, plays a formative role, along with the genres of poetry and epic.

The central character of *Snow* is Ka, a Turkish poet who spent 12 years in political exile in Frankfurt, Germany, and who returns to his native city of Istanbul,
Turkey, to attend his mother’s funeral. In Istanbul he meets a boyhood friend who works for the left-leaning kemalist newspaper *Cumhuriyet (Republican)* and who encourages him to travel to Kars, an Anatolian town in eastern Turkey, to write an article for the paper on upcoming municipal elections and on a suicide epidemic among the young girls of Kars. He agrees to this commitment, but his secret and larger motive is his hope to meet and marry his beautiful former classmate İpek who lives in Kars and has recently gotten divorced. Ka is a doubly westernized person – through his secular upbringing in Istanbul and through his exile in Germany –, and he now enters a different world in Kars.

The girls of Kars are not allowed to wear head scarves in the university, and this prohibition has led to the suicide epidemic. A snow blizzard engulfs Kars and isolates the city from the rest of the world. Ka is reunited with his college crush İpek, falls in love, and he dreams of taking her back with him to Frankfurt. Her sister, Kadife, is the leader of the head-scarf girls and also the girl-friend of a charismatic Islamist terrorist called Blue (“Lacivert” in the Turkish original or “Lapislazuli” in the German translation). Blue has arrived in Kars to see Kadife and to lend support to the religious girls, although he harbors conflicted feelings, since the girls’ response, suicide, is a religious sin.

A revolutionary theater group has arrived in the city and stages a play, entitled *My Fatherland or My Head Scarf*. Based on an earlier Turkish drama, this play becomes a front for a military coup and an army takeover of Kars. Like other Islamic believers, Blue is arrested and sentenced to death.

The mastermind behind this coup, Sunay Zaim, is a once renowned theater personality. His aesthetic approaches are reminiscent of those by Bertolt Brecht. Later Sunay Zaim decides to stage another play, *The Tragedy of Kars*. Kadife agrees to act in this play and remove her head scarf as a political statement in order to have Blue released. Ka is forced to arbitrate this deal. During this process, the secret police of Turkey, the MİT, interrogates Ka and tells him that İpek, his love, was in a relationship with Blue and is still in touch. Ka is heart-broken.

The second play, *The Tragedy in Kars*, is being performed, and Kadife, who bares her head, shoots the theater director, Sunay Zaim, dead on stage. This scene was rehearsed as part of the plot, and Sunay’s death was anticipated by the *Border City Gazette*, a local newspaper that publishes the news a day before it happens and thereby influences the course of many events. It remains unclear whether Kadife knew that the gun was loaded. Also, Blue was found, murdered by the secret police.

After the blizzard lifts, the army sends Ka back. Ka leaves alone, without İpek who believes that Ka has betrayed Blue out of jealousy. His stay in Kars only lasted three days. Ka spends the remaining four years of his life in Germany, a lonely
man. He is assassinated in Frankfurt, most likely by a Turkish Islamist group that has settled in Berlin and holds him responsible for Blue’s fate.

This novel is filled with literary references, to authors such as Franz Kafka and Thomas Mann. Kafka is one of the main sources of influence in this novel. Onomatopoetic allusions in the original Turkish text make this evident: The novel’s protagonist, Ka, is an acronym for Kerim Alakuşoğlu, the poet’s full name. The name “Ka” alliterates with “Kar”, the Turkish word for “snow” and title of this novel; and by adding the letter “s” we arrive at “Kars”, an actual city in northeast Turkey. The three frequently recurring words Ka, Kar, and Kars compose a poetic triad that becomes further enriched when considering that the city of Kars, where much of the novel takes place, is located in “Kafkasya”, the Turkish word for Caucasus. The Caucasus (in Turkish: Kafkasya) – the region in which Turks, Armenians, Kurds, and Russians fought so many battles – becomes a Kafkaesque universe in Orhan Pamuk’s novel. The poet Ka’s name also reminds the reader of Josef K., the protagonist of Kafka’s novel *The Trial* which starts with the sentence: “Someone must have slandered Josef K., for one morning, without having done anything wrong, he was arrested.”

There are similarities to Pamuk’s novel: While Ka came to Germany as a political exile, he is actually not very interested in politics, and he is even a little bourgeois. His true passion is poetry, not politics. Ka frequently states that he does not know why he was arrested in Turkey – it must have been something he published in a newspaper, but he cannot pin it down. Similarly, Orhan Pamuk does not see himself as a political novelist. He claims that this one book, *Snow*, is an exception. The protagonist Ka can thus be easily seen as a Kafkaesque figure that is caught in the paradoxes and complexities of contemporary bureaucracy from which he ultimately cannot escape.

The novel contains other literary allusions: One example is the fictive character Hans Hansen, whom Ka invents as a journalist or editor from the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and whom he modeled on a Kaufhof salesman who sold him his precious coat in Frankfurt. Hans Hansen, who is supposed to print a statement by Blue in the novel *Snow*, is an obvious reference to Thomas Mann’s novella *Tonio Kröger*.

Beyond these literary references, Pamuk integrates the three genres of poetry, prose, and drama into his novel. Poetry is represented by our Kafkaesque poet Ka; the epic genre is mediated through the narrator Orhan, a mouthpiece of the author Orhan Pamuk; and drama is personified by the figure of Sunay Zaim.

Narrator Orhan, the personification of prose, inserts himself briefly into the novel’s beginning and becomes a more active character toward the end, after Ka’s death. With the exception of a short paragraph at the beginning in
which the narrator introduces himself as “an old friend of Ka’s” (Snow 5), the first half of the book appears to be told by an omniscient third person narrator. Only in the later part does Orhan insert himself as a first person narrator – and probably the author himself, as several references, to his daughter Rüya or his forthcoming book The Museum of Innocence, show. This narrator figure acts as detective and as storyteller: He pays extended visits to Frankfurt and to Kars, just like the author Orhan Pamuk did to do research for his novel. In Frankfurt, narrator Orhan searches for the poems that Ka wrote while in Kars, and in Kars he hopes to learn whether Ka really betrayed Blue. He is unable to find the poems but discovers that Ka had indeed given away Blue’s hiding spot to the military and thus caused his death. As a farewell to his friend, Orhan decides to write a book on his journey to Kars, which turns out to be the novel Snow.

The most extensive space is devoted to the genre of theater, through the character of the actor and director Sunay Zaim. Sunay is frequently associated with Bertolt Brecht. His ensemble is introduced as a “Brechtian and Bakhtinian theater company” (Snow 147). Later there is an insinuation that “it was East German funding that had made it possible for him to perform Brecht” (Snow 206); and since this is mentioned in the context of Sunay performing Atatürk, it is left open whether Sunay performed a character in a Brecht play or acted the man himself. There is also gossip about Sunay’s disappearance one time: “One rumor had it that they’d joined the Brechtian Berliner Ensemble, ostensibly to teach drama though really they were learning how to be terrorists” (Snow 207). Toward the end, in the description of Sunay’s adaptation of Thomas Kyd’s Renaissance drama The Spanish Tragedy, Ka satirizes Sunay’s style: Sunay “made Corneille, Shakespeare, and Brecht more relevant by adding belly dances and bawdy songs” (Snow 337). In a later passage, Sunay specifies his interpretation of the play: “Thomas Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy: the rebellious rape victim’s tragic speech . . . with some alterations inspired by Brecht’s The Good Woman of Szechuan” (Snow 362). Sunay enjoyed regaling the audiences with “scenes from Shakespeare, Victor Hugo, and Brecht, if only to furnish the promised ‘play within the play’” (Snow 425).

Besides or even before Brecht, the most frequent association of Sunay Zaim in the novel is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the army officer and revolutionary statesman who founded the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk was born in 1881 in Salonica, present-day Thessaloniki, which is now a part of Greece but was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire at the time. This personal background may have motivated Atatürk’s western outlook: Kemalism, the ideology of Atatürk, introduced modernism and secularism to the Turkish Republic, when it was
founded in 1923 and when the capital shifted from Ottoman Istanbul to Anatolian Ankara. The official program involved the transition from a multiethnic Islamic Ottoman Empire to a secular republican nation-state (1923), the abolition of the Caliphate (1924), the abolition of the Islamic law Sharia, the adoption of the Swiss civil code (1926), and the abandonment of the Arabic script, replacing it with a modestly modified Latin alphabet (1928). The head scarf for women and the fez for men were both banned. While women were propagated as bearers of secularism and westernization, these changes did not bring about the social equality they promised.4

Sunay Zaim is frequently compared to Atatürk. He and his wife Funda Eser used to be the “leading lights of the revolutionary theater world” in the 1970s (Snow 7); and the “Sunay Zaim Theatrical Company . . . is known throughout Turkey for its theatrical tributes to Atatürk, the Republic, and the Enlightenment” (Snow 30). Sunay Zaim himself enjoyed “military and theatrical careers” (Snow 200), an allusion to Atatürk who began his career as an army officer and to the close connection between the military and the secular elite in Turkey at the time. Sunay’s lifelong dream was to perform Atatürk himself, and while one of the chapter headings saw him as “a man fit to play Atatürk” (Snow 200), he was never able to realize his dream. In earlier years, “the predominant view was that great national films called for great international stars like Laurence Olivier, Curd Jürgens, or Charlton Heston” (Snow 204). Sunay was hoping to be the first to change this pattern, but could not succeed. Ideologically, however, he feels close to Atatürk, and Sunay represents the ideals of the Turkish Republic.

In addition to Brecht and Atatürk, and probably connected to the latter, Sunay Zaim is often associated with the movement of the “Western Enlightenment” (Snow 31), which is also called the “European enlightenment” (Snow 261) or the “republican enlightenment” (Snow 373), in this instance referring to Turkey. The play My Fatherland or My Scarf that he performs in a new interpretation is considered an “enlightenment masterwork” (Snow 31). In this play Sunay’s wife Funda Eser was “launching herself into enlightenment as she removed her scarf” (Snow 158), briefly becoming “a heroine of the enlightenment” (Snow 163). In the second play, The Tragedy in Kars, based primarily on the Elizabethan playwright Thomas Kyd with a few alterations inspired by Bertolt Brecht, “Kadife the head-scarf girl shocked audiences first by baring her head in a moment of enlightenment fervor and then by pointing a weapon at Sunay Zaim . . . and firing” (Snow 364). While the image of baring your head as an act of enlightenment may be satirical, the frequent references to the enlightenment as a western phenomenon may respond to a common perception, or misperception, in Western Europe – the notion that eastern societies did not experience a period like the 18th
century enlightenment that caused profound democratizing changes in Europe. Through the character of Sunay Zaim, Pamuk seems to suggest that Atatürk’s revolutionary and republican reforms in Turkish society can be equated to the European enlightenment.

Sunay Zaim performs and directs two plays in Kars: At the beginning of Ka’s stay in Kars we witness My Fatherland or My Head Scarf, which is a revised version of a Turkish play from the 1930s and 1940s entitled My Fatherland or My Scarf (Snow 157). Three days later, Sunay stages The Tragedy in Kars, an adaptation of Thomas Kyd’s 16th century Renaissance drama The Spanish Tragedy, viewed by many as a precursor of Hamlet. In both plays a woman removes her head scarf and shows her hair to the audience; and both plays end violently in ways that mix drama with reality, or theatrical action with contemporary politics. The first play presents a military coup, as soldiers come on stage and shoot at the audience, and the second play seems to undo this coup and take revenge, since Kadife, who has to lift her scarf, afterwards turns to Sunay Zaim and kills him on stage.

Taking his cues from the philosopher Hegel – and Pamuk might have added Walter Benjamin or Bertolt Brecht – that history and theater are made of the same materials (Snow 213), Pamuk describes the first military coup as a “theater coup” (Snow 327, 372). The “coup d’état” is presented as a “coup de théâtre”. The military takeover is “staged” literally as a theater performance; and the audience in the provincial little town of Kars believes it is watching a sophisticated avantgarde performance from the cosmopolitan city of Istanbul. Only after the first injuries does the audience realize that the spectacle is not fantastic but real.

In the second play Kadife stages her counter-coup on stage by shooting Sunay Zaim. The reader never learns whether her act was intentional or not, since it was part of the script and plot, but the gun should not have been loaded. It is also possible that Sunay committed suicide by handing her a loaded gun. This theatrical ending may symbolize that the age of rationalism, as it was enforced by the military in Turkey and as it is represented by the ideology of Atatürk, and by extension and occasional reference also by Bertolt Brecht, did not provide all the answers to the country’s complex questions.

The novel’s title, Snow, is a leading metaphor or leitmotiv in the book. It corresponds to geographic reality: Unlike the Mediterranean western part of Turkey where the sun shines frequently all year round, eastern Anatolian Turkey can be cold, snowy, and subject to extreme temperatures. In Frankfurt too, it snows a lot. Snow is also the title of Ka’s poetry collection, although we never see the poems, only the titles, and the notebook is lost. He arranges his
poems in the shape of a snow crystal, a hexagon, around three main axes that characterize each poem: reason, imagination, memory. These snow crystals embody the secret symmetry of life for which Ka searches and where he may find God. The snowflake is a metaphor for unique beauty and at the same time for transience, and a momentary, short-lived ephemeral state. Snow can also isolate, as it shuts off Kars from the rest of the world, and at the same time it is a sign of peace and harmony: It covers up the poverty in Kars and dampens the sounds of the military coup. Snow adds a magical, dream-like quality to this book. As Ka wrote in one his early poems on the search for happiness, “it snows only once in our dreams” (Snow 4). The whiteness of snow can symbolize purity; and Ka, whose mother has just died, may be looking not only for erotic love, but also for maternal love in İpek. In addition, snow makes all the dramatic events in this book appear like a “fairy tale”. This frequently recurring term in Pamuk’s novel reminds the reader that besides the genres of poetry and drama, the fairy tale has influenced Pamuk’s conception of Snow. As an epic genre, Snow can be perceived as a blend of Kafkaesque novel and Romantic fairy tale.

**Conclusion**

Orhan Pamuk researched his novel in depth, both in Kars and in Frankfurt. In Germany he came to understand the Turkish-German cultural scene and met many of its artists and writers. Emine Sevgi Özdamar might have attended one of his many lectures to the Turkish-German community that he writes about in his essay collection *Der Blick aus meinem Fenster*. Pamuk’s descriptions of Ka’s German exile in his novel Snow suggest that he is intimately acquainted with the Turkish-German community. His novelistic poet Ka, however, takes a very different path than the semi-autobiographical protagonist in Özdamar’s novels: Ka is not guided by political passions and describes himself as rather apolitical.

Özdamar’s and Pamuk’s novels address a similar time period in the late 20th century; they have as protagonist a Turkish immigrant to Germany who returns to her/his homeland and moves back to Germany. In this process, the protagonists of all three novels are involved in or confronted with Brechtian political theater. Özdamar, who has acknowledged Brecht as one of her main literary models, appears much more sympathetic to Brecht’s epic theater than Pamuk. His novel Snow contains skeptical, if not critical and openly satirical references to Brecht, and Pamuk himself has expressed reservations toward a politically engaged literature in general.
Notes:


VERA STEGMAN –

Email address: vss2@lehigh.edu
Affiliation: University Lehigh (USA)
The Development of Meaning in Photographs in their Social Contexts: A Study of a Photograph from the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

Introduction

How does historically famous documentary photography function as an icon in society? How does it come to symbolize social meaning? Photography, which is image without a code, has evolved its meaning in tandem with its connotations in society.¹ When we see a picture, sometimes we do not know the basic information behind it, such as the name of the photographer, the date or place of an image, or the detail of the event. But only the image itself becomes well known through constant reproduction via media.

1. Indexicality and Iconicity

Photography can play several roles in its use. According to W.J.T. Michel, “Peirce’s account established the pattern for later semiotics by defining photographs as composites of iconic and indexical signs”.² Schaeffer’s 1986 diagram shows that when the picture serves as the “Trace” or “Testimony” of event, it has indexical character.³ And, when it is used as a “Souvenir”, “Remembering”, it is classified as having iconic function.

I would like to start the discussion with an example, as I have just found this picture of Warsaw ghetto uprising at the Holocaust Museum before I learned about the local historical context. We can recognise the basic information from this image: a soldier pointing a gun at a boy raising his arm. To understand the subject of this picture, we do not need to know who took the picture (photographer), or which people are shown in the picture. Recent research has identified the picture as being taken by the SS officer Franz Konrad and the Jewish people.
in this picture are unidentified. However, this famous photographic record of the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1943 become known, because this picture was seen in the articulation of different forms of narration. It is really unusual to see the original print of this kind of picture, although reproduction may have made it popular. Here, I would like to explore whether or not copies of the picture have the same character as the original.

At first, after the pictures were taken, they were kept as edited documents in the 1943 Stroop album for reporting the suppression of Jewish resistance. After the war, the two samples of the Stroop album were found and used as evidence of the event for the judgement at the 1945 Nuremberg trial. Then, it was used for history education in schools and its reproduction appeared in the culture. Now it is exhibited as a historical and cultural document for the memory of the Holocaust. Let us examine the each example.

Fig. 1

A. The Picture as Description of Event

As photography can represent the past reality, an image is supposed to tell us details of the event. Unlike testimonial literatures or drawings in which the narration of the account is contained in the representation of that event, we can see that photography on its own does not provide immediate testimony. Photography mediates between the event and the spectator and it shows a witness
of an event.\(^5\) It depends on the spectator and whether or not he or she believes the photography. With verbal testimony, photography does not merely go against what the text says. Using the same image, text could make different cases for both aggressors and victims before and after the war. The narrator changed and the idea of what they wanted to show through picture was changed, all while using the same material.

The original picture bears witness and serves as important proof of the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1943 and of its suppression by Nazis during the Second World War. On the cover of the Stroop album the following was written: “There is no longer a Jewish quarter in Warsaw”\(^6\) Under these words, the pictures showed details of the destruction of the ghetto with captions. Every image was numbered and explained with text. The picture of the boy was no. 14 and explained: “Mit Gewalt aus Bunkern hervorgeholt (Brought out by force from bunkers)”. The text served to read pictures with orientation for justifying of the destruction of the ghetto. There is another example: the article of New York Times in 1943 published this image with caption of “SS peacekeepers protect German civilians from Jewish attacks”. Whether it is truth or lie, it is possible to make any kind of discourse from the same picture.

After World War II, when the Allied forces gained possession of the Stroop album, it was used to provide evidence of Nazis crimes at the International Tribunal. The album was also used for the judgement of SS officer Julgen Stroop at the trial in Poland in 1951. The Nuremberg album was edited again from the contents of the Stroop album, in constructing different narrations. During the trial, the picture was shown as part of the evidence, justifying Nazi crimes from the point of view of the Allied forces. According to Frédéric Rousseau, in the Nuremberg Tribunal, the picture of the Jewish boy was not used to accuse, although it was shown in the series in the album.\(^7\)

**B. The Event Represented**

After the Second World War, the picture (Fig.1) became an iconic representation of the entire Holocaust, including what happened after 1943, without mentioning other victims or concentration camps. The Jewish boy was one of the children who died during this period and representative of them. Normally children under 15 years old could not survive in the death camps. When the picture was shown by editing the document, in the 1955 documentary film *Night and Fog* by Alain Resnais, it still remains descriptive within the filmic narration of the event. In France, high school students are required to view this film to learn about the history of the Second World War.
When this picture was used on book covers for history education, in the press or newspapers, it was sometimes cropped to focus more on the boy. With reproduction, image suffered a loss in quality, and consequently the personalities of peoples in the picture were also erased. For example, portraits of Anne Frank collaged in her diary, taken when she was healthy and before she went to the secret house in Amsterdam, were used repeatedly. As the Jews were forbidden to take a picture afterwards, in reality her face should have grown thinner from hunger. However, we believe and imagine the face of the journal author from her portrait as a younger girl. The repeated use of the picture makes it as an icon, seen in the conventional context of the memory of the victims.

C. Photography – Artwork

The picture (Fig.1) was originally created in a context removed from the production of art work, yet when the picture was used for aesthetic purposes, it took on the form of art rather than that of the historical document. When Susan Sontag said this image was a representation of tragedy in her book On Photography (1976), it is because the subject of the picture is clear, within the theatrical scene. The protagonist of the tragedy is shown in the composition: a Jewish child. Here, we can also imagine his destiny (clearness of story). It is similar to the memorial painting of Goya, The Shootings of May Third 1808 in 1814,8 where the aggressor (Napoleon's armies) and the victims (Spanish civil resistance) are presented. There, the specificity of the event and the universality of the human experience coexisted.

Even those photographs which speak so laceratingly of a specific historical moment also give us vicarious possession of their subjects under the aspect of a kind of eternity: the beautiful. The photograph of Che Guevara is finally... beautiful, as was the man. So are the people of Minamata. So is the small Jewish boy photographed in 1943 during a round-up in the Warsaw Ghetto, his arms raised, solemn with terror—whose picture the mute heroine of Bergman’s Persona has brought with her to the mental hospital to mediate on, as a photo-souvenir of the essence of tragedy.

‘The Heroism of Vision’9

In one of the scenes of Ingmar Bergman’s film Persona (1966), the picture of Warsaw ghetto is seen by heroine Elisabet, who focuses on the face of the each people. The peoples in the picture have lost their own personalities. In the filmic narration, there is no description of what kind of tragedy is taking
place in this picture. Instead, the personal experience of Elizabet with her son, the child she did not want to have, is superimposed on the image of the Jewish boy. The picture was used as the tool for the description of the inner mind of the heroin in the fictional story out of the original context.

Sontag also remarked the different perception according to the space where the picture is seen and the ethics of looking the images in *Regarding the Pain of Others* (2003).

Certain photographs—emblems of suffering, such as the snapshot of the little boy in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943, his hand raised, being herded to the transport to a death camp—can be used like memento mori, as objects of contemplation to deepen one’s sense of reality; as secular icons, if you will. But that would seem to demand the equivalent of a sacred or meditative space in which to look at them. Space reserved for being serious is hard to come by in a modern society, whose chief model of a public space is the mega-store (which may also be an airport or a museum).10

For example, it was shown in the exhibition *The Family of Man* in the 1950’s, at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. There, the documentary value in the photographic art exciting humanistic emotion was considered rather than the fact that the picture had been taken by an aggressor. Supposedly, it is because the victims and the photographer were both anonymous at that time. Then, it represented the more general notion of ‘Inhumanity towards human beings’, and no consequences of the event were explained.

Furthermore, when the picture was used to publicize a Rock concert in the Paris metro, it lost the original character of historical document and became a cultural icon.11 No copyright protection leads to overuse of the reproduction and consumption of the image. The distinction between ethical and aesthetical use of image are required.

D. ‘Historiography’ Photography-Testimony

Nowadays, we show this image as commemoration and to prevent a repeat of this kind of tragedy. At the Holocaust Memorial the image is historically interpreted and accompanied by text. Here, the categories of iconicity and indexicality are both applicable. However, the historical narrative is not always definitive, and the Memorial museum exhibition also contains its own story on the event and the picture.
2. Pose, Expression and Composition

As Sontag described beauty as eternity, as regards the circulation of images in society, how can the aesthetic aspect of the image influence the spectator and make an impression upon the viewer’s memory? The composition of the image is very important in relaying the message and in making a lasting impression on the mind of the spectator. Thus we can understand what the picture or photographer wants to show. Press photography requires visual impact and clarity of message to visually communicate with the reader.

In the pose of a figure or expression of the emotion, we can read a universal meaning and feel sympathy toward the object of the photograph. The conventions of signification and the symbolic form are associated to represent collective meaning. *Migrant Mother* by Dorotea Lang in 1936 is an iconic representation of the Great Depression of America of the thirties. It was one of the documents of the Farm Security Administration in the US, but now the picture has a more universal meaning as the image of a suffering mother. She is one of those mothers who are concerned about food shortage. It represents one of human experiences such as starvation, anxiety for life.

A crying mother was shown in *The Pietà of Kosovo* by the French photographer George Merillon (1957-), which received the World Press Photo prize in 1990, chosen as artistic photography rather than information or testimony of event. It imitates the archetype of Occidental Christian painting: a crying mother who lost her son.

3. Question of Authenticity

My last question bears on the verisimilitude of the representation of historical events by visual account. It is known that some of the most famous iconographies are staged: Robert Doisneau, Robert Capa… Unlike the example of Jewish boy, they tried to make dramatic scenes. Even though they are fictional, they have a certain impact on the history of photography. The impact or the beauty of the picture itself and the question of its authenticity are not always addressed. The question of authenticity concerns our faith and desire, what we want to see in the picture and which picture we want to remember. Remembering is at the same time the choice of forgetting. As the photography can recall our memory, we remember it as something. Although the fact that the images are staged, the icon will not disappear and they continue to be reproduced.

The picture of Joe Rosenthal (1911-2006), *Flaging soldiers in Iwô-jima* in 1945 were taken two times. This picture received the Pulitzer Prize and became known,
although it was known the scene as staged. It was even copied as a memorial stamps and made into the form of statue (monument). It is an image of the convention of victory and become a national symbol of every war in the United States.

Fig. 2

Conclusion

We encounter pictures reproduced by media before knowing their local and original context. Familiarity with the reproduction of the image and an understanding of its background are not the same concepts. For visual source of history or heritage, photography must be contextualized for accurate interpretation. However, each society does not share the same code. The vision represented by a certain image is limited in terms of its communicative power.

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Yoko Tsuchiyama


YOKO TSUCHIYAMA –

Email address: yoko.tsuchiyama@gmail.com
Affiliation: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Japan)
Reconsidering of Marina Abramović in the Yugoslavian Context: *Balkan Baroque*

I. Introduction

Marina Abramović, the daughter of World War II partisan heroes, was born in 1946 in Belgrade, the capital of former Yugoslavia. She moved to Holland in 1976, and never returned to live in what was then Tito's Yugoslavia. She pioneered the use of her own body as a visual art form in Western art world. Before leaving Holland, she created works by enacting violence upon herself. However, a shift in her work coincides with the Yugoslavian civil war of the early 1990s.

Before the civil war, her work seemed to be a reaction to the complex political and cultural dilemmas fundamental to the period. However, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, it could be argued that she lost the basis for her national identity. At the 1997 Venice Biennale, she was awarded the Golden Lion for her video installation/performance piece *Balkan Baroque*, which expressed a radical political message directed at the international community. Overall, her works can be seen as a response to the international community’s bias and the mass media’s inaccuracy regarding the Balkan situation. Further, it can be argued that this distorted, Western perspective stemmed from its insistence on political correctness and primitivism. Abramović was treated as a refugee artist, reacting with negative emotions with regard to a horrific tragedy that took place in her native country. Her Yugoslavian national identity having been dismissed, the artist realized that the international community stereotyped Balkan matters.

In this paper’s first chapter I posit that 1976, when she left her homeland at the age of 30, was a turning point with regard to her national identity. In the second chapter, I examine the underlying political message of *Balkan Baroque*, including folksongs and the story of wolf-rat. In the concluding chapter, I consider the reception of Abramović’s work, paying particular attention to different perceptions of the artist in Yugoslavia and the West.
II. Yugoslavia and Marina Abramović

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established in the post-World War II period, and a year later in 1946, Marina Abramović was born to partisan Serb and Montenegrin parents. Later, she belonged to a student communist group, while also being a longtime adherent of Tito. In the mid-1970s, she ceased to be communist and moved to Holland. The ideal of communism in Yugoslavia failed, partly because of Tito’s advanced age, and troubles due to economic imbalance between Croatia and Serbia surfaced. The matter of nationalism heated up, resulting in a tragic civil war and an ensuing crisis of national identity for Yugoslavians.

Meanwhile, a new art movement called Body Art appeared simultaneously around the world, symbolizing an attempt to break out of impossible situations. Body Art became radical, and sometimes underwent censorship by Yugoslavian communist authorities. In view of these circumstances, Abramović must have sought asylum in Holland for freedom of expression. In fact, most studies have regarded her as a political refugee. However, she was not a true political refugee, as she grew up in a rich Serb-Montenegrin partisan family and began her career as a performance artist in Croatia. In her acceptance speech for the Golden Lion, she asserted, “I’m only interested in an art which can change the ideology of society… Art which is only committed to aesthetic values is incomplete.” This suggests that she views her national identity as Yugoslavian.

But the real question is what the following statement means: “I’m only interested in an art which can change the ideology of society.” First, I would like to examine this statement from the viewpoint of Yugoslavia as perceived by the international community. When the civil war conflict began in the 1990s, the terrible visual images broadcast worldwide appealed directly to people’s sentiments. Consequently, the international community intervened, using military force. The argument – or as some Serbs felt, the propaganda for this intervention – aimed to make Serbia seem wicked and to make the media audience believe that stopping the outrage meant justice. NATO’s aerial bombing aimed at infrastructure continues to torment Serbia. On the other hand, after the conflict, the Western economy grew. Abramović thought that the intervention – euphemistically called a peacekeeping operation – was in fact aimed at pursuing profit of one’s own country. The international community’s behavior instilled distrust and, as a former Yugoslavian, shamed Abramović toward her motherland, where many people uncritically accepted military intervention. This was the very motive for Balkan Baroque, which was shown at the Venice Biennale in 1997.
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III. Responsibility for the Conflict

Abramović’s work Balkan Baroque consisted of a performance and an installation. The installation had several parts, some box-shaped rectangles made of copper and three individual video screens, which were used to project the image of her parents and herself. In front of a video screen, wearing a white robe, as if she were a scientist, Abramović recited the story of the wolf-rat a Balkan story about the transformation of an extremely intelligent rat into a cruel wolf.

You put them in a cage and give them only water to drink. After a while they start to get hungry, their front teeth start growing and even though, normally, they would not kill members of their own tribe, since they would risk suffocation they are forced to kill the weak one in the cage. And then another weak one, another weak one, and another weak one. They go on until only the strongest and most superior rat of them all is left in the cage. Now the rat catcher continues to give the rat water. At this point timing is extremely important. The rat’s teeth are growing. When the rat catcher sees that there is only half an hour left before the rat will suffocate he opens the cage, takes a knife, removes the rat’s eyes and lets it go. Now the rat is nervous, outraged and in a panic. He faces his own death and runs into the rat hole and kills every rat that comes his way. Until he comes across the rat who is stronger and superior to him. The rat kills him. This is how we make the wolf rat in the Balkans.

In the end, he is killed by a superior rat. In front of this video, bloody animal bones were piled high. Abramović sat in the middle of the heap in a posture suggestive of a saint, picked remaining meat from the bones, washed them, and crying, sang the folksongs of each republic of the former Yugoslavia. This performance went on for six hours every day, for four days.

This performed motif, to eliminate the unneeded and clean up, could be associated with the ethnic cleansing policy, in which Serbs carried out wholesale rape, imprisonment and torture of Muslims, and the murder of thousands in death camps. So, Balkan Baroque overlaps that situation and seems to commemorate the victims of ethnic cleansing. However, this is a superficial perspective. Some motifs, such as the rat and the bones, were allusions to previous works namely, Delusional (curated by Charles Atlas, 1994), Cleaning the Mirror I (1995), and Cleaning the House (1996). Iconographically, these are allegories of Memento Mori. Abramović thus implores viewers to believe that the deaths in Yugoslavia touch everyone and that they must not be indifferent even though many Westerners think this tragedy had little or nothing to do with them. In contrast, Abramović thought that international intervention was actually responsible for it. To make her message more effective, she substituted the white bones used in the Cleaning series.
the Mirror, and Cleaning the House) with the 1500 fresh animal bones still bearing remnants of flesh. The fresh bones, indicating violence and vulnerability, functioned as a metaphor for mangled bodies and more directly stirred viewers' feelings and consciousness than the white bones. Indeed, the overpoweringly putrid stench that permeated the entire room provoked subjective and emotional responses. The viewers were forced to confront the Balkan tragedy more actively, not as mere spectators from afar, but as accomplices. This provocative performance aimed to change people's acceptance of the Western ideology that paradoxically justified political and military intervention for peace in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, it should be noted that Abramović herself experienced a sense of guilt stemming from her national identity. In performance, she sang each Yugoslavian republic’s folksongs that she had learned as a child. With these songs, she alluded to history from the birth of the Tito's government until Yugoslavia's breakup. Sung on the third day, these lyrics symbolized her mental conflict over ethnic cleansing, “Hey, Kato, hey my treasure, come with me to pick sage… I can't, master, I can't.”3 Sage grows on the Balkan Peninsula, and signifies family love. In short, this song reveals her guilt over being nothing but a spectator in Amsterdam. Throughout the performance, Abramović implicated the international community for its guilty intervention and revealed her own feelings of guilt.

What then does another component, namely the video installation, signify in the work as a whole? That the rat’s teeth grow in the midst of crisis implied that humans have an underlying violent nature, suggesting we all can be murderers in a crisis. The rat myth throws some questions at us. Can we behave as usual in a cruel situation where life is precarious? What choice would we have? Abramović said, “Balkan people have so much contradiction in the attitude of extreme love, extreme hate, and extreme cruelty. No one from outside can understand how people could kill each other when they lived for 20 years in the same house.”4 The myth implies that the war resulted from the attempt to guard and protect one’s own family even by way of murder; in other words, homicide for the sake of “extreme love.” For Abramović, this is not necessarily a negative Yugoslavian history as is generally assumed; rather, she feels compassion for contradictory human nature, at once egoistic and altruistic.

IV. The Image of Marina Abramović in the West and Yugoslavia

After the 47th Venice Biennale, Abramović established herself as an artist, rapidly producing works that deal with issues concerning her native country even though her artistic reputation varies between her motherland and the Western art
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world. She was first chosen to represent Yugoslavia. However, Goran Rakočević, the Montenegrin minister of culture, rejected her work because it was very expensive (150,000 DM, about 100,000) and presented a negative image of New Yugoslavia. He posted a comment that turned on Abramović titled *Montenegro Is Not a Cultural Colony* on the Montenegrin newspaper *Podgotica*.

This outstanding opportunity ought to be used to represent authentic art from Montenegro, free of any complex of inferiority for which there is no reason in our exquisite tradition and spirituality... Montenegro is not a cultural margin and it should not be just a homeland colony for megalomaniac performances. In my opinion, we should be represented in the world by painters marked by Montenegro and its poetics, since we have the luck and honor to have brilliant artists of universal dimensions living among us.⁵

Subsequently, Abramović was labeled a refugee by the minister of Montenegrin culture for using negative images of her homeland for her career, despite the fact that she had not directly experienced the war. Finally, *Balkan Baroque* was exhibited in the Italian pavilion in the Giardini, and on the third day was awarded the Biennale's highest honor. Although her homeland did not embrace her warmly as one of its own, the international community has bestowed high acclaim on her works.

What does this difference in reputation imply? By the 1997 Biennale, Yugoslavia had already broken up. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina had become independent states, but the Kosovo conflict was just taking place. Indeed, this situation was broadcast live worldwide. We should keep in mind that Abramović was awarded the Golden Lion within the context that viewers knew of the atrocious events happening in her homeland.

An independent curator from Japan, Shinya Watanabe pointed out, “Marina’s *Balkan Baroque* as a representative Yugoslavian work of art can be politically correct for Western European authorities including those of Venice, Italy. In Italy and other parts of Europe, the Balkans were *Europe’s tinderbox* for a long time.”⁶ Since the art world focuses mainly on capitalistic Western Europe, the noteworthy career of an artist from Yugoslavia, which was once a socialist nation, has popular potential. The ostensible message of her work, for instance, a protest against the ethnic cleansing carried out by Serbia as the root of all evil, corresponded with the Western stereotype of Serbia and has been accepted willingly. Unfortunately, the work’s accusation of the international community has been neglected; instead the emphasis lies on her negative emotional reaction against the war.

After Modernism, Europe and the United States try to assimilate artwork characterized by ethnic, traditional, and religious traits of local art in different
cultures. By separating those works from their proper historical context, the West provides them with a location in Western traditional art history. Through primitivism or orientalism, the West stereotyped and folklorized Yugoslavia. *Balkan Baroque* is not free from this paradigm. Although the work’s reputation differs in Abramović’s motherland and the rest of the world, she has been commonly treated as a refugee artist.

She is aware of this situation surrounding the Balkans. After leaving her home, she had to feel the peculiarity of her national identity. That is the very motive for *Balkan Baroque*. The performance expressed a radical, accusatory message against the international community, while the folksongs revealed her own guilt as an onlooker. “Change the ideology of society,” she said in Venice, protesting the narrow, Western-oriented view of the international community.

*Balkan Baroque* remains a potent work. Now, even after the European Union received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, its strong political message cannot be ignored.

**Notes:**
