practising aesthetics

edited by Lilianna Bieszczad
practising aesthetics

edited by Lilianna Bieszczad
# Table of contents

LILIANNA BIESZCZAD  
Introduction 9

Part I. Aesthetics in Practice

GRZEGORZ SZTABIŃSKI  
Artistic Changes and the Ethos of Art 15

PEDRO HUSSAK VAN VELTHEN RAMOS  
Modernism, an Unfinished Project?  
Rancière, Adorno and Lyotard at a Crossroads 23

ERIK VOGT  
The Saturation of Aesthetics and the Recommencement of “Great Art” 33

BORIS ORLOV  
Projective Philosophy of “The Artistic” 43

AGNIESZKA BANDURA  
The Meaning and Value of Experiment in Contemporary Art and Aesthetics (On Experimental Art and Aesthetics) 47

GABRIELE BERSA  
Grand Hotel Abyss and Art and Aesthetics in the Globalized World 57

TIZIANA ANDINA  
A Quasi-Definition of Works of Art.  
Philosophy and Criticism for an Art in Action 65
RIFAT ŞAHINER
Cynical Reason in Appropriation Art and the Crisis in Criticism 73

KIKUKO TOYAMA
Infants’ Aesthetics for Eudaimonia: a Neo-premodernist Attempt 93

Part II. Philosophy of Art

JIUN LEE
Digital Art Reveals a Novel Aesthetics in Practice and Action: C. S. Peirce’s Semiotics and Creativity 107

PARK YEON-SOOK
Interactive Artworks in Terms of the Rhizome Concept of Deleuze and Guattari 117

MARIKO KANAME

ANNA ZIÓŁKOWSKA-JUŚ
Corporeal Dimension of Aesthetic Experience in Abstract Art. Wassily Kandinsky’s Creativity in the Light of Michel Henry’s Phenomenology 139

HELEN TATLA
Ornament in Contemporary Architecture: A Philosophical Discussion 147

GEORGIA APOSTOLOPOULOU
Panayotis Michelis’ Aesthetic Reconstruction of Dialectics 155

ALBERT VAN DER SCHOOOT
Kivy and Langer on Expressiveness in Music 163

JULIE C. VAN CAMP
Dance and Human Expression 171

Part III. Art in Action

MARÍA EUGENIA PIÑERO
The Anamorphic Look of Dionysos in Plastic Work from Marcelo Bordese 183

MAYUMI KAGAWA
Archival Art and the Moment of Counter-memory: Comparing Works by C. Boltanski and S. Sigurdsson 193
Summing up the first International Congress of Aesthetics in the new century, which took place in Tokyo-Makuhari in 2001, the president of IAA, Ken Ichi-Sazaki, failed to mention art among the six subjects he considered long-term predictors for the fields which aesthetics should be concerned with in the future. One could assume that he simply expressed the widespread view that while the problem of art monopolized the previous century, now the time has come to focus on aesthetics in motion, actively exploring and going beyond the existing research boundaries. However, art was not entirely absent from the IAA president’s speech: the goals of aesthetics as detailed by professor Ichi-Sazaki included art but in new semantic arrays, as befits the new century. Thus certain questions, such as the issue of the crisis of aesthetics, crisis of art, have become outdated and the emphasis has shifted to a different set of artistic activities. The papers compiled in the following book will demonstrate that the sentiments voiced by the speakers participating in the 19th International Congress of Aesthetics in Cracow 2013, *Aesthetics in Action*, show similar shifts in attitudes towards art.

The title of the monograph, *Practising Aesthetics*, refers to the various senses of the term *practice*, its keynote being the paraphrase of the topic of the 19th Congress: *Art in Action*. In most general terms, its subject matter explores the sphere of the cooperation between aesthetic thought and artistic practice, their interconnections and mutual inspirations. The term *practising* is intentionally used in the title to point to various projects whose different ways of approaching aesthetic reflection are evident in the way they develop their arguments, their selection of issues to be examined as well as examples from art chosen to illustrate those issues.

During the 19th International Congress of Aesthetics, the dynamic, although hardly unified, set of problems emerged, revolving around art and leading to
not just one interesting line of reflection but to a number of parallel ones. It was far from easy to find a key to group them together. From a wide range of issues the theme concerning the transformations of contemporary art and the role of an artist seems to have stood out and found its reflection in specific aesthetic theories. The first part, focused on the subject of Aesthetics in Practice, deals primarily with this kind of reflection. Alongside the aesthetic themes it discusses the issues which prove that art and aesthetics go beyond their primary interests and enter the territory of practice, including politics and ethics. Similar attempts to go beyond are also present in the other papers. The other parts were a great deal more difficult to divide into neat segments. Finally, the participants’ contributions compiled in this volume have been grouped into three thematic blocs, testifying to the polyphony of various approaches to aesthetics. Thus, the second part Philosophy of Art contains mainly the papers regarding the philosophical understanding to art or other theoretical notions, often confronted with artistic practice, while the third part Art in Action offers the examples of ‘directing’ aesthetics towards practice, the analyses of selected specific artistic activities. It can be said that the examples of aesthetic research included in this part tend to derive from examining ‘details’, specific instances of practice and the way they are experienced. Nonetheless, certain departures from the pre-set rule of arranging the speakers’ contributions can be found.

The first part Aesthetics in Practice covers the most general reflections regarding the changes of contemporary art and its relation to aesthetics. It begins with Grzegorz Sztabinski’s paper which places the reader in the middle of the debate concerning the role of art in the modern world as well as the place of the artist creating it, the ethos of creativity. The following papers discuss the explication of these transformations, from the understanding of modernism in context of post-modernism, illustrated by Th. W. Adorno, J. F. Lyotard and J. Ranciere (Pedro Hussak van Velthen Ramos), to the reinterpretation of M. Heidegger’s saturation of aesthetics and including the reference to music as a post-romantic art (Erik Voght). The reflection of a more general kind follows, with the attempts to examine art from the aesthetic and philosophical points of view exemplified by Boris Orlov’s project on the one hand and Agnieszka Bandura’s on the other. The Gabriele Bersa’s and Tiziana Andina’s papers deal with the recurring question whether it is possible to define art, combined with A. C. Danto’s and G. Dickie’s thought, but they offer different perspectives. This part concludes with Rifat Şahiner’s paper about the crisis in art criticism through the critique of cynical reason by Sloterdijk and Kikuko Toyama’s project which contemplates the possibility of infants’ aesthetics.

The second part Philosophy of Art is arranged according to a different formula. It contains mainly the papers regarding the philosophical theories of art,
which represent general perspective as well as expound on selected theoretical notions. As a result of the daring attempts to confront artistic practice and the efforts aimed to find suitable notional tools, it begins with more comprehensive analyses: Jiun Lee, who discusses how the semiotics of Ch.S. Peirce can be applied to digital art, and Park Yeonsook, who employs “rhizome theory” proposed by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari to examine interactive arts. Subsequently Mariko Kaname reconsiders Virginia Woolf’s theory of film, while Anna Ziółkowska-Juś investigates possible connections between Michel Henry’s phenomenology and W. Kandinsky’s theory of abstract art. Then Helen Tatla analyzes the term: ornament in contemporary architecture, with reference to H.G. Gadamer’s and J. Derrida’s philosophical propositions. And Georgia Apostolopoulou adopts a slightly different perspective in her study of the Greek aesthetician, Michelis Panayotis’s reflection on dialectics in the context of art. The last part of the discussion includes the analyses of certain artistic genres, notably processual ones, with Albert van der Schoot discussing M. Kivy’s and S. Langer’s take on expressiveness in music, and Julie van Camp looking at the same notion in the context of dance and recommending a pragmatic approach.

The third part poses yet another challenge to the reader. Its title, Art in Action, is meant to refer, on the one hand, to the methodological aspect of the issues discussed, the fact that its starting point is empirical material. María Eugenia Piñero analyses works of art Argentine artist, Marcelo Bordese, in the context of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, while Kagawa Mayumi is focusing on contemporary artworks which deals with memory of Holocaust. In the following papers Mihaela Pop endeavours to explicate the phenomenon of performance illustrated by specific examples, and Darko Štrajn analyses artistic „phenomena”, including those exhibited on the Venice Biennale referring to the idea of exposure elaborated by M. Ball. Thus each of the papers contained in this part gradually reveals a slightly different aspect of the discussion, as the focus shifts from the reflection on a work of art towards the processes it generates, such as the experiences it produces, and to ephemeral practices. Zdeňka Kalnická’s paper includes analysis of the sense of touch in relation to art, but its focus is rather on touch as a sense typically underappreciated in aesthetics. Lilianna Bieszczad, on the other hand, starts with her personal experience of cooperation with dancers to highlight the significance of R. Shusterman’s project of somaesthetics. The following two papers cover the subject of the chances in viewers’ sensibilities. Jacqueline Gómez Mayorga asks how digital cinema transforms the viewer, while Izabela Wieczorek illustrates the particular genealogy of changes in aesthetic engagement in the context of the atmospheric turn in the architectural discourse. This part concludes with the
Krzysztof Szwajgier’s reflection concerning music, which generates dialectical tensions, arche and arte.

The Congress of Aesthetics was attended by a large number of researchers from diverse cultural backgrounds (its 460 participants came from 48 different countries). Its size and variety seem to allow us to make some observations on certain tendencies which may have an impact on the research perspectives for the aesthetics concerned with art. Therefore, I would like to make a few comments, which could serve as a summary of the issues raised during the Congress, including those not present in the following volume, which, by necessity, contains only a selection of the views on art presented by the participants. First and foremost, the question of the transformations of art remains vitally important, with the historical themes, understood in the categories of avant-garde and neo-avant-garde as well as modernism and postmodernism, revisited in new reinterpretations and recontextualisations. Still, it seems that attempts to find an autonomous project of aesthetics have largely been abandoned and the focus of research has shifted towards processual, dynamizing approaches with interdisciplinary, or even trans-disciplinary or transgressive, aspirations. We also encounter the daring attempts to find notional tools capable of exploring new artistic practices such as Digital art or Bio art. On the one hand, we observe a significant growth in the interest in everyday phenomena, which are occasionally elevated to the status of art entering the public sphere. Among the most frequently cited practices of this kind we find spatial arts, such as architecture, public art or street art, and processual arts, including theatre and music, as well as borderline artistic activities of intermedial character. Thus, the shift from the aesthetics of an artwork to the aesthetics of a process, an activity or an event is all the more clearly noticeable, with frequent references to the broadly understood notion of an aesthetic experience. It could also be said that although historical themes have declined in importance, they were still far from absent from the discussion.

What I presented here is merely a sample of the tendencies, some of which may appear fairly obvious, brought up during the 19th International Congress of Aesthetics. And now I would like to invite the readers to read the papers collected in this book and to draw their own conclusions.

Notes:
3. Some of them are included in Performing Cultures, ed. Jakub Petri, LIBRON, Kraków 2015
Part I. Aesthetics in Practice
Issues related to the relationship between art and ethics are usually reduced the links and differences between aesthetic and moral values, or (starting with Plato) to the educational impact that certain types of works of art have on the audience. The question of the ethos of art assumes a slightly different point of view. The concept of “ethos” is not clear. Sometimes attempts are made to differentiate it from ethics. While the latter is a theoretical discipline that endeavors to determine what should be done and what should not, ethos is conceived as a way of life of a certain community, as the orientation of a culture associated with the established hierarchy of values. Therefore, some authors believe that the word “ethos” is a term which applies primarily to groups, not individuals, and the actual area of its use is the sociology of culture. However, such an understanding of ethos has not always been followed.

This applies especially to aesthetics. Mikel Dufrenne stressed that morality does not care at all about the ethos of art, it wants “only to censor [art]: it requires that art be subject to the law which is not its own law, which can only be considered against it, under duress”. Thus, the French esthetician acknowledges a singular character of the ethos of art, at the same time emphasizing its complexity, the impossibility to reduce it to either an established moral order or the issues of social life. He also believes that such ethos is to be distinguished from both the creative poiesis and the joyful aesthetic ecstasy of reception. Trying to determine its meaning, he suggests that art is a variation of praxis. He writes that the artist first of all “gains control over himself, transgresses in himself that which is not human, he becomes who he is”. Dufrenne believes that this is the basic form of the ethos of art. Aside from it, he distinguishes the ethos of individual works that expose the world in a certain way, and the ethos of aesthetic experience, which “binds us to one another and disposes us to do them justice”.

GRZEGORZ SZTABIŃSKI

Artistic Changes and the Ethos of Art
The issue of ethos played a very important role in the twentieth-century avant-garde reflection of art. For many of its representatives, the interest in the moral backbone of art was a gauge of the real value of actions. Questioned was the role of beauty that only serves to drug the minds of the audience. However, emphasis was placed on the role of non-conformist attitude manifested by the artist both in his creative achievements and the choices made in life. Arnold Schoenberg wrote: “The morality of art is a reaction to a Word that in many respects has surrendered to an amoral materialist word of success, one that leads to a gradual loss of all ethical constructs of art”6. This statement is distinctive because it closely links an artist’s way of life and his work. In both cases, an avant-garde representative does not comply with the prevailing cultural models and seeks his own solutions. These are not arbitrary but are the result of a perceptive diagnosis of the current situation of the world and the place of man within it. An avant-garde artist evaluated the reality and on that basis formulated a proposal for its change. In this project, art was given an important role, the concept of which, however, underwent significant modifications. This remodeling involved changing the social ethos in further implications. People were to start living in a new way, guided by a different set of values than the one assumed in a bourgeois society. The first attempt of such a modification would be an experience evoked by the contact with pioneering works. However, it was usually to occur not as an autonomous and autotelic aesthetic contemplation, but it was to embrace and transform the whole of human experience instead7. Individual trends of avant-garde conceived it differently. Mondrian preached the concept of harmony based on balance of opposing factors, Strzemiński advocated striving towards real unity, in which the oppositions will be neutralized, Rodchenko wanted that things used in everyday life be modified to become friends of man, and Breton insisted that the basis for a new way of human living should be to overcome the former oppositions hypocritically built in the traditional philosophical, psychological and social concepts. Avant-garde artists wanted to confirm the proposed values in their practical conduct. Thus, art became one of the components of a new way of living. Ethos, as a particular form of morality which regulates human way of being, appeared to be inseparable from it and gave it meaning.

Stefan Morawski was an esthetician who drew radical general conclusions from avant-garde propositions. He distinguished between “ethos in art” and “ethos of art”. The first expression has usually been associated with considerations on similarities and differences between aesthetic and moral values. The history of thought respected their coexistence and intersection up to the theses of their organic unity and blurring distinctions between them. However, the phrase “ethos of art”, as Morawski wrote, “shifts the emphasis to [...] the so-called worldview
Artistic Changes and the Ethos of Art

substructure of a work of art, and analysis – through the work - should address the artist himself as well”⁸. The ethos of work is combined with the ethos of artist. Such a situation occurred sometimes in the art of old. However, as I have pointed out earlier, it became a characteristic feature of the main trends of the twentieth-century avant-garde. Regarding the nineteenth century, the Polish esthetician recalled examples of novels by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. The ethos of art is evident in them despite the polyphonic structure of these works. “Such examples show – Morawski argued – that these were deontological options, supported by a specific historiosophic view, aiming to challenge the world of their time”⁹. In a slightly different way, but just as clearly, such situation occurred in painting or sculpture, where the image of reality represented in the works was infused with the presence of the artist’s personality. Referring to the achievements of the avant-garde, Morawski indicates one more possibility where the ethos of art could occur. He defines it as “the ethos of artist beyond art” and he characterizes it by taking into account the “shift of emphasis from the ethos of art to the ethos of artist doubting the meaning and relevance of artistic communication in the strict sense, i.e. a work of art that meets certain aesthetic conditions”¹⁰. Discussing such situations, the Polish esthetician considered not only examples of anti-art or post-art, but also a wider range of issues addressed by artists for whom art was not sufficient to express the relationship with the world and its assessment. Avant-garde creativity was to become a way to settle accounts with the world and art, to realize the dubious meaning or even bankruptcy of aesthetic values and conventional morality. An avant-garde artist was not so much a seeker of new artistic solutions, but he pursued a way of life that would be new, authentic, and liberating from the alienation. Striving to do so, he came into contact with philosophers or social activists with similar purposes.

Emphasizing the role of ethos in the avant-garde art assumed a high degree of self-awareness of artists. Life subordinated to achieving short-term goals, or based on accepting stereotypical patterns of cultural behavior, was unacceptable. It was necessary to exercise control over created art, aiming to realize its objectives and character, as well as to take into account its relationship with the way of life. Under the avant-garde, therefore, the artistic activity became intellectualized and intellectualistic ethos was adopted. It was based on deliberate planning and controlling the undertaken actions. Traditional, customary ways of life were challenged, including the liberated model of bohemian existence, shaped and in fact accepted by the bourgeois society. New foundations were sought for ethos, based not on attempts to differentiate oneself from the society, but on socialization of both art and artist, based on principles different than before. Also, efforts were made to justify the proposed changes referring to analyses of
trends of development of European culture, and diagnosing the current state thereof. Conclusions, presented in the manifestoes and other theoretical texts, were generally forthright, formulated in a categorical and unequivocical way. However, there were many specific proposals for new ethos in the avant-garde. Each suggestion was claimed to be the only correct one. These trends intensified after World War II, as part of the so-called neo-avant-garde.

This situation prompted Dick Higgins, one of the leading artists and art theorists of the 1960s and 1970s, to distinguish between two types of attitudes. More specifically, the author wrote about two types of questions, two ways of thinking, and even two cultural ages. As for the former one, it was characterized by the prevalence of “cognitive questions”. Higgins called them “Platonic and Aristotelian”, although he wrote that they were also questions of the “Enlightenment”, as they gave the reason a legislative role in the world. The basis for all decisions was to be a clear understanding, based on perception, reasoning or intuition, with which man wanted to define his role in the world. In the case of the avant-garde art, such attitude prevailed until about 1958, including both works and artists seeking to clearly determine the meanings of their actions, their locations and scope of operation. In later years, Higgins saw a change which entailed dispersing, mixing and penetration of elements that had earlier been seen as separate. Regarding works created in the 1960s and 1970s, art critics do indeed write about artistic movements, trying to characterize and order them, but “the artists moved from one format to another, one trend to another”11. Thus, a question arises whether in this situation we can even talk about artistic trends, assuming the traditional sense of the term. The American artist notes that “it is as difficult to change your movement, as your body: clothes are far easier to alter or shift”12. Should we therefore assume that, following the loss of cognitive questions, artists take on certain costumes, rather than tackle problems, that they are exclusively dedicated to a free play without any ethical obligations? Higgins does not go that far. He is rather inclined to believe that posing cognitive questioning became impossible when, instead of determining what the world is like, we must first find out what kind of world it is all about. Instead of defining our role, in fact, we should consider what part of us could do it. Traditional cognitive questions are no longer relevant in the situations we are living in. Therefore, setting them cannot be associated with ethos, as avant-garde artists were trying to do. Questions about the proper way of life became dispersed. They have no clear boundaries, we cannot capture them as certain opposition. They blend and blur, passing into one another, like artistic trends in recent decades. Does this mean that the question of the ethos of art is no longer relevant?
Artistic Changes and the Ethos of Art

I believe that the answer should be considered taking into account two perspectives. The first one is to seek a modified form of the ethos of art, one that is possible in the current situation. I will consider this suggestion referring to Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of postmodern ethics. He emphasized that the postmodern mind is aware of the fact that in the life of an individual, as well as in social life, there are problems for which there are no good solutions. We can say after Higgins that the intrinsic and universalizing cognitive questions do not apply in this situation. Can we then proceed to post-cognitive questions? Bauman expands and deepens the problem. “The postmodern mind – he writes – is aware of the fact that each local, specialized and focused treatment, effective or not, when measured by its ostensive target, spoils as much as, if not more than, it repairs. The postmodern mind reconciled to the idea that the messiness of human predicament is here to stay”13. Replacing generalized reflection on how to live with specific considerations will not solve the problems. Constructing mini-orders instead of focusing on a universal order, or even one that would be more general, may even contribute to the expansion of global disorder. Besides, if this brings us wisdom, we still cannot translate it into action. Therefore, according to Bauman, “the postmodern time is experienced as living through crisis”14.

What is morality in this situation? Surely it cannot be reduced to following the rules of any code of ethics. However, it can be understood as a humanization, personalization that is not based on the ultimate diagnosis or explanation. “We learn to live - says Bauman - with events and acts that are not only not-yet-explained, but (for all we know about what we will ever know) inexplicable. [...] We accept that not all actions, and particularly not all among the most important actions, need to justify and explain themselves to be worthy of our esteem”15. Such activities include maintaining the ethos of art. Today, it is impossible to indicate practical (utilitarian) or cognitive reasons to justify it. Instead, it creates an opportunity to confront human moral and artistic possibilities, unobscured and undistorted by other objectives. Personal morality – says Bauman – “would make any agreement that may be reached inconclusive, temporary and short of universal acceptance. Yet we know now that this is precisely where things stand, where we stand and that we could pretend otherwise only at the peril to our upright posture”16.

Jacques Rancière considers a different perspective. In his text Politics of Aesthetics, he introduces the notion of “<post-utopian> art”. The concept is explained with reference to the attitude adopted by contemporary philosophers and art historians, who are trying to extricate the radicalism of artistic pursuit from the utopia of the new life, because such a relationship usually compromised them, either in great totalitarian projects, or in the commercial aesthetization of life.
Grzegorz Sztabiński

The “post-utopian” approach is also noted among artists and professionals dealing with art (museum renovators, gallery directors, curators, critics). They are trying to maintain an equal distance from artistic and political radicalism, proclaiming the praise of art that is “modest not only as regards its capacity to transform the world, but also as regards claims about the singularity of its objects”\(^{17}\). The art is not a founding of a common world through the absolute singularity of form; it is a way of redisposing the objects and images that comprise the common world as it is already given.

Rancière does not want to join in the dispute between the cited concepts. Instead, he suggests to think about what they indicate and what makes formulating them possible. He also tackles the problem of whether art liberated from utopia can remain political, and how it happens. “Art is political – he says – because of the very distance it takes with respect to these functions, because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and people this space”\(^{18}\). Thus, he points out two concepts present today. One of them emphasizes passive encounter with what is heterogeneous in reality. The second one entails construction of indefinite and ephemeral situations, resulting in a shift of perception and the need to move from the position of a viewer to that of an actor, and thus a reconfiguration of places. In both cases, art works in a specific manner and on a specific level – it divides the material and symbolic space anew, and thus affects politics.

Does the political nature of art as Rancière understands it have a capacity to shape the ethos? Does it need the ethos? Surely it cannot be ethos understood traditionally, based on stability and devotion to certain rules. The French philosopher argues that the sphere of art is now more than any other area ready for redistribution of roles, and therefore also for redistribution of competence\(^{19}\). He believes that an artist and his creations move between several types of statuses. In contemporary art, media are mixed and artists interchange their competences. We are dealing with unpredictability and openness rather than maintaining rules or keeping the path designated by the agreed goal. Emancipation is no longer, as in the works of avant-garde, a task to be achieved. According to Rancière, art becomes truly emancipated and emancipating when it renounces imposing a particular message, a clear way to explain the world when it no longer wants to emancipate us. It can, therefore, be said that the concept of the ethos or art is here either rejected, or takes a particular form. The French author seems to suggest the former when he writes that “an avant-garde pioneer has become a guard”\(^{20}\). As regards the ethos, it means that it “preserves” and “watches”, rather than participating in the current life. The second option entails a suggestion of a singular ethos.
Artistic Changes and the Ethos of Art

involving constant crossing of existing divisions, introducing discrepancies, and pursuing emancipation by the lack of reconciliation.

The considerations I have presented here are not strictly theoretical. They have been inspired by a conversation with young Polish artists who feel lost and confused, and who, in the situation of extreme pluralism and relativism of values, ask about possible point of support in art.

Notes:

4. Ibid., p. 49.
5. Ibid., p. 55.
7. This concept was formulated clearly by Peter Bürger. Other scholars of avant-garde (such as Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno) have taken into account the role of artistic activity in the autotelic sense in the expected social changes.
8. Stefan Morawski, “Od etosu sztuki do etosu artysty poza sztuką”[From the Ethos of Art to the Ethos of Artist Beyond Art], Etos sztuki [The Ethos of Art], p. 63.
9. Ibid., p. 70.
10. Ibid., p. 78.
12. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 33.
16. Ibid., p. 34.
18. Ibid., p. 224.
Modernism, an Unfinished Project? Rancière, Adorno and Lyotard at a Crossroads

Rancière and the Aesthetic Paradoxes

Without a doubt, one of the most provocative themes in Jacques Rancière’s thinking on aesthetics is his rereading of modernism, especially in his books *Malaise dans l’esthétique* (*Aesthetics and its Discontents*) and *Aisthesis: Scènes du régime esthétique de l’art* (*Aisthesis: Themes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art*). However, in *Partage du sensible* (*The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*), Rancière adopts a position which touches on issues relating to modernism, postmodernism, and the avant-garde. After making a digression in order to clarify his conception of the *regime of arts*, Rancière affirms that we must undo what he considers to be a confusion surrounding the term *modernism*, thereby elaborating what he considers to be its two great paradigms: on the one hand, a discourse that identifies modernity in the autonomy of art; on the other, a model that identifies art as linked to community life. The first case searches for a pure form which is opposed to the heteronomous cultural manifestations of cultural industry. Related to this tendency, we can illustrate in the field of literature the experimentalism that diverts language from its communicative dimension; in the pictorial sphere the return to planarity against the illusion of perspective; and in the musical modernity the language of twelve sounds. The other tendency of modernism – which Rancière qualifies as *modernatism*, refers to the integration of art with life, projecting the forms of future community, which we can relate to the historical avant-garde.

Although Rancière does not admit it explicitly, it was the failure of the avant-garde project to integrate art and life that determined the growth of that which he characterizes as the first modernist paradigm, namely, art understood as a *rupture* in relation to dominant forms. It happens that the avant-garde proposal of Russian constructivism – perhaps the best example of this tendency – was suffocated by
the conversion of the Soviet Union to a totalitarian state, the correlated aesthetic of which was Socialist Realism. Rancière prefers to see a counter-modernity in the discourses that attest the end of the avant-garde project, whose historical development would come to culminate in *postmodernity*. This, in its first moment, expressed the end of the modern teleological model through mixtures between different arts, and through the use of different media. In fact, in Rancière's view, such contemporary practices signaled the defeat of the first modernist paradigm, set as it was in the idea that there exists something “immanent to art” to be found in the notion of form. However, in Rancière's view, there is a second moment in which the exaltation of the hybridism of languages quickly gives way to what is really at play in postmodern conceptions: the *mourning*, and the *disenchantment* with the non-realization of the avant-garde promise to integrate art with life.

Deploying this scheme allows us, in large measure, to comprehend an important aspect in the later development of Rancière's thinking: on the one hand, his adhesion to *modernitanism*; on the other, his critique both of the formalism of modernism's other tendency, as well as that of postmodernism. The critiques of these two tendencies may be incarnated in Adorno's problematics of the autonomy of art and in Lyotard's aesthetic of the sublime. To my mind, the fact that there is often an overlap between the critiques of both thinkers derives from the fact that Lyotard positions himself, to a significant extent, as the heir to Adornian aesthetic thought. In addition to questioning some aspects of Rancière's reading of Adorno, this paper aims at the verification of the reach of Rancière's project of rereading modernism against the impasses put forth by Lyotard's postmodern condition. I hope to show, finally, that although Rancière wants to move away from Adorno, they at least share the founding idea of eighteenth century aesthetic thought: namely, that there is a correlation between art and human emancipation, a possibility denied in Lyotard's sublime postmodernism.

**Schiller and the Avant-garde**

In the first place, I believe that what Rancière calls *modernitanism* is immediately identifiable with the notion of the *avant-garde*, which he considers to be confluent to Schiller’s thinking on aesthetic education. Here, I cite *The Politics of Aesthetics*:

> In short, there is the idea that links political subjectivity to a certain form […]
> On the other hand, there’s another idea of avant-garde that, in accordance with Schiller’s model, is rooted in the aesthetic anticipation of the future. If the concept of avant-garde has any meaning in the aesthetic regime of the arts, it is on this side of things, not on the side of the advanced detachments of artistic innova-
Thus, Rancière’s approach to Schiller is not in the agreement that the avant-garde produces something new breaking away from the traditional canons of art, but rather in the integration of art with life, which produces sensible conditions for the life to come. To establish this relationship, Rancière utilizes the idea that Schiller politicizes the aesthetic when considering the Kantian “free play of the faculties” in the context of the French Revolution. In fact, faced with such post-revolutionary *terror*, Schiller’s diagnostic is that humanity ought to be educated aesthetically in order to align its rational and moral side with its natural and sensible side. Between the *formal drive* on the one hand, and the *sensuous drive* on the other, there is a third impulse: that of knowledge, the *play drive* [*Spieltrieb*]. Thus, the freedom of the community arises from the fact that this *play* opposes the servility of work, breaking the hierarchies of the “theoretical man” over the “worker”; of “activity” over “passivity;” and of “intelligence” over “sensitivity,” putting an end to this order of domination between two humanities. Rancière’s utopia, then, exists in finding a dimension that overcomes the type of rationality, organized around ends and means, so characteristic of capitalist societies. In a different context, Giorgio Agamben characterizes the *play* as *mezzo puro*, or *pure means*.

It is in this direction that Rancière hopes to make operative Schiller’s concept of play, conferring to art its communitarian character. The play would therefore be a principle of social organization that explodes the hierarchy between mechanical work and artistic work, pointing toward overcoming the alienation of work in the Marxist sense. The consequence of this process would be the disappearance of the work of art as an autonomous object separated from other, quotidian objects.

As I see it, however, Rancière’s adhesion to the avant-garde project of integrating art with life neglects the fact that avant-gardes move according to a notion of history linked to progress. It is important to note that an ideal of progress also guided Schiller, who - in his conception of an aesthetic culture – believed in bringing humanity gradually in the direction of a historic goal. Therefore if, on the one hand, Schiller utilizes the ideas of the French Revolution, on the other hand he believes that humanity will encounter its emancipatory process not through political revolution, but rather thanks to an aesthetic education. In the eighteenth century, the German word *Kultur* was not the same as our word “culture,” in the sense that every people possesses its own culture and that the interpenetration of cultures promotes “multiculturalism.” *Kultur*, rather, offers a vision in which the European culture of the time was more advanced than...
all others in the dimension of clarity and liberty, and therefore attuned to the construction of bourgeois values of that time period.

In this sense, it is important to note that if Schiller, on the one hand, incarnates French revolutionary values; on the other hand, it is possible to approximate his thought to the bourgeois culture of that age. Peter Bürger, for example, in his *Theorie der Avant-Garde* (*Theory of the Avant-Garde*) considers that, for Schiller, art is a means to build an enlightened society through its detachment from vital praxis. Bürger identifies Schiller as a thinker within the bourgeois concept of the *autonomy of art*; in other words, as exactly the sort of figure against whom the avant-gardes fought⁴. It is not the objective of this work to compare and contrast Rancière and Bürger’s readings. I will point out only these both tendencies of interpreting Schiller.

Attuned with the current intellectual spirit, Rancière also criticizes the teleological conception of history, and the concept of *play* appears to him as another possibility of thinking about history. As we have shown, this concept seems to be operative in our discussion because it’s related to a dimension of means without ends. However, it is exactly the weakening – at once political and aesthetic – of the avant-garde utopia of the integration of art with life that, in my thinking, opens the path for the rise of artistic modernism, here identified as the autonomy of art in opposition to the impure forms of cultural industry. According to this perspective, I would like to problematize some of the critiques that Rancière weaves in regards to Theodor Adorno.

**Adorno and the Autonomy of Art**

Aside from his critiques of the author of *La condition Postmoderne* (*The Postmodern Condition*), Rancière’s text *Lyotard et l’esthétique du sublime: une contrelecture de Kant*, (“Lyotard and the Sublime: A Counter-Reading of Kant,”) published in *Malaise dans l’esthétique* (*Aesthetics and its Discontents*), also criticizes Adorno’s thinking⁵, which in the context of disillusionment with revolutionary perspectives defends a position in which the work of art is presented as a *rupture* in relation to the social. The work of art is a *promise*, the emancipatory potential of which derives from the fact that it is a heterogeneous aesthetic that, at the same time, establishes a break with the identity principle of the administrative world and with the pre-figurations of cultural industry. Published in 1970, Adorno’s *ästhetische Theorie* (*Aesthetic Theory*) characterizes the work of art as a *negativity*: the autonomous form, free of any relation to means and ends, serves as a guarantee of non-capture by the sphere of late capitalism’s cultural merchandise, which has become practically hegemonic in the period post World War II.
In his critique, Rancière considers that this member of the Frankfurt school opted for a closed model of art that, from a cultural point of view, seems to be elitist. As we know, the Russian constructivism, so admired by the author of *Partage du sensible* (*The Politics of Aesthetics*), assimilated a new kind of perception that amplified the aesthetic dimension of less “noble” cultural expressions such as, for example, cinema posters. In this sense, it is not shocking that in *Aithesis*, the arts-and-crafts and Bauhaus movements should be exalted for eliminating hierarchies between mechanical and liberal arts. All of this, pointed toward a perspective of integration and elimination of hierarchies, stands in opposition to a split character of the work of art in relation to society. However, the critique of Adorno’s aesthetic – as though this were a defense of “high culture” against cultural expressions considered as “low,” the dignity of which was one of the specific victories of the avant-gardes – fails to consider, on the one hand, the context in which Adorno developed his reflections, and on the other, their fundamentally dialectic character.

To the perplexity and disenchantment of post-war Europe – denounced in Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* – we must add, from an aesthetic point of view, the failure of the project of historic avant-gardes. In this context, Adorno – during his exile in the United States – verifies the growth of different forms of commodities, and the subsequent homogenization of culture. Thus, far from representing a “cultural elitism,” Adorno’s posture is that of facing the work of art as a horizon, a utopia in which the state of things could be better than they actually were. As I see it, the belief in the work of art as a promise for human emancipation removes the negative weight of Adorno’s supposed “pessimism” from a political point of view, as it substitutes the political sphere for the aesthetic, because for Adorno art is eminently political.

We also must not understand Adorno’s work as simply creating an opposition between “pure forms” and “impure forms”; instead, we must first make a critique of capitalism’s aesthetic dimension. Although Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* effectively gives centrality to the idea that social contradictions appear in the work of art as immanent problems of form, this notion grows weak when Adorno salutes the fluidification of the limits of arts – under pressure from the artistic expressions of the 1960s – and of the boundaries between forms of art in 1966’s *Die Kunst und die Künste* (*The art and the arts*). To me, it seems more interesting to consider that the negativity of a work of art is much more concerned with a critical space of resistance than with an uncontested defense of formalism.

In consequence, the idea that Adorno’s proclaimed “autonomy” falls into a conception that “isolates” the work of art from its social sphere fails to consider the dialectical dimension in his thinking, given that the “paradoxical character
of art” discussed in *Aesthetic Theory* demonstrates the fact that the work of art is, at the same time, *autonomy* and *fait social* (*social fact*). Adorno refuses any “general theory” of the work of art, which ought to be considered in its singularity inasmuch as it is a “monad.” However, the “closing” of a work of art incorporates all of the contradictions that society it denies, demanding an *interpretation* to reveal its truth content.

However, we must point to the limits of this Adornian analysis, given that the Adorno’s theories about the cultural industry, elaborated in 1947, barely reverberate today. This is due in large part to the fact that there is a correlation in the cultural sphere between the identity principle present in the structuring of Fordist-Taylorist capitalism, in light of the fact that Adorno shows that innumerable forms of “cultural commodities” have a structure of *repetition*. Besides this, Adorno sees weekend entertainment as a disciplining element on behalf of labor. It occurs that the transformations of capitalism, principally in the 1970s, took on the dimension of determining *information* for the flow of capitals, even though present-day technology businesses avail themselves of a *material* production that utilizes a workforce in many countries similar to that which Marx described in the nineteenth century. Jean-François Lyotard himself characterized this situation as an “information society.” This same phenomenon has attracted other designations which point to its different aspects, such as: “post-industrial society;” “digital revolution;” “cognitive capitalism.” Lyotard does not show himself to be optimistic in relation to said society’s possibilities, which he sees only as a dispute for power. With the term *postmodern*, he aims to point to the limits of modernity, the impasses of which continue to challenge our thinking.

**Lyotard and the Postmodern Sublime**

When Lyotard published *La condition postmoderne* (*The Postmodern Condition*) in 1979, he argued that the postmodern is not the overcoming of the modern, since – according to this perspective – modernity is not an historical period, but rather a form of giving a sequence of moments, basing their legitimacy not on the past, but on the future. Modernism presupposes a certain comprehension of the philosophy of history. The change toward the postmodern condition consists, then, in the end of the belief in meta-narratives of legitimation, such as the dialectic of the spirit, the hermeneutics of sense or the emancipation of the rational subject. Lyotard, therefore, holds that this passage consists in a change to the statute of knowledge directed toward a pragmatic understanding of language in the sphere of an information or post-industrial society. 
Far from the optimistic discourses that proliferate today about the “democratization of information” or the “free flow of images,” Lyotard shows a de-legitimation based on the enlargement of the reach of what Wittgenstein called *language games* [Sprachspiel]. In this sense, both science and art play “their own game” without being able to legitimize other language games. This has important consequences for what I aim to discuss here, because with the postmodern condition, the account of legitimatizing human emancipation – which had so moved the efforts of artistic modernism – falls. What is in question in the information society would be simply the power, toward which we can also add the dimension of control. From this perspective, it is interesting that Lyotard does not point toward a positive dimension in the sense of constructing a postmodern aesthetics; rather, he joins a dimension which, according to him, expresses the disenchantment stemming from the end of modernist metanarratives. Lyotard, then, points to the limits of the avant-garde project and its pretenses of progress, and of the integration of art with life.

To this end, Lyotard looks to the aesthetic category of the Kantian *sublime*, accentuating its contraposition to the sentiments of the beautiful. According to Kant’s theory, the pleasure of the beautiful comes from the free harmony between the faculties that produce images and those that produce concepts. The sublime, on the other hand, arises from the conflict between these faculties, when, faced with a very large object, the imagination fails to present an image. The postmodern sublime consists in accentuating the conflict between idea and image, giving art a characteristic of *non-communicability*. To this quarrelsome dimension deduced from Kant, Lyotard adds a singular interpretation from Edmund Burke, for whom the sublime is the terror by the threat of nothing happening. Thus, sublime art today would have the task of *undoing the presumption of the spirit in relation to time*, the aesthetic expression of which is the end of the modernist promise in relation to the future.

In his formulations on the aesthetics of the sublime, Lyotard explicitly claims an inheritance from Theodor Adorno in order to construct his aesthetics of the sublime. In *L’Inhumain* (*The Inhuman*), this appears in various moments, such as when Lyotard quotes the micrologies discussed at the end of Adorno’s *Negative Dialektik* (*Negative Dialectics*) in order to examine the unconsidered permanence in the decline of philosophical thought, or in the text in which he quotes the *ästhetische Theorie* (*Aesthetic Theory*) in order to consider communication without communication.

*The ästhetische Theorie* (*Aesthetic Theory*) had a strange fate in relation to its interpreters. On the one hand, Adorno’s critiques of progressive history and his accentuation of the moment of alterity of the work of art provided a reading that
placed him as a precursor of post-modernity. On the other hand, the centrality of the notion of form and the accentuation of the autonomy of the work of art could potentially place him in consonance with the defense of theses linked to artistic modernism, such as those of Clement Greenberg. What seems problematic to me in the approximation of Adorno to disenchanted postmodernism is the fact that his aesthetics, on the one hand, is one that wagers on the utopian and emancipatory character (even if it is the character of a negative utopia) of the work of art; on the other hand, it is one that, as already noted, accentuates the necessity of interpreting the work of art, which also engenders a communicative and dialogical process.

**Art and Postmodernity**

The publication of *La condition postmoderne (The Postmodern Condition)* had an enormous impact on various critics, who saw in the book's considerations a key to interpret the stretching of the limits of art, as well as the experimentalism of artistic practices from the 1960s and 70s. Revising her intellectual trajectory in *Perpetual Inventory*, the critic Rosalind Krauss quotes the book as an influence, going so far as to coin the phrase and concept of the “post-medium condition.” With this construction, she aims to characterize the artistic practices of the 1970s as identified with the explosion of limits between languages, as well as the artistic media characteristic of modernism, especially as considered by the critic Clement Greenberg.

However, although to Krauss the art of the 1960s and 70s was no longer oriented by the utopian and transformational vision of the avant-gardes, what Lyotard thinks of as the “postmodern aesthetic” is far from the analyses that Krauss makes in relation to the innovative practices of artistic production in opposition to the “specific medium of art,” against which she introduces concepts such as “the expanded field of art.” Lyotard’s post-modernism, first and foremost, is a *theory* that aims to characterize the paradigm of the times in which we live; thus the mobilization of the concept of the sublime and the identification of artists like Barnett Newman is, in this sense, exemplary.

**Adorno and Rancière: Aesthetics and Emancipation**

Although Rancière tries to distance himself from Adorno, it is undeniable that they share the necessity to consider the relation of art to human emancipation and freedom. Both are heirs to a tradition of aesthetic thinking from the eighteenth century, the rise of which is coetaneous with the idea that an education
of the sensible should be decisive for the political. Both see this education as moving beyond the hierarchy between the sphere of reason and the sphere of the senses which, in a general sense, characterized how aesthetic thinking ought to find a social correlation.

Whether through the integrating dimension of *play* in Rancière’s work or through the *promise* in Adorno’s, we can find in both thinkers an opposition to the rationality of determined means and ends that characterizes the current stage of capitalism. This opposition also notes the fact that the aesthetic dimension is outside of the relationship of “means” and “ends.” Perhaps finding the Nietzschean dimension in which “life does not proceed according to ends” is the contribution that aesthetics can still give to emancipation.

If, on the other hand, one ought not disregard the impasses that Lyotard notes in relation to the impasses of modernism, the fact that even he resorts to an eighteenth-century concept of aesthetic thinking – namely, the *sublime* – shows that even two hundred years after its birth, this tradition remains alive and stimulates contemporary intellectual discussions.

**Notes:**

In his eulogy to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Alain Badiou succinctly captures the two questions that essentially guided the former’s thought: “Lacoue-Labarthe’s questions lie […] between the two poles of our historial site. The first: the complicity of a lethal politics and the configuring will of great art, a complicity organized by the work of art’s mimetic motif. The second: the poetic possibility of withdrawal, as indicated by an art that escapes any will to contour it and all monumentality. An art that can exist after all great art”.1 A “poetic possibility of withdrawal” that requires, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, the difficult task of wresting art “from Heidegger’s great, memorable interpretation”.2

In what follows it will be shown that, although both Badiou and Lacoue-Labarthe endorse Heidegger’s deconstruction of aesthetics, each of them insists that this deconstruction is carried out in an ultimately insufficient manner because it remains mired in Romanticism; moreover, Badiou and Lacoue-Labarthe will draw opposite conclusions from the saturation or completion of aesthetics with regard to the question of post-romantic conception of art. For while Badiou’s inaesthetics affirms the possibility of preparing the ground for (thinking again) “great art”, Lacoue-Labarthe emphasizes the prosaic and “sober” character of post-romantic art, its de-artification of (great) art. This seeming opposition between Badiou and Lacoue-Labarthe will then be concretized via their respective constructions of the “case of Wagner” – a concretization that ultimately will reveal some surprising affinities between these two thinkers.

Badiou affirms three points in Heidegger’s thinking of art: Heidegger legitimately re-established the artwork to an “autonomous function of thought,” which allowed him to subtract it “from philosophical knowledge to render it to truth”, thereby founding “a radical critique of all aesthetics, of all determinations that construe the poem as a region of philosophy”;3 his analyses of Hölderlin’s poetry
in particular demonstrated that “philosophy is sometimes obliged to open up to the poem in a more dangerous fashion: it must think, for its own ends, the operations by which the poem sets a date with a truth in Time (for the period under consideration the principal truth that was poetically put to work was the destitution of the category of objectivity as a necessary form of ontological presentation […])”.4 That is to say: Heidegger’s thinking of art as Dichtung reveals itself as thinking under the “Poet’s condition,” that is, as a thinking sutured to the “Age of the Poets.”5 For Heidegger, Dichtung signified a work of thought and only the poem would be capable of grasping what Badiou calls “the real of this epoch: inconsistency and disorientation; destitution of the category of the object and of objectivity; dismissal of the subject-object ‘objectifying’ frame”.6 It is for this very reason that “until today, Heidegger’s thinking has owed its persuasive power to having been the only one to pick up what was at stake in the poem, namely the destitution of object fetishism, the opposition of truth and knowledge and lastly the essential disorientation of our epoch”.7

Nevertheless, Heidegger’s thinking of the relation between philosophy and art ultimately belongs to the romantic schema which holds that art “alone is capable of truth”.8 Heidegger’s hermeneutics of art is explicitly associated with the romantic schema that invests art with auras and revelatory authority. What, thus, characterizes Heidegger’s romantic-hermeneutic schema is “that between philosophy and art it is the same truth that circulates. The retreat of being comes to be thought in the conjoining of the poem and its interpretation. Interpretation is in the end nothing but the delivery of the poem to the trembling of finitude in which thought strives to endure the retreat of being as clearing. Poet and thinker, relying on one another, embody within the word opening out of its closure. In this respect, the poem, strictly speaking, cannot be equaled”.9

Yet the twentieth century also “experienced the saturation” of the romantic doctrine, a saturation that has produced “a kind of disentanglement of the terms, a desperate ‘disrelation’ between art and philosophy”;10 this “disrelation” necessitates, after the didactic, classical, and romantic schemata, a “fourth modality of the link between philosophy and art,” which Badiou calls “inaesthetics”.11 Briefly, inaesthetics describes a relation of philosophy to art that, although maintaining the non-objective status of art as producer of truths, seizes exclusively on the artwork’s intra-philosophical effects. That is to say, Badiou’s inaesthetics is based on the proposition that a proper philosophical identification of art cannot occur within the register of aesthetics; inaesthetics refuses therefore aesthetics’ traditional gesture of placing art within a hierarchy of the presentation of the Idea – a gesture that still centrally relies on the concept of beauty; in contrast to aesthetics’ appropriation of art, inaesthetics, by breaking with the romantic,
didactic, and classical schemes of thinking art, primarily concerns the task of “conveying, through the local production of truths within definite [artistic] configurations, a truth of a more general kind that philosophy ‘welcomes and shelters,’ the only truth that matters, namely that there are truths” in art;12 moreover, inaesthetics declares that “the arts, in their very diversity of intents and means, express in various degrees and at various levels of clarity only the simple truth that ‘art […] is in each and every one of its points the thinking of the thought that it itself is’.”13 Consequently, Badiou distances himself from the Heideggerian “couple of saying and thinking – forgetful of the ontological subtraction inaugurally inscribed by the matheme –, “since this very coupling is “in fact formed by the sermon of the end of philosophy and the romantic myth of authenticity”14. Because Heidegger’s anti-modernism failed “to validate [any] recourse to the matheme, he only managed to revoke the judgment of interruption and thus to restore[d] both the sacral authority of poetic utterance and the idea that the ‘authentic’ resides in the flesh of language”.15 Instead of inventing a new relation between philosophy and the modernist artwork that would be neither fusional nor aesthetic, “Heidegger emptily prophesied a re-activation of the Sacred in an indecipherable coupling of the saying of the poets and the thinking of the thinkers”16. Badiou’s farewell to Heidegger’s thinking of art therefore rejects any return to aesthetics and poses the question of the post-romantic or modernist artwork’s possibility for the present.

For Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger’s Destruktion of aesthetics remains significant because it is uniquely capable of revealing “the essence of Nazism”17. That is to say, Heidegger manages to demonstrate that National Socialism is enframed by Romanticism itself and its aesthetic apprehension of art; in this respect, Heidegger’s thought is “irreducible to Romanticism”,18 in that it both articulates the question of art in non-aesthetic terms and does not, contrary to both Wagner and Nietzsche, pursue a strategy that would figure the modern as simple re-birth of the ancient. Consequently, the abyss separating Heidegger’s thinking of art from “any form of Romanticism, and a fortiori National Socialism” allows Heidegger to cast “a precise light upon the essence of National Socialism” and decipher it in terms of national-aestheticism.19 What is more, Heidegger’s demonstration that National Socialism presented itself as the truth of the political to be sought in art renders it obvious that “no aesthetic […] is capable of undoing the unseverable link between art and politics, because its categories […] have at their roots the presupposition, dominant throughout the whole philosophical tradition, that the political (‘religion’) is the truth of art”.20

Yet, Romanticism’s legacy remains also the unthought of Heidegger’s thinking of art. In other words, one can identify stubborn adherences to Romanti-
Erik Vogt

cism in Heidegger’s thinking of art: his adherence to the notion of figuration, 
Gestaltung,21 as well as “his obsession with myth”;22 for myth is, for Heidegger, the 
“originary poem” of a people. This means that “a people originates, exists as such, 
or identifies and appropriates itself only on the basis of myth”;23 that is, on the 
basis of myth as Urgedicht and Sage. Consequently, “the Heideggerian apprehen-
sion of poetry is over-determined by speculative Romanticism: That is indeed 
why poetry (Dichtung) is defined in its essence as language, die Sprache – or why 
language […] is defined as the originary poetry (Urdichtung) of a people – and 
finally, why the latter in turn is defined in its essence as die Sage: ho muthos.”24 

Heidegger’s simultaneous deconstruction of and unacknowledged adherence 
to Romanticism characterizes also his approach to Richard Wagner’s dream to 
invent a myth and re-institute “great art” as a means to bring the German peo-
ple into its proper historial dimension. This dream – encapsulated in Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk - constitutes the culmination and completion of Romanticism 
in that it keeps from romanticist aesthetics the religious-political function of 
art to ground in myth the self-presentation or self-celebration of a people, for 
only myth is capable of providing the language and the figures a people needs 
in order to recognize itself and identify itself with itself. Although Wagner’s 
artistic project is essentially aesthetic and aestheticizing, it is, so Heidegger, also 
“unique, and it represents, after the Hegelian accomplishment of the aesthetic, 
the final outbreak, coming from the aesthetic, against the presupposition of 
the aesthetic itself, that is to say against the recognition and acceptance […] of 
the end of ‘great art’.”25 Wagner’s art only verifies the law according to which 
all art under the hegemony of the aesthetic is nostalgic for the “great art” that 
it undertakes – in vain – to restore; but from there, at the same time, Wagner 
takes “the aesthetic to its limit … to the brink of destruction”.26 

Wagner constitutes therefore a failure due to the “domination of art as music, 
and thereby the domination of the pure state of feeling”.27 Since language as such – 
Dichtung – remains subordinate in Wagner’s art, it lacks the figural force; thus, it 
is incapable of Sage, of myth, and ultimately it installs nothing but the reign of the 
pure affective state which itself presupposes a purely aesthetic apprehension of 
art; what is more, Wagner’s undue emphasis on theatricalization ruins in advance 
y any possibility of the appearance of an authentic Gestalt; in short, Wagner’s art 
is not great art because it lacks figuration, style – “his art is founded on music, 
that is to say, founded on the aesthetic apprehension of art and … conceived 
and organized from the viewpoint of an exclusive regard for affect – it is an art 
only for effect or impression, a call to pure passivity, a feminine art, a hysteri-
cal art”.28 Following Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe reads Wagner’s total work of 
art as a “totalizing sublation of all the arts”, as an attempt at the “restoration of
'great art'; nevertheless, Wagner’s “great art” is ultimately a false totalization, an “infinite” melocentrism anchored in and generating a metaphysics of feeling.

Badiou is thus right to claim that Wagner’s artistic apparatus represents for Lacoue-Labarthe an inconsistent composite that consists of evocations of originary myths, technological amplifications of operatic, orchestral and musical techniques, totalizing gestures bringing about the closure of a certain type of opera in Western music, and, reinforcing the first three features, a type of unification that, in the guise of endless melody, not only dissolves language or speech and synthesizes all internal differences, but also renders music itself mythological in that the Wagnerian leitmotif is the very method by means of which the mythic elements of plot and narrative are musically over-determined.29 However, Lacoue-Labarthe’s construction of a “mythological, technological, totalizing figure of Wagner, in which the music effects a synthesis of the mythological imperatives”,30 must ultimately be deciphered in terms of “prescribing a certain Wagner” on the basis of both “a theory of politics as aestheticization”31 and an ideal for contemporary art that, precisely in its imperative to dispense with “great” art after Wagner, who brought “great” art (and opera) to its completion and simultaneously opened it toward mass art, is owed to the notion of sobriety with its features of “fragmentation, de-totalization, experimentation”.32 What is more, this appeal to nüchtern art and its “regimen of absence of effects” tacitly assumes that it is ultimately no longer possible to distinguish between art and non-art. As Badiou explains, Lacoue-Labarthe articulates this idea in terms of “a theory holding that the essence of contemporary poetry lies in the becoming-prose of the poem. Because the demarcation between poem and prose is precisely what the poem must call into question, the essence of the poem will consist in its making itself impure and becoming prose, rather than in aspiring to be the pure or great poem”.33

Thus, it becomes obvious that Lacoue-Labarthe’s prescription for contemporary art encrypted in his negative construction of Wagner, in his catalogue of negative imperatives, must be understood as belonging, at least in part, to the current postmodern consensus that Badiou identifies in his Third Sketch of a Manifesto of Affirmationist Art; against this consensus, Badiou insists on the need to invent a new model of art that is capable of breaking with the heteronomous forces of the present – a break that assumes quasi-heroic features, as is evidenced by the following passage in which Badiou exhorts contemporary artists to “renounce the delights of the margin, of obliqueness, of infinite deconstruction, of the fragment, of the exhibition trembling with mortality, of finitude and of the body” and embrace “monumental construction, projects, […] the overthrow of established powers”.34 Against these “established powers” that stand
under the hegemony of the postmodern and its invocations of the “end of art, of metaphysics, of representation, of imitation, of the work, of the spirit”.

Badiou opposes what he calls “affirmationist art”. Affirmationist art rejects any expression of particularity and is concerned with “the impersonal production of a truth that is addressed to all”. Moreover, “there is necessarily a plurality of arts and … there is no imaginable totalization of that plurality.” Consequently, Badiou can declare “that the multimedia motif of a multisensory art is a motif without true destiny. All it does is project the obscene uniqueness of commerce – that is, the monetary equivalence of products – onto art”. Finally, art as a “second formalization of the emergence of a form as formless” interrupts “circulation” and communicates nothing: “that is the art we need, that is the only art that is addressed to all, that does not circulate within any pre-established circuit, and does not communicate with anyone in particular.”

Badiou’s inaesthetic re-tracing of a modernist conception of art envisages the possibility of a new “prescriptive model in which art may not only realize new monumental constructions”, but may also attain (again) something like “greatness”. This emphasis on monumental construction and “greatness” is directed against postmodern artistic productions that render art subservient to particularity and thereby represent material forms that are suspended between “an art linked to a notion of redemption, or art as suffering and radiant exhibition of the flesh, that is, art as the carnal installation of finitude”.

It is precisely in the context of the “false” poverty and humility marking contemporary postmodern artistic products that Badiou turns to Wagner - and against Lacoue-Labarthe’s verdict on Wagner - with the provocative claim that “Wagner still represents a music for the future”, especially since “we are on the cusp of a revival of high art and it is here that Wagner should be invoked. … Greatness is no longer merely part of our past; it is part of our future as well”. However, in order to find access to a “new Wagner”, that is, to his “great” art as creative project that still holds promises for the future, Badiou maintains that one has “to venture into Wagnerian fragmentation” and “localization: at the point where continuity and dissonance, the local and the global, confront each other both musically and dramatically”. Only by uncoupling greatness from totality will it be possible to revive a notion of greatness that is, however, no longer to be fused with totality, but rather negates the latter.

Recounting Lacoue-Labarthe’s main accusations against Wagner – Wagner’s imposition of seamless continuity in form of his theory of endless melody that is based on the model of subjective affect for the sake of erecting identities; his dialectical subsumption of differences, dissonances, discontinuities under the figure of final reconciliation; his subjection of music to narrative structures in
the guise of leitmotif – Badiou puts forth his hypothesis regarding the Wagnerian interplay between music and drama in which music, far from subordinating its rhythmic and melodic aspects under some pre-conceived coercive totality, is the very site where dramatic possibilities are created that engender unpredictable transformations and transitions testifying to the fundamental plasticity of metamorphosis that rupture the teleological narrative structure of Wagner’s music dramas and its characters. In other words, the focus on music and its processes of formal transformation reveals that music qua music is the very medium of metamorphosis and transition that immanently problematizes Wagnerian narrative, particularly in its mythical and monumental figurations. Thus, Badiou tries to demonstrate that the leitmotif, far from simply being a technique guaranteeing mythical identity and continuity, “also functions as a non-descriptive, internal musical development, with no dramatic or narrative connotations whatsoever”. Consequently, Wagner’s leitmotifs constitute “a unique nexus between discontinuity or transformation (with its potential for disintegration and destruction) on the one hand, and continuity or persistence (with its potential for narrative dogmatism) on the other”. Furthermore, Wagnerian music generates non-dialectical subjective splits, thereby exposing (the figures of) Wagner’s music dramas to an inner heterogeneity that cannot be sublated or reconciled by some affirmative finale that would entail a generalized spectacularization of suffering. In accordance with his inaesthetic proposition regarding the multiplicity of artistic configurations that cannot be totalized, Badiou suggests furthermore that each of Wagner’s music dramas constitutes a singular exploration “of a possibility of ending”, in other words, each music drama elaborates musically the consequences of its own innovative mode of thought regarding the possibility of ending. For instance, Badiou claims that, whereas the ending of Goetterdaemmerung must be grasped in terms of the utter destruction of mythology, both Meistersinger and Parsifal concern the question of the relationship between old and new, tradition and innovation. That is to say: One of the lessons of Wagnerian music for our own present and our future consists in the recognition that art cannot be solely “grounded in formal subtraction”, in a simple break with the past that would neglect its transformative potential, but must rather be grounded in an incorporation or repetition of the past such that its disruptive effects can continue and persist in the present. And music’s predicament is shared in an analogous manner by politics in that Parsifal’s subject is nothing else but the question regarding the possibility of a new, non-religious, non-transcendent “modern ceremony” as a generic “collectivity’s or even a community’s mode of self-representation”. Although Parsifal constitutes a failure in bringing about a Darstellung of modern ceremony because Wagner’s
conception of Bayreuth as theater for ceremony redoubles representation and is therefore in danger of reinstating closure, Wagner’s idea of ceremony addressed to no one in particular (and thus also not to a mythical Volk) cannot simply be dismissed; for “the question as to whether the Crowd declares itself […] cannot be exclusively recapitulated in collective figures of revolt. […] It must also put forward, examine and produce its own consistency”. Although Parsifal fails “in changing the ceremony into something new”, its philosophical-political lesson nevertheless consists in inviting us “at least to be able to get ready to intrude into future celebrations, that is, to anticipate or have the necessary prerequisites for the future celebration”.

Ultimately, Badiou claims that it is possible to extract a notion of greatness from Wagner’s works that is no longer complicit with myth, the violent fictioning of a people, and the totalization of the arts in the name of the Gesamtkunstwerk, as long as one heeds to “five rules […] concerning what greatness, as distinct from totality or from messianic will, might be”. These five rules or directions comprise the creation of new (subjective) possibilities; the multiplicity of hypotheses operative in and tolerated by Wagner’s works; the toleration of the split subject, of suffering, of heterogeneity; the non-dialectical figures of resolution; transformations that no longer operate under the guise of teleological principles of development and of affirmative dialectic.

Yet, one could ask the question as to whether Badiou’s approach to Wagner that proceeds in large part by means of inverting Lacoue-Labarthe’s critical-negative attitude toward Wagner does not ultimately betray affinities to the latter. That is to say: Apart from the fact, that Lacoue-Labarthe’s deconstructive approach cannot simply be equated with destruction and the pronouncement of the “end of art, of metaphysics” – after all, Lacoue-Labarthe is no less concerned with the link between repetition and innovation - could one not raise the suspicion that Badiou’s “second Wagner” is constructed on the basis of the very set of (negative) imperatives (detotalization, dispersive fragmentation, microscopic and cellular transitions and transformations, etc.) that characterize Lacoue-Labarthe’s “sober” or even “cold” art after “great art”? Does not Badiou’s “new”, undecidable and uncertain Wagner exhibit the very “modesty”, hesitation, and attitude of suspension that makes it difficult to see how Wagner could be invoked as threshold to the very monumental constructions and projects that, according to Badiou, are to exist (again) under the name of affirmationist art?
The Saturation of Aesthetics and the Recomencement of “Great Art”

Notes:

5. Like Heidegger, Badiou and Lacoue-Labarthe reserve for poetry a pre-eminent position among the arts.
Erik Vogt

37. Ibid., p. 144.
38. Ibid., p. 145.
39. Ibid., p. 146.
41. Badiou, Polemics, p. 139.
42. Badiou, Five Lessons on Wagner, p. 133.
43. Ibid., p. 83.
44. Ibid., pp. 83–84.
45. Ibid., p. 88.
46. Ibid., p. 20.
49. Ibid., p. 98.
50. Ibid., p. 99.
51. Ibid., p. 107.
52. Ibid., p. 108.
53. Ibid., p. 147.
54. Ibid., p. 151.
55. Ibid., p. 158.
56. Ibid., p. 159.
57. Ibid., p. 130.
58. Ibid., pp. 130–131.
59. As Scherzinger points out, inversion is the very strategy characterizing also Badiou’s treatment of other critical accounts of Wagner.
The following paper is devoted to the possibilities of application of various aesthetico-philosophical methodologies to the studies of the specificity of “the artistic”. And I am particularly interested in the most contemporary humanitarian methodologies, which are most relevant in relation to art.

Contemporary philosophy of art is currently undergoing a new paradigm shift that is happening due to the specificity of the post-postmodern sociocultural situation that in its turn affects understanding of art, maybe, its entity, or “The Artistic” (in Russian – hudozhestvennost). And thus, it has to be taken into consideration as the new “projective philosophy of “the artistic”, the one oriented towards the future, is emerging.

The most important of these shifts followed each other historically and fit within the borders of the 20th century: the “beginning” (debut de siecle) was marked by the transition from the Classical paradigm to Nonclassical (that later became Postclassical), and the “end” (fin de siecle) can be described as the turn from Post(non)classics to what can be already called “Protoclassics” (to accentuate the new quality of “post-postclassics” as its “other”, the “projective” vector, with “pro-” taken the place of “post-”). Here one may agree with the approach of Michail Epstein, who in his works of the late 1990s-early 2000s, especially in Mapping Blank Spaces: On the Future of the Humanities (2004) emphasizes radical change of the vector of contemporary culture – its dominant direction instead of the past towards the future. In his words, this turn indicates the appearance of the new paradigm, “proteism”, different than the previous ones – Classical and Post(non)classical.

“Proteism as a cultural movement is an alternative to that “post-” (postmodernism, poststructuralism, postutopianism, postindustrialism) that made a start from the past and was enchanted by it, unsuccessfully trying to leave its magical
Proto-... adjusts itself to the forthcoming and not the foregone. Proteism as a humanitarian methodology studies incipient, not yet taken shape phenomena at their initial unstable stage of development, when they rather herald and foretoken than exist in their own sense”

Historically, it is Classics that is initial and provides a primary, well historically grounded backdrop for the setting of key methodologemes of humanities and, hence, philosophy of art. Given the specificity of current culture as mosaic and rhizomatic (i.e. when Post- and Proto-, Classics, Post(non)classics and Protoclassics mix and co-exist), the individual potential of each methodology becomes ever more topical as expressed in combination with the others, in this heuristic creative eclectics.

The Classical paradigm is represented by the two key interconnected but oppositional methodologies viewing art in traditional way (with all the different implications of it for its own specificity): Analytical and Systematic art theories, or methodologies of the analytical and systematic artistic.

Analytics is oriented towards the description of events in their empirical, factual givenness. The decisive condition for it is a precise naming of the object of the study and its usage according to strict norms of language conventions. The artistic appears here as one of the possible names for art and the corresponding „analytics of the artistic“ opens perspectives for working with a lexicon of neighboring terms, for instance, on the basis of Wittgenstein’s idea of „language games“ and principle of „family resemblance“.

Systematics opens another, even more roundabout path. Here, the phenomenon is explained through a strict one-way tie to its essence: „Essence Appears/ Comes into Being“ In relation to defining the artistic within art it means that the artistic is the direct result of the „essence“ of art, its exhibited essence. This version presupposes existence of common ground shared by all art works – some kind of „art in its extreme“, a system of necessary and sufficient elements, structures and functions that appear in a concrete work of art and thus become its qualities and criteria as art. The „systematic artistic“, despite its closeness to synergetics, does not give a sense of real specificity, because it originates not from the spontaneity of creative „Initial Being“ and its unconscious components, but from the idea of conscious teleology and directedness of an artist towards realization of the essence of art. Yet, this associates Art with Techne (which is not bad), but not Creation (without which the artistic is lost, even if the status of art can be sustained institutionally).

The methodology of (so called) „heurmeneutic artistic“ in its extremely obscure postmetaphysical version was developed more fully by Heidegger (not to undermine unique contributions by Ortega-i-Gasset and Bakhtin), and later,
with more relevance to the present, by his student and follower Hadamer. In his lecture „Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry”², which in itself is characteristic of his phenomenology of art, Heidegger concentrates on what is key in our context – the search for authentic specificity, or in his words – „essential essence” of poetry, Hölderlin's oeuvre being the pure case of it. Though Heidegger pays tribute to essentialism, he understands the „essential essence” of art as something that exceeds the limits of the established essentialistic order and interpretative methodology of the „systematic artistic” associated with it. This is an emergent and created „Poesy”, i.e. „the Artistic” in our understanding (to refer to the well-known extrapolation of „poetry” onto „art”). It is worth noting that in his specification of art Heidegger easily does without the classical markers, such as mimesis, katharsis, techne, medium.

If the claim of nonclassic hermeneutics (within the same paradigm) was for understanding of ontological meaning of art, Deconstruction, in its post-nonclassic extreme, followed another route – not the vitalist-ontological-phenomenological one, but the route of intertextuality of the Artist as a Scriptor. Yet an „anticlaim” was made about the textual presentability and the correspondent importance of “Language of Being”, and „superclaim” – about the hypertext and its non-sense, i.e. total absence of stable meaning (in a specific aspect relevant to this paper – in the specificity of the artistic and in its interpretation). This is how the „intertextualist artistic” came into being.

The perspective of breaking the vicious circle of intertextuality (its ad absurdum) appears only within other methodologies of grasping the moment/instance of Being of Art. The essential part here is the burgeoning, self-generating and alive rhizomatics of the artistic/art itself that gives hope of finding a way out the impasses of the described methodologies (in part, thanks to Deleuze and Guattari).

In particular, in “What is Philosophy?”³, the chapter on sensations, percepts and affects, Deleuze and Guattari state: „Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts and affects are beings (or entities) whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man. The work of art is a being (or entity) of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself».

The “projective” mode of “the artistic” within the new Protoclassics (or Proteistic) paradigm can be specified as emergence, interrelation, inter- and co-being of the peculiar (“surhuman”, “transhuman”, “virtual”?) autonomous entities, creating their own artistic meanings. “Artistic creation” transforms into “artistic entities”, with its origin in “unsatisfied desire” of “otherness” (“alter-being”) in imaginary, illusory, virtual world, and realization on this basis of the “pleasure principle” and “eroticism of text”. In the context of psycho-schizo-analytical
discourse this may be also referred to Carl Jung’s “art archetypes” and concepts of “self- essence” (“self-entity”) and “autonomous psycho-complex”.

In this respect, one can suppose that “Artistic Entity” (or “Entity of the Artistic”?) in the context of “projective philosophy of art” is the Imaginer, the one who Imagines and who gives the status of existential authenticity to its own creations-fantasms. It is fantasms, artistic micro-entities, that create new (i.e. projective) meanings, those not existing before, i.e. Create Proteistic.

Notes:

AGNIESZKA BANDURA

The Meaning and Value of Experiment in Contemporary Art and Aesthetics (On Experimental Art and Aesthetics)

Introduction

One could say that aesthetics has had a serious problem with its own autonomy, subject and methods, since it was born in the middle of the eighteenth century. And I would not object. But the twentieth century put aesthetics in face of a quite new problem: contemporary aesthetics, struggling with methodological and content-related issues, tries to establish or reestablish its (relatively) autonomous position among the other human and social sciences, and on the other hand, contemporary aesthetics quite often underlines its trans- or interdisciplinary status and is trying to profit from that.

I think that one of the most promising solutions for contemporary aesthetics is to experiment. In other words, I have this vision of experimental aesthetics as an essential alternative for the broadly known philosophical aesthetics or so called philosophy of art. And I share the vision not only with contemporary researchers (for example psychologists doing research on visual or auditive perception of art), but also with the former ones, like Gustav Theodor Fechner, Grant Allen or Charles Lalo).

The idea of experimental aesthetics also seems to me strongly embedded in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s conception of aesthetics as “an art [in the first place] and science of sensitive cognition” (ars et scientia cognitionis sensitivae). As we know, Baumgarten had intended to publish two volumes of Aesthetics, but he never finished the first one. In the introduction to the first volume (1750) he briefly outlined the frames of a new discipline: it was supposed to consist of the natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis) and the aesthetics of arts (aesthetica articialis) ¹. The first one deals with human natural (but differentiated) predispositions to experience beauty and to create or present it as well.
The idea of experimental aesthetics comes back in *Philosophia generalis* (from 1770), where Baumgarten determines the status of aesthetics among the other philosophical disciplines. In chapter two we read that aesthetics should be the art of perfecting of the sensitive cognition or experience (including *ars sentiendi*, *i.e.* *empirica aesthetica*) and the art of expressing of sensitive data through right signs (*ars fingandi et ex signis cognoscedi*).

One hundred years later Gustav Theodor Fechner (firstly in *Zur experimentalen Ästhetik* from 1871, then in two volumes of *Vorschule der Ästhetik* from 1876) announces his program for “aesthetics from below” (*Ästhetik von unten*), also called by him “inductive”, “objective”, “scientific” or “experimental”. In opposition to a traditional (more theoretical or philosophical) aesthetics “from above” (*Ästhetik von oben*), the experimental one should be based on results of psychophysiological experiments with aesthetic experience of art. Without this empirical perspective, philosophical aesthetics from above is only “a giant on feet of clay”.

Few years later the authors of a physiological aesthetics project declared: “our object is to exhibit the purely physical origin of the sense of beauty, and its relativity to our nervous organization. […] all mental phenomena are the subjective sides of what are objectively cognized as nervous functions; and that they are in consequence as rigorously limited by natural laws as the physical processes whose correlatives they are”. They wanted to describe (qualitatively and quantitatively) the nature of aesthetic experience and treated the arts as an area of experimenting with pleasure (learning how to intensify it, combine it or contemplate it at least). Without a physiological aesthetics and experiments the traditional science stays only a “transcendental rhetoric and vague poetical declamation”.

The foregoing intuitions and observations were gathered together by Charles Lalo in *L’esthétique expérimentale contemporaine* (from 1908). Aesthetics from below (*esthétique d’en bas*) constitutes a part of a general science of pleasure (*hédonique*) and its main area of research should be art, conceived as a practical application of aesthetic laws of providing pleasure: “L’art présente l’application la plus haute et la plus développée des lois de l’esthétique.” The nature of this pleasure is socially determined and Lalo wants to analyze it as “a social fact” (*fait social*). Contemporary aesthetics should be “a total synthesis” of all sciences concerning the experience of beauty (“l’étude scientifique de toutes les conditions de la beauté, allant des plus abstraites aux les plus conrètes”), like mathematics, physiology, psychology, sociology and so on.

Unfortunately, that integral approach to aesthetic experience was in the 1920s reduced to so called psychometric aesthetics (in visual arts in forms of: McAdory Art Test, Meier Art Judgement Test, Knauber Test of Art Ability, Lowenrez Test,
Meaning of Experiment in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Arts

As we see, the notion of experiment often appears in the modern aesthetics (I’m sure I chose only few examples of it). Even more often it is present in contemporary arts practice and theory. Before going to the idea of experiment in arts, I would like to consider some important meanings of experiment in modern philosophy and aesthetics.

Here I start with David Hume’s role and limits of experiments in science and his criticism of induction. Although human knowledge is impossible without empirical proofs for the theoretical hypotheses, empirical evidence (received due to experiments) cannot force the choice of a theory or its revision. Very often there is a psychological belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, but it does not implicate that there is logical justification for the supposition that it will, simply because it always has in the past.

Such critical approach of induction inspired a contemporary philosophy of science. One of the most known notions and methods of philosophy of science is an experimentum crucis (a crucial experiment, a critical experiment) in which under the conditions of the experiment (under the same external circumstances and for the same “input variables” within the experiment) hypotheses and theories, superior to all other hypotheses or theories in the scientific community, are proven false, but the experimenter’s hypothesis is not ruled out.

Pierre Duhem (in La théorie physique son objet et sa structure from 1906) has questioned the idea of fixed and finished number of experimental criteria, which – according to him – are indeterminate. On the other hand, he holds that for any given set of observations there is an innumerably large number of explanations (Duhem-Quine thesis).

Karl Raimund Popper, in his conceptions of empirical falsification, claimed that logically no number of positive outcomes at the level of experimental testing can confirm a scientific theory, but a single counterexample is logically decisive: it shows the theory, from which the implication is derived, to be false (it means, possible to be shown false by observation or experiment). Moreover, he held that any scientific theory is abstract in nature, and can be tested only indirectly, by reference to their implications.

I am pretty sure that both critique of induction as well as intuition of inconclusiveness of experiments as methods of scientific verification are evident to aesthetics. Still, we can hardly adapt a scientific (or philo-scientific) meaning of experiment
to aesthetic perception or artistic creation. Let’s try to imagine such a situation in which we accept some regularity of our aesthetic behavior as a general rule and till the end of our life like nothing else but red and green realistic composition (for example still-lifes). From the other perspective, Popper’s idea of falsification seems to rule all progress in contemporary (especially avant-guard) arts.

Thedor W. Adorno noticed that experimenting both in arts and science is written into human nature as a necessity or a constant need for taking the risk. He compared artistic experiments to “explosions” and underlines its painful “brutality” (of something new), which always causes animosity or rejection in the public. The main difference between scientific and artistic understanding of experiment is that experiments in science (and in arts before 1930s) are conscious of their aims (results?), that is to verify some subjective hypotheses. Opposite to that, a modern artist, making experiments, is never sure of the results of creative process: “an artistic subject is not able to compass or imagine the results” of experimenting. The same as the viewer he is astonished by the results of his own work (l’imprévu).

What is characteristic to a modern philosophy of art is that it authorizes the experimental methods in arts (we could even talk about some imperative of experimenting) and in the same time negates aesthetics privilege to be experimental. So maybe we should look for the reasons for aesthetic experiments not in philosophy, but in art (maybe functions of experiment in arts will illuminate the meaning of experiment in aesthetics).

First of all, I would like to say that I took very seriously Wolfgang Welsch’s advice for the aestheticians to make aesthetics more closer and manifoldly connected with art (and his rather dramatic call from Congress starting debate: “show me some art!”). That is why I would like to focus rather on the examples (of experiment) from contemporary arts.

Experiment in Art or Experimental Art

What does it mean “to experiment” in arts? Is it as obvious as usual: to try out a new procedure, a new idea, or activity? And what does is mean: an experimental art?

Art used to experiment with human perception and understanding of reality since the very beginning. We are especially familiar with the futuristic or cubistic images of time and space, as well as with artistic impressions on colours, their contrasts, relations, afterimages and other visual phenomena.

The idea of experimenting with representation is written into a classical Aritotelian conception of mimesis, conceived as a creative synthesis of what
was perceived. But (as I think) a real artistic invention of our times are the twentieth century experiments with nature and environment (in minimal land art) and this part of nature which is human, that is a human body (in bio-tech art and body art).

**Experimenting with Nature**

In the early 1970s Richard Serra started to create large-scale and large-weight site-specific (usually outdoor) sculptures. They are usually built from the steel settles of rusty brown or greenish colour (after several years of being exposed to the outdoor conditions). The installations are at least twice the height of a normal person and dwarf the perceiver. Their scale as well as spatial complexity do not let the observer take them in at a glance – so to be totally perceived and well understood they need to be explored by the viewer, who has to walk into or to enter the space between steel slabs. One of the Serra’s critics, Lynne Cooke, calls this effect “thinking on your feet”.

They create an unusual space inside the natural one – when you enter such an installation you are getting astonished and disorientated. Huge, steel walls seem to be self-supporting and leaning in or out at the same time, rotating upward and overwhelming you (maybe even frightening). The first natural reaction is to discover the reasons of their paradoxical stability – so you move in a sculpture and earn this altered experience of space: non geometrical, non-ordered, curved and escaping the rules of gravitation. Then you move round a sculpture and you perceive it as a natural, integral element of the landscape: you’re learning how to tame it within the open-air space.

I think of Serra’s land art as some kind of an “ex-centric” experiment. “Ex-centric” has for me double meaning. First of all, it demands a specific viewer’s reaction and encourage him to unconventional aesthetic behavior. Perception of this odd, unusual space makes the viewer leave the inner belief on space behind and create a new idea or concept of space, in which he is totally engaged. And the space is, secondly, ex-centric because not situated in any geometric center – it is an open space without center, running outside, expanding, and taking the viewer outside of the installation, as well as outside of his traditional image of space.

**Experimenting with the Human**

In land art the artwork is not placed in the landscape (in the nature), but rather, the landscape (the nature) is the means of its creation.
The problem of reciprocity and of a mutual exchange between the material or the medium and the object of art is also present and essential to contemporary body art practice.

David Altmejd explores a mystery of human body on frontier of nature and technology, making the body giant, defragmented, re-organised in an absurd or highly aesthetic, fancy or grotesque way. His mythical, surreal or fantastical sculptures stay human-like and question their own humanity at the same time. Altmejd says that human figures are over-explored in art, so he portrays human-like creatures instead, believing they have a stronger potential to evoke feelings and reflection. He consciously replaces an over-idealized beauty of human bodies with more realistic ugliness and grotesque. „For me the grotesque is necessary to understand beauty. Things that are pure, I can’t feel them. They have to be infected or else they don’t exist – they don’t have a presence.”

The installation called TheVessel (from 2011) is a several meters plexiglass baroque diorama of disembodied hands, ears and noses, but also swanlike plaster arms, bird beaks of a phallic shape and other fragments, all holding together thanks to spider-web-like crystal threads. My first impression is The Vessel symbolizes at once disorder and symmetry in defragmented world of human body-parts (maybe even the cut off hands are pulling the threads to make it less chaotic).

Altmejd explores mystery of human-like body through holes. He says: „I like holes. I like orifices. They’re what lets in light and air. [...] that feeling of seeing the inside of something that you’re not supposed to see was really interesting to me.” Profaned beauty of a human body should help the viewer enter and tame the world of the inhuman, disintegration and being broke.

In 1980 Stelarc had created a mechanical human-like hand, which he attached to his right arm as an additional hand – The Third Hand. The hand (of natural size), cast in latex, was provided in essential abilities of grasping and moving and a tactile feedback system for a sense of touch. It is moving thanks to signals from the abdominal and leg muscles sent to the switching system. The hand played a major role in many of Stelarc’s performances. Like he said: “The Third Hand has come to stand for a body of work that explored intimate interface of technology and prosthetic augmentation – not as a replacement but rather as an addition to the body. A prosthesis not as a sign of lack, but rather a symptom of excess.”

The Third Ear Project began in 2006 (from Ear on Arm). The first prosthetic ear, surgically inserted into his left forearm, caused the serious infection and had to be removed. Actually Stelarc works on a more perfect prosthesis, in which he will insert a Wi-Fi enabled microphone, and that should allow the viewers-auditors “to listen in to what my ear is hearing, wherever you are and wherever I am.”
Those biotechnological experiments with the artist own body has a body art tradition. In 1980 Stelarc for the first time gave a performance during which he was suspended naked on around twenty hooks one meter over the ground.

The main question of body art practice arises when we confront with each other two philosophical ideas of the body – conceived as an object and as a subject. In the first case body is treated as a material and medium of art (sometimes as a final product of creation), but most of body artists would like to see in it a psycho-somatic whole, permanently engaged in the process of creation and experience as well. Moreover, thanks to unique, limit-experience of pain (rather than pleasure) such body replaces a traditional epistemological subject of cognition and awareness (self-cognition).

I would like to call this kind of artists experiments with the human (experiencing oneself) “exhibiting”, because on the one hand, it extremely exposes the artist body to view of the others as well as to insight of himself. On the other hand, such experiments exhibit qualities – as Joseph Margolis said during the Congress – which are not purely biological, for example the ability of artification.

Experimenting with the Limits (with the Impossible)

A limit experience of body art leads me to another form of experiments in art, I mean experimenting with the limits (of reason or imagination) and impossible representations (impossible images).

Oscar Reutersvärd played with perspective techniques to create images of tridimensional objects that cannot be made (constructed) or exist in our physical world7.

In a lithograph Waterfall Maurits Cornelis Escher, using conflicting proportions and visual illusions, creates the visual paradox: we see a building with a waterfall and an aqueduct in which water appears to run downhill to the top of the waterfall. In Relativity he shows us a world in which the laws of gravity do not apply at all 8.

More elaborated visions of impossible space and constructions can be admired in the catalogue Beyond Architecture: Imaginative Buildings and Fictional Cities (2011), where various artists take architecture as a starting point for experimentation within design, photography, painting, etc. (less radical character has Future City: Experiment and Utopia in Architecture from 2007).

I would like to call this last type of experiments “excessive”. Not only extravagant or unreasonable, but most of all transgressing human possibilities of imagination, representation or conceptualization. Perception of such an artwork frequently implies the uninhibited feeling of excitation and ambivalent enthusiasm (like in Kantian experience of the sublime).
Eduardo Kac said at the beginning of the Congress: „I think of art as a laboratory of freedom.” Laboratory is obviously a place where one can run experiments. As an aesthetician I am interested in the answer to the question if an artist studio (a painter studio for example) is really such a place. Is thinking experimental? Is creating always experimental?

Let’s assume that experimenting belongs to the nature of art and artistic creation. If it does, shouldn’t we find some place for experiments in aesthetics? After all, aesthetics is about experiencing work of art, which uses experiments. Shouldn’t we start to analyze the aesthetic experience using experimental methods? Is it possible to verify or falsify some of traditional aesthetic hypotheses with experimental or empirical tests? I believe it is, if we make aesthetic science by describing following stages of aesthetic experience or when we try to understand how the process of perception (or creation) of art goes on.

In a little research project on shape (its perception and aesthetic appreciation) in abstract paintings we try to investigate the simplicity of shapes in the abstract art. With my colleague from the Academy of Fine Arts in Wroclaw (the abstract painter) we assumed that the experience of shape in such images is in some sense “pure” – I mean free from any realistic associations, from relations of representation, from naturalistic meaning or emotions. But still, perceiving the abstract painting, is the source of aesthetic pleasure. So we inquire about the basic (probably common) reasons of it. In formulating hypotheses and describing the results of experiments we decided to use a traditional Gestalt terminology and rules (of emergence, of reification, Prägnanz, multistability and invariance).

In modern aesthetics there are few important experimental approaches which should be mentioned in the first place – I think of McManus’ conception, biology of art (by Livingstone), psychoaesthetics (by Konečni), Noë’s conception or Baxandall’s theory, etc.

I am especially fascinated with experiments on aesthetic perception of depth in paintings, carried by prof. Johan Wagemans and his co-workers from Institute of Experimental Psychology in Leuven. The amazing result of their experiments with visual perception in 2-D artworks (using varied perspective techniques) is a successful visualisation of representations of depth, experienced by all participants of trials.

In philosophy or philosophical aesthetics the experience of depth used to have a privileged status of something radically subjective or even metaphysical.
Now it turned out a little bit more objective or possible to communicate (through visualization for example).

The second problem the psychologists from Leuven are dealing with, using experimental methods, is a task of applying a traditional aesthetic and quasi-aesthetic terminology to results of their research on modes of aesthetic appreciation.

Perhaps it is the best time to reconsider co-operation between philosophers, art historians, psychologists and neurobiologists. As Rolf Reber has lately noticed: “art theorists… define the criterion of what the [aesthetic] experience is expected to be; scientists… provide a test of whether this criterion is fulfilled”.

For some time I have also had the impression that most of psychophysical tests on vision (the problem of contrast, afterimage, illusory movement, impression of dynamics or tridimensionality, etc.) base on artistic achievements; that artists intuitively (individually, not systematically) grasped the rules of perception and use them in creating images.

So maybe experimental aesthetics should borrow and systematize some of the artistic answers to the essential questions: experiment with what? how to experiment? who is a better experimenter?

**Conclusion**

I do not agree with Ludwig Wittgenstein (“aesthetic questions have nothing to do with psychological experiments, but are answered in an entirely different way”) and I am convinced, that new experimental aesthetics begins to fulfill the basic requirements of scientific research. It deals with its own object, which is certainly not Beauty or so called aesthetic truth, but sensitive experience (cognition) and aesthetic perception. It elaborates its own methods, scientific language and terminology, that allows to present and share the hypotheses and observations.

It is rather obvious that, if aesthetics wants to follow contemporary arts, it has to act in a less established (i.e. institutional, theoretical, philosophical, ‘from above’, etc.), and more experimental way (empirically, in practice, ‘from below’). Briefly, aesthetics should focus on experience and research, asking questions to Nature (Kant) and trying to find the rules of what does not yet exist (Lyotard). We could try to treat art as litmus paper of experience.

As Alva Noë says, it is time to turn toward an art of experience”: “we can think of the work of certain artists (but not all) as providing methods for the study of experience. […] sculpture is an object for us to experience which functions to draw our attention to what we do when we experience it and to how things are with us perceptually. In doing so, I have suggested, the work enables us to appreciate that experience is a mode of direct contact with and exploration
of the world. [...] A phenomenological study of experience is not an exercise in introspection, it is an act of attentiveness to what one does in exploring the world. To reflect on the character of experience, one must direct one's attention to the temporally extended, fully embodied, environmentally situated activity of exploration of the environment. Experiential art enables us to do this.”

Notes:

2. Grant Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 1877.
1. Georg Lukacs’s polemic with the intelligentsia is well-known. In his work *The Destruction of the reason* (1954), at the end of the chapter about Schopenhauer, we can read:

And nothingness as the pessimist outlook, as life’s horizon is quite unable… to prevent or even merely to discourage the individual from leading an enjoyable contemplative life. On the contrary: the abyss of nothingness, the gloomy background of the futility of existence only lends this enjoyment an extra piquancy … So Schopenhauer’s system … rises up like a modern luxury hotel on the brink of the abyss, nothingness and futility. And the daily sight of the abyss, between the leisurely enjoyment of meals or work of art, can only enhance one’s pleasure in this elegant comfort.¹

In 1962, in the conclusion of his *Preface* to the edition of *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukacs added:

A considerable part of the leading German intelligentsia, including Adorno, have taken up residence in the ‘Grand Hotel Abyss’, which I described in connection with my critique of Schopenhauer as ‘a beautiful hotel, equipped with every comfort, on the edge of an abyss, of nothingness, of absurdity. And the daily contemplation of the abyss between excellent meals or artistic entertainments, can only heighten the enjoyment of the subtle comforts offered.’ (*Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, Neuwied 1962, p.219).²

A reference also follows to Erich Bloch and to the outdatedness of his theoretical position, that is to his synthesis of «lefts» ethics and «rights» epistemology, attending to Lukacs.
2. It does not matter for us to know if these Lukacs's works belong to the period of free reflection upon Marxism or to the period of relative acquiescence to the regime, distinction, however, today decidedly attenuated, if not absolutely outdated. Lukacs's polemic then, understood as denunciation towards ideological function of the intellectuals and not as to look upon them such as cause of the irrational decline of western world, gives us the occasion to wonder about the meaning of a reality, whose so much we speak about but we do not succeed in lighting it utterly, that is contemporary art. I really believe that today art, rightly a cultural reality so important, is itself as a Grand Hotel on the brink of abyss of the existence.

Nevertheless, first of all, it seems necessary to explain what art we are talking about. On this point we get very little help from the remarks of the current critics of the figurative arts (included in this category, as we know, also happening, performance, installation, and so on) and of the literary or musical critics. We must indeed remember that the word «art» has had different meanings during history. We are referring, of course, to the western world, whose events regarding this point, we believe, are, however, emblematic also for the non-western cultures.

We shall briefly say that in the classical world art meant technique, that is production following rules as W. Tatarkiewicz rightly synthesizes, and that is why it was initially opposed to poetry as directly prompted by Muses, therefore not subject to rules. From ancient world through the Middle Ages, from Roman collegia to Byzantine scholae and then ministeria and officia up to the formation of the Guilds of arts and crafts, in order to restrict ourselves only to some aspects of this problematic history, the art-technique or the art as technique goes with all events of western society. We must, however, remember that the endless search of a more precise distinction between liberal arts and popular arts and of the constitution of their groups goes hand in hand with these events: liberal arts, let us consider besides the distinction between trivium and quadrivium arts on the one hand, and mechanical arts on the other. Until modern world, when the distinction is put forward between beautiful art, and so the fine arts on the one hand, and mechanical arts on the other, even if the concordance is still missing to indicate the arts of the first group. With Batteux (1746, 1747) we have the clearer and more structured formulation of this new perspective. Batteux characterizes the beautiful as pleasure and imitation of the nature, but that does not simplify nor settle down the more than millenary problems of definition of beauty, and remains unresolved, on the other hand, the question of the affinity-identity of art and beauty. History of art, then, becomes complicated with the classical German philosophy when art is understood as direct experience and knowledge of reality in itself, of the absolute. According to
Schelling art is infinity in the finite and finite in the infinity, identity of nature and spirit, unconscious and conscience, real and ideal, necessity and freedom, genius and technique. According to Schopenhauer art, by rending the Maia's veil of everyday life, shows us the absurd contradiction of the world, the blind will as principle of all the real. According to Hegel art unifies metaphysical universality and real particularity, its aim is the sensitive representation of the absolute. We cannot talk at length.

What art are we talking about therefore today: art as technique, beautiful art or art in itself as experience or relation with the absolute, however that may be conceived? Frequently indeed and from several sides, from the last century, people maintain that to define art is impossible. But we must note that every time people talk about art, and to talk about, implies its definition. In the past decades people stressed, among other meanings, art as novelty, then as technique and then as shock. And G. Dickie's polemic was a propos for the institutional origin of art. The starting point were, with Arthur Danto about the detergent Brillo boxes of A. Warhol, the problems of the possibility of distinguishing an object of the sensitive experience from the same object understood as artwork. Problems whose formulation can be certainly understood in a cultural area where the metaphysical perspective of an empirical positivistic realism rules.

According to Dickie, an appointed world, the artworld, confers the status of work of art through its institution, or rather, as Dickie specifies with his more advanced formulation, the artworld is a structure for presentation of a work of art:

What all of the artworld systems have in common is that each is a framework or a system for the creation of an artifact for presentation to a public.3

That is:

An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of the work of art by an artist to an artworld public... A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared, in some degree, to understand an object which is presented to them... An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of the work of art... A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public... The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems... the roles of artist and public and the structure of artworld systems are herein conceived of as things which persist through time and have a history. In short, the definitions characterize an ongoing cultural enterprise... the expression 'all artworld systems' is short for a list which includes literary system, theater system, painting system, and so on.4
Gabriele Bersa

Briefly:

Artist, work of art, artworld, and artworld system are what I shall call ‘inflected concepts’. I mean the expression ‘inflected concepts’ to designate a concept which is a member of a set of concepts which bend in on themselves, presupposing and supporting one another. No member of such a set can be understood apart from all the other concepts in the set.5

I apologize for the insistence of the quotations but what I should like to point out is that art, artist, artworld are concepts or realities interconnected. Circularity or tautology is therefore a feature of the institutionalization of art, as Dickie claims himself:

In the case of the institutional theory, the definition of ‘art’ is not at all foundational. First, it is one among several interconnected definitions, no one of which is foundational. The definitions are… inflected – they mutually support one another.6

Besides, it is interesting that

The institutional theory… places virtually no restrictions on what art may do, it seeks only to catch its essential nature. The institutional nature of art does not prevent art from serving moral, political, romantic, expressive, aesthetic, or a host of other needs.7

I will not say that the definition of the institutional theory is a foundational definition, even if, only formally foundational, and not with regard to the contents, but I will say that artworld which Dickie speaks about has therefore a relative reality, it would be better to say historical, and not absolute. From this point of view, of course, we must think that all definitions are institutional as they spring from a reflection in fieri, within a historical social context. That is very different from saying that a well-established institution has a priori the monopoly of the definition of art. But it is important to underline that, according to Dickie, the institution is in progress and grows up each time as historic-social cultural creation, does not coincide with the solid organization that has the power to decide what is art and dogmatically dictates its decisions: artworld has nothing to do with the exertion of a monopoly.

Nevertheless, according to this perspective, it is a short step from art as value to art as merchandise, object of the market. That really happens with the constitution of the art system which decides what is a work of art and its value, so influencing the market value too.

3. The mock-heroic hotchpotch, even if with some lack of style, that constitutes a habit of life of American society, described or rather narrated or still better
lived by Andy Warhol, as it is revealed in *The Philosophy of Andy Warhol*, can’t and mustn’t be literally understood as ascertainment and description of a fact. We miss so the irony, or rather the self-parody of Warhol himself, that strikes an absurd, inane and disorderly world, to which, however, Warhol cannot escape and absurdly takes part in. This way we must read, ironically, even then Warhol says that *Business Art* is a much better thing than *Art Art*:

Business Art is a much better thing to be making than Art Art, because Art Art doesn’t support the space it takes up, whereas Business Art does.”8 “Business art is the step that comes after Art. I started as a commercial artist, and I want to finish as a business artist. After I did the thing called ‘art’ or whatever it’s called, I went into business art. I wanted to be an Art Businessman or a Business Artist. Being good in business is the most fascinating kind of art… making money is art and working is art and good business is the best art. In the beginning, not everything in Andy Warhol Enterprises was organized too well. We went from art right into business when we made an agreement to provide a certain theater with one movie a week…It was enough that the art had gone into the stream of commerce, out into the real world. It was very heady to be able to look and see our movie out there in the real world on a marquee instead of in the art world. Business art. Art business. The Business Art Business.”9

The debunking goes to extremes. In a telephone conversation a B speaks to him about Art in the Toilet too. B says to have squirted out the colours of the tubes down the bathtub and started to film with a Super-eight movie camera: “and yet I had a whole painting. I Polaroided it and I still have the Polaroid. Then I decided I could do Roy Lichtenstein in the toilet so easily.”10 B tells him to have thrown the little round balls she had from the sixties Psychedelic Art period in the toilet and have taken a Polaroid: “it looked just like a Lichtenstein, and then I flushed the dots and the painting was gone.”11 Then B says to have thrown some little American flags into the toilet and to have photographed them “and so I thought I’d do some Jasper Johns on the toilet”12 B also says: “I did a Warhol in the john too, using the Dr. Scholl’s liners from the insides of my shoes…So I put them in the toilet and took the Polaroid and they looked like the dance-step painting.”13

Who are, effectively, the artists?

Why do people think artists are special? It’s just another job… Some people have deep-rooted long-standing art fantasies and they really stick with them.”14 “An artist is somebody who produces things that people don’t need to have but that he – for some reason – thinks it would be a good idea to give them.”15
Equally: empty space is never-wasted space, but wasted space is any space that has art in it.

*I really believe in empty spaces*, although, as an artist, I make a lot of junk… So on the one hand, I really believe in empty spaces, but on the other hand, because I’m still making some art, I’m still making junk for people to put in their spaces that I believe should be empty: i.e. I’m helping people waste their space when what I really want to do is help them empty their space.16

But it is clear that Warhol, not linearly and therefore unconsciously, fights against an art cut off from life, mummified and isolated in its abstract, closed and stifling world. We can think that this happens, other than as result of socio-economic-political factors, also because of the fact we have an idea of art as work of art hypostasized and absolute in itself and which does not consider it as reality in progress, search in progress in the experienced world of existence, search of a meaning and its realization. We cannot go on.

However, it is undoubted that Warhol is very aware of the distinction between art and commercial art, Art Art and Business Art. The distinction vanishes with the Art System, globally diffused today, and art is actually identified with commercial art; so it is very functional the denial of possibility to define art absolutely, because so art can be every time defined by the existing system with a view to market, that is to business.

Reality of the Art System, initially recognized and defined by the critic Achille Bonito Oliva in 1975, has been as well the perspective in conformity with all his activity as a critic and as a curator of art exhibitions. He gives in 2002 the more synthetic and essential definition of the Art System as a united chain of each other interactive functions:

Artist creates, critic analyses, gallerist exhibits, collector hoards, museum historicizes, mass-medium celebrates and public admires. So production, circulation and consumption find in the Art System their natural context that causes an added value, a surplus value of the work, the passage to an economically and culturally established statute.17

In 2000 A. Bonito Oliva had written that art system “… is a chain of complementary roles, comprising artist, critic, gallerist, collector, museum, mass media and public. This system became truly international in the Sixties”18 In 2012 Bonito Oliva specifies that the definition of art system has changed as regards the market, because the market takes shape today through the private enterprise, the gallery, the collective appointments at the fairs, at public sales, at auctions. “Art System takes shape as a chain letter with an interaction between different subjects,
every bearer of specificity that finally produces an added value, a surplus value. Exactly as an assembly line... an art system has taken shape that allows us to look at a fair on the Internet and to buy from a continent to another. “19 Bonito Oliva speaks also of a kind of “seven sisters” apropos of the great institutions of museums, of polycentrism today and of nomadic art now, assisted also by the Internet. Let us the critic to his activity. Art is here merchandise for market. Nevertheless, we know no authority exists that dogmatically has the monopoly of truth, either as ethics, or good, useful, freedom, happiness, democracy, being or becoming, and then art also. Don’t tell me this statement presumes to be an absolute truth, because I already know that.

Notes:

As is well known, a historical comprehension of the time in which people live and philosophers work is essential in order to outline a theory that could grasp something of the world. The specialized areas of philosophy – that is, philosophy of the mind, of language, music, science, of history, law or religion – are generally distinguished by a clear disciplinary identity. In all of the aforementioned cases, philosophy has a precise and detailed objective: history, science, music, law, language or even ourselves as beings endowed with a mind and with thought. Philosophy of art is no exception. The task of the philosophy of art is answering questions such as: ‘what is art?’, ‘what is an artwork?’, ‘what is beauty?’, ‘what is the difference between a common object and an artwork?’ and so on, would be reserved for philosophy of art.

The history of the relationship between art and philosophy is almost as old as philosophy itself. Plato, who was one of the first thinkers to take up the topic, posed the question in the most classical way – that is, by tackling the problem of definition. For better or for worse, the Platonic theory was successful in accomplishing its task for several centuries, until artists showed philosophers that the time had come to reconsider it. Customs officers prove to be a useful example in explaining the daily occurrences of the special philosophy committed to problems related to art and artworks.

Three examples and three dates will suffice to demonstrate this point: Constantin Brâncuși 1926, Andy Warhol 1965, Dan Flavin and Bill Viola 2010. What they have in common is their problematic relationship with customs.

*Bird in Space* arrived at U.S. customs along with its author as well as Duchamp. The project consisted in displaying the artwork in a gallery in New York. During a routine check the customs officers, in charge of classifying the object in order to apply to it the appropriate taxation, classified it among
kitchen utensils despite Brâncuşi’s protests. The artist then took the case to federal court. Thus began one of the most notorious trials in the history of art: ‘Brâncuşi versus the United States’. After a heated debate, the court decreed that *Bird in Space* is an artwork despite the fact that it does not remotely resemble a bird.

Let us consider the second example. The protagonists were Andy Warhol, once again the customs officers (this time Canadian) and the Brillo Boxes that were to be exhibited in a local art gallery. The customs workers classified them as objects from a grocery store. And how can we blame them, considering that at that time Brillo Boxes, which contained sponges for washing pots and pans, were found in supermarkets across all of North America? As we might imagine, Warhol also protested and so the Canadian government asked for the opinion of an expert: instead of taking Warhol’s side, Mr. Comfort, director of the National Gallery of Canada, supported the decision made by Customs. The Brillo Boxes are commercial objects and are to be taxed as such.

Let us now turn to recent events. It was December of 2010 and the protagonists were Dan Flavin and Bill Viola. This is the story. In 2006 a London gallery imported from the United States two contemporary works of art: *Six Alternating Cool White/Warm White Fluorescent Lights*, a 1973 sculpture of lights by Dan Flavin, and *Hall of Whispers*, a 1995 video by Bill Viola.

At the custom check-point, the representatives of the gallery declared that those objects were works of art and asked the customs officers to apply the correspondent taxation: that is, a VAT of 5 per cent as is requested in chapter 97 of the British ‘Common Customs Tariff’. As in all previous cases, the British customs authorities, noting that those objects do not fall in any of the categories included in the ‘Common Customs Tariff’, declared that the artefacts by Flavin and Viola were mere objects.

A few months later, officers of the ‘VAT and Duties Tribunal’ reconsidered the case. They changed the judgment of the court and the objects were declared works of art; as a result, the court applied to them the requested facilitations. In this case, and also in the Brancusi’s one, the logical process made by the judge did not consider the aesthetic aspect of the objects, privileging instead a reconstruction of the meaning incorporated by the objects and the evaluation of some of the protagonists of the art-world.

But this is not yet the end of the story. In 2010, a few member states asked the European Community for a pronouncement about similar cases examined by customs officers. So, in August, the European Community promulgated a Regulation (number 731/2010) declaring that the artefacts by Viola and Flavin were ordinary objects: that is, they were artefacts.
One thing emerges from these diatribes with customs officers: general consensus has truly been facing difficulties for more than a century if the question on the identity of works of art is still to be answered. If an artwork can be mistaken for a kitchen utensil, or for a box from a grocery store, or even for a light fixture, this means that the conceptualization of the particular domain of reality constituted by works of art poses a real problem. Based on such conditions, one of the main concerns of contemporary philosophy of art is to try and answer the question: ‘what is an artwork?’

Let us try now to start from question ‘what is an artwork?’ while keeping in mind the previous considerations. The hypothesis that I would like to uphold is that we can treat works of art as objects of a higher order: unique vehicles that transport meanings — therefore, as semantic vehicles. More specifically, they are objects which embody representations of the world made by those who create them and, subsequently, by those who enjoy and benefit from them. Arthur Danto, who maintains that artworks belong to the same ontological region of language, introduced the idea of semantic vehicles, borrowing it from epistemology and positively applying it to the ontological discourse on works of art. This is why, for Danto, living means elaborating a representation of ourselves, of the situations that concern us, of the facts of history, of the things of the world and of the meaning of these things; it follows that a philosopher must take it upon herself to clarify the ways of representation, with a work that will make it possible to construct a philosophy that deals with what makes us human.

Ludwig Wittgenstein notoriously asked himself what it was that differentiated two seemingly indistinguishable gestures such as an unconscious movement of the arm and the gesture used to greet someone. Along the same line of reasoning, Peter Strawson asked himself what it is that distinguishes a body from a person. In both cases, it is fundamental to certify that there exist two ‘things’ that exhibit identical properties and that, despite this and in defiance of Leibniz’s Law, are separate things. Therefore, Danto operates within a metaphysical perspective similar to Frederick Strawson’s: an artwork is a material object that embodies a certain something above and beyond its original structure and this ‘certain something’ makes the object distinct — a new mereological being, in other words. The world is full of this type of objects: rivers that become boundaries between states, pieces of paper that become bills, cardinals who become popes. However, not all rivers are also boundaries, just as not all rivers are artworks (provided that there exists a river that is a work of art; there certainly exist mountains that are).

After all, not all neon lights are Icons. Now, seeing that there exist many semantic vehicles of various types, how are we to identify those, and only those, which are works of art? In order to make a prime and important distinction
of epistemological nature it is necessary to distinguish semantic vehicles that are related to truth — for example, linguistic utterances that can be true or false depending on whether or not they capture the state of things in the outer world — from those that, conversely, do not entertain a relationship with the truth. Works of art belong precisely to this second type. The representations we find in works of art have an intentional character; that is, they are not required to respect the \textit{trait d’union} with the external world. This does not mean that at times we cannot get confused, like when we visit St. Petersburg and use \textit{Crime and Punishment} as a tour guide. Reflecting upon the habits of a typical reader, Roman Ingarden emphasizes how even in the case in which an author decides to adopt a certain correspondence between a work of fiction and the world, the author is not bound by the promise to respect it through and through.

To be clear, no one can complain about finding elements of fiction in Roberto Saviano’s \textit{Gomorra}, while we can protest until we invalidate the outcomes of a trial if we find that the acts of the public prosecutor contain grave and intentional distortions of reality. Similarly, no one expects Masaccio’s ‘Trinities’ to have a certain correspondence with ‘something’, i.e. an individual who is both one and triune, that is found somewhere in space-time. We might also conjecture that Naples and the Trinities caused the works of Saviano and Masaccio; yet, if there is causation, then it must be of a different kind than traditional causation.

At this point, we shall use the necessary theoretical tools in order to understand Danto’s definition of works of art as semantic vehicles. These are objects which we use to embody our representations, which do not necessarily have a dependent connection to reality (that is, works of art are semantic vehicles that embody intentional representations). Therefore:

\[ x \text{ is a work of art only if it embodies a meaning; that is, if it carries an intentional representation of the world.} \]

But are all semantic vehicles that embody these types of representations works of art? Evidently not. For example, symbols are not works of art and neither are certain artefacts. What might we say about a cross, for example? This is an age-old semantic vehicle that boasts a history that predates its use throughout Christianity. In considering the present-day meanings we are able to decipher without referring to the aid of certain reading guides, (at least) the following come to mind: the death of Jesus, the presence of a church, of a hospital, of a cemetery or a grave, of a pharmacy, of an intersection or of a dead end street. Let us examine these two slides: why is the first cross not a work of art, while the second and third are one?

The first cross represents a dead end on a street sign. In this case the representation is extensional, and if it weren’t so, we would be in trouble; while the
second and the third crosses depict two works by the imaginative and polyvalent French artist Clet Abraham. In his cross, the artist evidently embodies new meanings. In Abraham’s work, the road sign in the shape of a cross becomes a real cross. From it arises the second image, which displays a stylized body hanging from a pole without an outlet just like the dead-end street depicted on the street sign, and the third work, which cites the most classic and widely known deposition. An ordinary object, a sign that regulates the flow of traffic on a street, ‘can’, therefore, become a work of art.

But if this is so, then what is the difference between normal signs that also have a representative content? Abraham’s representations are contained in a medium, a body, which is not transparent: hanging on walls and found along the streets of Florence, the signs are looked at because of what they are and not only because of the classic meaning they embody (the warning of a dead-end street).

Here, then, is the second condition:

\[ x \text{ is a work of art only if the medium of } x \text{ is not transparent.} \]

Abraham’s representations live within a medium — in a body, that is — which is not transparent. In the majority of cases the medium of the artwork has much to say to our sensory system, which perceives the formal and aesthetic qualities that often contribute to the creation of the depicted meaning. For instance, there are two differences between the court procedures which Roberto Saviano’s *Gomorra* is based on and the work itself, which is created from those acts: first of all, the representational content, and second, the fact that the medium used by *Gomorra* (that is, language) is an actual part of the work.

Abraham’s work is particularly interesting as it presents a stratified plurality of meanings: there are the meanings that are traditionally expressed by the road sign and those which are signified by the artist, both of which are deeply related to each other. A cross is a road with no outlet: a man who is hung or taken down from a cross and placed into the desperate arms of his mother represents the expression of something that is, in the most definite way, with no outlet.

In order to circumvent the transparency of a medium, painters, poets, writers, musicians and composers have learned to put to use complex rhetorical and stylistic strategies meant to trace a sort of marker around the work, that allow it to be recognized for what it is, subtracting it from the flux of the ordinary. Words, sounds and drawings belong to our lives without being works of art, and yet, the appropriate use of those mediums can allow a work to become the most diverse and trivial of things.

Let us now turn to the third inescapable condition. In order to explain it, let us consider an imaginary scenario: let us suppose that we have a time machine at our disposal and that we are travelling back in time, having with us Andy
Warhol's *Brillo Box*. After travelling a good distance we get off at the stop where we know we will meet Plato. We are determined to explain to him what *Brillo Box* is and for what reason we believe it to be a work of art. What will we need in order to be successful in this endeavour? First of all, we will need to take our time in order to describe to him a bit of art history, explaining to him that one day someone decided to create an object that was very similar to the grocery store box designed by Harvey in order to exhibit it in museums. Plato will ask us about the meaning of that act and we will have to be able to explain it to him. We will succeed in doing so if we know a bit of art history, along with some knowledge of American reality in the nineteen sixties. Without these competencies the box would remain, even for us, a simple grocery store object – considering, obviously, that we know what grocery stores are. And so we reach the third condition:

\[ x \text{ is a work of art if the meanings it embodies are applied to a broader historical narrative.} \]

As this short story shows, artworks are social objects; they are, in other words, objects that depend on human beings, on their intentionality and on their way of reading the world, reconstructing history and envisioning traits and characters. Clearly, even from this perspective, neither eyes nor ears alone are sufficient for allowing for a good understanding of a work of art: the history of the relationships from which artworks emerge is an inescapable element as, oftentimes, those very relationships determine, at least partially, the meanings expressed by works of art. Similarly, it is equally necessary to read works of art while keeping in mind the history of the effects determined by their reception. The social world, along with its objects, is a world that exhibits properties that are connected to history.

Let us turn to a recent case that has emerged from a fusion of architecture, video-art, music and dance: *You Tube Play. A Biennial of Creative Video* (2010). This is a project that showcases a typically Pop spirit: revisiting – by violating – one of the new barriers of the contemporary world, which separates the system of art and the open and fluid world from user-generated content. In *You Tube Play*, video-art enthusiasts were given the possibility to shoot a video and to present it to an international jury. The 20 videos that were selected were presented simultaneously at the Guggenheim museums in Berlin, Bilbao and Venice, and were the protagonists of a large closing function for a four-day-long event at the Guggenheim in New York. This brings us to our main point. In order to understand something that certainly is a work of art – the Guggenheim Museum designed by Lloyd Wright – as well as the transformations that it went through during the days of You Tube Play, we cannot prescind either from the knowledge of New York and of its metropolitan reality, nor from American art
of the second half of the twentieth century. Nor can we ignore what it means to live in a globalized world; we must be aware of the expressive possibilities of digital media, and it is also a good idea to know what it means to speak of a total work of art – an idea presented by Richard Wagner that was exemplified at the Guggenheim during You Tube Play.

Now, let us suppose that a native of a remote African region finds himself in New York, on Fifth Avenue and Eighty-Ninth Street, when he catches sight of the Guggenheim illuminated by millions of videos. What would he think? Most likely that they are the same ads that cover Midtown Manhattan, or that New Yorkers find a strange enjoyment in transforming the city’s buildings into curious Christmas trees. The majority of properties that make that work a social object have to do with our capacity to historically and culturally situate the building, as well as its history, and ours. Some of those properties can then change throughout the course of time, because what surrounds the work changes as well.

So, at this point, we may rephrase our starting question. ‘What, then, is a work of art?’

It is a social object, an artefact, that embodies a representation, in the form of an inscribed trace upon a medium that is not transparent.

Oftentimes, though not always, artists are able to create works whose representational content means something for our mind and, at the same time, for our emotions. This is the reason why, as Nietzsche had already observed, artworks can mark our lives more than a well-formulated argument can. Evidence of this can be found in Christian Marclay’s The Clock, a film with an impressive duration of 24 hours. Cinematography displays more than a few examples of long (and extremely long) films. Nonetheless, The Clock is a true gem of cinematographic assemblage in which the separation between reality and the worlds of fiction marks the almost absolute consummation of the boundaries of temporality. Time, which is measured and indicated with obsessive constancy throughout the entire film, coincides with that of our lives in an astonishing way. The spectator realizes this immediately – at first with surprise and then by experiencing mounting unease combined with authentic enjoyment. Time passes and is measured; it is spoken of and is considered throughout the whole of the film, for 24 extraordinary hours. It is measured not only by clocks that capture its rhythm, but also by memory that travels through Marclay’s excerpts, contextualizes them, experiences the irony of scenes that belong to a past in black and white, only to open itself to a world of colours. Across time, the answers to some of the most challenging questions are dealt with, some of which, after having been brought up in one scene, are answered in a different one, almost in a new temporal dimension.
The medium is never transparent; in fact, we do not watch the kaleidoscopic collage as a collection of images but, rather, as a revisiting of the history of cinematography and, at the same time, of our memory. In art, the medium must be watched, observed, heard, studied, dissected and contextualized. The medium is always the begin-all for constructing or reconstructing meanings endowed by the artist.

Irene Caesar is not an ordinary photographer. She considers herself to be provoking, an artist who loves to provoke in order to test the validity of our ideas; that is, the conceptual structures that allow us to interact with the world. As a result, she requires something very simple of her subjects: to incarnate a particular idea before the lens, to experience it and to represent it. Madonna Liberated encompasses all of these dimensions. First and foremost, she cites the grand art of the Cinquecento: the Madonnas of Titian, Tintoretto and Raphael, along with the countless iconographic representations of that maternity scene. Caesar places a woman before her lens, a mother with her child who is loved but also displayed as a symbol. Only, in Caesar’s depiction, that symbol is female.

Christian theology tells us that God is male, tradition tells us that God is male, Western art has repeated to us for centuries that God is male. And, yet, whatever God may be, God does not fall under a particular gender distinction; to think of God ‘also’ as a woman can only help to liberate ourselves from the crystallization of our personal and cultural schemes. It is on these grounds that Caesar cites tradition and, by doing so, indicates its weaknesses and shatters them, demonstrating how one of art’s tasks is to call consolidated visions into question.

As Friedrich Nietzsche put it: ‘artists, an intermediary species: they at least fix an image of that which ought to be; they are productive, to the extent that they actually alter and transform; unlike men of knowledge, who leave everything as it is’.

Notes:

In the textual turn of art in the 1970s, the field of the aesthetic practice expanded, and the disciplinary limits of painting and sculpture broke down, while the fetishistic accumulation of the art market was replaced with immateriality of Conceptual Art. Yet, new fetishism soon re-emerged for the revival of art market in the early 1980s.

Jean Baudrillard highlighted how the art was re-organized by the functioning of the system in accordance with the urgent cultural issues, economic environment, critical styles, mostly prefixed with “neo.” All coexisted with a marvellous ease amid general indifference.

Also, with his simulation theory, Baudrillard put forward the concept of hyper-reality to describe how art was dragged into the unreality, which was grasped by a group of New York artists as a strategic issue. Although Baudrillard rejected the approach of this new generation with an assertion that “a group of snobbish New Yorker diluted his theory”, he had to face this paradoxical situation.

This situation also indicated the crisis in art criticism and brought to mind the theory of “cynical reason” coined by German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk. According to Sloterdijk, the cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he still insists upon the mask. The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, then was: “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it”. Cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it.

Particularly, the appropriation artists of the ’80s and ’90s enable us to see the cynical attitude Sloterdijk pointed out. One might reveal the cynical attitude in the works of some artists like Warhol, Koons, Steinbach, Halley, Levine, Sher-
mann, Kruger, and Prince, who either focused on the fetishistic accumulation of consumer markets or deconstructed the outdated styles of the past by placing them in the center of their own methods.

These approaches not only destroy the specific notions of modernism such as background in the formation of artworks, originality, creativity, authorship, but also deal with the deconstruction attempts by consumption markets, commodity fetishism, and the new identity of the commodity-sign related artworks through the representational issues in today’s art.

This study will focus on the crisis in art criticism through the critique of cynical reason by Sloterdijk, while questioning how post-structuralist arguments addressed the representational problems of art objects, which has been subjected to a radical transformation in contemporary art.

**Does Cynicism Refer to Egotistical Interests of Appropriation Artists?**

Peter Sloterdijk is one of the most provocative and prodigious philosophers today. Known to the stubbornly monophone AngloAmerican academy only by his 1980 *Critique of Cynical Reason*, he has been steadily building an oeuvre and reputation of great reach over the last three decades.

According to Sloterdijk, cynicism has been unfairly maligned as simply representing the world of a weary, opportunistic attitude that is described in common speech. He explains that among the Cynics of Ancient Greece it actually originated as a philosophy of resistance to restrictive social norms, instead of promoting the value of self-control and individual liberation. Although Antisthenes, a student of Socrates, is considered to be its earliest practitioner, it is in the figure of Diogenes of Sinopa (ca. 400–325 BC) that Sloterdijk locates his model cynic (or kynic, the spelling he uses to distinguish ancient cynicism from modern variation). Diogenes had studied under Antisthenes and took ideas regarding morality to their most extreme form. Bertrand Russell has summed up the key principle of this philosophy as follows: Diogenes sought virtue and moral freedom in liberation from desire.

Legend has it that this approach led Diogenes to live in a barrel and beg for his food, as well as to behave outrageously in public in order to flout social customs. In other words, the kynic has affinities with the traditional image of the avant-garde artist as a renegade and breaker of taboos.² For Sloterdijk, Diogenes represents the idea of an emancipated individual who should be imitated (though perhaps not in a literal sense) in what the former perceived as the prevalent climate of passivity and resignation after the political projects of the late 1960s and 1970s had faltered.
Žižek wonders whether Sloterdijk’s “obsessive-compulsive urge to find beneath solidarity, the envy of the weak and thirst for revenge… is sustained by a disavowed envy and resentment of its own, the envy of the universal emancipatory position.”

On the other hand, Žižek suggests that we must strictly distinguish between this cynicism and what Sloterdijk calls kynicism:

Kynicism represents the popular, plebeian rejection of the official culture by means of irony and sarcasm: the classical kynical procedure is to confront the pathetic phrases of the ruling official ideology — its solemn, grave tonality — with everyday banality and to hold them up to ridicule, thus exposing behind the sublime noblesse of the ideological phrases the egotistical interests, the violence, the brutal claims to power. This procedure, then, is more pragmatic than argumentative: it subverts the official proposition by confronting it with the situation of its enunciation; it proceeds ad hominem (for example when a politician preaches the duty of patriotic sacrifice, kynicism exposes the personal gain he is making from the sacrifice of others).

Cynicism, as enlightened false consciousness, has become a hard-boiled, shadowy cleverness that has split courage off from itself, holds anything positive to be fraud, and is intent only on somehow getting through life.

Sloterdijk framed the dilemma as the choice between escapism and collaboration:

“Escapists are justified because they do not want to be entangled with open eyes in the intolerable cynicisms of a society in which the distinction between producing and destroying is becoming blurred.” Collaboration is justified because individuals are also permitted to orient themselves toward survival in the short run.

Analyzing Sloterdijk’s ideas in his book Permission to Laugh, Gregory H. Williams associates them with the approach of the young German artists in the 1980s:

For the West German artists of the 1980s generation, the option as laid out by Sloterdijk was either to give in to cynicism and false consciousness or take the prevailing skepticism and employ it to constructive ends. Strategies of joking could lead in either direction, but also allow one to oscillate between them. An analysis of their public appearances, works of art, and critical reception will demonstrate that the artists often occupied both position at the same time.

On the other hand, Žižek argued that:

Cynicism is the answer of the ruling culture to this kynical subversion: it recognizes, it takes into account, the particular interest behind the ideological univer-
sality, the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reasons to retain the mask. This cynicism is not a direct position of immorality, it is more like morality itself put in the service of immorality — the model of cynical wisdom is to conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a supreme form of profligacy, the truth as the most effective form of a lie. This cynicism is therefore a kind of perverted 'negation of the negation' of the official ideology: confronted with illegal enrichment, with robbery, the cynical reaction consists in saying that legal enrichment is a lot more effective and, moreover, protected by the law. As Bertolt Brecht puts it in his Threepenny Opera: "what is the robbery of a bank compared to the founding of a new bank?"

It is thus clear that confronted with such cynical reason, the traditional critique of ideology no longer works. Žizek maintained that:

We can no longer subject the ideological text to 'symptomatic reading,' confronting it with its blank spots, with what it must repress to organize itself, to preserve its consistency — cynical reason takes this distance into account in advance. Do we then have to admit that with the reign of cynical reason we are in the so-called post-ideological world? Even Adorno came to this conclusion, as he began with the premise that ideology is, strictly speaking, only a system which makes a claim to the truth — that is, which is not simply a lie but a lie experienced as truth, a lie which pretends to be taken seriously. Totalitarian ideology no longer has this pretension. It is no longer meant, even by its authors, to be taken seriously — its status is just that of a means of manipulation, purely external and instrumental; its rule is secured not by its truth-value but by simple extra-ideological violence and promise of gain.8

It is here that the distinction between symptom and fantasy must be made in order for us to show how the idea that we live in a post-ideological society goes a little too far: cynical reason, with all its ironic detachment, leaves untouched the fundamental level of ideological fantasy, the level at which ideology structures the social reality itself.

At this point, one should briefly refer to Baudrillard’s arguments in order to comprehend the situation which Žižek described as follows: "cynical reason, with all its ironic detachment, leaves untouched the fundamental level of ideological fantasy, the level on which ideology structures the social reality itself."9

Pointing out the emergence of a new post-ideological social order, Baudrillard, just like Žižek, argued that it was not possible to analyze the contemporary art with the help of former methods, and that we must adopt a new approach to this process.

Baudrillard also maintained that while the Marxist ideas were built on a production-based social order, a new consumption-based social order has been built, and that all criteria had to be thought over from scratch. Focusing on such phenomenon as simulation and hyper-reality, Baudrillard talked about a universe
where one cannot trace the relationship between the real and the copy any longer, and proposed that the art, just like fake money, has lost its genuinity. In fact, the point Baudrillard continuously highlighted in his theoretical works, was that the crisis experienced during this process was indicative of a phenomenon related to “signs.” Besides, as the art achieved all its utopias, criticism was no longer possible. It was also not possible because one could not talk about movements and styles opposing each other as before. Everything had the privilege to coexist side by side with everything with no problem, as well as to scream at the same time. According to Baudrillard, since we lost the reality and lived in a world of copies, we did not have any reality to criticize on its behalf.

Though these ideas may seem pessimistic, they particularly help us to sense the cynicism characteristic of the contemporary art when analyzing the processes into which art has been sucked during the late capitalist phase.

For Baudrillard, Pop Art constitutes a turning point in the history of art, whereby art becomes quite simply the reproduction of signs of the world and, in particular, the signs of the consumer society, which itself is primarily a system of signs. To him, Pop thus represents the triumph of the sign over its referent, the end of representational art, the beginning of a new form of art, for which he coined the term “simulation.” From this perspective, art henceforth becomes mere simulation of the images and objects of the contemporary world. Baudrillard thus insists that it is wrong to criticize Pop Art for its naive Americanism, for its crass commercialism, for its flatness and banality, for precisely thereby it reproduces the very logic of contemporary culture.

The painting for Baudrillard only becomes an art object in today’s art world with the signature of the painter, with the sign of its origin which situates it as a “differential value” within the system of signs, the series of works, which is that of the oeuvre of the painter. Baudrillard argues that copies or even forgeries previously were not as denigrated as in the contemporary world in part because art was more the collective product of artist’s studios and because today art is supposed to be the “authentic” product of an individual creator as part of her or his oeuvre. 

Simulation Painting, Commodity Sculpture and Exchange Value of Art Objects:

By the middle 1980s there emerged in New York a geometric painting that, in keeping with the manic marketing of the time, was given two labels very quickly; neo-geo and simulationism. While such artists as Peter Halley, Jeff Koons, Taaffe, Steinbach, and Bleckner, who call themselves ‘simulationists’ and ‘neo-geos,’ base their works on Baudrillard’s concepts of simulation and hyper real,
Halley contends that one first needs to know Baudrillard’s philosophy in order to comprehend his works and artistic style.

At a conference in 1987 Baudrillard denied such a relationship and insisted that he did not see any link, relationship, or connection between his own ideas and concepts, and the art works, which had supposedly been produced, based on his ideas. (Kellner 1989) This, in itself, reflects a rather paradoxical situation; on the one hand, we have an artist who links the interpretation of his works to the ideas of a philosopher, while, on the other hand, we have a philosopher who says that such works have no relationship to his ideas.

Associated with artists like Peter Halley and Ashley Bickerton, this work assumed an ironic distance from its own tradition of abstract painting. In effect, it treated this tradition as a store of ready-made to appropriate, and strategy, if not in appearance, neo-geo was closer to appropriation art than to abstract painting.

However, representation is not preserved in simulation, which is the mode that neo-geo approximated (hence its alternative name “simulationism”). In future art histories of the sign, representation may be superseded not by abstraction alone, as in our basic accounts of prewar art, by simulation as well. For if abstraction tends only to sublate representation, simulation tends to subvert it, given that simulation can produce a representational effect without a referential connection to the world. The same is true of future social histories of the sign. Here, too, simulation may be seen to supersede representation, crucial as this mode is to the serial production of commodities and images in advanced-capitalist society.11

Hal Foster asks what exactly simulation is and answers with Deleuze’s statement on it. Gilles Deleuze has distinguished the simulacrum from the copy in two ways: the copy “is endowed with resemblance,” whereas the simulacrum need not be; and the copy produces the model as original, whereas the simulacrum “calls into question the very notion of the copy and the model.”12

Simulation is also not a force to be taken lightly outside of art. Along with old regimes of disciplinary surveillance and media spectacle, the simulation of events is an important form of social deterrence today, for how can one intervene in events when they are simulated or replaced by pseudo-events?13

In his The Crisis in Geometry, Peter Halley argues that since 1980 another generation of geometric work has appeared for which the relevant text is not so much Foucault as it is Baudrillard. This generation of artists is no longer connected to an industrial experience (compare Serra’s insistence on his background working in steel mills or Aycock’s use of construction-site lumber). Rather, this group of artists is the product of a post-industrial environment where the experience is not of factories but of subdivisions, not of production but of consumption.14
Along with simulation painting there emerged a kind of sculpture associated with artists like Jeff Koons and Haim Steinbach. This commodity sculpture developed out of appropriation art as well, and it too assumed an ironic distance from its own tradition, in this case the ready-made.

Hal Foster points out that most Koons and Steinbach readymades do the opposite; they present objects of exchange/exhibition in the place of art in a way that cancels use.

One can use vacuum cleaners and basketball shoes, of course, but the display is the thing here: the cases in Koons, the shelves in Steinbach, the arrangement of the objects (the effect recouped whatever critical value installation art might have possessed). Like Johns, then, Koons and Steinbach reverse Duchamp on use value. But they also trump Johns on the significance of consumption along the lines of appreciation and collection traced above. In general they intimate that all these values-aesthetic, use, and exchange/exhibition—are now subsumed by sign exchange value.15

They suggest, in other words, that we covet and consume not the vacuum cleaners so much as the Sheltons, not the basketball shoes so much as the Air Jordans, and that this passion for the sign, this fetishism of the signifier, governs our reception of art as well: we covet and consume not the work per se so much as the Koons, the Steinbach. These brands names may be more exalted, but in part because they are more expensive. This brings us to the other dimension of sign exchange value, the sumptuary, for, again, it is extravagant expenditure that guarantees the exalted status of these objects.

They do not follow the Duchampian concept of disfunctionalizing an object. Koons’ objects are positioned as objects possessing whatever original function they did before entering the artistic field as ready-mades. Not only do they not hide any of their characteristics, but they also strongly resist their current characteristics. *New Shop-Vac Wet/Dry of 1980* is remarkable for its triviality and utter nakedness. Its pedestal, the plexiglass, and neon tubes make the work extremely cold and unapproachable, but also decorative and bright. When it was first exhibited in the display window of the New Museum in New York, this manner of presentation had the expected effect. Many passers-by came into the museum to ask if they could purchase the vacuum cleaner under the assumption that they were in a shop for household appliances. The artificiality exuding from Jeff Koons’ works does not orient itself on reality, but measures itself, instead, against the intensifying degrees of abstraction in society and art.

Koons’ approach fits perfectly with Burger’s criticisms concerning the neo-avangardists. A vacuum cleaner sitting at the main entrance of the museum. An
art work presented as a purchasable commercial merchandise; it is upgraded to a different level with its attractive, sterile and exhibitionist qualities; it is an untouchable consumer good. One difference here definitely has to do with aesthetism. Duchamp’s ready-mades, though they possess the formational qualities of machine aesthetism, at once refuse to lead the audience to any aesthetic experience.

On the other hand, Koons’ ready-mades are close to kitsch and banality to the extent that they provoke the audience. Both the object and the audience are subject to a process of aesthetization. Koons does not question the museum concept, as it was the case with Duchamp. On the contrary, the museum, as a place where the art work is to be exhibited, here directly determines the context of an art work. Besides glorifying Warhol’s Brillo Boxes or Campbell Soup Cans, Koons also glorifies the vacuum cleaner and its label.

Koons’ work moves beyond appropriation involving reformulation rather than recontextualisation of cultural products. Following the Pop artists, who were their own interpreters and dealers, he claims his imagery to be democratic, not excluding anyone, not even a child. Communication at any price is his main concern. He wants to remove all options of rejection from the audience: if he cannot get you through the mind he’ll get you through the genitalia. Koons explains his works as missions to educate the bourgeois, a group that he assigned to become the new aristocracy of a coming monarchy. While his discussions about the self-exploitative role of a true artist alert us to take this statement with a grain of salt (or a spoon-full of sugar), this kind of participation in ideological issues is not the avant-garde role of art, but an attempt to confront those issues directly.

If Koons and Steinbach explored the social dimension of the commodity-sign in similar ways, they approached its structural dimension (again, the factitious, differential, encoded, systematized aspect of the object) from different angles. Koons was drawn to the factitious or fetishistic aspect of the commodity-sign, Steinbach to its differential or encoded aspect.

This deliberately ambiguous strategy was not without risk, considering the propensity of an integrated culture to turn art images into clichés, into goods to be consumed. That is why in 1985 Hal Foster, for example, in *Against Pluralism* suggested the need to distinguish between an art that ‘exploits the collapse of art into the mass media’ and another that ‘exposes’ it, a distinction that stresses, or even rehearses, the collapse of art into the media in order to construct a critical discourse. Such art steals representations from the very culture which had heretofore stolen from it. But the use of such images remains problematic, for the line between the exploitive and the critical is fine indeed. This holds true for the use of art-historical images, many of which are so often reproduced as
to be almost mass-cultural. This set of mass-cultural or ‘already out’ images (as Richard Prince would say) determines in some way the images that can be formed after them.

In a 1982 Artforum article Benjamin Buchloh described how the strategy of parodic appropriation was based on a double bind: everything occurred as if this form of appropriation recapitulated in advance its own takeover by the existing power structures, its apparently radical denial of subjectivity and of authorship being at the same time a voluntary submission to and a passive approval of the rules of the culture industry.¹⁸ The very principle of appropriation is contradictory since it aspires to subvert a code by reproducing and reiterating it. That being said, it is in no way surprising to note that appropriation has itself become one of the most frequently used strategies in the world of advertising. Because of this, appropriation as an artistic practice cannot have exactly the same meaning today as it had 30 years ago, not least because appropriation art today is informed, in a literal and figurative sense, by the earlier work.

Furthermore, if appropriation art in the 80s appropriated a mass-media iconography, today this process is mostly a re-appropriation which has meanwhile become little more than an advertising gimmick. Kelley Walker, for instance, has made a few posters based on the re-use of news images previously misappropriated by Benetton for an advertising campaign during the 90s. As Andreas Huyssen points out in his foreword to the Critique of Cynical Reason, (Sloterdijk’s) position remains crucially ambivalent in that he has as much trouble with the truth of Critical Theory as with the total dissolution of truth, reason, and subjectivity in certain radical forms of post-structuralism.

It is difficult, too, to ignore Peter Sloterdijk’s irksome, but in this case useful, positioning in the Critique of Cynical Reason. In the introduction Andreas Huyssen poses a series of questions emerging in Sloterdijk’s brooding work: “What forces do we have at hand against the power of instrumental reason and against the cynical reasoning of institutional power?... How can we reframe the problems of ideology critique and subjectivity, falling neither for the armored ego of Kant’s epistemological subject nor how can historical memory help us resist the spread of cynical amnesia that generates the simulacrum of postmodern culture?...” But Sloterdijk’s argument is far more pertinent:

Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness. It is that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has labored both successfully and unsuccessfully. It has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not able to, put them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already buffered.
“Cynicism,” he says in the chapter titled *In Search of Lost Cheekiness*, “prickles beneath the monotony.” While itself invoking an enlightenment ethic, Sloterdijk’s paean to moralities and tradition, nevertheless, stands as a form of diagnosis of the yet uncomfortable discourse of modern and postmodern positioning.

Theorized in so many ways, the issues that seem most pertinent in the continuing (and now perhaps dated) opposition mostly concern a radically altered subject - one not merely at the reception end of authority. But the inverted hierarchy of subject/authority is erroneous. And with the intervention of electronic media (with, among so many other things, its reconceptualization of both subjectivity and identity), the issue has often lapsed into virtualized sociologies of sadly presumed notions of the self transgressed by “life on the screen.” This, to use Huyssen’s term “schizosubjectivity,” lapses into re-essentialized categories by failing to understand the difference between identity and subjectivity, no less between the self and its anecdotal other. This astonishing disassociation leads into the possibility of a fugitive digital ethics whose contemptuous naiveté seems more reckless than subversive, more pessimistic than productive.19

**Hal Foster’s Critiques on the Art of Cynical Reason**

In his book titled *The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century* Hal Foster subjects the concept of cynical reason to a thorough analysis. While discussing the relationship between the cynical reason and the appropriation artists, Foster frequently refers to Sloterdijk’s ideas. In fact, the appropriation artists’ genres are best seen in terms of cynical reason, a paradoxical structure of thought explored by German philosopher Peter Sloderdijk in a long critique published in 1983, or during the rise of simulation painting and commodity sculpture. According to Sloterdijk, cynical reason is “enlightened false consciousness”.20 The cynic knows his belief to be false or ideological, but he holds to them, nonetheless, for the sake of self-protection, as a way to negotiate the contradictory demands placed upon him. This duplicity recalls the ambivalence of the fetishist in Freud: a subject who recognizes the reality of castration or trauma (or in Foster’s analogy here, of aesthetic conflict or political contradiction) but who disavows it. Yet the cynic does not disavow this reality so much as he ignores it, and this structure renders him almost impervious to ideology critique, for he is already demystified, already enlightened about his ideological relation to the world (this allows the cynic to feel superior to ideology critics as well). Thus ideological and enlightened at once, the cynic is “reflexively buffered”: his very splitting armors him, his very ambivalence renders him immune. In this regard Sloterdijk describes cynical reason less as a toying with fetishism than as
Cynical reason in appropriation art and the Crisis in Criticism

“coquetting” with schizophrenia, a formulation that captures the subject-position of much contemporary art.21

Hal Foster says he didn’t mean to suggest a zeitgeist of cynicism, but a specific cynical reason has developed within contemporary art, especially in the crisis of criticality that followed appropriation art. While referring to some statements of Kruger’s at this point, Foster seeks to substantiate Sloterdijk’s arguments.

Already in 1982 one of the foremost practitioners of this art foresaw some of its dangers. In “Taking Pictures”, a short text published in Screen, Barbara Kruger implied that appropriation art drew on both ideology critique and deconstruction (though she did not cite these methods by name).22 On the one hand, like ideology critique, appropriation art was concerned to question stereotypes, to contradict “the surety of our initial readings,” to expose the reality underneath the representation. On the other hand, like deconstruction, it was also concerned “to question ideas of competence, originality, authorship and property,” to contradict the surety of any reading, to expose reality as a representation. Here Kruger offered two caveats. The first touched on the ideology-critical aspect of appropriation art: its negativity, she warned, “can merely serve to congratulate its viewers on their contemptuous acuity.” The second touched on the deconstructive aspect of this art: its mimicry can turn into replication, its parody “subsumed by the power granted its ‘original.’” These two warnings might be rewritten as follows: ideology critique can lapse into contempt, and deconstruction can slip into complicity. Much of the work that followed appropriation art stepped into one of these two traps.23

According to Foster, a tension between ideology critique and deconstruction already existed within appropriation art. In the simplest forms of ideology critique the true dispels the false as science dispels ideology. Confident in knowledge, the ideology critic operates by exposure. This operation can be accusatory, even punitive, as it sees the world in terms of errors to be corrected. In this way it can also be dogmatic, even orthodox.

Hal Foster, “To a great extent the aesthetic of cynical reason emerged not only as a reaction against the presumptive truth claims of ideology critique but also as an exaggeration of the epistemological skepticism of deconstruction.”24

At a meeting organized by Peter Nagy in May 1986, such leading representatives of simulation painting and commodity sculpture as Levine, Halley, Bickerton, Taaffe, Koons ve Steinbach) convened and penciled a text with a title “From Criticism to Complicity.” First, with his post-historical approach resulting from the climax the epistemological skepticism reached, Halley stated:

Just like reality, politics is an obsolete idea. We are now in a post-political world.
Second, with his attempt to recover epistemological skepticism as an aesthetical
If the aesthetic of cynical reason was prepared by a double slippage of ideology critique into contempt and deconstruction into complicity, what prepared this slippage? To be sure, there is antimodernist contempt in postmodernist art, especially in the critique of originality advanced in appropriation art. Again, already in 1981 Thomas Lawson had argued that the critique of painting could only be continued within painting, as if deconstructively, with painting used as camouflage for its own subversion was to shake the value structures of the art world, but much the opposite occurred: subversion was contained there, at the point of painting, and reversed into complicity. Rather than a “last exit”, then such painting became the site of another “strategic inversion”. And such inversions contributed to the making of an art world in which, without much irony, an art dealer could be presented as a master of deconstruction, a stockbroker could assume the mantle of Duchamp, and an investment banker could cite institution critique as his formative influence.

It is obvious that there exists at least some tension (or compromise?) between feeling responsible and snobbish in the appropriation art. (In one of her past statements, Levine asserted that “I appropriate these objects in order to articulate the simultaneous longing I feel for the amazement of passion for association and indifference.”) However, this tension will exist as long as the political culture allows it to do so. While Reaganism spread throughout the 1980s, the status of snobbishness became more cynical and Warhol’s fame left that of all others in the shadow.

So what is the current status of the snobbish artist’s critical indifference? Have the prerequisites for discourse vanished or have they just been transformed? What would the aesthetics of cynical reason tell us in this regard? Any discourse is doubtful to the degree that it is at least taken as a whole. It is necessary for criticism to associate somewhat with the hegemonic culture, just as it is necessary for the avant guard to be associated a little with the patrons.

Nevertheless, the situation with simulation painting and commodity sculpture is different here. Their engagement to the hegemonic culture has almost turned into a merger, and their association with respectable customers is almost without limits.

Jeff Koons clearly emphasizes this as follows:
Cynical Reason in Appropriation Art and the Crisis in Criticism

Jeff Koons: Banality [1988 exhibition] was about communicating to the bourgeois class. I wanted to remove their guilt and shame about the banality that motivates them and which they respond to.

….And I wanted to remove their guilt and shame so that they can embrace what motivates them and what they respond to - to embrace their own history so that they can move on and actually create a new upper class instead of having culture debase them. And they would start to respond to or have beliefs in things that they have truly experienced, what their own history actually is.28

Both the artists and their permanent customers alike tend to view the art as a sign of prestige and an investment portfolio, and to have a traditional point of view whereby almost everything is an exchange commodity sign. This political order was taken care of by a community of professional executives and elites – called “yuppies” in the mid-1980s, and “symbolic analysts” in the early 1990s. This exclusive community administers the movement of commodity signs through an electronic network where signs are converted into objects and in turn objects are turned into signs and the markets and the media live in a symbiotic relationship.

While talking about the reaction the audience displayed towards the consumption objects on the shelves, Haim Steinbach seems to be caricaturizing this situation:

People were coming into the gallery and seeing a shelf with a group of objects that had been untampered with, unchanged, and their first response was: “Supermarket in the art gallery,” or something like that. By supermarket they meant commodities, commodity art. This was said to be a violation of art, of the art space, even of a commercial art space like the gallery, which is a business meant to sell art. But the work is more about the meaning of art and about art being in many places and in many things — and about the non-hierarchical position from which to enter it. Of course, there are all kinds of ways that people will enter it.29

Patronage was an appropriate source of funding for the arts to the extent that it guaranteed the production of “good works”. As an object of representation the artwork signified the virtue of its patron. That it was this dimension as much as the particular skill or individual talent of the artist that was celebrated is indicated by the expectation that, at times, the artist would adapt a work out of respect for the criticism of the patron, whether or not such criticism was accepted prudentially or willingly by the artist. The value of the work depended upon a public or social reading of its authenticity and authority with regard to its historical testimony. The „greatness” attributed to the artist was based in respect for his/her ability to cipher, record and reflect the spirit of the age. In
that sense the artist's role was perceived as an agency in the creation of meaning, rather than as a form of personal commentary upon it.

**Appropriation as Artistic Genre**

Image appropriation is an artistic genre that is often questioned for its originality and ethics. To appropriate means to take exclusive possession of, or to set apart for or assign to a particular purpose or use, both of which can be done with positive or negative intentions and results. The champions of this radical aesthetical stance defend the direct integration of images borrowed from different sources, original or secondary, into a new (original) work. The most extremist elements, on the other hand, claim that plagiarism, the fully fledged imitation of an original work, should be accepted as a legitimate artistic option.

This genre is breaking down the traditional categorization of painting, photography, sculpture etc., and incorporating many of the “new media” types which rely upon such practices as digital sampling, e.g. “computer art” and “sound sculpture”. The new “art” genres are no longer skills and practice specific but are delineated by their conceptual positions – one of those taken into consideration being direct confrontation with copyright issues. The presence of such artists and their mainstream acceptance does not just mean that „art” has changed, it also means that society has changed.

Appropriation artists' works were not looked at as singular artistic expressions. The photographic images of artists such as Richard Prince, Louise Lawler, Cindy Sherman, Laurie Simmons, Allan McCollum, and Christopher Williams were „stolen” images that already existed. Most of them were circulating in the „low culture” of mass media, but sometimes the images were stolen from the realm of high culture in the case of Lawler and Levine. The artists had come across them while flipping through a magazine or watching TV, maybe startled by something in them, simultaneously disgusted and fascinated by the power of these images and the stereotypes they convey. The artists cropped them, re-photographed them, took them out of their original context, and reused them for their own ends.

Appropriation artists usually base their proposals on the ideas of the Post-structuralist theorists such as Foucault and Barthes. Foucault's and Barthes's thoughts on the author and his art object, which define this process, are attacked with the very concept of objectivity and fixed meaning – especially in language or art work.

The debate about these ideas and the aesthetic attitudes that grew out of the discourse led to appropriation, parody, and pastiche as critical imaging methods
(key features of post-modernism). As we have seen, the unmediated appropriation exemplified by Levine and Bidlo's works has a transgressional political edge. In underlying the contradictory position occupied by the individual author, ever subsumed into symbolic structures that last longer, these artists pretend to be faithful to the classic dictum of Walter Benjamin that the singularity of a work of art is inseparable from its insertion inside a longer tradition. Making intensive use of irony and parody, the ultimate aim of this art is to question the very possibility of continuing to talk about “original” works of arts, to keep attributing individual works to individual authors. Among the most famous cases is American painter Mike Bidlo's appropriations of Duchamp's “Bottle Rack” or Picasso's “Guernica”.

This act of appropriation and repetition indicates a kind of cultural exhaustion which has important shock value because it dramatically brings into focus major issues which normally lie below the surface, issues which need to be questioned. Seen in today’s context, Duchamp's ideas, about appropriation, have gained fresh impetus by bringing up issues of the copy and the original, and the privileging of the object. Duchamp's ready-mades set an important precedent because they recontextualized and reoriented art away from its own identity as a form (as in Minimalism or Abstract Expressionism) towards the kind of instability and undecidability of Postmodernism.

Some of Levine's works contain the photographs of the works of some famous 19th-century photographers such as Edward Weston (portraits of his son Neil) and Eliot Porter (the landscapes). She, in her artistic appropriation, challenges the notion of the proprietary nature of the imagination. It is true that Weston created that image, but why should he maintain eternal possession of it? Why should that bit of “ideal” estate be forever turned into a representational sanctuary, fenced off for future use or speculation? The fences are in mind only. Anyone can copy. The troubling question is why won’t people appreciate as an equal the copy of the copy, when they appreciate the original which itself must be a copy?

This approach places her directly in conflict with copyright law. Copyright law promptly restores the images of the son to its paternal creator. In terms of copyright laws, the way Levine positions herself in relation to “her” work is irrelevant. According to “the law”, the images belong to Weston, or rather to his estate. Levine would be free to “copy” the ideas present in the work, but she cannot appropriate his very expression of those ideas. In our classical sculpture. But what she cannot appropriate is Weston's presentation of this style, his photographing of his son.

In this sense, copyright's reliance on “original” representation is a misnomer. That is,
Rifat Şahiner

“It is only in the absence of the original that representation may take place. And representation takes place because it is always already there in the world as representation. The a priori Weston had in mind was not really in his mind at all; it was in the world and Weston only copied it.”

To make things even more puzzling, Rosalind Krauss, in her defense of Levine, tells us that Levine’s activity is no more parasitic than Weston’s. He, after all – Krauss concludes – was borrowing the classic forms of order and representation of the past. Moreover, Weston with his camera produced an image, or copy, of something that had been constructed. Thus, Levine’s copy is nothing but the copy of a copy.

Hence, one can conclude that Levine’s photographic replicas challenge the status of the (typically male) artist as mythic genius. They have recently been appropriated yet again by an artist named Michael Mandiberg. It is in the digital readymades ‘authored’ by Mandiberg that one can see the shift from mechanical reproduction to digital replication and to an aesthetic of cloning. The websites created by Mandiberg in 2003 exist in two formats. One is titled ‘aftersherrylevine.com,’ and the other ‘afterwalkerevans.com.’ Nevertheless, both websites are the same. They depict the same images and display the same texts. On his websites Mandiberg expands on the notion of readymades. Enabling the website visitors to download and print the digital copies of the photochemically appropriated images, Mandiberg emerges as an example of the open-ended nature of digital images widely and freely available on the Internet.

His identical websites repeat the strategies of Duchamp and Levine. However, the digital nature of his project allows the viewer of the work to participate in the process of appropriation, and raises questions concerning the authority of the ‘original.’ When one can download and manipulate an iconic image such as the Walker Evans photograph, is the originality of the image maintained, possibly reinforced, or is it challenged through a shift in authorship? Does this process eliminate the physical and conceptual distance between the Evans’ photograph and Levine’s appropriation? Does it challenge or reinforce the authority of the artist or originality of art works?

Levine’s and other appropriation artists’ strategy involves problematizing the role of art and its relationship with law by exposing the historical and philosophical specificity of this front. To do this they infringe the copyright of others, even though to date they have been able to negotiate around litigation. By opening the values of ‘art’ and ‘copyright’ for critical appraisal they move toward restoring a “public” function for art in the sense that she makes a space for decision-making about “who we are” possible.
Conclusion

In this paper we have discussed the possible conditions of a genuinely critical position that artists can occupy in the increasingly complex environment of advanced capitalism, which has the capacity to appropriate the criticism directed at it, thus making itself immune to it. I have also discussed the possibilities and the potentialities implied in the present time by taking into account a time in the recent past marked by arguably similar complexity. The art of the 80s was characterized by a crisis of criticism following the movement of appropriation art, and by a desire for re-evaluation of the previous modes of criticism - ideological critique and deconstruction, which, as Hal Foster argues, when taken as general tendencies, devalue “artistic agency” or “the very activity of representation.” Art of cynical reason emerged as a reaction to this impasse. Today we are in a position to reconsider retrospective accounts of what is too quickly labeled the “cynicism” inherent in art of the 1980s. Donald Kuspit’s summation of the problem is a case in point:

The postmodern cynical artist knows the languages of modern art, and usually has complete mastery of them, but does not know what to say with them experientially… The postmodern artists knows styles, but not their meanings, and has no meaning of his or her own - no authentic experimental meaning to communicate.35

Nowadays, many artists utilize copying strategy in order to question the functioning of the system and the positions of an artist and art work. Paradoxically (both because their work aroused so much controversy and because of their special postmodern relevance) it has been reproduced countless times, thus raising their market value. Nevertheless, the system not only absorbs all the criticisms coming its way, but also digests them in its body and puts them back on the market. Most of those protesting the artistic cult have long entered the art history. After all, their anti-art applications are already on the market with high price tags.

However, the problems an art critic currently faces are not limited to the above. Just as an artwork assumes simulative qualities as a result of unlimited multiplication of its origin, the evaluation of an artwork through a mediator is also threatened by simulation.

The disappearance of the borders among visuals has resulted in the appearance of a mass of art works that are linked to each other with sign chains. This is an ‘as if’ scene just like the culture it exists.36 This ‘metaphor’ seems to have swallowed both the artwork and the artist. Hence, today it is not the critic, but
the electronic communication network powered by contemporary technology that has the possibility to market and introduce the ‘name.’

The biggest danger awaiting the criticism and the critic today is that the radical transformation in the world of scenes has also transformed those people in charge of the task into some sort of subjects. In Baudrillard’s words, while the reality is absorbed and ultimately negated by ‘the representation system with no referents’, it signals for us the inevitability of a new beginning in the works of artwork evaluation.

Maybe, in the current art world, which is radically drawn into unknowability, the critic has grown powerless, to deal with an artwork that is loaded with so many signs, concepts and propositions... By classifying this wild crowding or establishing some similarities, criticism can create small cosmos of forms. It might still achieve this with small notes attached to infrastructures, references, and a heavy technical language (the so-called professional jargon)!

Notes:

5. In this sense, Žižek draws heavily on Sloterdijk’s early work and acknowledges that the disavowal of knowledge instead of false consciousness is today’s pervasive problem of cultural and social behaviour by quoting Octave Mannoni: “Je sais bien, mais quand meme…”
Cynical Reason in Appropriation Art and the Crisis in Criticism

13. These are complex structures from Foucault's surveillance over Debord's Spectacle and Baudrillard's simulation.
15. Foster, The Return of the Real, p. 112.
34. Şahiner, “An Attempt to Understand the Copy Artists’ Ready-mades…”
35. Kuspit, Signs of Psyche…
36. Baudrillard sees culture as absolutely void of any significance at all, political or otherwise. Any meaning or power in culture has been stripped away by incessant commodification, advertising, and the trivializing effects of mass media.
In 1998, On Kawara was invited to participate in the 11th Biennale of Sydney. Instead of exhibiting pieces from his well-known Date Paintings in an ordinary gallery space for the Biennale, he chose a playschool (kindergarten). Since then, this project has been traveling to similar preschool settings worldwide.1 Friða Björk Ingvarsdottr, a coordinator of the program in Iceland wrote,

The title of the exhibit, Pure Consciousness, reflects the children and their understanding of the vast amounts of disparate phenomena which they encounter at this age. The sole function of the works is to merge with the space around and they are not to be used with any educational purpose in mind, but blend into the children’s everyday existence.2

This project, thus, seems to be intriguingly dedicated to “childlikeness,” or the time and space of children before they start formal elementary education, i.e., according to the author of another catalogue essay published for showing the exhibit in Avignon, before they become initiated into civilization and become distracted from their essential nature.3

 Needless to say, the project can be counted among quite a few of those by modern and contemporary artists who have confessed that children are their teachers (in some cases they incorporate children’s drawings into their work, and in others long for the state of “childlikeness” itself, say, Jackson Pollock’s “amazingly childlike, Zen quality,” if we accept Allan Kaprow’s interpretation4). Those cases, I am aware, can be easily criticized as exploiting the heritage of the Others’ culture — the culture of the primitive, the outsider, or the socially oppressed or marginalized. Romanticizing and mythologizing childhood might be only reactionary, and yet, I would like to take a chance here and propose a so-called infants’ aesthetics as one small segment of a transformative aesthetics (or
an alternative aesthetics as the art of living), through which one is expected to change oneself and live “better,” by both learning from children and protecting them, as well as protecting “childlikeness” in ourselves.

1. Rooted in Nature, Connected with the Body

What, then, can we possibly learn from small children, when we say “children are our teachers,” and why do we need to protect them? From what? And how?

Let me start with a couple of points that Kyoshi Hayakawa makes in his analysis of Abbas Kiarostami’s movie *And Life Goes On* (1992). The movie was filmed right after the big earthquake in the northwest region of Iran in June 1990, and as is often the case in Kiarostami’s works, children play a critical role. Hayakawa points out that their “closeness to nature, and their liveliness, the strength as nature beings” lies at the core of this movie, which draws an analogy between the boy (the filmmaker’s son) and a grasshopper that he catches in the field (a natural environment) and puts into the car (an artificial environment), and then eventually lets go, as his father tells him to do. Not unlike this insect, which has its own power to survive if left alone in nature, children show more affinity for the natural world than the human world. They can be strong and flexible, and recover quickly so long as they stay close to nature, although nature here is not simply regarded as the opposite of civilization but rather it includes local cultural customs (what one eats and drinks, for example) based on the specific conditions of a region, especially if it is one’s “homeland”:

Blamed and bullied, scolded by adults and harmed in the artificial world, they are always afraid of those daily mishaps; living in such a situation, children may feel in fact all the closer to the ferocity of nature, more so compared with grown-ups. They resemble the grasshopper in the sense that danger coming from humans could be more threatening than the one from nature, which they can avoid normally if protected by adults.5

In the middle of, or more precisely, right alongside disasters such as a large earthquake, or a “tragedy” such as the death of a family member, children find a way out of their plight and live each moment in the here and now. Kiarostami, amazed by his own son’s such capacity, shows great respect for him. The boy was quite sad when his beloved grandmother passed away, and yet, at her funeral, he was delighted to enjoy a play forbidden in any other circumstances! Kiarostami takes it as a lesson from his son, that is, “you can look at a ‘tragedy’ from a different angle, a different manner. Life can go on right next to the tragedy.”6
Infants’ Aesthetics for Eudaimonia: a Neo-premodernist Attempt

This type of quick shift in mood, a protean multiplicity of the subject, which we can observe on various occasions with little children, may sometimes strike us as selfishness on their part, or a lack of depth and prudence. They do not behave properly and decently because they do not care how they are supposed to behave. However, such behavior can be regarded as a display of freedom from social norms and responsibilities. Children are not alienated from the flux that is called life, not imprisoned within the frame of one single narrative. A narrative, a story, however dominant it may appear, always remains just one of an infinite number of possible interpretations/representations/abstractions of an ever-elusive, constantly changing reality. In this sense, children’s attitude is a reminder of the teaching of Zen Buddhism, “Every day, good day.” According to Sokyu Genyu, in each person’s mind cohabit three thousand pupils (namely, infinite aspects of “me”), who pop up in turn in response to ever-changing situations, a different one surfing by at each moment; there is neither unity nor self-identical consistency that one can assume for one’s own mind, nor any privileged point of view from which one can tell and cling to a story = one’s personal history that covers the whole experience, even for a relatively short term.7 Therefore, we should taste each moment as it is, and as it comes, “as a group of *concrete facts* seen for the first time.”8

Children thus seem to exemplify a model alternative to the modern subject. If the modern subject, as an autonomous, fair-minded and integrated subject, presumes the right to access the truth, which is universally valid and independent of any specific local condition, then in early childhood (as well as in the old age), the subject is more likely to stick to his/her specific, concrete, local environment in order to remain connected to and confined within the home ground. In the very beginning, a baby is conceived and rooted in the body of the mother, without whom the baby cannot survive even a day, and even after this oneness is broken, the child remains closely tied to his/her immediate nature through his/her own body, which is exposed to and touched by the oceanic flow of the world.

2. Marginal Beings, Mediumistic Beings

The state of being embedded in concrete reality must have something to do with the sense of time, or rather, of timeless time. Speculating on the similarity between old people and infants, Toji Kamata, a religious studies scholar, points out,

… old people and children, neither of them have the sense of time as evenly regulated by a clock. Since the mode of modern linear thinking has been closely connected with this clock time, the old people and children, who do not belong
to it, are antiquity in modern society. To put it further, senescence and childhood are the antiquity of one's life. Within the bodies of old age and of infancy one could see dwell a mythological time, or a circulatory timeless time, uncontaminated by usefulness, use values, and efficiency.  

Because old people and children are situated not in the center but at the margins, i.e. they are not yet or no longer expected to be productive and reproductive, and they are not affected to a great extent by the logic of technology and the compulsive, goal-oriented movement of our culture, they live day to day, moment to moment, projecting no goals, no perspective for the future, but rather sealed within the present.

In relation to this, another common aspect shared by those at this stage of “antiquity,” infants and seniors, is their liminality, so to speak, because both stand between life and death, this world and another one, although they are in opposite directions. “In myths, old folklores, and traditional rituals,” Kamata says, “gods and spiritual beings appear as old men and children, or they do so using old men and children as their ‘channels = mediums.’” As old people and children belong to this ambiguous field in which life and death are inextricably linked, they can often enter into an altered state of consciousness, such as half dreaming and half awake, possessed and spirited away by supernatural beings.

This, naturally, can be associated with the pre-Oedipal stage, in which the subject/object, or the “I” and the others are not yet divided, in which the world is not yet thoroughly articulated, nor structured linguistically into the symbolic. Infants seem to remain, up to a certain point, specific bodily subjects, or rather, presubjects, interacting with their own immediate environments via the senses and changing accordingly. They possess a highly unstable, receptive, sympathetic body, one that is easily synchronized with those around them, and thus they can go beyond the boundary that exists between themselves and others, mirroring and echoing the subconscious desires of others, as if “possessed” by them — and as if they are consequently offering themselves as a vehicle, as mediumistic beings.

The issue of “possession,” of course, is not easy to grasp, because most of us have lost touch with the ancient traditions of shamanism and animism, although these practices seem to have survived in some modest manner among artists, musicians, dancers, and poets even today. In discussing different layers of memories, Hisao Nakai, a psychiatrist, elaborates on Harry Stack Sullivan’s hypothesis of the “self-system,” according to which the “self” as present to one’s consciousness maintains itself via “dissociation”; it is a system that controls the range of one’s consciousness and maintains its unity by dissociating itself from whatever falls outside the frame, so as to avoid collapsing with a flood of representations that
are too contradictory, too ambiguous and unmanageable.\textsuperscript{11} In addition, Nakai argues, this process should control the number of memories that are allowed to appear at once on the screen of our conscious self: “if everything that is inside of me emerges to be present simultaneously, my consciousness will collapse due to this over-flooding.”\textsuperscript{12}

When the self is regarded as a system that “ignores,” it puts away whatever cannot comfortably fit within it; thus, it is not fixed but rather mutable, expanding and shrinking, so to speak, depending on its own capacity as well as the situation outside it. In the case of integration dysfunction syndrome (schizophrenia), the dissociation process works too weakly, whereas in traumatic incidents, one might dissociate more than usual to bear and survive what is happening, to the extent that one feels detached from that event, although the pain may recur later on. In this scheme, therefore, “possession” seemingly belongs to the former; the unintegrated parts, normally left out and left dissociated, rush in and feel as if they are coming from outside the conscious self, if not from other psychic beings within and outside this world.

It should be noted here that the sympathetic, synchronic body can be found not solely in the domain of children and in “mediumistic” occupations, but can occur for anyone when the “self-system” fails. There is always a danger in this, i.e. in identifying with others and stepping outside the boundaries of the self. One may become too willing to conform, be mobilized and oriented toward a certain direction, and may thereby make oneself vulnerable to social contamination, including totalitarian enthusiasm. Or, one may become immobilized each time one runs into suffering people or suffering animals, to the extent that one cannot function effectively, which is considered destructive (inefficient, irresponsible, and lazy) in our modern society (therefore, we switch off, “dissociate” too much, in our daily trauma)!

If the self as a controlling, dissociating system mediates between the subject and the world around it, thus protecting and distancing at the same time this potentially fragile subject from a flood of excessive chunks of raw materials, perhaps in the case of small children such a system is not yet full-fledged, as it works only weakly or unevenly. The subject of a child is still under construction – “soft,” “broken,” “mad” – in any case largely “dysfunctional” if judged in comparison to a fully developed system. The danger and shortcoming of being sympathetic and receptive, which are qualities that are criticized when found in adults, tend to be tolerated among children, for they exist on the margins and are allowed to stay close to the “Every day, good day” wisdom. They remain at peace on the side of nature, or life, and exist in a flux that is constantly inconstant, shifting beyond any attempt to frame and fix it.
3. Unruly Body Versus the Process of Socialization = Domestication

In the “antiquity” of one’s life – a premodern, antimodern dimension that is exemplified by marginal and mediumistic beings – one may have an affinity for dancing bodies of a certain type. Dancer Kazuo Ohno (1906–2010), who came to be known worldwide at the age of 76 and danced until he died at 103, would make reference to his mother every time he was asked to talk about his dancing. “Butoh takes place in the mother’s womb. In the womb, in that of the universe – that’s where my dance is.” According to another Butoh dancer, Maro Akaji, “Dancers are linked to the world directly through the skin sensation. We are allowed to remain babies until we die; that’s our privilege. In exchange for that, we serve as sacrifices, offering dance to the invisible beings.” In Japanese kabuki theater as well, the mind of a small child is most valued in an actor who is playing the part of a young ruffian in a bold style. Therefore, a question may be raised, is this a “privilege” given only to those exceptional, committed few, and not to most of us, who outgrow such a stage of antiquity and lose our unruly energy, which was once considered akin to the violent nature of deities and spirits, gods that did not submit to the emperor? The bliss of childhood gets lost much too soon, and especially these days.

With the transformation of the everyday landscape via the media and the information industry, we are becoming increasingly overloaded with excessive sensory stimulation and the accelerating fragments of images that circulate at a high speed over the surface of this planet. We then become cut off from our sensuous somatic existence within a concrete, specific reality. As Susan Sontag wrote half a century ago, in 1964,

> Ours is a culture based on excess, on overproduction; the result is a steady loss of sharpness in our sensory experience. All the conditions of modern life – its material plentitude, its sheer crowdedness – conjoin to dull our sensory faculties.

Under such circumstances, Sontag argued, “What is important now is to recover our senses. We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more,” to get to “the pure, untranslatable, sensuous immediacy,” instead of “interpretation.” “To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world – in order to set up a shadow world of ‘meaning,’” she continued. “The world, our world, is depleted, impoverished enough. Away with all duplicates of it, until we again experience more immediately what we have.”

Let us suppose it is still valid to claim the necessity of an “erotics” in place of a “hermeneutics,” and then we may wonder whether and how it is possible
to recover our aesthetic – when, with a thick layer of duplicates of the world standing in the way, our bodily “censor” becomes spoiled so easily, and we seem inclined to see less, hear less, feel less, as if in the midst of our daily environment we are in a state of shock, if not of trauma, so that we have to protect ourselves by blocking our senses. Even little children cannot afford to remain sympathetic, mediumistic, today. It would be a much too risky business to be that way! The cultural environment for children and adults alike, therefore, does not seem favorable at all for us to “recover our senses.”

Finally, another problem I would like to bring up is an almost institutional, biopolitical one: infants (at least in Japan) become tamed and disciplined too prematurely by the public education system, which works as a confining force together with other pressures from society. Kamata is aware of this, and therefore he says,

…in modern times, old people and children are sent to those social control system [school, hospital, an institution for the aged], so that their mythical powers have been largely suppressed. While they should not be subject to the clock time, they are now fenced in by it, even during the summer holidays.18

This socialization = domestication process, however, might not be simply a modern phenomenon. As Minoru Oda discerned this process in a classical text by Pseudo-Longinus, On the Sublime, we “seem to have learnt in our childhood the lessons of a benignant despotism, to have been cradled in her habits and customs from the time when our minds were still tender, and never to have tasted the fairest and most fruitful fountain of eloquence, I mean liberty.”19

As, then (if what I have heard is credible), the cages in which those pigmies commonly called dwarfs are reared not only stop the growth of the imprisoned creature, but absolutely make him smaller by compressing every part of his body, so all despotism, however equitable, may be defined as a cage of the soul and a general prison.20

Are we, perhaps, too accustomed to a life of slavery to see our body deformed, our soul chained? Wataru Tsutumi expresses himself clearly on this. Applying Michel Foucault’s most influential studies to his own personal experience in Japan, he candidly insists that “we live in prison.”21 In his detailed description of how school and prison are similar, i.e. how much their cultures resemble that of the army (and other institutions in modern industrialized society), he sees the educational system of discipline and training, which he calls “drills,” as nothing but a mechanism to implant in the individual a subtle, controlling power and turn him/her into a docile, obedient being:
It’s not at all a metaphor when I say we live in a prison-like situation. That’s why we sometimes find it so painful and difficult just to live.

That’s also a reason why we don’t look at nature any more [by the time we are in college]. People distance themselves from nature in the order men, women, and eventually children and seniors, as they get stuck in the “drills” in the same order. All we have there is pleasures coming from brains, no room left for those to be felt physically.22

Dance can offer a way to reclaim one’s own body (and one’s connectedness with nature), Tsurumi continues. Changing the whole modern system may not be realistic, but changing (or “hacking”) one’s own body through somatic methods such as dancing can work better and more easily. The title of his book, Dance in Prison, therefore indicates a rather practical methodology for the erotics, or its messy version that I call “infants’ aesthetics.” The unruly body, if once lost, should be recovered. There seem to be slight signs of change, in fact, suggesting that young people are dancing quite fiercely everywhere, these days, as if they were striving to revive some aspects of premodern society, in which dancing bodies, both in festivity and in revolt, constituted an integral part.

Although I do agree with Tsurumi that paying more attention to one’s own body, and its link to nature, is certainly a remedy, I suspect that such an approach can be eventually brought over to their side, as the system for domestication and standardization, which has been refined more and more, is still so overwhelming. In Japan, dance has become part of the newly determined requirements in physical education for junior high school students, while the Law Regulating the Adult Entertainment Business forbids anyone to dance in certain places after midnight! (And, of course, dance is always an ambiguous affair; it obtains its power from that ambiguity, liberating the body sometimes and being utilized to colonize it at other times.) I wonder, therefore, whether we should be satisfied at seeing “flash mobs” so frequently these days on the Internet, when what we might actually need is a real mob.

**Concluding (and Yet not so Concluding) Remarks**

Decades have passed since aesthetics, as a product of the Enlightenment and of secularization, lost its credibility, revealing its methodological ambiguity and ideological impurity, among other vices. However, given that it was born in an age of crisis (the epitome of which might have been the Lisbon Earthquake in 1755), aesthetics does seem to have a chance to be revived today in our age of crisis, as a nondualistic perception of the mental and the physical, and particu-
larly so if it ventures to take up a long tradition of the arts of living, for which the *epimeleia heautou* (care of the self) is a precondition to seeking a conversion or a transformation of the subject. Would it be, then, a reckless anachronism to insist that aesthetics should reshape itself after the fashion of this ancient tradition? If the study of philosophy was once a “medicine” – “a therapeutic enterprise” – and its role was “to cure the diseases of the soul,” we can hope for nothing more, nothing less. We need the truth that can save the subject, even though it requires a steady, long process of the transformation of the subject. As the lesson of Plato’s erotics teaches us, an encounter with beauty is, after all, something like that, both involving the changed subject and changing the subject. The subject is destabilized, endangered, and renewed when the process is completed.

Confronted with the defects in the governmental, bureaucratic, and academic systems (which suddenly proved enormous in Japan after March 11, 2011, and yet were still guarded and covered up through certain acrobatic rhetorical operations), people’s reactions seem to have been polarized, roughly speaking, between a “Don’t panic, let’s stay cool, we – as well-disciplined Japanese – will manage if we remain self-possessed and behave” attitude and a “No way, get angry now!” attitude. From the latter some began to insist on the crucial importance of the “de-colonization of the soul,” which, via various strategic approaches, deals with issues related to our “imprisoned, chained” status that are discussed partially in this paper.

One way to generate this process of “decolonization” is to re-evaluate one’s somatic and aesthetic receptivity, which is a capacity to *feel* rather than to *think*. Although this receptivity tends to be badly damaged as we lose our childhood voice and body in the process of socialization as well as a wrongheaded education, there still remains a lot to learn from the state of children – those mediumistic beings strongly tied to Nature as well as to the Other world. My attempt to find in this infancy model a renewed aesthetics that is germinating in the complexity of social systems/problems mentioned above is thus restricted, since it largely favors the angry (over the calm). I am hopeful, however, that it will lead up to the first step, if both unruly gods and peaceful/blessed gods are needed, as was believed in ancient practices, in order to clear a path for prayers.
Notes:


10. Ibid., p. 23. See also pp. 28, 30, 173–175.


12. Ibid.


14. From an interview with Akaji Maro, Asahi Shinbun [Asahi Newspaper], April 23, 2011.


16. Ibid., pp. 14, 9, 7.


20. Ibid.

Infants’ Aesthetics for *Eudaimonia*: a Neo-premodernist Attempt


25. I came to learn about the concept from Ayumu Yasutomi’s numerous books including *Genpatu Kiki to ‘Todai Wahou’* [Fukushima Crisis and ‘Parlance of the University of Tokyo’] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2012) and Youko Fukao, *Tamashii no Datsu-shokuminti-ka towa Nanika* [What Is Decolonization of the Soul?] (Tokyo: Seitou-sya, 2012), to name only a few.
Part II. Philosophy of Art
1. Preface
The special kinds of aesthetics in digital art practice have seldom been theorized. Digital art creates a new practice, and thus demands a new paradigm in our analysis of the philosophy of art.

Now digital art allows for greater plasticity in space, time and ongoing meanings of art practice since the purpose of the art experience is actively changing now instead of stable. Therefore, our past categories of aesthetics analysis should change in this case to understand action and interactive feedback as the basis of digital art aesthetics.

I focus on the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and how his concepts can be applied to understand this novel ongoing practice that is digital art. Specifically, I describe his idea of “Thirdness” and how it can be connected to digital art practice’s creative concept. Once we experience and analyze these new artistic experiences, art can be more clearly conceived of as a living thing with its own unpredictable autonomy.

I will argue the attempt to understand the practice and meaning of digital art as an ongoing practice has altered our past views of aesthetics and can add more conceptual richness to the philosophy of art in general.

2. Introduction
I have a question. Can you imagine the art of open space, open futures, and an inventive and changing humanity? This is an image from Stanley Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey. (Fig. 1) How can we have a conception of creative human beings in the universe, creating a work of art in any way, in any form, as the basic concept – without limiting our conceptions of aesthetics too closely to a particular medium?
A more direct example of Digital Art is called Second Life, in which many artists work, like Roy Ascott. This example is exclusively in cyberspace. Other direct examples are Marcos Novak’s architecture, equally only in cyberspace (Fig. 2 and 3). However, other digital art examples are just as open and interactive without being limited to the medium of cyberspace. This would be like Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s work (Fig. 4) which crosses both cyberspace and the real world in which the whole world’s data participation designs the artistic work instead of only the artist per se by group adjustment of ongoing trajectories of the lights. This is aided by computers and facilitated through cyberspace group participation, yet it is in the real physical world as well. What do all these have in common? They have an ongoing open interaction in common as the digital art, instead of being an art limited to a particular medium. The interaction is the thing. This challenges past views of aesthetics to understand these interactions as art. This is the context of digital art.
There are three important concepts that I wish to discuss: a definition of Digital Art, its conception of open action and activities, and its sense of ongoing creativity. In all three, I usefully draw on the ideas of Peirce. My argument will be that there are special kinds of aesthetics in Digital Art practice. Digital Art creates a new practice, and thus demands a new paradigm in our analysis of the philosophy of art.

I have shown many examples. What do they have in common? I will explore some common characteristics. Digital Art is the common use of digital technology either in cyberspace, or in real life, or in both simultaneously to create an art based on ongoing actions instead of a finished piece of art as the goal. Another person’s definition of digital art is similar. Bruce Wands equally argues that the interactive definition of Digital Art is important: “Fundamental to any explanation of Digital Art is an understanding of the context in which we view it: the ‘art experience’ itself.” According to Wands, for the commonalities of digital art with other mediums of art, there are four elements of art in general: “It can be said that great works of art communicate simultaneously on four levels: Sensory, emotional, mental and spiritual.”

I suggest that there are common features of digital art as well. First, there is the Image-Plasticity, Transformation, and Immersion. Second, there is the Interactivity. Third, there is the Ubiquitous Sense. This third characteristic is common regardless of multi-media versions of digital art (like cyberspace) or potentially non-cyberspace versions of digital art (like very multi-sensory experiences interactive to body, sound, image, space, time, tactile senses, and including potentially cyberspace participation, though hardly limited to it.) Now our digital art allows for greater plasticity in space, time, and ongoing meanings of art practice since the purpose of the art experience is now actively changing instead of stable. This is an ephemeral quality of digital art. However, I argue its ephemerality is not a good way to differentiate our definition of Digital Art.
since many other forms of art are ephemeral. As Christiane Paul said: “Digital Art is often referred to as ephemeral and unstable, a label that is only partially accurate. Any time-based art piece, such as a performance, is essentially ephemeral and often continues to exist after the event only in its documentation.” In short, our past categories of aesthetics analysis should change in this case to understand that action and interactive feedback are the true bases of Digital Art aesthetics instead of mere ephemerality which, as Paul said, is non-specific to defining Digital Art at all. So this study is conceived with a purpose to solve these aesthetics issues of interaction and ongoing activity in all Digital Art. Digital Art has shown a paradigm shift and Copernican turn to the traditional forms of art. Now it is time for a similar Copernican turn to our awareness of its very different aesthetic characteristics from past art.

3. The New Aesthetics Question

What is art in human life? This is the Aesthetics question posed both by those commenters upon our posthuman condition and Digital Art similarly. This question, "What is art in human life," that is raised by Digital Art deviates from the more essentialist question, "What is art," discussed in the history of aesthetics. This prompts aesthetics discussions to highlight reflexive relations between art and human life from the philosophical standpoint instead of what has been concentrated upon in the past, i.e., only art’s definition. This is why I am drawing on wider philosophy to understand Digital Art instead of only past Aesthetics writings.

Digital Art has shown a paradigm shift from the traditional forms of art, which can be usefully viewed now from the perspective of Peirce’s semiotics. Research on art’s definition previously has served as the core discussion in the history of aesthetics, mainly because it was assumed that there is a common stable universal nature in all forms of art as finished, with the premise that all certain ‘works of art’ also have such nature as finished. While I think it is true that there are universal aspects to all art, I believe the characteristics of older mediums of ‘finished art’ have unfairly been the only way we delimit our aesthetic experiences — a limitation that the development of Digital Art’s practice has revealed. Just as the digital environment has changed human life and perceptions, Digital Art has changed the concepts and sentiments of art. It has made us rethink and widen the manners and terminology in which we define ‘art.’

More traditional representations of aesthetics concepts have considered art to have only contemplative characteristics and to have (Kantian) disinterestedness characterized by no purpose. To the contrary, any image in Digital Art has
Digital Art Reveals a Novel Aesthetics...

characteristics of ongoing action that actively requires intervention from viewers
as makers, instead of the past separation of the contemplation of viewers from
the makers of art. Thus Digital Art requires a different structure of produc-
tion than the traditional image. This means its image should be subject to new
interpretations. There should be the construction of a representation concept
proper for the ‘unfinished image’ in Digital Art since it signifies a dynamic image
implemented based on experiential activities in the reflexive relations between
art and life. This form of aesthetics may even be useful toward understanding
the realm of actions around older finished works of art now.

To elaborate, Digital Art finds its core analysis on ‘art activities’ in the partici-
patory and performative nature of practice in the network of artists, writers, and
works and the altered structure of production, distribution, and acceptance. The
image in Digital Art is only the core area in which these art activities interplay.
Thus the image in Digital Art goes beyond the status of stationary ‘objects of ap-
preciation’ or expressive objects of the outside world. Next, this study compares
and examines the digital image and the traditional pictorial image to discover the
changed status of image in Digital Art, and to discuss this as an aesthetics point.
As an aesthetics concept to deal with images, ‘representation’ is the category that
explains the most important function of art involved in human perception and
emotion. This is why an application of Peirce’s semiotics is useful.

4. C. S. Peirce’s Semiotics and Creativity

4.1. Peirce’s Semiotics

I focus on Peirce’s Semiotics and how his concepts can be applied to understand
this novel ongoing practice of representation and interaction that is more clearly
seen in Digital Art. Peirce is one of the few philosophers of semiotics who have
appreciated this historical interaction of symbols, representation, interpretation,
and ongoing action loops in any semiotic practices. I am arguing that Digital
Art is such a semiotic practice as Peirce described.

Peirce was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician and scientist,
and the founder of pragmatism. He was educated as a chemist and employed as a
scientist for thirty years. Today, he is appreciated largely for his contributions to
logic, mathematics, philosophy, scientific methodology, semiotics, and aesthetics.
Semiotics is a very important central theme in Peirce’s philosophy. Plus, he used
this word ‘semiotics’ interchangeably with the term ‘logic’. Peirce writes: “We
have no power of thinking without signs.”, and “A Sign, or representamen, is
something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity.”
By using Peirce’s semiotics, this study argues that the image of Digital Art has a dynamic structure of communication and growth. Such a concept of growth emphasizes concepts of process, change and progress within the work of art as a series of ongoing relationships. This expands the concept of art as an ongoing experiential art activity – a lot like a living creature. Such an approach will provide important clues for discussing a Digital Art that does value the roles of the user/viewer intervening in art. This is why Digital Art is best analyzed in semiotics. Connected with this, a Digital Art aesthetics employs a strategy of shifting the focus from works of art to art activity, and through this, hoping to address such interactive activity points via semiotics – points that are unresolved in both the traditional aesthetics discussions and in others’ discussions about Digital Art.

4.2. Triadic Relation and Thirdness

In trying to interpret contemporary art as signs, the semiotics of Peirce provides an aesthetic foundation to explain appropriately the dynamic ongoing action and interpretation relations of a represented image. This is via his idea of constructing signs in what he called a triadic relationship. “A Sign...is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Objects, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same Object. Triadic relation is genuine, that is[,] its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.”9

This will be described. This allows for ongoing art activities instead of finalized art products to become more crucial to the analysis of Digital Art – and likely aesthetics in general. Specifically, I describe Peirce’s idea of ‘Thirdness’ and how it can be connected to Digital Art practice’s creative concept. Several other quotes from Peirce follow.

Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run, mould reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being consists. For this reason I call this element of the phenomenon or objects of thought the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future.10

Peirce elsewhere defines Thirdness as “an act, or influence, which is or involves a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant, [with] this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into acts between pairs.”11 The semiotics of Peirce is very effective in explaining the dynamics of ongoing images, interpretation, and interpretations of others that effect further ongoing actions of digital art without a clear end goal, except for the ongoing
interaction. In other words, the more ‘evolving’ style of semiotics of Peirce’s triadic relations, his ‘Thirdness,’ well explains this multidimensionality of the ongoing digital image that is uniquely (as art goes) simultaneously linearly iterative and unpredictable, yet equally cyclically recursive in its ongoing process of ‘Thirdness.’ This is especially important since the definition of Digital Art now focuses more clearly on the interactive community of arts viewers, artists, and ongoing cultural interpretation as what is essential to its definition.

In conclusion to this section, Kenneth L. Ketner has a useful chart comparing Peirce’s Thirdness view of semiotics with other more traditional views of static or dialectical/ dyadic views:

**Table 1.** The three categories characterized—a reconstructed sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Firstness (pos)</th>
<th>Secondness (pos)</th>
<th>Thirdness (pos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>attribute</td>
<td>relation</td>
<td>genuine triadicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-logic</td>
<td>monadic predicate</td>
<td>dyadic predicate</td>
<td>polyadic predicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiotic</td>
<td>quality, such as sign (transcendental) Ground</td>
<td>polarity, * antithesis (reacting) correlate</td>
<td>continuity, * symmetry (reflecting) interpretant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenic</td>
<td>representamen, sign</td>
<td>correlate, object</td>
<td>conceptual imprinter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>immediate representation (‘sensation’)</td>
<td>reference (re action)</td>
<td>mediate representation (conception)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenic</td>
<td>appearance</td>
<td>occurrence</td>
<td>‘meaning,’ purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial</td>
<td>causal-dependence (original) spontaneity</td>
<td>&lt;causal&gt; &lt;multi-dependent&gt;</td>
<td>organic (ceremonial) mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>absolute variety</td>
<td>constrain; contingency</td>
<td>habit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial</td>
<td>immediate being: what might be</td>
<td>what happens to be</td>
<td>social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td>possibility</td>
<td>actuality; brute facticity</td>
<td>mental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial</td>
<td></td>
<td>existence</td>
<td>reality**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* How we have the concrete qualitatively of dual discriminations, inference in the “between—otherwise” principle of individualization (Dase Sein), over against the unlimited quotability of the gradual immediation of the discrete (Peirce’s principle of continuous realization: CP| | 3.34).

** Oftentimes, Peirce used ‘universe’ and ‘universe’ indifferently as synonymous alternative exemplifying Secondness (CP| | 3.30, 336, 3.391, 3.584). A comparative study, however, shows clearly that, confronting us, the minds of scholastic reason (especially Dase Sein), the distinction of difference as a second and of reality as a third is a basic asset of Peircean’s. This is apparent in such fragments as CP| | 3.178, 2.580, 3.104, 3.40, 4.691, 4.696, 6.383, 3.97. This is again an illustration of the fact that for Peirce, ontology—although always handled contumaciously and incoherently by this unquestioned writer—stressed, such Peircean events as rhythm, synthesis, and, more generally, reality, cannot be understood properly without the recognition of reality as a third.

Chart 1: Comparing Peirce’s View of Thirdness in Semiotics with Others

I feel there should be a construction of a representation concept proper for the image in Digital Art since it signifies a dynamic image implemented based on experiential activities in the reflexive relations between art and life. Discussed in Peirce’s semiotics, this ‘Thirdness’ is one of the core concepts of this study of how to understand and to analyze what is essential in Digital Art.

### 4.3. Peirce’s Abduction: The Inception of Creativity

Second, how can I further connect creativity to Digital Art and Thirdness? It is through Peirce’s view of Abduction. The thesis of this section is how the abduction form of thinking in Peirce’s philosophy can help us to understand the process of creative thinking and artistic creativity in general, whether in science and the arts. In Peirce’s philosophy, aesthetics and philosophy are very closely related.
His aesthetic thinking began by reading Schiller's *Aesthetische Briefe*. According to Peirce, every thought is a sign and a creative inference, and we cannot think without creating signs and interpretations. All thinking, thus, is a process of creative interpretation and translation of signs. Therefore, the base of Peirce's logic is that even science is the study of symbols which are always connected to abduction instead of clearly only referential and stable. Peirce writes: “Abduction is originary in respect to being the only kind of argument which starts a new idea.”\(^{13}\) He further wrote: “I look upon creation as going on and I believe such vague idea as we can have of the power of creation is best identified with the idea of theism. So then the ideal would be to be fulfilling our appropriate offices in the work of creation.”\(^{14}\)

Peirce from 1868 emphasized the fact that symbols evolved. This was his new addition to the meaning of signification. This is quite like Digital Art as well. So more thought should go into analysis of the creative origins of symbols, the building blocks of thought and ongoing interactions.

Peirce distinguished three very different forms of this symbolic, creative reasoning: deduction, induction and abduction. My question is, further, why is abduction the most creative form of reasoning? The origin of abduction in Peirce's “apagoge” term is derived from Aristotle. I will argue that Peirce's abduction most of all touches on this creative aspect because it is the one form of thinking most closely related to guessing and building mental models first, instead of a reasoning through already available evidence first. Douglas R. Anderson is one who has written about Peirce's views of a more creative abduction: “An artist is actively and passively free in using his talents of imagination and observation. Artistic abduction, differently, comes out of the observation of qualities of feeling in relation to perceptual facts, and this gives these qualities in turn free play in imagination.”\(^{15}\)

Peirce's abduction inference scheme is described by himself as follows:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;

But if [an unknown] A were true, C would be a matter of course,

Hence, there is reason to suspect [creatively infer] that A is true.\(^{16}\)

For Peirce creative guessing is, of course, a kind of reasoning like the other kinds of reasoning of deduction and induction. He called abduction the “hypothetical inference.” Others have thought similarly about abduction like Peirce. According to William Davis, „abduction is the creative act of making up explanatory hypotheses.”\(^{17}\) Once more, Anderson writes: “abductions can have various degrees of creativity.”\(^{18}\) If all forms of thought and art are creative sign
and semiotics relations of various kinds, this is one of the rationales why Peirce links philosophy so closely to aesthetics — and why Peirce’s semiotics applies so well to understanding Digital Art.

5. Conclusion

I argued the attempt to understand the action/activity and meaning of Digital Art as an ongoing practice has altered our past views of aesthetics and can add more conceptual richness to the philosophy of art in general. These discussions have sketched out the preliminaries for the following four tasks. First, we can demarcate the research areas by defining the concepts of Digital Art and reviewing its characteristics. Secondly, we can examine in what ways Digital Art can produce new concepts of representation following its definition above and how this new concept of representation can be applied to the expanded semiotic extension of art as community relations around the art activity. Thirdly, unaddressed here, we can discuss a need for a more pragmatic aesthetics based on Dewey’s ‘experience concept’ equally to give a fuller account of representation that allows for experiential art activities as part of art. Finally, as the core of the study, fourth, this summary produces the possibility of a new aesthetics by connecting the special issues of image representation in Digital Art as similar to the experiential activities in Peirce’s semiotics.

The significance of the study was that it offered new interpretations of image representation by theoretically systemizing dynamic images of Digital Art by discussing its semiotics (symbolic connections with the world), its syntactics (relations among those signs in formal structures), and its pragmatics (here, the reflexive relations between signs and people). Advancements in technology and civilization have evolved into new forms, combined with human life that makes the ‘digital’ quality of art enter our awareness more regularly. Today the areas of art expand even to include biology and artificial life. There are now beginning (and will be many more) fields that can be analyzed within a semiotics of “Digital Art,” in other words. Philosophical discussions about these new genres of creativity should take place in the awareness of a close interactive and reflexive activity between life and art, in any art activity.
Notes:


2. Roy Ascott (1934) is a British artist and theorist who can be said to be a pioneer in Digital Art. His awareness of a telecommunications network based on virtual reality, digital technologies and consciousness are of interest. This can be seen in his book *Telematic Embrace: Visionary Theories of Art, Technology, and Consciousness*, by Roy Ascott and with Edward A. Shanken, ed.; Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2003.


4. Ibid., p. 10.


8. CP 2.228.

9. CP 2.274.

10. CP 1.343.

11. CP 5.484.


13. CP 2.96.


16. CP 5.189.


18. Ibid., pp. 14–49.

Interactive Artworks in Terms of the Rhizome Concept of Deleuze and Guattari

I. Introduction

This study discusses audience interactivity with artwork, applying the rhizome concept of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992). Most interactive artists attempt to involve their audiences in their works. Because of this involvement, interactive artwork requires a different process for appreciating artworks, compared with others that are not intended for audience participation. Interactive artwork divides the responsibility of creating and producing art so that the usually centralized power of creation is shared. These features are similar to the “rhizome theory” proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. In their argument, a “rhizome” is an interval, something in “between” that keeps changing.

Timothy Marry thinks that what Deleuze imagined as possible at the pivotal moment of 1968 might be understood now, near the beginning of the new millennium, as having come to material fruition in the interactive aesthetics of CD-ROM and virtual installation. Interactive artwork is associated with continually changing art image texts and the participators’ physical reactions in savoring the art; therefore, the artwork itself usually decentralizes and disperses the images, and keeps changing as the audience interacts with the work.

In the rest of this paper, I first discuss the properties of interactivity that are consonant with the rhizome theory, in which experiences are made of plateaus and are always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. I then offer an explanation of rhizome theory and discuss whether interactive artwork uses the rhizome system. In order to promote the idea that interactive artwork corresponds to rhizome theory, I analyze several interactive artworks.
II. Interactivity as an Open and Floating Tool

Though the term “interactivity” is not unusual or newly coined, it is used in many fields without definite meaning, having different definitions and nuances. Steve Dixon argues that all art is an interaction between the viewer and the artworks, and thus that all artworks are interactive in the sense that a negotiation or confrontation takes place between the beholder and what is beheld. The worth of artworks is in the interaction because only when an object is experienced by the audiences as art is it finally labeled as a work of art. All artworks have their spectators who interact with them physically or mentally. Thus, when I distinguish interactive artworks from art in general interactions, how they differ, I think, is in the physical reactions, in the idea that the audiences or participants activate, affect, delete, shift, or converse with the work.

Rocky Miller defines “interactivity” as a reciprocal dialog between the user and the system, including conceptual constructions from both sociology and informatics. The adjective “interactive” is used when referring to the active participation of the user in directing the flow of a computer or video program. This system exchanges information with the viewer, processing the viewer’s input in order to generate the appropriate response within the context of the program.

This kind of response occurs in the networked relationship in which a multitude of users who control the progression of the works exist. All of the people who join a certain work at the same time change and develop the work, which is a connected and floating state. The work is no longer the expression of a single individual. Neither is it the expression of a collective; rather, it is the state of a “connective” - a web of influences that is continually recognized by all participants. Söke Dinkla regards open interactive artworks as floating phenomena and refers to them as “floating” works of art. Dinkla believes that the term “interactive artworks” is not sufficient for explaining the connecting and networking property in a fundamental sense; therefore, the term “floating work of art” is offered as an alternative. It explains more complex, acentric, and in-progress phenomena. Dinkla may even want to argue that interactive artworks on the Web are “alive.”

In my opinion, if we apply the above definitions, interactivity is the tool for producing open and floating artworks. Without interactivity, the work can hardly flow among the spectators. If the work needs to be kept open, floating, connecting, and changing, interactivity must be applied as a tool. In the progression of artworks, the rhizome systems grow from the seeds of ideas, and, conversely, the ideas from artists who transfer them to the audience are cultivated as a rhizome.
Interactive Artworks in Terms of the Rhizome Concept...

III. How Rhizome Systems Relate to Interactive Art

Because interactive artworks are programmed to be open and floating, the interactivity is an important aspect of and catalyst for activating such works. Spectators act as participators, adding, editing, and deleting the text of works, and the work is thus detachable, connectable, reversible, and modifiable. These attributes are similar to the rhizome systems in Deleuze and Guattari’s theory. A rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature. It is reducible neither to the One nor to the many; and it has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and overspills.6

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the rhizome pertains to a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, has multiple entry-ways, and its own lines of flight. The rhizome seems to be a liberal, uncertain state that does not have centered or polycentric systems with hierarchical modes of communication and pre-established ways. Thus, the rhizome system is an a-centric, “nonhierarchical,” non “signifying system” that is defined solely by a circulation of states. Likewise, whereas hypertext enables multidirectional navigation only within the limits of a certain structure, cyber text makes it possible to create new paths and areas. Thus, calling such a strategy a “rhizome” indicates that it is a multidirectional, unpredictable development.7

When artworks apply multidirectionality, endlessness, and (to some extent) unpredictability, they are equipped with rhizome systems. The system itself makes environments that are beyond dimensional, that are movable and changeable, and “that are more nomadic than historic.”8 An interactive artwork is like a living organism, which keeps growing and transforming or at least changing. Artworks with a rhizome system evolve and proliferate; these interactive artworks are floating and in-progress. The floating work of art is not an entity, but a state of transformation by changing influences. A floating work of art is mobile and dynamic; therefore, it recognizes only temporary hierarchies. Its uniqueness lies precisely in the fact that it is recreated with every moment of perception.9 It is precisely changeable, interactive image texts that rhizome systems induce. In art field, the interactivity is an important tool for establishing the rhizome systems in the works, and interactive artworks, conversely, demonstrate the properties of rhizome systems.

VI. Proliferating the Seeds of Interactive Art

The ideas an interactive artist proposes are like seeds grown and developed by the audiences. The works possess their own DNA, which consists of the programs
made up by the artist, but their growth is dependent on interactivity. They exist but are not activated. The programmer only provides the seeds; the audience shares the responsibility of creation by cultivating the work so that it flourishes.

From the seeds of the artist’s ideas, the rhizome grows by means of the interactivity of the audience with the artworks. The a-centric, cycling, and decoding properties of rhizomes can be applied to the images that the interactive art produces. The spectators can intuit the message underlying the process of the artworks being created.

The work of Maurice Benayoun (1957~), from which an image is shown in Figure 2, demonstrates the new dimension of visual systems by decodification, which is the process of converting everyone’s energy into image text. The ID Worms, red installations in a public square on Century Avenue in Pudong, Shanghai, are constructed so that spectators look inside, after which their data are converted into two-dimensional (2D) QR Codes, an apparently neutral way of identifying people and objects. (Fig. 1) The red ID Worms have two ends, one small and the other large, the latter being made up of a big rear projection screen that displays giant black and white pixels. The ID Worms collect people’s identities to construct a virtual city, using the data from the QR Codes. The city image, which is like a map projected on the giant screen, is visible from the same angle, and it displays a kind of city landscape that perpetually grows as people’s IDs are scanned.

Figure 1. Maurice Benayoun <NeORIZON>, Urban interactive art installation, «Shanghai e-Art Festival», China, 2008.
Interactive Artworks in Terms of the Rhizome Concept...

At the bottom of the screen, the ground moves away like a long surface of fabric mapped with thousands of ID Codes, 2D codes built out of the users’ faces – that is, from the people who look into the ID Worms. (Fig. 2) As the ID codes move away from the viewer, like a continuously growing roll of fabric, some of them are extruded from the ground, rising upward as cubes and volumes, converting the ground surface into a growing number of buildings. People are thus converted into a city that will never stop growing.

This work has “the property of rhizome, a significant rupture [in] building a different one from the others without respect to the origin or fundamental meanings of the sign.” In the course of the conversion, ID Worms transfer a spectator’s identity in reality to the virtual reality of the new domain which has an effect that might be called “detrimentalizing.” The spectators are changing their existential axes while connecting to and interacting with ID Worms. The spectators’ faces are representative, crystallized into codified complexes, laid out along a genetic axis, and distributed within a syntagmatic structure by “decodification.” Deleuze and Guattari explain these actions as a property of rhizomes. ID Worms blend whole images from the outer world, such as people, animals, and inanimate objects, into signs and 2D images. The leading characteristic of interactive artwork is to keep changing as the interacting spectator changes, which means that the work is perpetually “becoming.”

The face of the spectator is converted into a sign system that has a different dimension from the original one. It deviates from the representation and provides new image ranges, making a map. Deleuze and Guattari mention maps, which are...
a trait of rhizomes. They believe that the map is oriented toward experimentation in contact with the real as well as being itself a part of rhizome. Because a map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions, it is detachable, reversible, and susceptible to constant modification; as well, it can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, or reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. One of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entry ways.11

After the conversion progression, Benayoun programmed the work to show a map of images. The image itself represents the idea of the rhizome with its interactivity. In Benayoun’s work, the urban installations are the most visible part of what the artist calls “critical fusion,” by which he means introducing fiction into reality to improve its transparency. <NeORIZON> is one of the works that introduce hints for helping to decipher the codes of our daily lives into physical space.12 This aspect practices the concept of the rhizome system that decodes what we observe into what we cannot see in reality.

In another work by Jeffrey Shaw, <Legible City>, (Fig. 3) the spectators are able to access the streets by means of a bicycle. In other words, “the spectator is converted from ‘the being before images’ (Vor-der-Bild-sein) to ‘the being inside images’ (In-der-Bildwelt-sein).”13 The handlebar and pedals of the interface bicycle give the viewer interactive control over the direction and speed of travel. (Fig. 4) The physical effort of cycling in the real world is gratuitously transposed into the virtual environment, affirming a conjunction of the active body with the virtual domain. The map images, which have changeable and reversible axes, are not arranged with a center or hub.

To open another dimension, Shaw decodes the buildings in the cities as map images, and as they ride the bicycle, the spectators interact with the images that are composed on the screen. These images keep changing in accordance with the speed at which the person is riding. To experience the image, the spectator should walk into the image, not merely stand before it, because it is more intuitive to act to experience artworks.14 This active involvement of the audience goes beyond passive awareness of the image so that interactivity plays an important role. While a participant is riding the bicycle through the virtual world, he or she is “becoming” someone who looks around the virtual and intuitive world. In traveling the virtual images, the audience “becomes.”
The interactivity in this work mainly involves physical “acts” or “movements” on the part of the spectators. Shaw’s empirical point of view of traditional painting is to make participants experience their own bodies in front of the canvas. The audiences experience the exact distance between the work and themselves, as well as accurately realizing the physical relationships between the images and their physical presence while walking back and forth before the images. Physical involvement becomes intertwined with mental involvement, and it is an effective
This act of appreciation is similar to the act of reading a map because we move our bodies in accordance with what we read. Therefore, a map is a diagram to use as a guide for our actions. Because of its properties, the map itself belongs to the rhizome conceptually as it presents endless variations and open entrances for new dimensional images. Composing the image of the map on the screen, both Benayoun and Shaw, by taking advantage of the interactivity, constructed rhizome systems and thereby created new layers of images. As a result, the spectators or participants can experience the rhizome systems while interacting with the image texts.

Figure 5. Woo-sok Jang <Fluid Boundaries>, Interactive Installation, New York, 2009.

Figure 6. Woo-sok Jang <Fluid Boundaries>, Interactive Installation, New York, 2009.
Korean interactive artist Woo Sok Jang renders real time water effect, sounds, and real elements, such as White Mason sand, in his work <Fluid Boundaries>. (Fig. 5) In this work, he stresses that the audience should indirectly create a visual representation of the interactions between themselves and others in human society. In addition, he suggests the audience participate by enjoying the experience of environments they cannot access in reality. It attempts to create visual representations of interactions via the mutual relation of boundaries between individuals. Humans have a basic instinct of self-preservation, and according to Carl Jung’s (1875–1961) “theory of symbol,” people always have their own variety of invisible layers and boundaries of different sizes that depend on their cultural backgrounds or personalities, which they strive to protect from being violated. Such invisible boundaries seem clear when we form relationships with individuals and make ceaseless efforts not to infringe on others’ privacy.

In Fluid Boundaries, when two participants are in bodily contact with each other or are standing within 20 cm of each other, the boundaries created beneath them in the “water” will merge. The person’s identity is decoded to the fluid boundaries, and the virtual boundaries merge and separate, always ‘becoming,’ existing as a state not as a physical organism. Audiences are also able to see shadow traces behind them along the path they have been moving, walking, or running. Through this process, participants are allowed to see their revealed paintings underneath the ocean when they cleave the “water.” Those images do not represent anything in reality as the audience cannot encounter or experience this state in real life. The images on the screen keep changing whenever the participants perform and interact with them. The images on the screen are always different: none of them is the same nor can one return to a previous image because it never existed from the beginning. Since there is no beginning image, the work progresses in the middle: it has only a middle dimension like the rhizome system. It simply keeps reacting and proliferating eternally.

V. Conclusion

The rhizome theory of Deleuze and Guattari is a neutral state that is variable and a-centric. The variations of the rhizome system are activated by interactivity, and this cycling and floating system is similar to the images created by spectators’ interactivity with interactive art. The interactive artworks tend to elicit appreciative behaviors from the spectators, and the important tool to practice in relation to the artwork is interactivity, with which the participants’ actions can be connected and combined, constructing the floating quality of the work.
This floating property of digital images is neither a personal expression nor a collective one. Rather, it is the connective status activated with interactivity.

Interactive artworks have no beginning and no end. The middle field sequences that connect the conditions to eternal states are the important part. Therefore, the images are open to several directions, providing many ways to appreciate the work. Rhizome contemplation occurs while we interact with the artwork that proposes the rhizome system. This interactive artwork has scattered centers, not representing a fixed perspective or a phenomenon but rather being established with a principle of diversity that results from a variable system.

Interactivity becomes the most important method for encountering the principle of artwork of this nature; therefore, the characteristics of interactivity are the crucial clue and medium used to organize the rhizome systematization of the works. When spectators are taking part in creating the text of these artworks, the participation causes immediate immersion, which is unprecedented.

As Deleuze and Guattari say, the map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing of it always involves an alleged “competence.” The spectator’s actions are involved in the appreciation of the work; therefore, the audience is able to experience through behavior the underlying meanings of life beyond the artwork itself. Thus, the rhizome system can penetrate the spectator’s perceptual field, transmitting it to the intuitive realm. In this way, interactive artwork can be regarded as a desirable tool for experiencing Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome theory.

Notes:

5. Ibid., p. 38.
8. Ibid.
Interactive Artworks in Terms of the Rhizome Concept...

16. Woosok Jang, Interactive Media Artist & Chief Director in Dilussion Inc. exhibiting, lecturing, and working internationally, received his MFA in 2009 from the Pratt Institute in New York. He especially majored in Interactive Media as his professional specialty. He used to work for ‘D’strict holdings Inc.’ as a Director & Leader of Art and Technology Group in order to design diverse emerging media and converge analog and digital experience for global advertising, entertainment, education and art marketing industries. His unique disciplines and tangible product R&D outputs craft revolutionary brand launching show, event, concert and environment designs such as “Tiffany&Co. media Hyper facade in Beijing in 2010,” “Samsung Mobile Jet & Corby Global Launching Show in 2009” with gesture sensing based by holographic display and diverse interactive brand spaces innovations.
Bloomsbury’s Vision: Considering ‘The Cinema (1926)’ by Virginia Woolf

Introduction

The English novelist, Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), is well known as the central figure of Bloomsbury Group in London. Although initially displaying a negative attitude toward motion pictures in the 1910s, she became as interested in it as a new art form as the other members of the group. Actually, many of them, including J. M. Keynes, Leonard Woolf and Clive Bell, took part in the establishment of the London Film Society (1925), which was the first cultural reaction to motion pictures in England. It is interesting to note that the Bloomsbury Group was actively involved in films: in 1926, Woolf wrote two versions of an essay about certain films in the Arts and New Republic, and she was also engaged in pioneering film theories at a time when the approach to films was changing from dealing with them as simple amusement to considering them as the object of intellectual discussion. In her work, Woolf emphasized the unique artistic value which distinguished film from photography and literature. In this paper, I will examine the artistic vision shared by the Bloomsbury Group and underlying Virginia Woolf’s film theory, and will clarify the nature of that vision.

1. Virginia Woolf’s Film Theory in Relation to Earlier Studies

In her theory of cinema of 1926, Woolf recognized that most films of her time were merely adaptations from literature, and that this situation was undesirable for cinema. While exploring the possibility of an expression of its own, she proposed that films might, in time to come, be composed of movements and abstract images. However, in Paris, at that time, at least three abstract films...
had already been produced, two of which were screened in New York, and the American cultural critic, Gilbert Seldes, remonstrated that she had not mentioned them\textsuperscript{4}. Her husband, Leonard Woolf, had heard of abstract films in the London Film Society and her sister’s husband, Clive Bell, had watched Leger’s \textit{Ballet Mecanique} and Renet Clair’s \textit{Entr’acte} in 1926\textsuperscript{5}. Therefore, it is reasonable to imagine that she was aware of at least two such films. The point here is why, although exploring motion and abstraction as pure expression in cinema, she did not mention the contemporary abstract films in Paris.

According to Seldes, “trick” films, such as Georges Melies’s \textit{A Trip to the Moon} (1902), were considered to be forerunners of the abstract films which came out in the 1920s\textsuperscript{6}. The “purity” of films, he said, occurs when it does not depend on a technique of expression present in literature or theatre, but is the particular expression only technically possible in film. For example, in the film made by Léger, geometric shapes such as circles or triangles are made to move by animation technology, followed by repeated close-ups of a female lip or machine parts. At times, Léger attempts to avoid the monotony of repetitive movements by changing the speed at which the film is projected. In Seldes’s analysis, this process of making images produced the climax of the film following a gradual build-up of the viewer’s emotions.

In fact, the close-up, repetitive movements and changes of speed were simply for the purpose of movement and construction, the motivation of films. In contrast, Woolf thought the motivating factor of film to be the specific quality of each emotion rather than emotional dynamism. She commented on the movement of “a shadow shaped like a tadpole” in the German expressionist film \textit{Dr. Caligari} (1919). “The monstrous quivering tadpole seemed to be fear itself, and not the statement ‘I am afraid’. In fact, the shadow was accidental, and the effect unintentional”\textsuperscript{7}. Here, the sense of “fear itself” that Woolf indicates seems to be different from the movement of a female lip or machine parts. She stressed that the emotion of “fear” was expressed in the film, not by a sentence or words such as “I am afraid”, but by the movement of “a shadow shaped like a tadpole”\textsuperscript{8}. That is to say, she understood the purity of films to lie in the emotion expressed by shapes, while Seldes and abstract filmmakers understood this purity to be in its technical differences from literature or theatre.

Since 1990s, Feminist scholars and cultural critics have started to discuss Woolf’s notions of the unique expression of film. Certain female theoreticians, such as Leslie Catherine Hankins and Maggie Humm, have tried to show that Woolf’s awareness as regards films was ahead of her times\textsuperscript{9}. Indeed Humm states: “She envisages film not as mimetic but as offering a kind of dialectical psychic montage”\textsuperscript{10}. 
2. Symbol and Emotion in Woolf’s Film Theory

2.1. A Comparison Between Woolf’s Film Theory and Eisenstein’s Montage Theory

When Maggie Humm mentioned “a kind of dialectical psychic montage”\(^1\), she was referring to Sergei Eisenstein’s (1898–1948) Montage theory, which appeared at nearly the same time as Woolf’s criticism. Eisenstein conceived this theory in 1925, during the production of Battleship Potemkin, which showed how the composition (or sometimes the collision) of several shots could create a symbolic level beyond that of the early Hollywood method of narrating events by juxtaposing representational shots. Eisenstein explained this filmmaking process using the analogy of Chinese characters (Kan-ji) as ideograms. For example, the Kan-ji “泣” consists of the symbolised pictures for water “氵” and an eye “目”, and signifies “to weep” as the meaning beyond anatomical similarity (“目” symbolizes → and “氵” symbolizes  kao and “泣” symbolizes →|slide]. He insisted that this process of producing symbolic meaning is montage itself\(^1\).

At first glance, Eisenstein’s theory seems very much like Woolf’s, which emphasized expression by using symbolic shapes. She also conceived the possibility that “thought could be conveyed by shape more effectively than by words”\(^1\). She called this a “symbol” in the same way that Eisenstein focused the Bushu (a fundamental part of Kan-ji) of ideograms. However, when she used the term “symbol”, it was not the embodied abstract idea Eisenstein imagined, but a shape connected with a particular emotion\(^1\).

2.2. The Uniqueness of Woolf’s Film Criticism

Early British films followed the naturalistic tradition. Therefore, while literary works came to be made into movies in Italy, France and United States in the 1910s and 1920s, in England, filmmaking generally declined in favour of newsreels, which reported on domestic events. This led to the documentary films movement, which started in the late 1920s, when Woolf wrote ‘The Cinema,’ and peaked in the 1930s.

The three genres of film noted in her essay suggest that Woolf’s ‘The Cinema’ was written under these circumstances. First is the newsreel featuring sporting events, such as the Grand National, FA Cup or America’s Cup. Second is Anna Karenina (1915/ USA), based on Tolstoy’s original novel. Finally, the German Expressionist film, Dr. Caligari directed by Robert Wiene (1919). FA Cup showed King George V attending the football match in Wembley Stadium, the Grand National showed the winning horse Jack Horner by projecting the images (motion pictures) onto the screen.
These newsreels describe everyday events, but it is not the actual events which occur before our eyes on the screen. Woolf used the relationship between the eyes and the brain as a metaphor for the relationship between visual sense and thought. The English “unaesthetic eye” fulfils a biological role without brain’s help in everyday life\textsuperscript{15}, but it is not necessary for it to perform that function when we look at images on the screen. The images on the screen retain actual events at the same time as they are “what happened before”. Therefore, the visual function is denied and “eyes” ask “brain” for help. “Brain” finds a quality in the images on the screen, which Woolf, in ‘The Movie and Reality,’ describes as “the passage of time and the suggestiveness of reality”\textsuperscript{16}.

Although the images in newsreels contain the above-mentioned quality, contemporary filmmakers were not satisfied with Woolf’s analysis. They managed to make their films artistic with the help of existing art forms such as literature or theatre. However, the collaborative alliance between “eyes” and “brain” was prevented by adaptation of these forms. For example, in \textit{Anna Karenina}, viewers generally imagine the female image on the screen to be Anna Karenina, knowing “by the inside of her mind”\textsuperscript{17}. Filmmakers use the images in order to allow viewers to become emotionally involved in the inner world of the characters on the screen. In contrast to the case of the newsreels, eyes see “Anna”, who is projected through the images on the screen, yet brain knows she is not Anna but an actress who is playing the character of Anna\textsuperscript{18}.

Filmmakers tried to emphasize the inner world of Anna using visual symbols rather than the words in novel\textsuperscript{19}. Yet, as Woolf pointed out, these visualized symbolic expressions had nothing to do with Tolstoy’s novel\textsuperscript{20}. It is important to note that she found the possibilities of films not in the images bounded by literary context/contents, but, for example, “a shadow shaped like a tadpole” connected to a specific emotion, such as “fear itself”, which the viewer would experience in \textit{Dr. Caligari}.

\section*{3. The Visions of the Cinematograph: The Art Theory of the Bloomsbury Group}

Woolf seemed to aspire to a specific artistic quality in cinema, separating technology for expressiveness. Her attitude was thought to be influenced by the art critic Roger Fry (1866–1934), another member of the Bloomsbury Group. In 1926, Woolf published her film theory, and Fry and Woolf jointly contributed an introduction to \textit{Victorian Photographs of Famous Men and Fair Women by Julia Margaret Cameron}\textsuperscript{21}.

There is some evidence of their relationship in the works written in that same year\textsuperscript{22}. In this section, I will explore the similarities between Woolf and Fry’s ideas,
considering the latter’s texts ‘An Essay on Aesthetics (1909)’\textsuperscript{23} and ‘Retrospect (1920)’\textsuperscript{24}. Woolf’s stance, which addressed the construction of images within films which were neither an “imitation of nature” or literary, was different from that of French abstract films, which made use of avant-gardism mechanically, technologically, or the intellectual Montage theory which Eisenstein developed.

3.1. The Vision in the Real Life and a Cinematograph

At the time Roger Fry became famous as an art critic, the English people’s taste in art had changed from the Pre-Raphaelites to French Impressionism. Naturally, both the narrative or theme paintings in the Royal Academy of Arts as well as Impressionist paintings held an important place in the art world of early 20\textsuperscript{th} century England. However, Fry did not support both styles. While stating that when “the Impressionist aims at truth he aims at truth to visual impressions only and renders no allegiance to the truth of external facts”\textsuperscript{25}, he criticised Royal Academy paintings for “the deplorable level of stereotyped sentimentality”\textsuperscript{26}. He advocated a new direction in art, neither the imitation of nature nor literariness, in two Post-impressionist exhibitions organized by him in 1910 and 1912. This direction was different from both the subject-oriented, realistic expression in the Academy and the impressionistic expression of French contemporary art.

Fry was interested in artistic expression divorced from everyday life. In his work ‘An Essay on Aesthetics’ he defines “to look at” as the vision for art in imaginative life, as opposed to “to see” for everyday life. The latter is related to a biological, instinctive reaction and an ethical action restricted by certain social habits. To see is not only a matter of visual function; for example, if we see a runaway horse approaching us in everyday life, we would think of getting out of its way at the same time as feeling horror. According to Fry, this horror-like emotion was aroused by the appropriate psychological reaction to an instinctive sensation such as preventing a risk. So, in everyday life, “to see” arouses a certain emotion and the appropriate resultant action. Alternatively, the state of mind in the “imaginative life,” is cut off from our instincts and morality so that we can be engaged in looking at something without this resulting in the appropriate action. As examples of this imaginative vision Fry mentioned the visions in the cinematograph and the mirror in his work ‘An Essay on Aesthetics’ in 1909.

In his vision of the cinematograph, Fry is referring to early films, such as those made famous by the Lumiè\`ere brothers, consisting of a single shot taken by a fixed camera, so not involving montage. Fry describes a scene as if it was a part of the film \textit{L’Arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat} (1895) from the spectator’s viewpoint\textsuperscript{27}. On a train, we are usually concerned about luggage or prospective
seats, so we do not notice the composition of the view and the passengers' actions. However, emotions which are aroused by the visions of cinematograph are felt quite purely, since the person “cannot, as they would in life, pass at once into actions”, “…The fact being that at a station one is never really a spectator of events, but an actor engaged in the drama of luggage or prospective seats, and one actually sees only as much as may help to the appropriate action”28.

In parallel to Fry, in “The Cinema’ Woolf appears to assume a difference between the visual function of the everyday life and an extraordinary scene. In relation to the newsreels mentioned above, which appear to represent normal scenes, she says, “the King, the boat, the horse” have become “real with a different reality from that when we perceive in daily life. We behold them as they are when we are not there. We see life as it is when we have no part in it”29. And then, as if we watch these “antics of our kind from this post of vantage”, “we have time to register on top of this sensation”30.

For those who behold newsreels, their vision is certainly close to Fry’s vision of the cinematograph. Be that as it may, in 1926, when ‘The Cinema’ was written, films had progressed dramatically since early cinematograph days; for example, the fixed camera could by then be moved freely. The short films taken in a single shot had evolved into feature films containing a montage of several shots.

In fact, as mentioned in the previous section, filmmaking during the 1910s and 1920s in England was in decline and remained at the level of the recorded information of newsreels, although there was editing in the changes of frame and the continuity of shots. This was in contrast to other European countries, where artistic quality was a requirement for films.

Given this situation, Woolf understood the specific quality of the medium to be “time art” and dealt with news, literary and German expressionist films equally without reference to genre. In relation to the future possibility of a unique expression of cinema based on a specific cinematic, non-literary vision31.

3.2 The Vision of the Mirror and the Emotion Related to Form

Fry proposed the vision of mirror as a means of attaining an artistic vision. The important thing here is not the correspondence between the appearance of objects and their reflection in the mirror, but the image (reflecting appearance) within the frame of the mirror. This corresponds to his championship of Post-impressionist painting32. He recognized the image as something different from everyday life: looking in a mirror in which a street scene was reflected. This would appear to be similar to the quality which is “a different reality from that which we perceive in daily life” in Woolf’s statement33.
When we look upon the scene as a whole reflected in the mirror, we come to notice the relationships between the parts that constitute our view, because our vision is freed from its biological function in our actual life and curiosity about the cinematograph as the record of real life. In this way, we come to see objects equally, “with that intense disinterested contemplation”\textsuperscript{34}. “The frame of the mirror, then, does to some extent turn the reflected scene from one that belongs to our actual life into one that belongs rather to the imaginative life. The frame of the mirror makes its surface into a very rudimentary work of art, since it helps us to attain to the artistic vision”\textsuperscript{35}.

Naturally, Fry made a classification of visions, with the artistic vision being paramount. While the “vision of cinematograph” might be likened to Impressionists, who attempted to represent the appearance of real life inside a fixed frame, the “vision of mirror” might be regarded as the antithesis of the literary theme paintings in Royal Academy. Fry criticized both directions and exhibited his enthusiasm for post-impressionist art, which included abstract art. It should be noted that while Fry did not completely welcome abstraction, he was interested in both this and Cézanne’s work, with its emphasis on geometric forms and composition. However, he did not show enthusiasm for the principle of geometric construction in progressive Cubism, despite his aim to find a new expression which did not involve the imitation of nature and adaptation of literature\textsuperscript{36}. The reason for this is that this Cubist work remained the level of collage and did not display the emotional composition Fry found in Cézanne’s paintings. His focus was on the expression of emotion in the form of artworks rather than their subject matter. In other words, the way in which constituents such as colour and shapes are put together consistently in the works. Fry called these colour and shapes “the emotional elements of designs”\textsuperscript{37}. In the same way that Fry felt little empathy with abstract art, such as Cubist developments, including Futurism and Vorticism, Woolf showed little interest in abstract films.

**Conclusion**

As has been discussed, there is a correspondence between Fry’s theory of vision and Woolf’s film theory. Through a comparison of the medium of paintings as space art and films as time art, we can suggest the originality of her theory. Whereas the specific emotions which Fry insisted were aroused by spatial composition in the fine arts, the composition of films also contains temporal elements. Woolf’s quality of “a different reality from that which we perceive in daily life” must contain the dimension of time from the outset. That is to say, even newsreels representing past events do not belong to the time of the actual
world: the viewer looks at a scene which has been extracted from concrete time and constructed in another way. Imagining that films may have their own consciousness or thought, in “The Cinema,” Woolf tried to suggest a process of cinematic thinking which visually integrates each symbolic expression of “wild and lovely and grotesque thoughts”.

Notes:

1. Virginia Woolf wrote about cinema for the first time in “The ‘Movie’ Novel”, in Times Literary Supplement, Aug. 29, 1918, p. 403. [In the following review, Woolf maintains that the characters in The Early Life and Adventures of Sylvia Scarlett are better-suited for films than fiction]; the earliest mention of movies which I have been able to find is in Jan. 1915 of her diary: The Diary of Virginia Woolf Vol. I: 1915–1919, London: Hogarth Press, 1983, p. 18.

2. Woolf, ‘The Cinema,’ The Essays of Virginia Woolf vol. 4 1925–1928, London: The Hogarth Press, pp. 349–350: “All the famous novels of the world with their well-known characters and their famous scenes only asked to be put on the films. What could be easier, what could be simpler? The cinema fell upon its prey with immense rapacity and to this moment largely subsists upon the body of its un-fortunate victim. But the results have been disastrous to both”.

3. Ibid., p. 351.


8. In ‘The Cinema,’ Woolf’s idea of the purity of films stressed non-technological aspects such as multi-exposure and animation. Ibid., p. 351: “For the cinema has been born the wrong end first. The mechanical skill is far in advance of the art to be expressed.” However, Seldes had only read “The Movie and Reality”.


10. Maggie Humm, Modernist Women and Visual Cultures, p. 188.

11. Ibid., p. 188.


Bloomsbury's Vision: Considering 'The Cinema (1926)' by Virginia Woolf

15. Ibid., p. 349.
18. Ibid., p. 350: "The eye says, ‘Here is Anna Karenina’, and a voluptuous lady in black velvet wearing pearls comes before us. But the brain exclaims, ‘That is no more Anna Karenina than it is Queen Victoria!’”
27. Ibid., p. 14: “I remember seeing in a cinematograph the arrival of a train at a foreign station and the people descending from the carriages: there was no platform and to my intense surprise I saw several people turn right round after reaching the ground, as though to orientate themselves; an almost ridiculous performance, which I had never noticed in all the many hundred occasions on which such a scene had passed before my eye in real life”.
30. Ibid., p. 349.
31. Ibid., pp. 349–350.
32. Roger Fry, 'Expression and Representation in the Graphic Arts' (1908), A Roger Fry Reader, p. 63: “we find that no test of accuracy in the imitation of the appearance of nature will ever suffice to distinguish between what we find to be great works of art and inferior ones”.
33. Fry, 'An Essay in Aesthetics', p. 14: “But, in the mirror, it is easier to abstract ourselves completely, and look upon the changing scene as a whole. It then, at once, takes on the visionary quality, and we become true spectators, not selecting what we will see, but seeing everything equally, and thereby we come to notice a number of appearances
Mariko Kaname

... and relations of appearances, which would have escaped our notice before, owing to that perpetual economizing by selection of what impressions we will assimilate, which in life we perform by unconscious processes”.


35. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15. Fry suggested the vision of the scene in the mirror was a metaphor which is likely to be directed toward abstraction apart from representation in art, including paintings and cinema. In the mirror, paintings, cinema, the vision is no other than an image which forms our visual field, not the sign for preventing crisis.

36. Fry criticized the idea of his friend, Clive Bell. See Fry, *Retrospect*, p. 206: “He also declared that representation of nature was entirely irrelevant to this and that a picture might be completely non-representative. This last view seemed to me always to go too far since any, even the slightest suggestion, of the third dimension in a picture must be due to some element of representation”.


Corporeal Dimension of Aesthetic Experience in Abstract Art. Wassily Kandinsky’s Creativity in the Light of Michel Henry’s Phenomenology

Introduction

In my paper I would like to consider the sense of aesthetic experience in Wassily Kandinsky’s abstract art in the light of Michel Henry’s phenomenology. In the first part of my paper I present the main categories of Michel Henry’s phenomenology (especially the corporeality and Life) and then, in the second part – I indicate similarities between Henry’s phenomenology and Kandinsky’s theoretical and artistic creativity. In the third part I focus on consequences which follow from these considerations to the sense of aesthetic experience. I will search answers to the following questions: what is the aim of abstract art? What is the sense of aesthetic experience in abstract art? Why is the experience of abstract art a basic and corporeal experience? What forms the source of abstract art? In what sense do corporeality, affectivity, freedom and spirituality connect to each other in abstract art? Why does experience of abstract art have a moral character?

1. Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Life

The main category in Michel Henry’s thought is corporeality. Henry differentiates corporeality (le chair) and the sensual body (le corps). Corporeality is invisible and it is experienced from internal and personal perspective. One cannot treat corporeality like a physical object because it is impossible to distance to it in any way. One can experience it without any mediation. It is the most intimate and immediate sphere of our personal life which makes that we are individual. Corporeality has both active and passive character. On the other hand the sensual body (le corps) is an object between other objects in the world. It is the second dimension of our body. It is something that we can explore and describe from the distance (for example in the science). These two aspects of the body are
connected with two dimensions of existence: corporeality (la chair) belongs to the invisible Life and essential experience (sensibility) whereas the sensual body (le corps) belongs to the world and its sensuality (sensuality).

Although category of Life is very important in Henry’s phenomenology, it is not precisely defined. The thinker underlines a transcendental and even religious dimension of Life and differentiates it from the biological sense of life. In his thought Life has an absolute character and it is experienced by corporeality in a direct way. We have no distance to Life that is why we have a problem to describe it in any way. It is difficult to contain Life with a conceptual language because a language has representative and indirect character. We can say that the central category of Henry’s phenomenology is live corporeality which reveals Life. Henry proposes the radical sense of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. Because of the radical phenomenological reduction one can follow from intentional phenomenology to the phenomenology of Life and corporeality. Life has no objects. It constitutes the basic condition of the world and intentionality. It is the most absolute, transcendental and invisible reality which exceeds such dualism as: object – subject, internality – externality, and sensuality – reflectivity.

It is important to mention that corporeality, in contrast to a body, is not only sensual (sensualité) but has an affective character (affectivité). Corporeality is felt and experienced from internal perspective and connected with such feelings as: suffering, sorrow, enjoyment, love, etc. Everything that is only sensual or intellectual can appear because of corporeality and Life. Henry writes about corporeal subject which has an affective and dynamic character.

In Henry’s opinion, everything that is connected with the world is external and different, whereas affective Life connects people on the most basic level. Paradoxically, corporeality - which makes us individual – is something that we have in common and something that enables communication between people. However, for Henry the true community of people has no social but transcendental character. Henry says about “transcendental community”. The thinker writes that: “community is an underground stream of affections and everybody drinks the same water from this source and from this well which is one”. In everyday existence people usually forget about indirect experience of corporeality and attach to material, pragmatic and incidental things. Consumption, pragmatic and even intellectual attitude, which is typical for modern world, is not appropriate to experience Life. In everyday existence, Life and corporeality are present, but we cannot see them. Philosopher proposes attitude which enables us “to see” invisible Life. It is possible if we “close our eyes” to the external world. Henry is convinced that the abstract art (especially Kandinsky’s abstract art) allows us to experience Life and, at the same time, transcendental communication. Abstract
tion enables us “to see” the invisible sphere of Life because it is not focused on object but on the way of feeling.

2. Phenomenology of Abstract Art

In the work Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky Henry treats Kandinsky’s aesthetic consideration and creativity similarly to his own phenomenological conception. In Henry’s point of view Kandinsky’s consideration is an example of phenomenological analyses. According to Kandinsky’s theory, art expresses source and essence (eidos) of our life experience. We can say that the artist uses phenomenological epoche to free art from everything which is only incidental, past, conceptual, material, and pragmatic. He also wants to free art from object.

There is no doubt about it that Kandinsky’s art evolved gradually from mimesis to expressionist, from materialism to spiritualism and from representation to abstraction. The painter finely entirely frees art from all obligations to the outside world. The aim of his further compositions and improvisations is not representation of reality, but revelation “inner and spiritual sound” of every thing and expression of the affective life. Resignation from the objects and following into abstraction dematerializes art and leads to its direct influence upon the soul. The living subjectivity with its affective modalities Kandinsky calls “the soul”. Henry sees an association between “the soul” and corporeality. According to Henry’s thought, it is impossible to perceive and represent dynamic Life and corporeality. Kandinsky in his abstractions intensifies Life which pulsates in the live corporeality. In abstract art aesthetic experience is not a simple perception but rather a feeling of the things. Both recipient and creator go beyond the conceptual and objective level and feel the vibrations stimulated by the play of abstract colours and forms. We can say that aesthetic experience in abstract art constitutes the ecstatic harmony between corporeality, soul and abstract forms in the picture. Art reveals to us something which is hidden behind our common perception and, at the same time, allows us to see different possibilities of being in the world. It does not imitate reality (mimesis) but it expresses internal force and reveals pure sphere of corporeality (le chair) and affectivity. In Henry’s interpretation abstract art enables this pure expression of Life.

Although Kandinsky sees abstract forms in all kinds of art, he often underlines that especially music reaches high level of abstraction. He was especially inspired by Arnold Schönberg’s creativity, which – as he writes in On the Spiritual in Art – “leads us into a new realm, where the musical experiences are not acoustic, but soul inspiring.” Especially absolute music is the most free because it does not imitate nature but expresses the inner Life and feelings. However, music is the
most freed from the objects and the outside world, we can see the evolution to abstraction in every kind of art, in which artists examine spiritual meaning of elements to use them in their arts.

It is important to mention that Kandinsky had a particular capacity for synaesthetic experience. He did not perceive colours solely, but associated them with sounds. The author of *Point, Line to Plane* created “theory of harmony for painting” comparable to harmony in music. In *On the Spiritual in Art* he writes that the “inner sound” of a work of art causes a resonance in the soul of a viewer. We can read there that: “Therefore, colour is a means of exerting a direct influence upon the soul. Colour is the keyboard. The eye is a hammer, while the soul is a piano of many strings. The artist is the hand through which the medium of different keys causes the human soul to vibrate.” This quotation indicates the strong connection between soul and corporeality. Colours and shapes cause affective and direct vibration both in our corporeality and soul. There is no dualism and no distance between corporeality and soul. What is more, there is also no distance between a recipient and abstraction. We feel the vibration of colours and other elements of abstraction in direct way, before we perceive them. This is the reason why Henry could say about spiritual meaning of corporeality. The abstraction is closer to Life and corporeality than objective art because there is no object that we could perceive in intentional way. It does not present Life but it expresses Life.

Kandinsky analyses emotional power of every colour. He notices that different colours stimulate different inner energies. For example, yellow is an external colour which is disquieting to the spectator. The pointer compares yellow with the brighter tones. He writes that yellow: “sounds like a shrill horn, blown constantly louder, or a high pitched flourish of trumpets.” By contrast, black sounds like internal silence without future and hope. It is the most toneless colour. In similar way Kandinsky examines emotional and dynamic affection of shapes. He had already introduced the idea of interaction between colour and form. For him the effect of yellow is emphasized by a sharp form. Similarly, the effect of a calm and deeper colour - for example blue - is reinforced by rounded form.

In Kandinsky’s opinion, art should be based on pure, spiritual law that he calls an “internal necessity”. It should be the guiding principle of all artistic activities. In the abstract art an artist does not link the basic elements (such as colours and forms) in an arbitrary way. On the one hand, he is free from an external model such as nature, the style of the epoch and his personal life, but on the other hand, he depends on inner impressions, which are universal. Kandinsky believes that the decisive factor in the genesis of a picture should be the “inner necessity”.

He viewed the spiritual, inner voice as the ultimate
authority of his art. Emotional power of every colour is the sufficient reason to use it. In mature Kandinsky’s composition we can see the respect for every colour, point and line. In these abstractions, elements are not arbitrary. Kandinsky is of the opinion that every element affects in one, determine way. The painter does not paint the world but he expresses his emotions. Nevertheless, he does according with inner, objective, spiritual and universal law. This “inner necessity” is connected with inner freedom. In the abstract art there is no constrain and there is no choice. Artist should not create under the pressure of the culture, convention, fashionable trends, suggestion of other people but he should open up for his inner experiences. Both artist and recipient should be freed from everything which is external and incidental. That is way they can reach to the universal source of art and universal meaning. It is another similarity between Kandinsky and Henry: we have to “close our eyes” to the external world to feel the Life better.

3. Conclusion

Michel Henry treats experience of abstraction as basic and most original experience. In the contact with abstraction we can refresh our feeling and experience in the way which is natural for children who see things for the first time. One can say that abstract art wakes up our sensibility which is necessary to have deeper contact with present time and see the inner value of everything. Both Kandinsky and Henry lead us from presentations to the way of donation. “How we experience” is more important than “what we experience”. In Henry’s interpretation, Kandinsky’s play of colours and forms intensifies connection with Life at the most basic level. It is important to mention that aesthetic experience is possible in the attitude which has disinterested character. Between a creator and a recipient there is no distance, no concepts and no categories which can separate them from Life and from the present time. In this experience the recipient, the work of art and the way of feeling art are unity.

Both Kandinsky and Henry say that abstract art has moral and even religious character. It is moral because it enables experience and connection with Life. People often forget about this connection because, in their existence, they focus especially on pragmatic, material and incidental matter. Only affective experience can refresh this connection. In this perspective, art becomes ethic and even religious experience when it livens up this radical connection with Life and wakes up affective forces within us. According to Kandinsky, the development of art is a struggle of the objective against the subjective. The artist should listen only to the voice of “internal necessity”. Kandinsky writes that: “All means are sacred
when called upon by innermost necessity. All means are a sin and lacking virtue if they do not come from this source”.

To sum up, both Kandinsky and Henry treat experience of abstract art as spiritual, aesthetic, moral, transcendental, affective expression which exceed dualism such as: object – subject, internality – externality, sensuality – reflectivity, soul – corporeality. This experience of art is the most original experience which has an affective character and is connected with such feelings as: pain, sorrow, suffering, happiness, love, etc. It expresses the most basic level of our Life. Kandinsky and Henry indicate special transcendental aesthetic ability that is connected with corporeality and feelings.

In conclusion, I would like to express some doubts about Henry’s interpretations of Kandinsky’s art. Firstly, I wonder if only Kandinsky’s abstract art enables immediate experience of Life. It seems to me that immediate experience of Life appears in a more vivid way in the body language, dancing, popular art and in performance (especially in body art). Does not body language more immediate experience than abstract art? Secondly, I wonder if abstract art in its content indeed enables intersubjective communication. Is Kandinsky’s art in fact more universal than, for example, Leonardo da Vinci’s works of art? Does the “theory of harmony for painting” have universal meaning? Will, for example, blue and yellow cause the same affective vibrations among people from different cultures? Do these elements of Kandinsky’s art have universal or cultural character? Thirdly, I wonder if the most intimate sphere, like corporeality, can be communicable and if it has objective character. Henry writes about unintentional communication, what suggests that experience of abstract art is beyond our reflective consciousness. Moreover, Henry dispels the myth of abstract art as incomprehensible and strange. He writes about direct experience in abstract art. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand Kandinsky’s abstract art without his theoretical consideration. It seems to me that the experience of Kandinsky’s abstract art requires knowledge, so I have doubts if it has direct character. One can solve this problem if one assumes that indirect knowledge and reflection can precede immediate aesthetic experience.

Despite these doubts I can say that Henry’s interpretation of Kandinsky’s creativity is generally very inspiring for me because it underlines and appreciates the role of corporeality in the experience of art. In this conception corporeality is a subject who has its own meaning even when it is passive. Unintentional and direct experience of art is connected with unintentional meaning which cannot be contained in conceptual language. Another significant point is that this theory treats experience of art as communication. It is communication not only between people but also with something that is bigger than reflective, in-
Corporal Dimension of Aesthetic Experience...

dividual consciousness and what Henry calls “Life” and even “God”. The sphere which is revealed by abstract art has its own meaning that is beyond reflective consciousness and requires of us opening for the affective Life and corporeality.

Notes:

1. Michel Henry analyses two dimensions of the body (le chair and le corps) and category of Life in the work: Incarnation. Une philosophie de la chair, Seuil, Paris 2000.
3. Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: on Kandinsky, translated by Scott Davidson, Continuum International Publishing Group, London 2009, p. 23: “Kandinsky calls this living subjectivity ‘the soul’ and its affective modalities, its concrete emotions ‘vibrations of the soul’. This is why Kandinsky writes: ‘the inner element created by the soul’s vibration, is the content of the work of art. Without inner content, no work of art can exist’.
4. “Because the content that painting seeks to express is Life, art is situated within a process of becoming. It belongs to and coincides with the drive of Being within us. Art has the task of supporting and carrying it to the extreme point, to this ‘paroxysm of life’, where life experiences itself on its own basis, in which it is lost in this ‘impossible happiness’ that Kandinsky calls ‘ecstasy’”. Ibid., p. 19.
6. Ibid., p. 47.
7. Ibid., p. 63.
8. Ibid., p. 58: “The artist should be blind to the importance of ‘recognition’ and ‘non-recognition’ and deaf to the teaching and demands of the time. His eye should be directed to his inner life and his ear should harken to the words of the inner necessity”.
10. Ibid., p. 58.
In the “Third Moment” of his Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant asserts that, in contrast to pure aesthetic judgments, judgements based on sensation, called by him material, cannot claim universality. As a consequence, notions such as design, figure, and composition of figures, which refer to form as an abstract geometrical entity, are privileged by Kant over charm and emotion, which derive from sensation. Ornamentation is not an intrinsic constituent of the representation of an object; it can only augment the delight of taste. Kant uses the Greek word parerga, coming from para (next, close) and ergon (work), as a synonym of ornamentation.¹ The influence of Kant’s rejection of ornament in favour of geometrical abstraction on modern art and architecture is fundamental.

This essay deals with two different philosophical approaches to ornament: the one by Hans-Georg Gadamer and the other by Jacques Derrida. They share in common a fierce opposition to the Kantian disinterested abstraction. Within the scope of his ontological hermeneutics, Gadamer insists that ornament has a crucial role in the ontological event of representation, in which architecture has to participate.² Derrida, on the other hand, in his extensive essay “The Parergon”, which constitutes a sustained reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, focuses on the double function of ornament: although apparently detachable, ornament undermines Kantian aesthetic autonomy and returns the work of art and architecture back to its materiality and the world of things.³ Gadamer’s as well as Derrida’s approaches to ornament have both greatly influenced architectural theory and practice, mainly since the eighties.

Our discussion opens with the ontological significance which Gadamer, opposing to Kant, attributes to ornament through his hermeneutics. Derrida’s reading and commenting on Kant’s definition of ornament as parergon will follow.
Gadamer argues that as far as architecture is the art which creates space, it involves a twofold mediation: it gives shape to space, while it leaves it free. As such, Gadamer insists, architecture is itself decorative in nature; it not only embraces all the other arts, including works of poetry, music and dancing and thus has to respond to their space-creating potentialities – a music hall or a dancing theater for instance - but it consists in the decorative shaping of space which involves architectural ornament, works of plastic art, gardening, etc. The nature of decoration consists in performing this two-fold mediation of architecture: it captures the attention of the viewer, activates his taste and redirects it to the greater context of life. As such, it serves to represent and enhance the context of life to which it belongs.4

Gadamer maintains that the importance which ornament carries for architecture shows the inadequacy of the Kantian claim that a work can become an object of aesthetic experience outside all space and all time.5 On the other hand, he considers that the usual distinction between a work of art proper and decoration demands reexamination. He finds the source of this antithesis in the conception of the work of art as the outcome of “the inspiration of a genius”, developed by Kant as a transcendental principle of artistic beauty. In this context, decoration was reduced to mere craftsmanship and became something additional, subjugated to the rules of what it is supposed to decorate.

Gadamer urges for the need to recover the ancient meaning of the terms ornament and decoration. “The ornamental and the decorative” he insists “originally meant the beautiful as such.”6 As Plato states in Philebus, for instance, the idea as the metaphysical form of a sensible thing, coincides with goodness, harmony and truth. Departing from Plato, Gadamer argues that the concept of decoration needs to be grounded in the ontological structure of representation, which constitutes, within his hermeneutic philosophy, the mode of being of the work of art as such. Opposing Kant, he claims that “Ornament or decoration is determined by its relation to what it decorates, to what carries it. It has no aesthetic import of its own that is thereafter limited by its relation to what it is decorating.”7 In this way, ornament is part of the presentation of a thing. Gadamer claims that as an ontological event, presentation is always representation.

Departing from the structure of play and pointing to its universal significance, Gadamer conceives of representation as “reproduction” without an original; or, better, as “reproduction” which is an original at the same time. In this way, representation is the original mode of being of the original work of art. Ornament participates in this coming-to-presentation of being. Representation for Gadamer is part of a hermeneutic experience. This experience concerns as
much the creation of ornament as an integral part of an architectural work, as its meditative function within a particular life context.

As Gadamer explains, hermeneutic experience is grounded on the concept of historical consciousness. Every work of art and architecture requires understanding. Understanding has to be conceived as part of the ontological event of hermeneutic experience. As such it is less a subjective act than a participating in the event of tradition.

The aesthetic appreciation of the work of art considered as an object of disinterested experience depends on a process of abstractions: only by disregarding its original place and context of life as well as its particular function and meaning within this context, the work becomes visible as a “pure work of art”. Gadamer argues that Kant's exclusion of any claim to knowledge from the experience of art indeed implies a scientific concept of knowledge and of reality. Appealing to Hegel instead, he asserts that truth as the outcome of artistic experience is recognized and at the same time mediated with the concept of historical consciousness.

Among all the arts, Gadamer claims, the special importance of architecture lies in the fact that a building points beyond itself, to the whole of a context. A work of architecture extends beyond itself in two ways: first, it has to serve a particular way of life, and, second, it has to occupy a place within a total space context. Nevertheless, a building is not a work of art if it is just an artistic solution to this problem. In order to be a work of art it has to preserve the context of purpose and life to which it originally belong, so that even if its original purpose changes, it always points back to the original context. In this way, the building mediates between past and present. The role of ornament of this “increase of being” of a work of architecture achieved through its mediation between past and present is crucial.

Within this context, Gadamer's argument that architecture is decorative in nature as far as it shapes human space, endows ornament and decoration with a major ontological significance. Involved in the process of hermeneutic experience, ornament and decoration have to be the outcome of the understanding and interpretation of tradition in relation to a particular place. This does not imply copying. For, as Gadamer explains through his conception of representation as play, there is no original. Nevertheless, this does not prevent ornament and decoration from being carriers of truth within a particular life context. On the other hand, the lack of original creates the obligation to the architect or the artist to be faithful to the interpretation.

Within the postmodern quest for reevaluation of values of the past, which originates in the seventies and the eighties, the work of architects such as Leon and Rob Krier, Aldo Rossi, Paolo Portoghesi, Demitri Porphyrios could be
related to Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics. However, it was in the fifties and the sixties when we have pioneering architects such as Carlo Scarpa, Gino Valle, Demetris Pikionis, who seek for contextual unity in their work. They have denied Kantian abstraction in favour of ornament. Ornament here constitutes an ontological characteristic of the work of architecture which is engaged in a constant interpretative dialectical procedure with the context of life in which it belongs.

We proceed with Jacques Derrida’s answer to the Kantian parergon, included in his work *The Truth in Painting*. In order to challenge Kant’s attempt to arrive at a universally valid, “pure” aesthetic judgement in relation to the beautiful, Derrida focuses on the concept of “parergon” which is marginal, “a frame and outside-the-frame”, “a hybrid of outside and inside”. Following his philosophical method of deconstruction, Derrida seeks to reverse the hierarchy between binary oppositions as form and ornament or pure and material aesthetic judgements. Furthermore, he questions the ability to draw a clear line between the inside and the outside of a beautiful form. His aim is to expose the contradictions of Kant’s argument and reveal the hidden assumptions.

In paragraph 14 of the *Analytic of the Beautiful* under the title “Exemplification” Kant raises the issue of parerga:

> Even what is called ornamentation (parerga), i.e. what is only an adjunct, and not an intrinsic constituent in the complete representation of the object, in augmenting the delight of taste does so only by means of its form. Thus it is with the frames of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades of palaces. But if the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of the beautiful form – if it is introduced like a gold frame merely to win approval for the picture by means of its charm – it is then called finery and takes away from the genuine beauty.

Derrida claims that the choice of examples provided by Kant (the frames of pictures, the clothing on statues and the colonnades of Classical architecture), serving the elucidation of the term ornamentation or parerga, is not self-evident. He proceeds to expose Kant’s faulty logic starting from the clothing of statues.

Kant makes it clear, according to Derrida, that the clothing on statues is not an intrinsic part of the representation of an object, but belongs to it in an extrinsic way, as a surplus or supplement. In the representation of a statue then, the naked body could only be “the proper object of a pure judgement of taste”. This assertion becomes stranger if we wonder where parergon starts on the statue. What if we take as an example Cranach’s Lucretia, for instance? Is her transparent veil a parergon? Her necklace? And what about the dagger which touches her
skin in the middle of the triangle formed by her breasts and her navel? There is nowhere to draw a clear line between what is intrinsic and what extrinsic to the work itself. As it comes out from Derrida’s argument, it is rather the value Kant ascribes to naturalness and the naked human body taken as an immediate self-presentation of consciousness that constitutes the criterion of his delimitation.16

Derrida continues his investigation of the border between inside and outside of a work of art with reference to the example concerning the porticos of Classical architecture. This case is more obscure than the previous one due to an extra difficulty: unlike the representation of a human body, architecture does not represent anything which already exists in nature; rather, it is itself something already added to nature. How can we talk of the intrinsic value of something which is already a supplement? Derrida wonders. The argument becomes more absurd if we start talking along with Derrida about columns in the form of the human body, columns (naked or clothed) that support or represent that they support a window, which (the window) is not clear of course if it belongs to the inside or the outside, and the situation is getting even worse if we start asking about the window of a building in a painting perhaps.17

The issue Derrida asserts here is much broader. By discussing the example of the column taken by Kant as parergon, he initiates the problematics of inscribing something in a given milieu. It is always difficult to decide whether this milieu is natural or artificial, and, in the case it is artificial, if it is ergon or parergon. According to Kant, Derrida claims, the natural site of a temple is not a parergon; neither the artificial site of a church, or a museum. But the drapery or the column is. This implies that there is a lack in the interior of the work which creates the need of the parergon. This lack, for Derrida, is the cause of the very unity of the ergon of art with its parergon.

Dealing with Kant’s third example concerning the frame of a picture, Derrida claims that the frame of the picture alike the clothing of the body or the colonnade of the building has a thickness and a surface, so it does not have only an internal limit but also an external one. Thus the parergon, in comparison to the work merges into the wall or the context (historical, economic, political) and in comparison to the wall or the context merges into the work. Thus, the parergon is a form which, far from being a background or a context to the work, confirms itself by “disappearing” and “melting away”.18

Here Derrida exposes Kant’s reliance on an absolute distinction between the intrinsic and the extrinsic, as it is expressed in his analytics of aesthetic judgement. Continuing the discussion, Derrida argues that, according to the logic of the supplement, the division of the parergon into two, implied in Kant’s distinction, gives rise to a pathology.19 Kant insists that the parergon contributes to the pure
judgement of taste only under the condition that it intervenes “by its form” alone. This is, Derrida comments, the “normal” parergon. However, if it is not purely beautiful, it lapses, according to Kant, into adornment and thus damages the beauty of the work. The attraction of sensory matter causes the deterioration of the parergon. In order to be “pure”, the parergon has to be a design dealing with the organization of lines and the forming of angles; moreover, it has to remain colorless and deprived of all empirical sensory materiality. We could argue that this is the case with the prevailing trends within modernist art and architecture.

Modernism views ornament as parergon or supplement, a useless surplus to structure. The opposition between ornament and functionalism remained crucial for modernism throughout the twentieth century. By associating formal purity with functionalism, modernist avant-guard in architecture attempted to maintain traditional consistency of form. It was in the eighties, with the great influence which Derrida's philosophy exerted on architecture, that the ornament / structure antithesis was put under the scope of a thorough interdisciplinary examination. This antithesis could be deconstructed by Derrida's notion of supplement or parergon. According to Derrida's logic, which we discussed earlier, ornament inhabits the privileged term – structure - and constitutes an inherent component of its formal expression. When the abstract, Euclidean structure of modernism, which Kant would favor, was exposed to the pathology of ornament in the work of architects as Peter Eisenman, Bernard Tschumi or Daniel Libeskind, it became evident that there could be no such thing as a pure architecture any more. This has further consequences: there is an explosion of the limit between work and context which releases an endless series of binarities, such as interior and exterior, form and content, work and nature, presence and absence. At the same time, architectural space becomes heterogeneous, differential and open, subject to the action of forces.

Finally, what Gadamer's and Derrida's philosophies share in common is the significance of ornament in contemporary aesthetics, not as something which gains universality and eternity detached from life, materiality and practice, but as subject to a constant change, in relation to its context; natural, political, cultural. In Gadamer, ornament is a constitutive part of the ontology of the work, which is the outcome of a circular, never ending interpretative process in relation to tradition. As such, the work is consistent and well-defined. In Derrida, on the other hand, ornament taken as parergon, breaks the limits of consistency in form. The parergon actively participates as much to the work as to the context, while they both suffer from its absence.
Notes:
5. Ibid., p. 151.
6. Ibid., p. 152.
7. Ibid., p. 152.
8. Ibid., p. 158.
9. Ibid., p. 291.
10. Ibid., p. 76.
11. Ibid., pp. 84–87.
12. Ibid., pp. 149–150.
15. Kant, p. 68.
16. Ibid., pp. 57–58.
17. Ibid., p. 59.
18. Ibid., p. 61.
19. Ibid., p. 64.
1. Preliminary Note

The Congress of Aesthetics currently taking place in Cracow is a jubilee congress. For it is organised a hundred years after the first International Congress of Aesthetics that was held in Berlin in 1913. In the long chain of international congresses of aesthetics, a Hellenic ring was added in 1960 when the Fourth International Congress of Aesthetics took place in Athens. This Congress was organised by Panayotis Michelis, who, at that time, was a professor in the School of Architecture at the Athens Polytechnic. Michelis was a distinguished architect and aesthetician; he founded the Hellenic Society for Aesthetics and the review *Annals for Aesthetics*, and he became its first president.

The Fourth Congress of Aesthetics was a great event for Greece. Politicians and academics participated in different Committees. Philosophers like Panayotis Michelis, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos Tsatsos, Johannes N. Theodorakopoulos, Basileios Tatakos, Evangelos Papanoutsos, and Evangelos Moutsopoulos, authors like Pantelis Prevelakis and Takis Papatsonis, the painter Nikolaos Chatzikiyriakos-Gikas were among the members of the Hellenic Organising Committee. Many Greek philosophers of the time, intellectuals and artists were among the participants. The president of the Executive Committee for Aesthetics was Étienne Souriau, while among the members were Thomas Munro, Toshio Takeuchi, Panayotis Michelis and others. Among the many participants, there were also aestheticians from Poland, like Ladislas Tatarkiewicz, Stefan Morawski, Roman Ingarden. It has been a long time since Panayotis Michelis edited the Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of Aesthetics in an extensive volume of almost nine hundred pages. This volume is a testimony manifesting the international recognition of aesthetics not only as a philosophical discipline and as a specific kind of theorising about
art, creativity and aesthetic experience, but also as a place of intercultural communication and cooperation.

Taking into account the aforementioned Hellenic ring, I decided to take Panayotis Michelis’ aesthetic reconstruction of dialectics as the issue of my paper.

2. Introduction

Michelis reconstructs dialectics as the dialectics ‘in art’, in order to explain the structure, the meaning and the human context of art. The main issues of this procedure are the autonomy of art, the history of art without constraints on metaphysics, art beyond its realised history, dialectics of synthesis, and the work of art as dialogue. Michelis recognises that dialectics, as it is set out by Plato and Hegel, has investigated the broad interrelation of art to the creativity, the achievements, and the expectations of human life. In his view, both philosophers have raised the question of art on the high level of the question of truth. Nevertheless, truth is for them the culmination of metaphysics. In Plato’s dialectics, the source of truth is the transcendent idea of the good, while the idea of beauty is the refuge of the power of the good. In Hegel’s dialectics, truth is the self-conscious supersession of contradictions within the development of spirit, while beauty is the appearance of the absolute idea.

Plato’s critique of art as well as Hegel’s aesthetics is more or less restrictive towards the possibility that art manifests truth. Michelis’ way of theorising encompasses the meta-critique of Plato’s critique of art as well as the refutation of Hegel’s interweaving of art with the absolute spirit. This examination liberates those aspects of Plato’s and of Hegel’s dialectics that can be relevant for aesthetics after the critique of metaphysics. It is plain that Michelis’ critique of dialectics goes along with the creative reception of its hermeneutic results. So, the limitations and the perspectives of dialectics are reconstructed, and dialectics ‘in art’ can explore the question of art by taking into account the contemporary theoretical demands of aesthetics.

In what follows, I explore these issues in detail.

3. Metacritique of Plato’s Critique of Art

Michelis criticises Plato’s dialectics as underestimating the creative inspiration of poets and artists in favour of true knowledge provided through philosophy. He stresses that Plato, who was a philosopher-poet, was conscious of the limitations of dialectics and attempted to face them through poetic means, as myth and dialogue are. But Plato never abandoned the priority of logos. Michelis
interprets Plato's critique of art as a theoretical account that places a constraint on art in terms of the highest aims before assessing that art fails to accomplish these aims. He argues against Plato that art, not only philosophy, is also ruled through dialectics. In his view, philosophy and art constitute two different but equivalent paths to the highest values of truth and of beauty respectively. The good, the true, and the beautiful are the highest values for Michelis' aesthetics. Although this solution is not genuinely Platonic, it is set out in the spirit of Platonism. For it presupposes Plato's conception that beauty is the glorious manifestation of good.

Michelis' creative interpretation of Plato's dialogues is similar. Plato's dialogues are unique, but dialogue itself is transformed into the intrinsic feature of the work of art. Indeed, Michelis characterises the work of art as the ‘text’ that ‘tells the truth’ without words. This ‘text’ is the link between inspiration and creation; it constitutes the dialogue between artist and spectator, between the artist and the human community. So, the work of art leads beyond the necessity of reality, it liberates the human towards emotion and further towards the appreciation of beauty. Indeed, the work of art constitutes the relation between the good, the true, and the beautiful.

Michelis interprets the work of art in terms of a minimal ontology focusing on the richness of the work of art and not on the split between transcendence and immanence, as Plato did and tried to overcome through mimesis. In this way, Michelis obtains an additional argument against Plato's critique of art. Yet, he maintains that the idea is not separated from the work of art, but it ‘exists within’ the work of art, it is immanent in the work of art. This turn towards the immanence of the beauty of the work of art goes together with the internalisation of the beauty of the work of art. Michelis stresses that this turn is the revolutionary achievement of Plotinus' aesthetics. For, Plotinus criticised the conception of symmetry as one-sided, focusing on the external characteristics of the work of art; to this, he juxtaposed his own view concerning the immanence of the idea of the work of art. Michelis' conclusion is that Plotinus' aesthetics is the turning-point in the path leading from Plato's critique of art to Hegel's moderate appraisal of art.

4. Critique of Hegel's Aesthetics

Michelis' critique of Hegel's aesthetics bears the characteristics of every pertinent critique. Since Hegel's aesthetics is the most comprehensive one and unifies the theory of beauty and the history of art under strong metaphysical and logical claims, no critique can lead to an equivalent theory. So, aesthetics after Hegel
‘lives’ against Hegel’s aesthetics, but it does not ‘live’ without it, or as if Hegel’s aesthetics did not exist. Michelis’ critique of Hegel’s dialectics goes together with the creative reception of its hermeneutic results. Michelis criticises Hegel’s account about the unification of aesthetics and metaphysics as well as of art and the absolute spirit, because they restrain the autonomy of art and also of aesthetics. So, Michelis detaches the beauty of nature and the beauty of art from the teleology of absolute spirit. For his moderate realism, the dialectics of the absolute idea that was ‘established by Hegel’ is a metaphysical exaggeration.5

Michelis accepts that Hegel was the first philosopher who posed and investigated the relation between art and time. He stresses, however, that Hegel’s metaphysical history of art does not offer the solution. Therefore, he argues for the separation of the history of art from the history of the absolute spirit. Certainly, the exploration of the history of art without recourse to the Hegelian absolute spirit is a theoretical account that emerged after Hegel’s philosophy, when history of art took the way of an independent science. Michelis not only endorses this development, but he also introduces new issues in philosophical aesthetics, as it is obvious, for instance, in his critique of Hegel’s definition of the sublime. So, he underlines very often that, while Hegel connected the sublime with Christian art, Hegel came to a positive interpretation of Gothic art and to a negative evaluation of Byzantine art. Further, Michelis opposes his aesthetic consideration of Byzantine art to Hegel’s one-sided conclusion, and at the same time introduces and investigates Byzantine art as an important issue for aesthetics.6

Finally, Michelis’ critique of Hegel’s dialectics of absolute idea or of absolute spirit leads to a dialectics without metaphysical claims. Michelis retains Hegel’s terminology through a new semantics, even if he rarely mentions Hegel by name. Indeed, the dialectical moments of thesis, antithesis and synthesis or supersession, the struggle of the opposites, the contradictions or the dialectical movement are transformed into dialectical moments of ‘the dialectics of synthesis’, as Michelis calls his own dialectics. It is plain that Michelis criticises Hegel’s dialectics in order, rather, to define the limits of his own dialectics in relation to Hegel’s dialectics of absolute spirit. Admittedly, Hegel’s aesthetics is a part of his extensive dialectics of the existing reality of the Absolute. Michelis sets out his dialectics of synthesis only as a part of his aesthetics. For him, the elaboration of distinctions is more important than the formulation of oppositions. The spiritualisation of the sensuous and the sensualisation of the spiritual is the dialectical achievement of the work of art, as Hegel asserts. Further, Hegel explores art as the supersession of contradictions; first of all, of the contradiction between spirit and nature. Hegel’s statements are integrated within Michelis’ dialectics of synthesis. Nevertheless,
they are transformed as aspects of the finitude of the work of art that does not point to a metaphysical substance.

5. The Main Aspects of Michelis’ Dialectics of Synthesis

Through his dialectics ‘in art’, Michelis avoids the metaphysical burdening as well as the naturalistic reduction of the work of art. Maybe he intends to prevent the invasion of a radical Cartesianism into his aesthetics, which could argue for art without works of art. Michelis’ dialectics of synthesis is the theory of the intrinsic movement of the work of art, which goes beyond the sensuous limits of its surface. Michelis analyses this dialectical movement in a chapter of his work Architecture as Art. In his view, dialectics is the dialectics of opposites and of relations, of unity and freedom, of the connection of the work of art with the artist, with the spectator, and with the human community. Dialectical synthesis, as Michelis defines it, means neither closure nor inertia; it is rather the dynamic nexus of coexisting opposites and relations that do not destroy the whole.

This nexus is created and restrained by spirit, while the work of art is the indispensable centre of interrelations. Yet, spirit is the power of meaning and value; it is the essential characteristic of life. Spirit is revealed to the human, when the human starts from the senses and from sensuous things, goes beyond them and feels and understands beauty, freedom and truth. Consequently, spirit is connected with free intuition that searches for a different value of things beyond the immediacy of the senses, beyond the first impression, beyond the everyday life. According to Michelis, it is exactly this free intuition and view that liberates the human towards emotion or towards the appreciation of the beauty of nature as well as that of art.

Certainly, the human consists of body and mind, but, as a unity, he or she is the subject of life who has also spiritual needs. In other words, spiritual needs make up the content, the meaning of life. Indeed, Michelis emphasises the spiritual character of the human, in order to indicate that art is indispensable for human life. In some cases, Michelis uses the concept of economy, in order to assert that architecture has to introduce beauty into life and is not allowed to be contented only with the minimal covering of needs. As Michelis stresses, architecture has to estimate human needs ‘according to the measure of art’. Consequently, architecture has to respond to the spiritual and the emotional need of the human for a home and not simply for a roof, for beauty and not simply for elementary functionality.

Michelis writes as an architect, as an artist, and at the same time as a spectator and as a philosopher; last but not least, he also writes as a poet. Although
he often refers to all the arts, his thinking is orientated towards the activity of the architect. In Michelis’ view, the architect fights for creating synthesis on different levels. He relates construction and synthesis, without making synthesis dependent on construction. The distinctions between construction and synthesis, between dependence and relation are very important for Michelis’ aesthetics and theory of architecture. The ‘morphological synthesis’, namely the synthesis concerning the logic of form, presupposes the opposition between mass and material, it moves through the transformation of mass to material of art and for art. Besides, architecture cooperates with science and technique, in order to create the solid work of art, whether it is a church, a representative building or a house. This complex activity is the struggle, the fight and the contest for the realisation of the idea of the work of this art. So, the work of art is the way and the result, the inspiration and its expression, the idea and its realisation.

Michelis stresses that the dialectics of synthesis presupposes a morphological synthesis, but it is not identical to the latter. In Michelis’ view, the final element of the dialectics of synthesis is the spiritual element, which is identical neither to the form nor to the subject of the work of art. The spiritual element points to understanding and self-understanding of the human. For this reason, Michelis accuses ‘morphocracy’, namely the view of the dominance of form, because it leads to the exterior of the work of art, to which no interior element corresponds. He asserts that the work of art is more than its formal elements. For, the work of art is a ‘monad’ creating community and freedom and offering the spiritual enrichment of human life.9

Michelis defends the transcendent validity of the work of art against the arguments about the ‘end of art’ or about the ‘dehumanisation’ of modern art. On the one hand, he maintains that art never comes to an end, because art and artistic creativity correspond to the higher needs of human existence. On the other hand, Michelis brings to the fore the silent dialectics of a contradiction between modern art and the modern world. As he maintains, while the modern world is without spirit and transcendence, modern art has discovered ‘the poetry of material’, the dialectical interplay of matter and light.10 Therefore, modern art rescues the openness of lived experience and still remains within the human context.

6. Concluding Remarks

Michelis’ aesthetic reconstruction of dialectics corresponds to his consciousness regarding the theoretical demands and the methodology of aesthetics. His purpose is to bring to the fore a connective line between ancient and modern
Panayotis Michelis’ Aesthetic Reconstruction of Dialectics

theories and to re-examine realised art as an issue for aesthetics. Michelis’ aesthetic reconstruction of dialectics is also important as a contribution towards developing aesthetics and understanding art within the framework of a concrete cultural community and a concrete language. If we are gathered together here in Cracow for this International Congress of Aesthetics and are using English as a means of communication and expression, we should not forget the localities of philosophy and language. In the concrete case, we should consider Michelis’ remarkable contribution to aesthetics not only from the viewpoint of the international, but also from that of a local community, namely from the Greek or the Hellenic point of view.

Notes:
1 Actes du IV Congrès Internationale d’Esthétique, Athens, 1960.
5 Panayotis A. Michelis, Architecture as an Art, p. 365.
7 See the special chapter, in: Michelis, Architecture as an Art, pp. 199–217.
8 Ibid., pp. 442, 445.
9 Ibid., p. 199.
During the second half of the twentieth century the question as to whether, and to what extent, music is capable of expressing something as quintessentially human as \emph{emotion} has exercised many authors on the philosophy of music. Measured against the volume of paper printed with texts that in one way or another treat this question, the return is rather poor. Many of these authors apply the methods of analytical philosophy, which is to say that a plethora of ad hoc conceptual distinctions is generated, which at first sight seem closely reasoned, but in the end have little to add to a better understanding of the expressive qualities of music.

\textbf{Peter Kivy’s Saint Bernard}

An author who, over recent decades, has taken centre stage in this debate is Peter Kivy. Kivy, to his merit, displays a much greater understanding of the history of the question of musical expressivity than many other Anglo-Saxon authors do. Yet even he seems to feel the need to claim a unique position in the literature and to magnify the distinctions between himself and other authors.

Kivy has long been engaged with the philosophy of music. His first work, \textit{The Corded Shell},\textsuperscript{1} became an immediate bestseller. Amidst his many other books, the \textit{Introduction to a Philosophy of Music}\textsuperscript{2} stands out as an excellent guide to get acquainted with the field. The illustration that starts off \textit{The Corded Shell} is rather unusual for a work on the aesthetics of music: sitting on a wooden floor a Saint Bernard looks out at us giving the distinct impression that it is feeling uneasy with being the eye-catcher of the book. The caption of the photo reads: ‘The Saint Bernard Has a Sad Face’.

Yet, the dog’s expression and its description in the caption give a clue as to what Kivy wants to make clear about the expressive properties of music; one
might even say that this first illustration sums up what Kivy will go on to put forward concerning the aesthetics of music, even if his writing becomes much more differentiated and nuanced. What would the doggy have looked like if it had been fully aware of its glorious position as the visual opening statement of an introduction into the aesthetics of music? The answer can only be: exactly the same. And the caption would still read: ‘The Saint Bernard Has a Sad Face’.

We are faced with a paradox: when we feel that somebody is looking a little sorry, we tend to assume that she will be feeling unhappy. A failed exam, unlucky in love, a bad night’s sleep, anything might have caused someone to look dejected to our eyes. Yet, when we take the melancholy that we see in the Saint Bernard’s face to be an expression of the animal’s state of mind, we make an error: this is just the way the dog always looks.

**Physiological as Opposed to Cognitive Points of View**

Kivy has no difficulty in detecting parallel errors in descriptions of the character of a piece of music. As in the case of Donald Tovey, author of the well-known *Essays in Musical Analysis*, when he describes the music of the second part of Beethoven’s *Eroica* as ‘utterly broken with grief’. If that be the case, an empathetic Kivy suggests: ‘Shouldn’t we try to cheer the poor thing up?’

It is a striking introduction to the basic distinction which informs Kivy’s theory of musical expression. As is to be expected from an analytic philosopher, he finds the solution of the above-mentioned paradox in a linguistic distinction. When we say: ‘The Saint Bernard Has a Sad Face’, we do not mean to say: ‘The Saint Bernard’s face expresses sadness’; we mean to say: ‘The Saint Bernard’s face is expressive of sadness’. What is the difference between the two? The dog’s face looks sad, without the dog having to feel sad. The impression the dog’s face makes on us has been abstracted from the emotion that can be taken as the cause of an expression of sadness. In other words: there is a species of expressiveness which should not be taken to be a representation of a truly experienced emotion.

With this move Kivy turns against a venerable tradition in the history of Western music. In the Romantic era, the composer was taken to express his deepest personal feelings in music. But even earlier, in the writings of the Baroque era and of *Empfindsamkeit*, many an example can be found of views on the expressiveness of music in which no distinction is made between a musician who is cheerful, and music which sounds cheerful. As in, for instance, the well-known passage in Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach’s *Versuch über die wahre Art das Klavier zu spielen* (*Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments*) from 1753:
A musician cannot move others unless he too is moved. He must of necessity feel all of the affects that he hopes to arouse in his audience, for the revealing of his own humor will stimulate a like humor in the listener. In languishing, sad passages, the performer must languish and grow sad. (…) Similarly, in lively, joyous passages, the executant must again put himself into the appropriate mood. And so, constantly varying the passions he will barely quiet one before he rouses another. Above all, he must discharge this office in a piece which is highly expressive by nature, whether it be by him or someone else. In the latter case he must make certain that he assumes the emotion which the composer intended in writing it.\(^5\)

Here music is taken to be a kind of infectious disease, and in the context of 18th Century thinking about emotions, this is less of an anomaly than it seems today. Events happening in the world could well have a direct impact on our physical constitution, while emotions were thought to be under the influence of the *humours* or of the *animal spirits*, that, according to Descartes, liaised between the mind and the body. In treatises such as Mattheson’s *Der vollkommene Kapellmeister* (1739) we find an application of this way of thinking to music. Yet, according to Kivy, Mattheson takes a giant leap forward as he takes the correlation between the movements of the animal spirits and the character of the music not to be a mechanical one. What is reflected in the music is, rather, the composer’s *knowledge* of emotions, which does not require the listener to be infected with the emotions that the composer expresses in his music.

In the philosophy of music of the 20th Century, the old-fashioned ‘physiological’ views on how music works have been almost entirely replaced with the ‘cognitive’ views which Kivy believes are to be found in Mattheson’s work for the very first time – and to which he wholeheartedly subscribes. Many words and even works have been devoted by Kivy to convince us of a point that, perhaps, cannot be expected to accord to the intuitions of all and every music listener, yet is not so terribly convoluted that it takes a retraining of the mind to work it out. I often feel that minor differences in approach with other philosophers are blown up out of proportion in order to justify the ocean of ink.

**Symbolic Transformation**

To illustrate this with one striking example, I will now turn to what Kivy himself thinks sets him apart from Susanne K. Langer (1895–1985). Langer shared an avid interest in and sympathy for Wittgenstein and his conceptual precision with many other American philosophers. Yet she never, unlike many of her compatriots of later generations, let herself be trapped by the analytical tradition.
Her best-known book, *Philosophy in a New Key*[^6], is devoted entirely to symbolism – in language, in ritual, in myth and in the arts. Not in the sense that existing symbols were to be translated into their meanings; her interest was focused on the ways in which symbolism works. With that question in mind, she devoted an entire chapter to *significance in music*. This chapter is often read out of context. Commentaries on it often fail to mention that Langer’s text should be read in the context of her reflections on the functioning of the human mind, and not as a contribution to the aesthetics of music. The human mind is set apart by an activity which Langer, following her European forebear Ernst Cassirer, characterizes as *symbolic transformation*: impulses that permeate into our consciousness are transferred to a different domain of signification. This constitutes a cognitive act, of which we need not necessarily be conscious. When listening to music we recognize in an insistent, yet conceptually inaccessible way something about the structure of our emotions: ‘music articulates forms which language cannot set forth’[^7].

How does Kivy set his views on the expressive character of music against Langer’s?

From the very first time he mentions her name in *The Corded Shell*[^8], he attempts to steer clear of her. Kivy refers to Langer when she remarks that the physical effects of music affect the unmusical listener in the same way that they do the musical listener – from which she concludes that these effects have more to do with *sound* than with *music* (or, as I would reformulate it, they are the effects of *hearing* music rather than *listening* to it). Kivy condemns this view: if the engendering of emotions is an effect of sound and not of music, then Langer must be suffering from the preconception that music *cannot* arouse emotions. However, when we read Langer in her own context, we find that she is not so much talking about the arousing of emotions, but about primary somatic changes in heartbeat and breathing patterns. She writes that these are more easily influenced by sound than by music, and she adds that the sounds used in psychological experiments are irritating rather than inspiring[^9]. When we return to Kivy, we find that his quoting of Langer is preceded by a remark about a baby who burst into tears at the sound of a trumpet. That the poor child is frightened to death by the noise is to be expected, according to Kivy, and has nothing to do with any connotation one might associate with trumpet music. In what way exactly does this remark differ from Langer’s observations on primary physical reactions being due to sound rather than to music?

We encounter another attempt to put Langer down on the question of the historical role of Schopenhauer. Langer has adopted Schopenhauer as one of her chief inspirations. In her view, Schopenhauer has recognised a form of emotive

[^6]: *Philosophy in a New Key*
[^7]: ‘music articulates forms which language cannot set forth’
[^8]: *The Corded Shell*
[^9]: The Corded Shell
symbolism in music, which does not result from the emotional state in which the musician finds himself (as many of Schopenhauer’s contemporaries still believed). Here, too, Langer’s views are in accordance with Kivy’s: music has to do with audible emotionality, to which the listener is responsive. However, this is not the expression of a person’s state of mind. Kivy responds to Langer’s declaration of support for Schopenhauer by taking a swipe at her: he believes that the German philosopher ‘does not point forward to the semantic theory of Langer so much as backward to the resemblance theory of Mattheson (by which I mean to pay him a compliment)”.

Emotions and Conventions

The two aspects that seem to annoy Kivy most, and which in his later works re-emerge as reproofs of Langer’s work, touch on the core of the theory. The first aspect concerns the nature of the relationship of meaning between music and emotionality. Langer refers to this relationship as being symbolic, in a sense of that term which she has first carefully distinguished from the discursive symbolism which we meet in the realm of language. The syntax and semantics of language are not open to willy-nilly manipulation: we can look up what a word means in a dictionary, but the fact that the word has this specific meaning cannot be deduced from the form of the word itself. In music it is the other way round: the ‘meaning’ of chords and phrases cannot be looked up in a glossary. If music nevertheless does have meaning, then this has to be ascribed precisely to its forms: musical structures resemble outer-musical ones, those of our emotions in particular. Langer approvingly quotes psychologist of music Carroll Pratt who claims that the auditory characters of music ‘are not emotions at all. They merely sound the way moods feel……’11. There is a certain formal analogy, an isomorphism, between the two, and when a relationship of meaning is realised in this way, then Langer speaks of presentational symbolism, as opposed to the discursive symbolism of language.

Kivy does not approve. Even if he too recognises a resemblance between music and the emotions, he denies that the isomorphism Langer speaks of is sufficient to claim a symbolic relationship between music and emotion. Music should also refer the listener to these emotions. In other words, there must be a convention of meaning before it can be said to be a symbol: ‘(f)or even iconic, “look-like” symbols must “mean” by convention”12. Which does not apply to music.

The difficulty here is that Kivy’s argument rests on a restriction that, in the wake of Charles S. Peirce, has become attached to the concept of ‘symbol’ in Anglo-American semiotics. This restriction entails that the concept of symbol
Albert van der Schoot

is used only for the kind of signs that lack a natural relationship with what they signify, and rely on convention (such as a designation) or agreement (such as a right-of-way sign). The concept of symbol is certainly one of the most difficult to apply unambiguously, but at this point Kivy should have realised that symbolism (and not music) is the new key to which Langer's book is dedicated.

On coming to Chapter VIII, the reader has become acquainted with Langer's use of the concept of symbol in the tradition of Cassirer. In her previous chapter, symbolism in mythology is discussed; the reader has become familiar with just about the strongest symbol which mythology can offer: the moon as a symbol for femininity. Long before Wittgenstein came up with his picture theory, long before Peirce decided that a symbol must not have a natural relationship to whatever it symbolises, even long before anyone had learned to read or write, people had noticed that both the moon and the human female had a 28 days cycle. Therefore, 'moon = woman', whatever the exact nature of the copula may be. That is what old-fashioned philosophers like Cassirer and Langer (or Freud, for that matter) refer to as a symbol. Would Kivy really mean that this requires an explicit 'convention of meaning'? The strength of Langer's contribution to the understanding of the capacities of music lies exactly in that she shows that music, in so far as significance can be ascribed to it, works implicitly, as in mythology, and not explicitly, as in language.

A second reproof Kivy repeats time and again ultimately refers again to this difference between implicit and explicit acquisition of significance. Kivy presents his own theory of expressiveness as a conception in which music relates to the garden-variety of individual emotions, whereas, in his representation of Langer's position, she relates music to emotionality in general. According to him, Langer denies any possibility of music being expressive of individual emotions. But where does he get this idea from? It is true that Langer does not elaborate on the various emotions that can be related to music; it is also true that she emphasizes that music cannot distinguish between the various emotions in the way language can, and it is even true that she points out that some musical forms allow both a sad and a happy interpretation. But she distances herself from a conception (defended by Hauptmann and Carrière) in which music 'conveys general forms of feeling': however much she admires the insights into the cognitive value of music that it expresses, she considers this conception to be too abstract to do justice to the emotional values and the vitality that characterise each piece of music.

Langer does not deny that music relates to individual emotions; what she does deny is that they relate to the emotions of the individual. A short quote, in which she aligns herself to the insights Schopenhauer and Wagner brought to the question: 'Feelings revealed in music are essentially not "the passion, love or longing
of such-and-such an individual”, inviting us to put ourselves into that individual’s place, but are represented to our understanding ...14. Langer’s theory, formulated in an era when romantic conceptions of expression reigned supreme, is a classic example of the cognitive conception that Kivy pursues: ‘(n)ot communication but insight is the gift of music; in very naïve phrase, a knowledge of “how feelings go”’.15.

In conclusion: of all Anglo-Saxon philosophers of music seeking the limelight today, Kivy is the most informative and the most readable. Anyone who wants an introduction into this field will find him an invaluable guide. Of Langer, however, he draws a caricature; he fails to inform his readers that Langer presents music as a form of implicit symbolism, enabling us to sense emotions not in it, but through it: ‘Articulation is its life, but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression’16. I’m afraid I can’t escape the conclusion that Kivy, in spite of his recognition of her pioneering role in the question of music’s relation to the emotion17, finds it hard to accept that Langer preceded his Saint Bernard by almost half a century.

**Notes:**

17. Kivy, *The Corded Shell*, p. 27
Dance, of all the arts, would seem to have the most natural expressiveness, as it uses the entire human body itself. We should not need to worry about metaphorical or hypothetical or symbolic expression. The body itself, the instrument of dance, really does express a range of human emotions and attitudes in ordinary life.

But far from simplifying our understanding of expression, this unique situation raises questions unlike any other art form. What is the difference between the expression of an emotion by a person in an artwork in dance and the expression of an emotion by a person in non-art, “everyday life” situations? Do the expressions in the artwork have a special presence or symbolism or universality that we do not experience when the identical bodily movements are completed by a person in ordinary life?

If we understand what it means for a person to express an emotion, do we necessarily understand how that emotion is expressed in a work of art, using the human body? Is the “same” emotion being expressed? Or is an abstraction or symbol of that emotion being expressed?

If not performing as a character in a dramatic work, can a dancer still express emotional content in a way different from ordinary expression? If performing as a non-representational body, moving in space, can a dancer still express something, and is it different from ordinary life activities?

What does it mean to be “successful” in expressing emotions? Is the key test the satisfaction of the dancer? Or the satisfaction of the audience in understanding the emotion communicated? If we assume that the artist will know when this success happens, could this be delusional self-satisfaction, or is there an objective measure of such success?
How does expression in dance compare with expression in other art forms, especially performing arts which use the human body as an instrument, such as theater or vocal music?

These puzzles have been addressed by philosophers, dancers, critics, and dance theorists, often with widely varying conclusions. I first review the range of proposals which have been offered to explain expression in dance. I then propose a pragmatist approach to address seemingly irreconcilable positions in various “dance worlds.”

Although philosophers historically paid little attention to dance among the arts, some early thinkers, such as Lucian, identified expression of ideas and sentiments as an element of dance, not merely the imitation of reality that Plato and Aristotle promoted. Hegel, in a brief consideration of dance, suggested that dance be evaluated for “… its ability to express mind or spirit.” But the view that expression of emotions and feelings is the central goal of dance emerged only in the twentieth century.

Havelock Ellis, writing in 1923, shared the view that expression by humans is the central core of dance. “The art of dancing stands at the source of all the arts that express themselves first in the human person.” For Ellis, this expressiveness can be found in our religious and spiritual lives throughout history and expressiveness in dance was a natural outgrowth of these other activities. But, as with many early theorists, he mentions a “symbolic significance” for expression in dance, but never develops what that might mean.

Theodore Meyer Greene, writing in 1947, also stressed the expressiveness of ordinary human movement as the basis for the expressiveness in dance as art. For Greene, expression can include both “emotions and conative attitudes,” and an even broader notion of “artistically expressive.” Like dancers and critics of this era, he placed expressiveness at the center of what is special about dance as an art form, but he does not address just what it means to be expressive, whether the dancer must actually experience the emotions and attitudes expressed, or whether the audience must recognize those emotions and attitudes.

In modern dance over the past century, expression using natural human feelings has often been a priority, a way of breaking away from formalized languages of classical ballet. But what counts as “natural” is not immediately obvious, except perhaps a visual similarity to non-dance movement. Why is this “natural” movement preferred? Is this considered more expressive of genuine or authentic human feelings and experiences? Is this a test of a feeling of “completeness” or “rightness”? Is this a priority for mind or soul over mere body and a belief that “natural” expression would be more accurate in externalizing these internal states, as might be inferred from the work of the early dance pioneer, Isadora Duncan?
Another modern dance pioneer, Rudolf von Laban, preferred “natural” movement, as he believed it made dance “teleological instead of mechanical.” Laban was one of a school of German choreographers typically characterized as “expressionist.” As with the earliest American modern dance pioneers, they believed dance should express true inner emotions of the dancers, and that the emotions should reflect a unity of persons and nature.

Philosopher Susanne K. Langer was a leading proponent of the expressiveness of dance, and has been widely read by dance students in the last half century, especially given the paucity of attention to dance by most philosophers of art. She urged that works of art be understood as “expressions of human feeling in a sensuous form.” All art is expressive, not merely in portraying our inner emotional life, but also in structuring, through symbolic forms, our understanding of our external reality. The long-standing problem with her work has been developing a precise understanding of her notion of “symbol.”

In contrast to these early theorists, philosopher Graham McFee has argued that expression in dance is best understood in the context of expression in all the arts, and that it is a mistake to try to understand it as most like expression of ordinary human movement in a non-art context.

Because dance played such a minimal role in the work of philosophers of art until recent years, much of the early thought was developed by philosophically inclined dance critics and historians. Dance theorists from centuries ago highlighted the special expressive nature of dance. The French writer Jean-Georges Noverre, in the eighteenth century, said of dance movement, “… when feeling and expression do not contribute their powers sufficiently to affect and interest me, I admire the skill of the human machine, … but it leaves me unmoved….” These observations anticipate claims that one test of successful expression in dance is the impact on the observer.

John Martin, long-time dance critic for the New York Times and cheerleader for modern dance pioneers, recognized the central role of the expression of human emotions in dance. He characterized movement as “… a medium for the transference of an aesthetic and emotional concept from the consciousness of one individual to that of another.” As observed by noted dance historian Selma Jeanne Cohen, for Martin,

Dance is an art of communication only when it grows out of human experience, when individual movements are derived from individual emotions. The dance deals with feelings that can be represented neither by words nor by a superimposed system of motion.
But Martin also believed that dance expressed something broader than emotion, “things that transcended reason,” and which could not be talked about in words.  

Although a practicing dance critic was not expected to pursue the philosophical nuance we might expect today, his insights shape issues we still confront. Is expression “best” or “most effective” when it is somehow “natural” expression of normal human emotions? If dance is about natural emotional expression, what sets apart the expression in dance, the art form, from the expression of human beings in their normal non-art lives? Exactly what is being expressed in an expressive dance? Must the dancer actually experience the emotion being expressed to be effective? Is it more important for the dancer to be a good actor in presenting the appearance of expression of those emotions? 

Cohen seems to defend the position that expressiveness is an essential element, or necessary condition, of all dance, but that expressiveness is not the “essence” of dance. 

The dance as a whole has an expressive quality, but this quality does not account for all its parts. It cannot, because its movements are designed for a purpose beyond expressiveness.

She also understands expressiveness broadly to include more than emotion, but also “meaning.” But she does not intend “meaning” in the way that a discursive sentence would have meaning. Rather, the dance expresses either the “quality of character” of the person or emotion.

She offers helpful insights into the difference between the expressiveness of a dance and the expressiveness of a person in ordinary, non-art life. Mainly, these differences have to do with the stylistic and exaggerated characteristics that are the hallmark of choreography – adding “a more definitely perceivable shape in space,” or enhanced “dynamics” or enhancement of the “sign” communicating ideas. She also explains expression in plotless works as expressing emotion “in their attitude toward the movement,” rather than in “the relations of the dancers” that we find in dramatic works.

Can dancers really express more than emotion – intellectual content? Symbols? Discursive content? Martin and Cohen seemed to think so, as does Roger Scruton, who has argued that art can express “thought, attitude, character, in fact, anything that can be expressed at all.” Romanticists, in contrast, he notes, limit expression more narrowly to expression of “emotions, moods, and feelings.”

Etienne Gilson also stressed the non-verbal intellectual activity of dancing: “The born dancer thinks with his body the way he dances with his mind.” But he considers “expression” only in the sense of mimicry, “... the art of expressing thoughts through gestures,” and does not consider emotional expression, as did other theorists.
Years later, post-modern choreographers used exactly the ordinary movements of life by non-dancers as part of their works, thus challenging this approach to understanding what makes dance expression what it is. Philosopher Noël Carroll observes that expressiveness had been “… taken as a sine qua non of dance by many academic theoreticians and critics,” but argues that much post-modern dance is overtly “non-expressive or even anti-expressive.” Carroll notes a variety of things which theorists and critics have thought dance could “express.” A narrower sense of expression was limited to emotions or some “anthropomorphic quality” such as “wit, charm, majesty, aloofness, sentimentality, generosity,” which was metaphorically portrayed. A broader sense of expression, he observed, was communication of “… ideas as well as feelings and other anthropomorphic qualities.” Some post-moderns, he argues, have succeeded in eliminating expression in the narrower sense, but not the broader sense of ideas.

It should also be noted that what is most interesting about such post-modern works is precisely their overt rejection of earlier, more traditional views of the “specialness” of dance. In other words, their content was directly parasitic on the existence of these earlier notions of expression. Their innovations furthered the continuing dialogue in dance about the appropriate role of expression, even as they sought to jettison it.

Another important contemporary analysis by Mary Sirridge and Adina Armelagos notes the dominance of expression theory in explaining dance, at least in the twentieth century. But they reject classical expression theory, which said that the dancer expresses actual emotions they are experiencing. They also reject a “weakened or modified” account of expression, in which “the dance expresses a feeling or emotion, but need not actually possess it; [and] the audience apprehends that feeling or emotion, but need not come to share it.” They instead urge adoption of an approach to expression borrowed from Nelson Goodman, in which expression is understood “as a kind of metaphorical possession of qualities by the dance art work.” They develop Goodman’s insight using the concept of “style” to account for “… the crucial link between the dancer and the dance as perceived.”

They argue that dancers focus only on their physical training, not on what they are expressing, in both classical and modern dance. Rather than stressing the “natural” connection of the human body expressiveness in ordinary life to its expressiveness in dance, they insist that what makes dance an art form is precisely its disconnection from ordinary movement.

In a later article, they dismiss the appeal to “natural expressiveness” of other philosophers. They note that even dance which is constructed with so-called “ordinary” or “everyday” movement is strangely devoid of “… the everyday
expressiveness of ordinary movement.” Their training as dancers and choreographers eager to account for a wide range of contemporary dance, from classical ballet to modern dance to post-modern dance, seems to color their adamance that the supposed “natural expressiveness” of the human body has no role in our understanding of dance today. At most, there is a metaphorical connection between the images conveyed by the dancer and the understanding of their meaning, if any, by the audience.

In sum, we see serious disagreements throughout this survey on several aspects of expression. First, should we understand “expression” in dance mainly as a subspecies of expression in all the arts or as a variant of “expression” by the human body in daily life? Second, should we limit “expression” to the conveyance or metaphorical representation of emotions or should we understand it more broadly to include expression of ideas and linguistic content? Third, how should we understand successful expression, as authentic communication of inner feelings by the dancer? As authentic communication actually understood by the observer? As symbolic or metaphorical representations of inner states understood by the observer, regardless of the inner feelings of the performer?

I propose that “expression” is best understood pragmatically. I urge that we resist the historic urge to find an “essence” or singular explanation of expression for dance that suits all purposes and perspectives. Note that “expression” means many things in non-art contexts. We can use ordinary language to “express” a feeling, an idea, a command, and so forth. Non-verbal expression, whether in the arts or otherwise, can also express a variety of things, with emphasis on different aspects of the expression, depending on our context and purposes.

Consistently with contemporary pragmatic theory, I want to stress that different on-going community dialogues might reasonably understand “expression” differently. Thus, a beginning modern dancer might reasonably say that she is pursuing the art in order to express herself, even though that approach to expression might strike experienced dancers or dancers in another genre or critics or theoreticians as naive. Historic modern dancers and choreographers might also understand expression as effective communication of their inner emotions to an audience which would understand the content of those inner states. This view of expression crystallized their rebellion against older, more stultified forms of classical ballet and, to understand their work, we need to recognize their sense of “expression” as they understand it. Sophisticates today might understand expression as a symbolic portrayal of emotional states, whether or not the dancer and the audience actually experienced that emotion. Post-modern dancers and choreographers might understand their expression as communication of intellectual ideas, but not emotions. There is room for everyone on the dance floor.
These positions seem irreconcilable compared against each other. But they are not intolerable as understandings in different communities within the larger art world. We should recognize that the role of expression in the art form of dance does indeed vary, depending on the role and context of the dancer, the choreographer, the audience, and the critic and theoretician, and their place in the historic dialogue of the development of dance. The complex texture of these overlapping dance worlds informs and enhances our understanding of expression.

Notes:

1. Philosopher Van Meter Ames argued that “Expression is aesthetic when fused with form,” thus distinguishing expression in ordinary life which “may lack form,” from aesthetic expressions. “Expression and Aesthetic Expression,” JAAC 6:2 (December 1947), 172–179, 172–173. Although he does not discuss dance specifically, these insights give us a starting point for distinguishing the human body of everyday life as it expresses emotion from the human body-as-dance-instrument with such expressions. We might then ask, what would count as the “form” that is distinctive in this art. In this regard, Ames cites the suggestions of Louis Arnaud Reid, who says that “aesthetic expressions” are “finer, subtler, more accurate, less literal and more imaginative.” Quoting from Louis Arnaud Reid, A Study in Aesthetics, New York: Macmillan, 1931, p. 50.


4. Ibid., p. 23.
5. Ibid., p. 24.
7. Ibid., p. 63.
9. Ibid., p. 67.
10. Ibid., p. 132.
11. E.g., he claims that “The final purpose of every serious dance … is to offer a new and vital interpretation of some aspect of man's inner emotional experience and of his generic emotive-conative responses to his complex environment.” Ibid., p. 341.
13. This is hinted at in Gilbert, p. 108.
25. Ibid., p. 21.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 24.
29. Barwell, ibid., p. 175.
31. Ibid., p. 197.
33. Ibid., p. 98.
Part III. Art in Action
The Anamorphic Look of Dionysos in Plastic Work from Marcelo Bordese

This paper is inscribed in the frame of a still embryonic investigative process that began with the finding of the plastic work of Argentinian artist Marcelo Bordese. The interest that this artistic “corpus” has awakened has been attenuated on the basis of a primary approximation to the “Dionysian” concept that has been developed from the perspective of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.

In his works, which have been qualified as “early” or of “youth”, the philosopher from Röcken develops an aesthetic vision of the world that moves it to the mere condition of human existence. Both visions – the cosmologic and the anthropologic – respond to an only Will, to the primordial One. This ‘only will’ is manifested through the one the Greeks call Dionysius: the one that bursts tragically into existence, emerging “from that divine Titanic order of horror, the divine order of happiness: in the way that roses bloom from a thorny bush”.

It is not the purpose of this work to find – or force – certain sympathies or coincidences between the philosopher and the artist, though that way has always been tried, the arbitrariness has always sacrificed one or the other. At least, the invite is to think if the message by which the philosopher inaugurates a new conception of the being has become a necessary prophecy in present times, making even more evident the fact that, “only through art, the existence and the world find justification”. For the demonstration of this evidence – if we insist in the necessity of some justification – we analyse the work of the artist Marcelo Bordese with the alleged that through this Dionysian vision of the world is recreated from a determined aesthetic provocation, by putting ourselves in front of the plastic creation of Bordese, we cannot ignore what Panofsky considered by referring to the study of the artistic expressions; which, according to him, should be understood in then relations to other phenomena’s that escape the
artistic surrounding, due to the fact that they are the product of a determined conception of the being of the world.

Contemporary studies about art begin to propose what we could call a “new sensibility”. In the case of the analysis of Bordese’s work, this “post-modern” attitude reveals a way of feeling art which no longer responds – or ignores – the traditional assumptions of all aesthetic judgement:

Any object can be art if it is exposed with artistic intention that produces in us an aesthetic experience. Saying this is art could hence express a feeling of art and certainly, in front of a determined object, we can coincide in this appreciation. But the concept of art that we look for today should aspire to this coincidence, it should then include everything that makes each individual feel art.

The analysis of the actual debates around the problems that a history of art brings, supports the compromise of not unlinking – in detriment of the work – the intrinsic elements that signify it from others, that some denominate “external” to its structure, given that these later works in some way comprise the work, making it a participant of that micro-cosmos we call “art”; hence, as Da Vinci expressed “if art has a resemblance to something, it is not what is being represented, like it happens with the mere copy, but with the spirit that conceives it”. That, far from enclosing the work in itself, opens it to senses that the producer of it would not recognize, if not being this one an “open” fragment of reality to being signified through multiple ways.

In other words, we recognize that a work of art is composed of elements that, in themselves, respond to a structural logic that gives it, in the best of cases, a certain intelligibility; nonetheless, we ask: recognizing this structure, are we adding that “sense of plus” with which we denominate something as “work of art” by the fact of a recognition of a certain intrinsic relation between its parts? Admitting that every work of art is the product of what gives it sense, then it should not be denied that if it’s understood as art, it is because it responds to something other than its own internal logic. This, that is [further than the work of art] and that allows it to be recognized with the qualifier of “artistic” are the different weaves of sense that define it and grant it “existence”. Is in this consideration that art- and the art – starts being talked about in the frame a philosophical problematic of an aesthetic nature.

The sense of the existent presents itself – by saying of philosopher Andres Ortiz-Oses – as the “symbolic suture of a real fissure” that convolutes and unites what originally is found fragmented. In this line of thought, Bordese’s work could be considered as a “fragment” of a spirit of a time that reclaimed the existential revindication of a sense, which Nietzsche saw happen in the womb of tragic thought.
The Anamorphic Look of Dionysos in Plastic Work from Marcelo Bordese

Considered ‘symbol’ of a reality, we can see in Bordese’s work a new look in which the conditions of anamorphic for the visual experience are created. A primitive shaping game or metaphors is established through which the thought generates vital fictions which emerge from a Dionysian impulse, which creates and destroys possibilities of being in the multiple experience of sense. Anamorphic is manifested in the necessity of curving the look towards an experience that will allow “a new sensibility of vision” as overcoming the mirage of our own culture. It is thus that Bordese mocked the institutionalizations of the profane, of the religious, of the excremental, of the humane; all the ecumenical of nature fallen from modern man.

His art is, then, the exclamation of a new befall of culture, the one in which the fall of man is produced, exacerbating his most vital sources, his most primitive existence. This artistic phenomenon has in itself an air of lateness that brings us back to nostalgia for a mythical world where the being manifested him in an aesthetic way through an agonic combat of impulses of a unique primordial will: the Dionysian.

The symbolism that falls from Bordese’s paintings and drawings make up the weave of sense in which the images suffer a sort of depersonalization, one in others, coinciding in a unique impulse through which all existence, if vital, will be understood from the optics of art.

1. From an apostolate of a Croatian Franciscan congregation, member of the School of Jesuits of Saint Michael, Marcelo Bordese found within the space that monasterial reclusion offered, an opportunity to venture in the knowledge of the biblical language in the internal institutional operation at religious orders. In that way he converted that experience in the source of his creative impulses; Bordese spent years in those places, where he tended friendship ties with his seminarian pairs to the point that some of them became his first collectors and were the first ones that disseminated his works in different European collections.

Over his experience Bordese’s spirit is questioned since youth by a spirituality that places him as a personality of mystical temple. This is a lot to say if we intend to evaluate the imprint that dyes his artistic work.

Bordese’s conception about art in general and particularly his work has very little in common with the conventional image of profane art, social and hermetic as was Latin American surrealist art¹⁰. The attempt of finding in his works elements of a “surrealist” style becomes overshadowed by the seriocomic character that parodies that oneiric landscape of possible images issued by Xul Solar, one of the representatives of Latin American surrealism. The existence of a possible oneiric, fanciful and surreal world in Marcelo Bordese, adopts the tragic load that man has been submitted to, as if from his works a whole ritual of death
and rebirth would flow; as if by every streak, every colour, every gesture, would respond to the agony in which the "Dyonisiac" will – as a primordial impulse – builds its shapes to confront life, which is also death. From this perspective the existence assumes the tragic, in so far as:

Conscious of intuited truth, man seeks everywhere the most frightening and absurd of the being […] feels nausea. Here, in this supreme danger of will, nearing him the art, as a magician that saves and cures: only he is capable of twisting those thoughts of nausea over the evil or absurd of existence, turning them into representations with which we can live\textsuperscript{11}.

After the supposed familiarity with the identified style of surrealism we should distinguish that art appears in Bordese under the form of a spirit that seeks the return to the most primitive of man, to a state that will offer a desperate attempt of “world re-enchantment”. About religion, as in other topics, Bordese is a spirit free of all heterodoxy or orthodoxy. Or to say the same, in the words of Marcilio Ficino, reunites and contains all four levels of fury: the poetic, priestly, prophetic and lover that in the manner of Orpheus, choosing secular and profane life gets close to God\textsuperscript{12}.

2. It is possible that the interpretations will multiply from different readings, even though the one offered here has the heuristic of who was conceived in parts. Dionysus has been considered as the impulse that builds, destroys all appearance, and the form itself turns into something senseless and its correlation is the void, the nothing. Through chaos the creative man shows his creations, signifies them, looks at them; though this look is no other than the petrous look of the medusa, which with her eyes crystallizes everything that through her is looked upon. As a lens “distorts” the object, singularizes it, typifies it, so the look through the gap presents itself as the feeble mark of a perspective.

In the paintings of the renaissance piece we find images that respond to the search for a centre, for a fixed point from where to turn our looks. This is not due to a necessity raised towards the interior of a piece, but of a vision of the world where a model of mimetic rationality is established. For which every pectoris production must be the imitation of a model, even if the model is no longer God’s Idea, but one of the ideas of Nature and Men. We should not forget that, in this sense, the artist from the renaissance has overcome the old model in which art was subordinated to a Socratic morality, where the work was reduced to a mere copy and its model subject to an intelligible structure – it had to respond to a criteria of the truth that tied the piece to an irrevocable moral character. In the frame of his rationalist conception of the world (for which the logos is inseparable from the eidos), Plato presented the painter (nemeses)\textsuperscript{13} as
a producer of a “nemesis phantastike”\textsuperscript{14}, understanding that painting – differently from other arts – should be a “techne of lies”, expression where the tie between art and truth is reflected, opposing this one to every illusory representation of reality (\textit{defectus veritatis}).

Even when Leonardo Da Vinci accepts the idea that every work of art should be faithful to the model, he introduces an element that had not been considered before, the creativity of the artist and his liberty respecting the moment of his production. In the opinion of Argentinian aesthete Elena Oliveras, Leonardo “he doesn't stop highlighting that the work is the result of the action of a free being that adds imagination to nature”\textsuperscript{15}. At this point, we can introduce an inquiry: what aspects of the imagination could be represented through art?

The Idea which lies in the platonic theory about the artist as a creator of illusions is taken again by Nietzsche with the attempt of founding his conception “that art is the proper supreme metaphysical task of and the activity in this life”\textsuperscript{16}. A vision of the world based on a sense of knowledge in an extra-moral sense\textsuperscript{17}, that is to say, based on a relationship between \textit{nemesis} and \textit{eidolon}, as mere appearance.

In this sense the idea that there is a capacity in man that allows him to realise that distance and proximity in respect to the perceived object that already exists; in such way that being a characteristic of the vision to deform objects, the subject is bound to situate himself in a certain point of view from where the envisioned element would take a clear and proportionate shape. Is our apollonian impulse towards the construction of form different from this fiction like function? Isn’t it in dissonance in which “our being would need to be able to live a magnificent illusion that would extend its veil of beauty over its own essence?”\textsuperscript{18}

The work of art is a product of an illusion, of the necessity to “give shape” to what will remain, in other way, undetermined. Nonetheless, it is necessary that the artist as he sees an appearance will not take it as the reality (per se) of the thing. In that sense I bring forth the words of the painter whose work is analysed here:

Art- for which I always felt uncomfortable or shameful – should try to give shape to what never had it, cradle the non-representable, in same way be the incarnation of the non-live, which is to say, miss encounter. Art and life should be as two cold and nervous lovers (Marcelo Bordese)\textsuperscript{19}.

In this way, a gadget that fictionalizes the pectoris figure is created, with the objective of making visible the invisible, the horrible side of \textit{the thing}:

I so not know why but it only seems to me that a deformed body is visually richer, a lot more expressive. I have painted crucifixions that have little or nothing to
do with religion, but because it seems to me that there is an aesthetics in the
deformity of a stretched body, twisted, nailed, bloodied, deformed, that seems
to me very plastic and wonderful. If we think about it in reality it is horrific, but
art is that wonder: the greatest repugnance in the world can become a wonderful
thing if painted.

And here we are in condition of answering the previous question about what
the artist could represent using his imagination. And the answer is that Da Vinci
did not stray from Beauty. Since romanticism, on the other hand, ugliness begins
to be rescued as a significant element of the work. The beautiful Works in virtue
of an anamorphous; a distortion of the look that presupposes a fascination at
the same time:

“I paint to avoid life, not to reflect it. I paint to run away, to avoid the tragedy
of constantly being me.”

3. The Dionysian shows up in the game of perspectives, dragging man to the
recognition of what he bursts in an unconscious manner and that, to begin with,
he is an outsider of the scene or of the pectoris frame.

Some critics are right to see in Bordese’s work a romanticism that is celebrated
in Francisco Goya’s paintings *The dreams of reason engendered monsters, as did
the balderdashes*. It seems that Bordese, in the same line as Francisco de Goya
feeds criticism towards all authority, this one coming from civil, military or
state institutions; being of that ‘*logos*’ that we referred to at the beginning of the
written work, of the illustrated access to the truth and progress of the people
through the authority of reason. In the way that Nietzsche breaks the spells of
reason, by considering it one of the masks – or ghosts – by which Dionysius
manifests himself to us; also Bordese’s beings are masks that inscribe themselves
into a barbaric past from which, this foreigner – Dionysius – bursts in not with-
out certain provocation: “I do not Gild the beings that populate my paintings,
I destroy them”. All of them, recognizable images where tranquillity sees itself
outcast by founding bewilderment, uneasiness, and rejection by the destruction
of themes with socially accepted models of representation. As he rises, they are
not beings built by his imagination but by the destruction of the pre-existing.

Just as in the Goyaesque paintings of Marcelo Bordese there is no longer the
beauty the object of art, but the *pathos* and a certain consciousness of showing all
the aspects of life, even those in which the ugly, the terrible looms. Insinuating
a certain “air of familiarity” between the Aragonite painter and the Argentinian
we can rescue the words pronounced by Valeriano Bozal when he thought of the
work of Goya as the virtual locus of “a Secular Sistine Chapel where salvation
and beauty have been substituted by the lucidity and consciousness of solitude,
old age and death.”

188
The Anamorphic Look of Dionysos in Plastic Work from Marcelo Bordese

Everything that art has of uncertain and extreme appears recognized in a symbolic way with images of a period that coincides with infancy of humanity. Observing the work of Bordese, we stop in images that respond to a state of childhood and “ingenuity” with symbols like dolls, which aspects enjoy in their faces certain evil mixed expressions with innocence: children playing and mixing in a bellicose background and allowing themselves to be persuaded by an eroticism proper of the first reckonings of the body and sexuality. In this case the elements and images that respond to an erotica in the drawings and paintings of Bordese don't seem to be a repudiation towards the sexual nature of men, but a Nietzschean enthusiasm for an

Art understood as the good will of appearance, every arrogant art, hesitant, dancing, burlesque, childlike and blessed is necessary to us so as not to lose that freedom over things that our ideal demands.23

It is in here where the Dionysian appears with more furore submitting man to the loss of individuation, reaching up to the state of unity that carries a “spirit of community” that represents the life which surges and blossoms in the spring, but doesn’t exclude death in winter. It would not be absurd, then, to attribute to Bordese’s work the display of a true Dionysian feast in which all participate and in which the loss of oneself unites to a tragic experience from which art saves us: “and meanwhile art lets life be conscious of itself, art serves life.”24

Conclusions

I suggest the reading of my art piece in silence and totally free of prejudice. My work does not have a message, I do not adhere to any particular aesthetic, nor has preferences to any movement; I’m not interested in the unreal nor the real with their endless paradox; scarcely does that ungraspable point where the “close-ness” comprises the prosaic perversion. The only truthfully subversive is reality.25

As the world of Bordsian art emerges from the transfiguration of the tormented world of original contradiction (the world as one and multiple)26, his Dionysian vision of the world becomes more present. This way of conceiving art, cannot be separated from a worldview where All is One and where the multiple has become into being and existing (intransitive verb that gives account of the proper be-being), because becoming and metaphor are manifested in the different folds of existence conforming visual anamorphic, “a type of representation of an object, in such a way that a deformation of perspective exists and forces the spectator to obtain a more correct vision, to place himself in a unique lateral
point determined by that this one is possible”. With this we break the idea that a relationship exists between the representation between the work and the truth of the work; idea previously exposed by mentioning the mimetic character of reality, from a moral sense. The truth in art becomes ridiculized by making intervene this illusory element that obliges the artist to recognize that what he sees is only appearance. In this sense, “every process of apprehension of reality is nothing else than an interpretation that does not follow logic order but a pre-logic one” – even aesthetic – through which man “finds himself profoundly submerged in illusions and dreams; his gaze limited to sliding over the surface of things and perceives ‘forms’, his sensation does not conduct in any case to the truth, instead is contented with receiving stimuli, as if playing to probe the reverse of things”.

Keeping with the Nietzschean language, Bordese operates with irony and the play of an artist, perhaps with the purpose to find in his works the alternative to transform mere reality into the philosophical concept that the only truth is the distortion of the lie. Intuiting that order is only fiction, it does not escape the art scope which “the death of God” has reached, and thus Bordese has experimented. And that causes vertigo of orphaned and run out: everything returns to the womb of the undetermined from where it has surged, every individualization reveals itself fictitious. It is the vital chaos, Dionysius, who rules the existence.

Nowadays his works have intensified on the base of an impulsive primitive world that, as the painter said, deepens the thematic of deformation, moving from critique to religion. That symbology remounts us to that lost paradise, to that primitive world longed by the romantics, where art is thought from an aesthetic of existence, even in its more terrible aspects. So Nietzsche said: “Art is the only superior force opposed to every will to deny life, that not only perceives the terrible and enigmatic character of existence, but lives it and desires to live it”.

In this way, the reception of the Bordesian work finds fundament behind the footsteps of the Nietzschean thought that in Eugen Fink’s criteria has inflected “an aesthetic fascination”, from which the images themselves reveal against the conventional aesthetic canons and inaugurate a new understanding of art. In the frame of what Nietzsche denominated in the “self-criticism trial” an artist’s metaphysics, in which the artistic phenomenon is elevated to a vision of art posed beyond the works of art and that is justified in the romantic recovery of an aesthetic access of the being.

Beyond any classificatory scheme that could frame it as new-fangled or as a piece of art that proclaims the rebirth of a past art, the art in Bordese presents itself as an activity of time renouncement, a sort of entrance where all time lacks sense and it’s from there that his art can be thought from a criteria that surpasses the same historic condition in which the work is created.
The Anamorphic Look of Dionysos in Plastic Work from Marcelo Bordese

Notes:

3. This Idea is expressed by Eugen Fink in his book *Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, who assures that the Nietzsche thought inaugurates a new way of thinking the being, different that was comprehended during the last 2000 years. Spanish version by Andrés Sanchez Pascual, 3rd edition, Ed. Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1980.
14. Plato in *The Sophist* (255 BC) observes that far from being a technique that creates useful things, like the function of a carpenter would be, painting is a *technai mimetikai* technique than an art of imitation; more in the sense of *mimes* more like the production of something unreal that provides an allusion of reality. So that the painter is the one that creates mere illusions, ghosts or simulations of the same things.
25. Interview with Marcelo Bordese in Bola de Nieve. Work, Biography and Thought from 1106 Artists Selected by Other Artists, Ramona, Fundation START.
27. Luis Enrique de Santiago Gervós in Writings about Rhetoric, Trotta, Madrid, p. 45.
30. Fink, Nietzsche’s Philosophy, p. 11.
Today there are many works of art, made up of collected historical materials and constructed into the form of an archive. Hal Foster, an American art theorist, points out in his 2004 essay, 'An Archival Impulse', that archival art “arranges these materials according to a quasi-archival logic, a matrix of citation and juxtaposition, and presents them in a quasi-archival architecture, a complex of texts and objects”\(^2\). In so doing, he suggests that such works of art act out “alternative knowledge or counter-memory”\(^3\).

However, considering the diversity of archival art, the archival logic governing them must not be uniform. And, given that, how exactly do these varying logics function to create counter-memory in each work?

In this paper I investigate this issue by focusing on contemporary artwork which deals with the memory of the Holocaust as connotative subject matter. As examples of this, I take up works by French artist Christian Boltanski and German woman artist Sigrid Sigurdsson. Both artists work on archival art, which imitates, to a greater or lesser degree, institutional archives. They collect and accumulate images like photographs, documents like letters, or objects like belongings, which once carried the memory of an individual person relating to the historical event but have since lost it. These materials have been drained of personal memory, and begin to float through society, more specifically, through the antique markets. By collecting and manipulating these materials, the archival art of these two artists taps into social memory in his or her respective manner. In order to analyze the difference between them, I will focus especially on the structure of the archives they create, thinking in terms of the binary concepts of minimalism vs. hybridity.
1. Christian Boltanski

First, let’s look at Christian Boltanski, who represents the concept of minimalism. From the beginning of his artistic production, Boltanski has collected relics of the past and of people who no longer exist. In an early work from the 1970’s, Reference Case (1970), he gathered several materials associated with his childhood, like photographs of clothing or strange hammer-shaped artifacts, and arranged them in a flat box with a glass cover as in an ethnological museum exhibition. After that, his interest expanded from his own personal memory to collective and social memory. Seeking the traces of absent people, or for members of eradicated social groups, he collected indexical item like names, portrait photos and belongings. By means of enumerating and assembling these items, to all appearances, his work tries to recreate the memory of the past, but paradoxically, it emphasizes the impossibility of recalling these lost memories.

Since around 1987, allusions to the Holocaust have appeared in Boltanski’s work. For example, the series of installation entitled Alter to the Chases high school, deals with the tragic fate of the Jewish people. It is composed of tin boxes and photographs of persons’ faces. The source of the face-images was a class portrait, a photograph of the graduating class of a Jewish high school that Boltanski found in a book on Vienna’s Jews. He cropped each face from the photograph, enlarging them until they had lost any traces of individuality. Some faces were frozen in smiles; others were enlarged to such an extent that they looked like skulls. In so doing, he seems to have used photography to explore the connection between photos and death, and to dramatize the fact that the people pictured no longer existed. He assembled these pictures and framed them in tin, and perched them on top of rusty biscuit tins. Black clamp-on desk lamps ominously illuminate the pictured faces.

By making the faces blurred, the individuals were no longer identifiable, so that the referentiality of this archive (that is, its reference to actual people) is weakened. The face images, which have lost their origin, become unanchored and begin to float. The reassembled faces or names in his work are degraded into vacant, exchangeable signs.

Moreover, Boltanski’s archives are constructed with a serial structure that consists of a repetition of items of the same kind. Through the construction of the framed ominous black-and-white photographs and the symmetrical shape of religious altars, this work reminds us of some architectural constructions for the mourning of the dead. In contrast to established ordinary archives, which collect actual evidential documents, Boltanski’s archival art assembles significations that have lost their origins, and evokes in us an association with the social memory.
I’d like to investigate this point further in terms of what I call “figurative rhetoric”. His fundamental method for collecting and archiving is the repetition of the same item over and over. The enumeration of face-images, which we see in “Altar to Chase high school, culminates in works such as Archives (1987) and Menschlich (1994), which consist of hundreds or thousands of portrait photographs.

Similarly, in works such as Reserve: Canada, he uses many, many articles of clothing, which indicate individual absent bodies. This has the same effect of accumulation and multiplication that we see in the works like Archives and Menschlich, just mentioned.

Arthur Danto, an American art critic, writes of his impression based on his experience of the work in New York. He writes that these articles of clothing seem to have somehow survived their wearers, left behind by vanished persons. He continues,

> Left behind and then improvised into a memorial to their wearers, the garments are made somehow self-metaphorical and almost unendurably poignant. It becomes, so to speak, a soft Wailing Wall, and the little, now unbearably bright pieces of clothing seem ranked, like the names of the dead soldiers of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.5

With the concept of “self-metaphor”, Danto is referring to the configuration of everyday objects in artwork: in this case, a wall hung with clothing is transformed into a construction which evokes in onlookers an association with memorials and mourning places for the dead. This effect of association, caused by the similarity of figurative forms, taps into the subliminal memory of the culture to which the recipients of work belong. Among his works, Reserve: Canada is relatively denotative of the Holocaust, because the word “Canada” is actually the name of the warehouse in Auschwitz for the storage of clothing left behind by the victims of the gas chamber.

But here we must draw attention to the fact that this metaphorical effect of Boltanski’s work is based on a structural identity with the Holocaust or coincidence with mass death in general, as totalizing entity.

2. Sigrid Sigurdsson

As another example of archival art, let’s turn to Sigrid Sigurdsson’s work Before the Silence (fig. 1)6. This installation has been housed in the Karl Ernst Osthaus Museum in Hagen (a city in western Germany) since 1988. It consists of several tall shelves, containing scrapbooks and other book-like works of art, or glass cases that house more books or other objects, and two tables on which to look
Mayumi Kagawa

through them. These books and vitrines contain various kinds of documents and mementos which the artist collected over a period of almost thirty years, from second-hand shops or flea markets. As of the year 1993, the collected materials amounted to more than thirty thousand pieces, and the collection continues to expand even today. In 2009 the work was integrated into a more comprehensive installation by Sigurdsson, entitled *The Architecture of Remembrance* (fig. 2).

Figure 1. *Before the Silence*

Figure 2. *The Architekture of Remembrance*, photo by Achim Kukulies
The collected items vary widely from private letters, diaries, newspaper articles, and official papers to the German chess board, which came into fashion under the Nazi regime, to bottles of medicine and medical tools (fig. 3). In this sense, Sigurdsson's work can be characterized as a hybrid archive. Upon closer observation, it is revealed that the documents and mementos cover the pre-Nazi era to the postwar period, and into the present, representing the social memory of the contemporary history, as well as the personal memory of the people in each period. Some of the pieces are documentary texts, which are supposed to be opened and read, and others are objects and articles, which are no less meaningful than texts as part of the archive. Every material is fragmentary, and it is uncertain, who is portrayed in the photographs, or who owned the objects. Floating through the antique market, they have been drained of private memory, so that instead the social memories which they carry come into the foreground.

Hal Foster, the American art critic whom I mentioned earlier, writes also in his essay “Archival Impulse” that “(archival art) is concerned less with absolute origins than with obscure traces.” This indifference to origins holds true for Sigurdsson’s archive as well as Boltanski’s. Nevertheless, there is a critical difference between the two. In the case of Sigurdsson’s Before the Silence, the work is based on the method of collage or montage which generates meaning by way of the rearrangement and juxtaposition of fragmentary materials. According to the artist’s statements, every material is deliberately composed, and nothing is left to chance, so that short narratives are created on each double-page.
Mayumi Kagawa

of the scrapbooks or in each of the vitrines. For example, the vitrine “freight invoice” (fig. 4) shows a double-page of a file, which is juxtaposed with obvious artistic intentions. On the left page, there is a blank, yellowish form, a Nazi freight invoice, in which a photograph of a little girl is pasted. On the opposite page, a dry plant is included like a botanical specimen, which is, according to the caption written by the artist, named “Great Burnet”, and under the Nazi regime German families were prompted to grow it in their house gardens as a medical plant, because it has the virtue of stopping blood. In other words, the plant is a particle of memory about the war mobilization of that time. Through this composition, a short narrative comes into being, namely that in those days Jewish people were persecuted including even such an innocent girl, whereas the mobilization of the German people went deep into their everyday lives. In Sigurdsson’s archive this kind of fragmentary narrative is ubiquitous, generating a network of memories. And this becomes possible only by means of the hybridity of the archive.

Figure 4. Before the Silence, detail

However, it must be noted that not every onlooker recognizes the meaning of each composition, and that some people cannot understand while others may misread them. In this respect, this archive by nature allows for the possibility of misreading and forgetting, permitting recipients to make free associations based on their respective experiences. This fragmentary, multivocal narrative in Sigurdsson’s archive distinguishes it from established positivistic archives. To understand this difference better, it would be helpful to make reference to the
Michel Foucault’s essay on archive, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, which was written in 1969 to advocate a theory of alternative archive for historical science. Foucault argues that his method of analyzing source materials attaches no importance to their origins, and deals with various kinds of materials, from private diaries to official documents, completely equally. By means of this operation he aims at exposing the ways of thinking, which lie behind the discourses presented by the materials. Moreover, in another essay, *The Order of Things*, he also insists that the world should be considered a book filled with emblems, letters, cryptographs and obscure narratives, which he calls “hieroglyphs”. This book as a metaphor for the world, according to him, can be read with recourse not to positivistic evidence but to the perception of resemblance between two different items through an invisible third item. In other words, from the juxtaposition of two materials, it is required to gather or “read” the invisible state of the time. Foucault’s theory of historical epistemology as readability, which investigates subliminal structures of the historical past by adhering to individual discourses, and is certainly adaptable to images, illuminates the effect of Sigurdsson’s archive, which intends to represent the ineffable. Namely, the invisible third item corresponds to the fragmentary ambiguous narratives in her work, which creates web-like linkage of memories, including unspoken ones.

### 3. Conclusion

From what we have seen, it should be concluded, that Boltanski’s minimalistic archive assumes structural identity (or coincidence) with the wholeness of the historical event, engulfing anonymous individuals, whereas Sigurdsson’s hybrid archive tends to represent the wholeness as a network of narratives about individual experiences, suggesting the unspeakable in the margin of representation.

Both archival arts begin by collecting traces of individuals of the past, as a clue for discovering counter-memory, but the end result of this process produces an entirely different effect in each case.

### Notes:

Mayumi Kagawa

2. Hal Foster, "An Archival Impulse", *October* vol.110, The MIT Press, 2004. Extract repr. in: C. Merewether (ed.), *The Archive: Documents of Contemporary Art*, London: Whitechapel Gallery / The MIT Press, 2006, pp. 143–148. Foster points out, “Finally, the work in question is archival since it not only draws on informal archives but produces them as well, and does so in a way that underscores the nature of all archival materials as found yet constructed, factual yet fictive, public yet private. Further, it often arranges these materials according to a quasi-archival logic, a matrix of citation and juxtaposition, and presents them in a quasi-archival architecture, a complex of texts and objects.” (Merewether ed., *The Archive*, p. 145).

3. Ibid., p. 144.


On Digital Exposures

Contemporary Art is the institutionalized network through which the art of today presents itself to itself and to its interested audiences all over the world.¹

Introduction

After a closer reading of the sentence cited above, which sounds as a simple and quite clear assertion, we cannot avoid paying attention to the figure of replication in Smith's expression which postulates a double position of art that “presents itself to itself.” Smith’s relatively discreet inference brings forward a kind of a double bind, which determines a positioning of art within the institutional framework that, in turn, makes art for what it is.

Although he is not saying it, Smith actually points towards the notion of exposure as it has been conceived by Mieke Bal more than a decade before Smith's text was published. Institutional network with which Smith even ontologically identifies the very meaning of contemporary art, was, of course, originally determined by the institution of museum. This is still the case even though museum has expanded in between to other spaces, especially significantly into so called virtual space. The triumph of the museum as the institution in the sphere of art is paralleled by some other such triumphs like University in the area of education. However, historically and socially such triumphs tend to have a transitional and mediating role. So, for example, the institution of University keeps determining levels of education as well as a global academic space and the notion of knowledge itself, but at the same time, knowledge is increasingly being produced and becomes available elsewhere as well. Still, the University ultimately keeps being the instance of verification of knowledge as well as mu-
seum and/or gallery functions as a safeguard that verifies ‘art,’ no matter where different artefacts happen to be shown or exhibited. Therefore, the institution of museum should be taken as a specific materialization of a metaphor of itself, which became universally recognized through the course of time of modernism and even more emphatically in the time-space of post-modernism.

Mieke Bal, explaining her “partly metaphorical use of the idea of ‘museum,’” subsequently points out: “The discourse around which museums evolve, and which defines their primary function, is exposition.” There can’t be exposition without gestures “/…/ that point to things and seem to say: ‘Look!’ – often implying: ‘That’s how it is.’ The ‘Look!’ aspect involves the visual availability of the exposed object. The ‘That’s how it is’ aspect involves the authority of the person who knows: epistemic authority. The gesture of exposing connects these two aspects.” The idea of exposure points, as Mieke Bal elaborates further on the next page, to a “subject/object dichotomy,” which is a fundamental aspect of the binary determination of the art and its notion as it happens to be recognised by experts and wider public.

However, there is also an agency of double determination of exposure in the process of a production of a contemporary artistic work. This side turns out to be much more perceptible, when we take into account the technological aspect of contemporary art, which works in a conjunction with the institutional aspect. The analogue electronic media, the technology of CRT (cathode ray tube), which at first enabled television and displaying of videos, entered in museums and increasingly shaped artistic events in the period of the peak of modernism, already entering new age of post-modernism. Such an exposure of art to itself presupposed a double action within the very process of making an object for a video shooting. This double action of arranging an object and ‘visualising’ it on the magnetic tape was able to produce an exposure in a form of a display in an electronic presentation in a gallery or a museum or in an exhibition within an event – for example, the biannual mostra in Venice or the Documenta in Kassel, etc. The digital technology further enfolds the imagined space behind the screen since the object can be also generated within the act of what used to be shooting of an object, or a scene, or whatever the case may be. Still, the double gestures are retained at least in the same way as a Derridian trace, which has a complex signifying effect. Therefore, double gestures also affect the institutional external/internal space within the institution of museum. “It is no exaggeration to suggest that new media provide performance with an energy and excitement perhaps unparalleled since the advent of silent cinema. Spectators, faced with the morphing shapes of holographic form and virtual reality, are confronted with an artistic spectacle strangely similar in effect to that of the silent cinematic image.
described in 1927 by Antonin Artaud.”⁵ This gives Murray a pretext to suggest a new understanding of an increasingly important feature of contemporary art under the auspice of the digital baroque. Digital technology is only the last agency in a whole history, in which marvellous effects appear in the artistic field. Changes of modes of production within the industrial civilization, which decidedly determined social and economic spaces, exposed a new relevance of the processes of making an art work. These changes propelled a range of different approaches to the processes of conceptualising of reflexive impacts of representation (in a performance) of interactions between perception and objects generated in the artistic practice. Of course, Benjamin’s epistemological break, as it has been expressed in the notion of aura, serves as an unavoidable explanatory theoretical reference here.

Figure 1. Shanghai Twins – Celine and Cara – at the Venice Biennale 2007 (photo: D. Strajn)

Shanghai twins

“Expository agency ought, however, not to be equated with individual intention.”⁶ This Mieke Bal’s imperative, expressed in a kind of a methodological request addressed to expository agency, could be taken nowadays as almost a rule by which the museum custodians work, being aware that their practice makes part of some cultural politics. There is no need to say that especially in art museums, but increasingly in other kinds of museums too and in other forms and genres of presentations of art, the curators tend to avoid any accusation of essentialism against them. Hence, in this sense they tend to ally with artists in an effort to contribute to a decentering or even subverting of a dominant (broadly
ideologically determined) gaze. Categories of the binary, the double, the dual in different asymmetrical arrangements, which are usually supposed to produce some deconstructive effect, form frames of contemporary art and its contents, attitudes, gestures and positions. Artists invent statements as much as they produce artefacts. However, so called shock effects from modernist period are mostly absent; they mostly fail to be generated, although it is obvious that a form of presentation is derived from artistic ‘shocks’ in the days of yore. Henceforth, a semblance of a structural similarity with the 17th Century Baroque situation seems quite attestable in spite of relative narrowness of the analogy, especially when we take into account incomparable historical contexts and especially only barely comparable notions of art.

The globalisation, which may well be a content empty concept, has some relevance in art and in the theory, which is trying to crack meanings of art, to define a presence or absence of a message, or decipher any explicit or implicit statements. However, artists and thinkers seem to be, particularly in the contemporary art, in the same boat. Let me take just a small example of the intersection of different semiotic axes, or to be more precise, the case in which this intersection was simply positioned within an expository gesture by artists who have taken a role of the public. In the particular case they, at the same time, pointed to a decentering of the colonial gaze, and finally, they put specific and very directly pointed emphases on the notion of double exposure. The case, which I am about to report briefly, is identified by the name of the artistic tandem Shanghai Twins. Eventually, I had a personal encounter with this artistic ‘phenomenon’ at the Venice Biennale of 2007. I met sisters Cara and Celine Zhuang from Shanghai at the Arsenali exhibition space. At first I took them to be global visitors or tourists from afresh prospering China. I shot two photographs of them, than I had a brief chat with the girls, and I promised to e-mail my photos to them. Only in retrospect was I able to decipher what they were actually telling me during our brief chat on the spot, where somebody put an old issue of Vogue magazine in an aquarium. Their mission became obvious when I got on my e-mail the zipped portfolio of photos (one of the two I shot included in it) depicting the twins together with art objects at the Biennale and the Documenta in Kassel the same year. Their project in the given case was a work of double exposure on a basic level: two young artists produced their work of art by ‘inserting’ themselves into the position of art objects. This gesture, however, became more persuasive by the fact that they represented an agency of looking back or returning their look to the colonial gaze. Thanks to the Internet it was possible to find out that their subsequent work consisted of exposures which combine genres of fashion modelling and performances. Of course, a photographic evidence of their
subject/object artistic mix rounds off the exposure. The same year (2007) they worked with a renowned fashion photographer Jeremy Stockton Johnson and another photographer Giuseppe Ciaolo in a Yu Wei and Island6 project Twins and Trompe l’oeil.7 Definitely we have a case in which an effect, conforming to the notion of singularity, was produced by the means of multiple double exposures. Obviously, the acts of Shanghai Twins retain the exposing representation only and foremost as a photographic trace; they are totally immersed in the aesthetic regime of the arts, which “dismantled this correlation between subject matter and mode of representation.”8

Ocean Without a Shore

Many changes after a decisive transformation, caused by the technical reproduction, which Walter Benjamin found to be an irrevocable overwhelming social and cultural rearrangement, form folds, marked not only by repetitiveness and a potential for multiplying, but also by multifarious double productive gestures. One of the many impacts of these changes, which finally made the Benjamin’s pre-war perspective fully comprehensible sometime in the 1960s, was a reformulation of aesthetics, which had to deal with many problems concerning the relevance of its categories, rooted in Romanticism and in Kant’s system. Let us just claim that what is happening in the realm of exhibitions and performances in recent times compels aesthetics to revise over and over again its basic suppositions and core hypotheses. However, problems of ‘defining the beauty’ and ways of describing the sensual aspect of artistic objects as related to the subliminal dimensions linked to the Subject, somehow paradoxically return through the very same media, which made such categories seem almost obsolete. “In the most sophisticated arenas of electronic spectacle, theatrical performance, and multimedia installation, new media artists frequently endorse a paradoxical return to primitivism, mysticism and spiritualism. Particularly in the digitized arena of electronic installation and performance, artists as divergent in form and vision as Nam June Paik, Reeves, Dawson, and Viola have developed artworks that are often described, sometimes by the artists themselves, as soliciting a unifying, spiritualizing aesthetics in contrast to the shifting terrain of politics and identity.”9

A case of Bill Viola’s installation at the same Venice Biennale 2007 we already mentioned above, illustrates this point well enough. The artist, who in a video on You Tube, in which he himself explains his installation in Chiesa di San Gallo, confirms Murray’s point on both counts: the technological and, let’s say so, metaphysical. In the Viola’s narration on his own installation Ocean Without a Shore a line of explanation concerning the border between life and death, fra-
gility of human life, human condition and mortality interweaves with another line on the technological and other aspects of making the videos, shown on plasma screens and mounted on three altars in the church. Each screen displays a different slow motion movement of human figures starting in black and white, passing through the water ‘curtain’ and slowly gaining colour. Saying that he “came up with this idea of the notion of the dead coming back to our world – just temporarily” Viola signals his use of a kind of primitive imaginary of the ‘living dead.’ Looking at the movement of human figures in the recordings one cannot but remember a maverick director’s George Romero cult film Night of the Living Dead (1968). So Viola’s installation in its ‘metaphysical’ dimension could be read as an internal visual interpretation or even as a dialogue with the modernist mass-cultural iconography of the ultimate zombie horror. The installation clearly suggests that such iconography belongs to the past since it exhausted its effectiveness belonging to the register of the modernist techniques of single shocks. His usage of similar iconography in another – digital – media takes, as he says himself, the “notion of the dead coming back to our world” not as an emblem of evil, but as a reflection of human condition. Therefore, Viola demonstrates a power of digital imaging technology, albeit supplemented with laser and other devices in the particular case, to define the space in which the installation is created on a level, unthinkable before. This isn’t actually any return to the ‘pre-Benjaminian’ aesthetics, but it is a reminder that the ‘old’ aesthetics can be brought to “our world – just temporarily.” Digital technology, in this way, signals that the age of new Baroque is our contemporaneity.

Conclusion

Another case, among many other and undoubtedly innovative cases, of usage of digital technology, can be seen in the work of BridA, the group of three younger artists: Sendi Mango, Jurij Pavlica and Tom Kerševan, who belong to 21st Century researchers of meanings of art. They make use of digital technology in order to expose contours of the post-industrial world. Their installations and other objects can be surprisingly different as far as their form is concerned. Some of them are a kind of sculptures like a ‘giant’ Information accelerator which, being a composition of prefabricated tubes, can be adapted to different spaces, but it is always interactive: the ‘accelerator’ after it is touched on some ‘control panels’ reacts with sounds and smoke. Another type of BridA’s inventions is an artwork which is generated with the willing public who puts colours in the designated squares, following instructions through headphones. This work that directs visitors not only to look, but involves them in an implementation of an artistic ‘master plan,’
is a clear case of a double exposure, which includes movement between objects and subjects (visitors, most often children), who are turned into instruments of the mechanics of BridA art. The work with the title *Change the Colour* gives its name to the whole BridA’s exhibition, which took place in the International Centre of Graphic Arts in May 2011 in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Although much more could be said about BridA’s work, let us focus on a question of a common denominator of different exposures, which even in a case of a ‘classical’ painting succumbs to its inclusion in the narrative of the whole exhibition and, therefore, the common denominator identifies the painting with a screen. This holds especially true in the case of the series of ‘screens’ under the title *Printed Circuit Boards*. Therefore, the common denominator of BridA’s work could be defined as an exposure of a systemic construction, which functions as a metaphor of a scientific mind and its objectivation. In the case of Viola’s work, we came across very visibly used elements of mysticism and primitive imaginary of the spiritual ‘realities,’ and in the case of BridA’s work, the same aesthetic function is fulfilled by science. What makes both approaches comparable is their distancing from postmodernist play with identity and social signifiers. However, precisely this distancing, which can be deciphered in the visual effects of all three cases, and which we discussed in this paper, must be read as primarily a gesture, which is in principle comparable to the original Baroque attitude.

Double exposure, which is fundamentally structuring digital and/or digital media one way or the other related to the digital technology, gives the contemporary art a common significance and readability. We are increasingly talking about the modes of production of art works, about aesthetics, meaning affecting of senses, and about institution that enfolds this into itself and into the world, pretending to have resisted impulses for a social change in the modernist times.

**Notes:**

2. Paradigmatic cases for this are, among others, Christo’s (and his wife’s, Jeanne-Claude’s) installations in all kinds of open spaces, but their artistic significance was confirmed by museums which exhibited a range of artefacts related to the installations, like preparatory drawings, photographs, etc. It goes without saying that their work is abundantly documented on the Internet.


7. Evidence of this project can be found at this Internet address: http://www.island6.org/Twins_info.html (Accessed on the 1st December 2013).


The Performance Art emerged from Italian Futurist artistic explorations and Russian Constructivism as well as from the contributions of Dada and Surrealist avant-gardes. It succeeded in bringing together various arts (painting, sculpture, dance, music, literature) in what became an artistic act, event, or happening, or performance. All these new kinds of art which manifested intensively during the 1960s and 1970s and which are still present in our contemporary artistic world, see the artist as their medium, the actual work of art resulting from the artist’s action (performance).

In my opinion, two characteristics of this kind of art are very important and mainly contribute to its definition: a) the direct experience, which ensures the **immediacy** of this art and, b) though it is an art without artistic object, it has its **authenticity** based on intensive emotions and deep thoughts and ideas which find their artistic expression in the process of performance. In this article, I shall try to approach some aspects of these two characteristics. RoseLee Goldberg defined performance¹ in a quite complete manner, in my opinion, pointing out the main characteristics:

- the performer is usually the artist himself;
- the place is not as always a gallery but uncommon locations, just in order to oppose the performance art to the location where the artistic objects are included in a commercial elite chain; it also tries to prove that art can be produced anywhere;
- the work of art is the performance itself. It is usually produced once, but not necessarily. It can be produced spontaneously, through improvisation or, on the contrary, well-rehearsed.
- the presence of the artist could be interpreted in various ways: shamanistic, esoteric, instructive, provocative, entertaining.

---

A. Experience – Immediacy

If we go deeper into this defining process, performance is based on actions, not on already finished artistic objects, and this is a significant change in the evolution of the artistic thought of the 20th century. In the performance art, the work of art is the action itself. The performance developed as a revolt against commercialism trying to prove that art could be intangible and cannot be bought. Allan Kaprow thought a happening could not be considered as an economic success due to its ephemeral condition. While a specific modern work of art was well finished and well de-termined and de-fined, the performance was the result of a process of “de-definition”, and “de-determination” and “de-construction” of what was traditionally considered a work of art. Thus, such art eliminated traditional artistic materials (canvas, brush, and chisel). The artist’s body became the art material. Having such an uncommon medium, the performance is based on the body’s movements or, on the direct, immediate experience which is not only lived directly by the artist but also by the spectator into a simultaneous process of participation. It materializes artistic concepts and ideas and transfigures them in live gestures. The direct material of the performance is the artist’s body. In some productions, the artist also uses the body shadow or traces such as in the works of some Romanian artists – Doru Tulcan or Constantin Flondor. Erika Fischer-Lichte thinks that the artist’s body is present twice:

- as an object when it is an instrument of creativity. Let’s remember Yves Klein, who used to cover human bodies in paint and then push these painted bodies on already prepared canvases. He called those bodies living paint brushes. Pierro Manzoni also used to sign his name on nude human bodies calling them living statues. This idea is reiterated by Gilbert and George who considered themselves as living statues.
- as a subject since the performance intends to suggest an aesthetic reflection on being a body, being a human body. The artist uses stories of his personal memory or the collective memory especially in performances based on rituals and esoteric actions. As a subject, the human body supposes an embodied mind and the performance is not a simple movement, it stirs our imagination and reflection. The artist is not a simple living entity; he is an embodied mind who planned the event (by composing the script previously prepared).

Merleau-Ponty also made another distinction: a) having a body (as an object) means also b) being a body. The French philosopher analyzed the relationship between the human being and the world through the human body, stressing out concepts of live experience and action. He tried to prove that the opposi-
tion nature - mind should be eliminated as the human being is not only mind, nor only body. Our own way of existence in this world is ensured by the unity between body and mind. At the same time, the world is based on a network of inter-sensitive connections, a continuous flow of relationships. Each phenomenon changes into another one, any synthesis is transient, and nothing is immutable as the world is continuously open. The human being is connected to this world through the body which is double oriented: towards the outside (the world itself) and towards the inside (corporal and spiritual as well). Thus the body is not only an object but it is a subject as well. It is in the world but it also has a world as it has already acquired “worlds” based on the body’s experience. These already acquired “worlds” are not immutable; they are fed by the cogito and by experience. “My body is not a physical object, it is a work of art”, says Merleau-Ponty. The subject should not be separated any more from the body, as well as the cogito from the sensitive side. Thus, being a body means being within the world, being capable of connecting to the life experience.

According to this theory, Richard Shusterman proposes, at the end of the 20th century, a new Aesthetics, called Somaesthetics. In his opinion, the new Aesthetics should re-actualize the ancient thought about philosophy considered as a way of life. If we take into consideration the fact that the body is the place of perceptive appreciation (aesthesis), then it would facilitate a deeper understanding of the role the body plays in our life. The new discipline, somaesthetics should help us to improve ourselves, to shape our behaviors and ways of thinking through a deeper awareness of our body. Shusterman’s theory reactivates the ancient theme of kalokagathia expressed also through the formula “the statue of the soul”, which supposes a permanent activity of shaping, modeling the body and the soul according to a transcendent model of perfection (especially according to Plato’s and Plotinus’ philosophy).

Coming back to our analysis of the changes brought by performance art in the way in which we should understand the contemporary art, we have to take into consideration that the audience is also active in performance art. The relationship artist – spectator has dramatically changed. There are no more limits between them. The findings of the traditional aesthetics and art – the separation between the artist and the audience, as well as many other kinds of distinctions such as: art / reality, object of art / object of daily life, are now eliminated. The audience is encouraged to intervene and participate in the event. They can talk to the artist, make gestures, actions. An example could be Marina Abramovic’s Rhythm O where the artist exposes herself to the curiosity of the audience who, for six hours, were free to use 72 objects placed near the artist, on the artist’s body itself in the way they like.
Such performances are the expression of a new concept present in this postmodern art: the concept of hazard, aleatory, or unpredictable. It generates a permanent metamorphosis of the action. The artist usually prepares a script mentioning some possible directions of the event, its purpose and a certain duration. When the audience intervenes, the results are subject to unpredictable changes. This case also proves that the performance is based on a direct experience in the actual time, on immediacy.

According to John Dewey's thought there is a great difference between the modern art and the contemporary one: the modern object of art used to be completely separated from the artist and the art itself was placed in a distinct world, it did not communicate with life. Dewey also pointed out the need to reestablish the continuity between forms of experience (the artistic products) and events, doings and emotions specific to the general life experience. In order to understand art, we need to reestablish contact with the direct life experience which is the raw material of art. “The Parthenon needs to be understood within the large frame of the Greek daily life.” Dewey also remarked that art emerged from direct experience, from rituals and everyday gestures done with passion and satisfaction. The art is not an image of actual objects; it reflects emotions and ideas associated with the basic activities of the human being. As an example, Dewey chooses Plato’s attitude against art. This Greek philosopher perfectly understood the role played by art in society, the fact that a simple change in the musical expression from the Dorian mode to the Lydian one would have diminished the fervent attitude in favor of democracy in ancient Athens. In those times art for the art’s sake was not an option, remarks Dewey. Thus, by re-thinking art as experience, we can easily connect it to other living experiences. The art – life relation becomes more obvious in this new way of thinking the art being based on the qualities of the common experience. Any theory of art would not be benefic if it does not connect art with other human activities and experiences. The artist can re-establish art as a domain of life and becoming. The experience as im-mediate experience is “heightened vitality”, it does not mean restriction to personal introspection, and it constitutes an active and permanent exchange with the world and events. Experience means the fulfillment of the living human being during his battles and victories with the world and this is the “delightful perception” which gets aesthetic expression in art.

There are many examples of artists and performances focused on the experience of time and space. For instance, Bruce Nauman’s performance Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a Square (1968) was an experience of the volume and dimensions of objects and space. Klaus Runke’s performance, Primary Demonstrations (1970), was based on the direct experience of a walk.
through a geometrical space configuration. In each example, the idea is to have a direct, im-mediate experience of the space through the action itself. Joseph Beuys’ performance *Celtic+* (1975) supposes another aspect that should be mentioned: the artist invited his audience in a small room so that any movement of the artist within that room caused a kind of wave movement among the spectators. The concept of space was thus brought to attention. It was impossible to determine the space using a pre-established point within that room. The space was metamorphosing continuously in relation to the movement inside. It was somehow fluid, liquid.

Dan Graham, in his performance *Present Continuous Past(s)* (1974) proposed an immediate *experience of time*. He used mirrors and video feedbacks in order to create the sense of past, present and future. In the first seconds a mirror captured the actual (present) image of the performer. Then, after a few seconds, the video feedbacks showed the performer and the spectators in their past actions. The video feedback image “relates the past and the present in a kind of durational time flow” said Goldberg.15

Vito Acconci explored yet another kind of experience, a psychological one: the *psychological power fields* which suppose the implication of the audience in the artist's performance. Acconci was influenced by the psychologist Kurt Lewin and his study on *The Principle of Topological Psychology*. He spoke about how each individual radiates a personal power field which includes interactions with other people and objects in the physical space. Acconci wanted to set up a psychological power field allowing the audience to become a part of what he was doing, a part of the physical space where he was moving. His performance *Seedbed* (1971) is based on such a theory.16

### B. Authenticity

As we can see, art as experience could be a continuous dialogue with aliveness. It is an on-going process not a *stasis*, an intense emotional and volitional process. The emotions are generated by the senses, by which we see and perceive. And all our sensitive powers contribute to reach the significance, a sense of the action, its meaning. This is, in my opinion, a proof of artistic *authenticity* of the performance.

In his *Legacy of Jackson Pollock*, Allan Kaprow says that the concept of hori-zontality in painting was fruitful for the performance art. Pollock’s “legacy” was “to take advantage of the action itself” as a kind of ritual dance.17 The horizon-tality as a way of painting suggests a dramatic change in the way the painting is conceived. It stimulates action and also generates a certain feeling of equality
between artist and spectator. They have the feeling of being involved and living together in a common action as they would be part of a canvas or theater play. Thus, the canvas becomes a real “stage”.

This proves, in my opinion, the fact that the performance art is an authentic manner of thinking artistically and trying to find out new ways of artistic expression.

The action implies some other significant aspects. The *time of action* is the present. It ensures a real feeling of immediacy and authenticity as well. Walter Benjamin mentioned this present (*Jetzzeit*) as a characteristic of the industrialized society of the 20th century. However, time should not be perceived as a line coming from a passed moment and evolving towards a future through this very present moment. Time and space are subjective and material at the same time. Time and space belong to me and to my way of being-in-the-world as they are based on my oriented or intentional perception; thus, the time is a network of intentionalities as Merleau-Ponty pointed out in his *Phenomenology of perception*. Thus, the entire perception of time is moving as a kind of fluid from the future (projected by intentionality), toward the past through the present. Each “now-moment” contains a “no more” and anticipates a “not-yet” moment. This “now-moment” is mine; it is not an *in-sistance*, oriented only toward the inside, it is an *ex-istence* or *ek-staz*. Each moment is a temporality as it is based on intentionality. This suggests that time is subjective having a different meaning for each person. *Time is alive* as it is *for us* and we are a world through our living body. This subjectivity generates the authenticity of the action, of the performance itself.

The perception is an intentional one and, in this way, it is the first level of gaining the consciousness of being-in-the-world and being and embodied mind. This intentionality of perception ensures a *co-nnaissance* and a *comm-union* between body and soul (subject – object) and also between man and world. We cannot think without our body and we perceive only through and within it. Thus, the distinctions: subject / object, reason / nature are not any more so clear; there is a certain circularity which eliminates the traditional dichotomies. Even the transcendentality of the world should be reconsidered: it is not thought by a transcendental ego but by a subject which is the living human body provided with consciousness. This is possible because the living human body can transcend itself in two ways:

- in a vertical sense tending toward perfection, ideality, and
- in a horizontal way, in a relation with the *other*, the collectivity.

Thus, the subject supposes a permanent relationship, a dialog and continuous authentic exchange with the world. As a consequence, the human being uses
Performance Art – Immediacy and Authenticity

the body in a transcendent way, or a cultural way, full of meanings. The human being is not only natura naturata as body in itself but also natura naturans as subject body. Painting and art in general is, for Merleau-Ponty, an activity through which the human being manifests and can see itself. This activity is based on perception. The art should not restrict itself from representing the visible but it should make visible or unveil and thus the art is formative, it expresses cultural meanings which can shape our being. This formative capacity of art becomes active through the artistic style, says Merleau-Ponty. The style should be considered under two aspects:

a) as an individual expression, since it manifests the artist’s personal way of being, the way of living in the world and it supposes the perception which is individual and determined by the individual intentionality;

b) as a collective way of being specific in the case of a community which has a cultural common heritage that Merleau-Ponty called cumulative history. This history is a living one, consisting of many artistic works which should be considered as manifestations of the human condition and having, thus, a symbolic value. Therefore, the individual corporal existence is expressed in cultural works. The true, living history depends on the individual bodily-being-in-the-world.

* 

Taking into consideration all these aspects approached by Merleau-Ponty, we can say that the performance art could find in this phenomenology an efficient explanatory method. This contemporary art and its variations (happenings, body art, and installations) are based on the presence of the artist’s body, which is not only object but also subject of the action. Even more, this circularity subject-object is also present in the artist – spectator relationship as they seem to interchange or reverse their roles. The presence of the other as an alter-ego also makes possible the presence of the hazard. It increases the horizontal diversity suggesting exactly the condition of being-in-the-world and the sense of aliveness. At the same time, the hazard can unveil what Merleau-Ponty called the silent voices or the cumulative history (the cultural history) that manifests through individual reactions and behaviors. These reactions are not simply instinctive; they are cultural ones. That is why during a performance, a certain atmosphere is generated, which is felt by each individual in the audience. Allan Kaprow spoke about a kind of contagious sickness that spreads among the audience. It is based on the idea of sharing something, a moment, a space, an idea. To share supposes immediacy among bodies, space and time. And the immediacy implies individual
Mihaela Pop

authenticity; it ensures an identity generated by and within that artistic event. And thus, that event encompasses not only an artistic manifestation but also a common identity. Such feeling of belonging to a certain collectivity, having an identity which originates in that activity can generate a sort of magic specific for any ritual. And thus, the artistic event re-enacts the magic *aura* of the work of art which, according to Benjamin’s thought, had disappeared during the era of mechanical multiplication. This could be another argument in favor of this contemporary art, which is, in my opinion, a very interesting artistic response to the way of life in the 20th century.

**Notes:**

14. *Idem*.
17. [www.wikipedia/Kaprow 2013.04.18/14.45h.](#)
Art and Touch

Introduction
To address the problem of touch as one of aesthetic senses and in its relation to art, we start with the Ovid’s version of the ancient myth of Pygmalion where art and touch play an important role. In the next part of the paper, we shortly describe understanding of the sense of touch in the history of European Aesthetics and theory of visual art. The following section is devoted to touch as a theme for artists, especially in the Baroque art and Surrealism. In the last part of the paper the author indicates the increasing interest in touch in the area of visual art; she also asks the question if touch can enrich the process of art interpretation and evaluation.

Myth of Pygmalion
In the story known especially from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Pygmalion was a Greek sculptor from Cyprus. After becoming disgusted by some local prostitutes, he lost all interest in women and avoided their company completely. He dedicated himself to his work and soon created the statue of a beautiful woman; more beautiful than any woman that had ever lived or been carved in stone. After finishing the statue, he deeply fell in love with it. He caressed it, kissed it, talked to it every day, and even took it to his bed. During Venus’ holidays, Pygmalion went to her temple, offered her some gifts and prayed: “If you can give all things, oh gods, I pray my wife may be – (He almost said, My ivory girl, but dared not) – one like my ivory girl”. Venus understood his wish and gave him a sign; the flames shot up three times. When Pygmalion went home, he again ran to his statue, lay beside it and embraced it, having feeling that the stone seems warm to his touch this time. When kissing her, her lips seemed soft.
Pygmalion’s mind oscillated between doubt and joy, and “Plays lover again, and over and over touches the body with his hand. It is a body!”

This story explicitly points to the touch as being responsible not only for creation of the statue, but also for transforming the dead stone into the living flesh. Might it be a metaphor of our experience when we are “touched” by a great work of art?

**The Sense of Touch**

While the four human senses: eyes, ears, mouth, nose are site specific, that is located on particular parts of humans body, the sense of touch is not so easy to locate. It was the problem even for Aristotle, who dealt with the senses in detail, his ideas becoming a part of theory for a long time of European history. Aristotle stated that the five senses are ordered hierarchically, that sensation, and especially touch, gives us truthful access to the essences of extra mental things. Touch is, according to him, the “sense of nourishment”, since the animal feeds on the base of discriminating what is hot or cold, dry or moist, that is on what possesses qualities that manifest themselves immediately to the flesh. Touch is therefore the primordial sense of immediacy located on the whole surface of the skin. Nina Jablonski calls the touch the mother of all senses. She describes the human development out of the ancient primates thanks to their growing capacity of grasping by their feet and hands and stresses the importance of touch for human well-being. She indicates the lips, fingers and external genitalia as the most touch sensitive parts of the human body, which “allows the physical intimacy that leads to sexual intercourse and reproduction. Evolution does not get much more fundamental than that.” Thus, according to her, touch is strongly connected with erotic pleasure and thus very powerful, metaphorically saying touch is “life-giving”. However, we do not need to forget that touch can also be “death-giving” because of its ability to harm and to destroy things or put human beings to death.

On the other hand, touch is often connected with knowledge. Aristotle, for example, understood touch as a threshold of our cognitive quest, because it gives us “bodily” to ourselves and thus constitutes us as potential epistemological subjects. Without touch, we would have no consciousness and would know nothing. The essence of sense is to discriminate, and human touch has the highest discriminatory power among all the animals. Jablonski adds that this capacity is located especially at the top of our fingers: she calls them “digital pads” housing sensory nerve endings and receptors that are connected with special corpuscles in our brain which can register light touch, constant pressure, deep pressure and vibrations, temperature, and pain. According to Aristotle, a person whose flesh
is tenderer and whose skin is more delicate will perceive a more nuanced variety of tangible qualities and will more easily reach *theoria*. Aristotle went even so far as thinking of touch in aesthetics terms - because human excellence grows from aesthetic overabundance of the power of senses, that is in case of touch going over and beyond nutritive goods, he could imagine that touch would rise to touching things for their own sake, out of curiosity and for the pleasure of it, in view of knowing and understanding.

We gather enormous amounts of information through our skin and a huge part of our brain is devoted to perceiving the world around us through our sense of touch, especially hands. Francesca Bacci writes: "What is commonly referred to as ‘touch’ is a complex combination of the information coming from different receptors, including pressure on the skin and proprioception (which is the feeling of where our muscles and joints are in space). Touch is a sensorimotor activity, since it involves and interaction between toucher and touched that goes beyond the physical aspect of nerve endings transmitting a signal to our brain."8 Touch informs us not only about temperature, texture and weight of the object, but also about its effects on us: pleasure or pain, for example.

**Touch as an Aesthetic Sense**

Rosalyn Driscoll defines aesthetic touch as follows: “*Aesthetic touch* is conscious, inquiring touch that explores form, material, and spaces for their qualities, their effects, and their meanings. …Like aesthetic sight, aesthetic touch involves a departure from habitual recognition and functional use; attention to formal elements such as shape, space and pattern; transformation of the object or situation into alternative structures, concepts, or meanings; and openness to the emotional implications of what we perceive.”9 However, touch was not very often considered as an aesthetic sense.10 The priority was given to sight and hearing, two higher senses with the ability to acquire knowledge about the word and - due to their relative detachments from the object seen or heard - with the possibility to secure an aesthetic distance necessary for production of beauty and art. The character of touch does not meet these criteria, as the act of touching is “an ambiguous set-up in which….the roles of ‘touching’ and being ‘touched’ can alternate.”11

In the European history, however, several authors stressed the importance of touch for Aesthetics. We would mention just two of them: Edmund Burke and Johann Gottfried Herder. In Burke’s theory of beauty, articulated in his book *On the Sublime and Beautiful*,12 we can identify a special attention he gave to tactility. Burke defines beauty as pleasure caused by soft, smooth, sensual bodies - that is beautiful bodies evidently associated with femininity and touch, since, accord-
ting to Burke, touch receives pleasure form softness, which is not an object for sight. Elio Franzini even claims that Burke „designs his entire aesthetic theory of beauty around sensory qualities that are mainly tactile“. He summarizes Burke’s theory as follows: „In sum, touch is the true sense of beauty, the one that defines its kind of pleasure and also, through sex, its social usefulness.”

Johann Gottfried Herder elaborated his notion about touch especially in connection with the sculpture in his book *Sculpture*. Here, he made tactility the essence of the sculpture as an art, claiming that tactility confronts us with the third dimension which identifies the aesthetics of sculpture. Herder stated that ‘body’ (object that is present in space through its three dimensions) can be represented only by sculpture and “it is such because it is in tactile contact with our body, that is to say, with a body that can really make one ‘feel’ the form, its ‘impenetrability, hardness, softness, smoothness, form, figure, roundness’.”

Herder also challenged the principles laying under the art system – that is their classifying primarily according to sight and hearing. “To these senses one now needs to add touch, since it does not limit itself to perceiving what is ‘outside’ of it (sight), and does not put one object ‘next’ to the other, but can perceive them ‘one in the other’, thus offering not only surfaces or sounds but also forms.”

Not only in the area of Aesthetics was the sense of touch generally neglected, with a few exceptions underlined above. Fiona Candlin in her book *Art, museum and touch* offers a detailed analysis of the place and understanding of the touch in the theory of visual arts, especially in the works of Alois Riegl, Bernard Berenson, Heinrich Wölfflin and Erwin Panofsky. She claims that especially those three “fathers” of modern art history helped to lift the sense of sight into its superior position in the realm of “visual” arts. Though they have not excluded the touch entirely, they saw it as a more primitive, basic, antique, even cannibal sense in comparison to the sight.

When asking what kind of “will” operated behind their views, Candlin points out to the general modern idea of progress based on rationality and knowledge those authors transferred into the area of art. “The becoming-optical of art is equated to a rational world view where subjects conceive of themselves to be wholly detached from objects and, therefore, as being capable of objective, rational understanding. Being a full subject means looking, not touching”, writes Candlin.

**Touch as a Theme of Visual Art**

If we look at the European art, we can detect some epoch and styles when the touch was quite often addressed by artists as a theme of their artworks, explicit
or implicit, as a self-touch or the touch of others. I would offer some examples from Baroque sculpture and painting, and from Surrealist art as representing two of “tactile sensitive” styles.

In the European history of visual art, however, we can find the period when the discussion about touch and sight within the area of Visual arts themselves was very hot. It was connected with the aim to establish hierarchy between sculptures and paintings and to decide which one is more “noble” – Early Modern Italian art. As Johnson writes, “Writers who favored sculpture often saw tactility as one of this art’s most positive attributes, while advocates of painting repeatedly used sculpture’s tactile qualities as evidence of its lower status, especially in comparison to vision”. Leonardo da Vinci claimed that painting is more noble than sculpture because “…the painter sits in front of his work at perfect ease. He is well dressed and moves a very light brush dipped in delicate color…his home is clean…and he often is accompanied by music or by the reading of various beautiful works to which he can listen with great pleasure without interference of hammering and other noises.” However, there were other important arguments again tactility of sculpture involved such as that painting can imitate the very material of sculpture itself, and that painting uses colors to be able to imitate nature’s most ephemeral effects. On the other hand, Michelangelo was on the side of tactility. He even went so far as claiming that “painting was the best the more it resembles sculptural relief, while sculpture was worse the more it resembles painting.” Michelangelo’s interest in touch and tactility is evident not only in his statues and paintings, but also in his poetry. Hands are the theme of many of his artworks, most famous being the depiction of God reaching out to touch Adam in his *The Creation of Adam* in Sistine Chapel.

In Baroque art, we can find touch as an explicit theme of artworks such as *The Sense of Touch. The Blind Man of Gambassi* (1632) painted by J. de Ribera, depicting the blind person handling the sculptured head in his hands.

In the painting with the same title *The Sense of Touch*, created by Jan Brueghel the Elder (1618), the author stresses the intimate and tactile bond of mother and child, portrayed as an isle of love and life. We can feel the softness and warmth of the mother’s and child’s skin, in contrast with their surroundings - dark, cold and hard metal armors. Touch is here portrayed in its creative as well as its destructive possibilities; there are even some artworks involved in the contents of the painting, depicting both – life-giving and death-bringing aspect of touch.

We can see, not only at this painting, that touch was connected mostly with women, especially in the context of mother and child relationship. Touch as an active action was associated mostly with men, while women were portrayed as
passive object to be touched – metaphorically by men's eyes, that is objects to be-looked-at, but also more literally as objects for physical, real touch. We can find many paintings depicting man (mostly dressed) touching (mostly naked) woman as for example on the painting by L.de Silvestre: *The Sense of Touch: A Youth Kissing an Unclad Young Woman* (not dated).

An erotic and loving touch seen on this painting can change to more aggressive touch of the rape, as we can see on Gian Lorenzo Bernini's statue *The Rape of Proserpina* (1621–1622). The Greek mythological heroine Persephone, who was raped by Hades while collecting flowers on the meadow, is here displayed under her Roman name Proserpina. Hades-Pluto is depicted in the moment when having caught Proserpina trying to escape as documented by his hands holding her hip and cestus firmly and hardly, with fingers plunging into her skin.

The next example of Bernini' work, the statue *Beata Ludovica Albertoni* (1671–1674) is based on equation of erotic and mystic, the ecstasy coming from self-touch with religious ecstasy of metaphorically “touching” the God.

It can also be seen as documenting theory of feminist philosopher and psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray, claiming in her book *This Sex Which Is Not One* that “Woman takes pleasure more from touching than looking”.23 She states that in contrary to woman who is constantly touching herself as her self-touching labia enables unmediated auto-eroticism, man's touch needs something to be mediated with, that is requires an instrument: his hand or woman's body. Constance Classen even thinks that especially “women can challenge the traditional visualism of Western art by drawing on their particular aesthetic experience to develop a non-visual or multisensory aesthetics.”24

In the context of surrealism, we can point to Frida Kahlo's painting entitled *What the Water Gave Me* (1938). We can see, or better not see her body immersed in the “body” of water in her bath-tub. Water touches her skin and we cannot in fact discern who touches and who is touched. This feeling probably incites her imagination, as she can see different “objects” and “situations” emerging out of the water. These objects and situations are to be found on her artworks she has already painted. Thus, we can ask a question if touch can originate imagination and create artistic images, which was later explored by Jan Švankmajer.

In the painting of René Magritte *The Red Model* (1934), there is touch of the ground by the bare feet stressed. René Magritte shows our feet – in civilized world usually covered by shoes – as touching grinned surface of the earth seemingly not very pleasurable for walking on it by bare feet. Each kind of material depicted on the painting – wood, surface of the ground and shoe-skin evoke very tactile feelings in the viewer, together with directing his/her attention to the fact that our shoes are in fact our second skin because made from the skin
of our animal neighbors. By showing only feet, Magritte might remind us that we are firmly connected with the earth because we touch it at every moment we walk and cannot walk without touching it. But we often forget this very simple and basic fact, because the shoes which we put on can make touch sensations caused by the surface under our feet “untouchable”. This might cause the loss of the ability to differentiate touch sensations given to us by our feet and – in wider context - our loss of the contact with the „real“ world.

The interesting example of surrealist painting where touch is underlined is Salvador Dali’s artwork *Metamorphosis of Narcissus* (1937). In contrast with the original myth of Narcissus, where the sight is the means of giving the reflection of Narcissus beauty seen on the surface of the still water back to him, Dali prefers touch as a means not of the sameness of the reflection but of the metamorphosis to something and someone else. Narcissus’ hand plunging into the water of the lake, invisibility of his face and not-looking on the surface of water together with his metamorphoses into the hand handling an egg from which the flower is coming out makes this painting an apotheoses of the ability of hand to change things and human beings. There are two Narcissuses according to Dali – the first one on the left side, and the second one equated by Dali with his wife Gala (in the poem he had written as a part of this “complex surrealist work”). The importance of touch is shown also by the group of the people in the middle of the painting – they are touching themselves while looking at each other. Even the figure-statue on the right side on the pedestal is touching his own body. And in the poem, Dali describes the head on the hills as “the god of snow” trying to touch the water “melting with desire”.25

The Czech Surrealist artist Jan Švankmajer works explicitly with touch, theoretically and artistically. In his book *Touch and Imagination*, he searches for possibilities of touch in the area of visual art and proposes many haptic experiments, actions and performances with the aim to cultivate our haptic sense. According to him, the way how to reach it is to “disconnect touch from its utilitarian dependence on other senses, especially on sight.”26 In his artistic experiments with touch, he tries to test what are the possibilities of touch to evoke imagination that is to connect touch with our memory, stories, etc. There is an example of J. Švankmajer’s activity, installation called *The Possibilities of Dialogue* (not dated), where eye on the television screen is accompanied by four hands trying to reach the viewer. However, those hands are mechanical, and more than that, they have gloves on them, alluding by the fear of touch characterizing our recent culture (though in different cultures in different degree). Similarly to feet in René Magritte’s work, here hands begin to lose their tactile sensitivity.
Touch in the Process of Gaining Knowledge, Interpretation and Evaluation of Visual Art

All of us have experience with the sign in galleries: "Do not touch!" However, as Fiona Candlin claims, touch was not at all times prohibited in museums and galleries: "touch was understood as a legitimate and even essential means of engaging with art and arte-facts during the eighteenth century, although not everyone had the change to do so since strictly opening hours, ticketing and tips meant that the working classes, and to some extent even the middle classes, did not gain access anywhere near as easily as the elite." So, the possibility of someone to use touch in contact with art relied not only on the theoretical concept of visual art, the idea of museum excluding touch as causing damage to artworks, but also on class, for example.

Recently, we can witness the changes in the galleries and museums regimes in relation to touch. Touch is increasingly being allowed and advocated in art museums for people who are blind or visually impaired. A sculptor, painter, papermaker, writer and educator, Rosalyn Driscoll, a member of a group of artists Art in Touch, claims that "Touch is a way for all of us to know art. What we see is not the whole story." She tries to "move touch out of the ghetto of disability into the realm of possibility for everyone." Her deep exploration of aesthetic touch especially in the area of sculpture, takes the form of making and exhibiting tactile sculptures, gathering viewer reactions, following research in tactile/haptic perception, working with scientists, engineers, artists and people with disabilities, lecturing and teaching workshops, and writing a manuscript, Whole Body Seeing: Touch in the Visual Arts. Rosalyn Driscoll often makes her statues directly from dry skin or deals with the skin metaphorically, as seen in video made together with a multi-media artist Sarah Bliss entitled Poetics of Skin. In this video, as Bliss said, they were “…deconstructing the boundaries between one form of matter and another, and fore-fronting the truth of the seamlessness between all material realities.”

Contemporary artist Roy Nachum made his Self Portrait (2008–2009) inspired by the way how blind people use their hands to know the world. The painted hands seem to try to reach and touch others standing before the artwork, but we can see their gesture as protecting his face, too. The painting can be metaphorically “seen” also by blind people, who are invited to touch the painting as there is a poem written by Braille letters on its surface.
Art and Touch

Conclusion

The sense of touch was mostly neglected in the history of European Aesthetics, theory of visual art and art itself. This is connected with Kantian aesthetic point of view, where sight was described as sense which – because of its distance between subject and object, and detachment from his/her living interests – is able to make aesthetic judgments. However, though it was the prevailing view in modern times producing the principle of Do not touch! the artworks on display in galleries and art museums, it was not the only view - there were some theoreticians as well as artists, who were interested in touch as an aesthetic sense, and in the area of visual arts (with the different role in sculpture and painting).

Recently, we can witness growing interest in touch coming from different directions and inspirations: from scientists working in the area of sensory organs research stressing the multi-sensorial character of our bodily experiences; from feminist theory and art focusing on the close connection of women and touch; from disability studies, with the aim at opening an experience of visual art to blind or visually impaired people (the movement Do Touch!); from artists themselves, both women and men (Art in Touch group, etc.). Touch is being re-evaluated as very important aspect of our relations to the world, to themselves and to others, and the “fear of touch”, especially of touching other human beings, is detected as one source of the increasing amount of stress or psychical discomfort in so-called highly civilized societies (especially the USA, where the fear of touch is probably the highest in the world).

In the area of aesthetics, mainly in the perception of art, touch is praised as a means of our bodily experience of works of art being able to transgress the borders between subjectivity and objectivity. As visual art is mostly made by hands either working directly with materials from which particular artwork is made, or with the mediation of some tool (from pencil to computer or video), to permit viewer to use touch in the process of interaction with the work of art can enrich his/her aesthetic experience, not even to mention that some of its enriching qualities are not totally reachable by sight (texture of painting; weight, sensual qualities of material, volume, shape, etc. in the case of statue). The problem remains: can touch really enrich aesthetic experience of visual arts, and if yes, how to do it in practice?
Notes:

7. See more in Davenport “Aristotle and Descartes on Touch”.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
22. Johnson, ”The Art of Touch in Early Modern Italy”, p. 78.


As a lecturer during the workshops *Body Constitution*¹, organized for young actors, dancers and performers in the Grotowski Institute² in Wrocław (Richard Shusterman ran such workshops in the same place a year before), I had a chance to observe that, despite their extensive creative effort, they attached relatively little significance to the talks presenting philosophical theories expounding their activities. On the other hand, some of the people attending the lecture on somaesthetics were clearly interested in its pragmatic ideas. This led me to the conclusion that somaesthetic studies could be able to fill the existing gap between theory and practice. I made similar observations in Cracow two years before. Having talked to artists on many occasions, I became convinced that what they are particularly inspired by is the combination of theory and practice offered by the pragmatic aesthetics, while the aversion to philosophy persists, particularly among dancers³.

These conversations certainly contributed to the setting up of the Somaesthetics Unit at the John Dewey Research Center in the Faculty of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow with the aim of meeting artists’ needs in this respect. Since my main aim is to examine why somaesthetics is particularly inspiring for dancers, I have based most of my conclusions on the experience I gained working with them.

The establishment of the Somaesthetics Unit⁴ within John Dewey Research Center was first considered in 2010 during the promotion of Shusterman’s book *Body Consciousness. A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics⁵*, organized by Krystyna Wilkoszewska⁶ at the Institute of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University. The event, which included the performance by the DF Dance Theatre, was well attended, its highlight being the discussion with the author ‘in the atmosphere’ of dance. This gave rise to the initiative to meet on
a regular basis in order to explore the idea of combining theory and practice in
the broadest possible sense, drawing on the pragmatic tradition. A year later, as
a result of the collaboration with dancers, the three-day workshops took place,
entitled Know Yourself through your Body and aimed at academics. They were
organized and run by Katarzyna Skawińska\(^7\) and Anna Wańtuch (DF Dance
Theatre), while Krystyna Wilkoszewska provided support and assistance. The
workshops were attended by the academics from the Department of Aesthet-
ics and Eastern Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian
University, who examined, among others, the self-awareness of the body based
on the Feldenkrais’s method as well as experiencing the elements of Contact
Improvisation. The effects of the workshops were analysed in detail during the
round table discussion, which concluded the official opening of the Unit in
September 2012. The inauguration was honoured by the presence of the special
guest, Richard Shusterman, who gave a lecture ‘Pragmatism, Somaesthetics and
Contemporary Art’. The participants were invited to take part in the discussion
after the lecture by the dancer, Anna Wańtuch, who performed her own dance
production entitled Postnatal project.\(^8\)

The workshops, extremely fruitful and inspiring, prompted the participants
to raise certain philosophical questions, such as psycho-physical dualism or
John Dewey’s principle of cooperation between thoughts, feelings, senses and
emotions. (The academics taking part in the workshops were somewhat sur-
prised to hear the dancers saying that they ‘think with their knees’. The phrase,
an example of a non-dualistic view of the body, might not be exceptionally
original in contemporary philosophical thought, but such an idea is not easily
accessible to the academic, whose experience to a large extent involves mental,
rather than physical, activity.) It is already here that we can see a well-established
gap between what is conceivable by the body and by the mind, the gap that
requires problematization, a new approach to the range of their competences.

And even more importantly, the participants realized that if they were to
understand certain issues, they need to meet again in order to ‘work through’ the
problems raised, experience them with their own bodies. The second meeting of
the Somaesthetics Unit, ‘Contact Improvisation – dance technique or a lifestyle’,
which took place in 2013, was organized in a form of a lecture performance, a new
type of dance classes run by an expert in the field, Iwona Olszowska (Dance
Studio EST in Cracow)\(^9\). During the event Iwona Olszowska with the dancers,
Piotr Skalski and Małgorzata Werbińska (members of the project group EST
from Hurtownia Ruchu), presented ‘Falling after Paxton’ / the law of physics
in contact, covering the origins of contact improvisation. Katarzyna Skawińska
(DF Dance Theatre), with other dancers demonstrated how the elements of
improvisation could be employed in creating dance choreography. Also Anna Wańtuch and Tomasz Foltyn10 ‘presented’ contact improvisation, inviting the participants to join in. At the end, during the round table discussion the issues such as the problem of oppression in dance and one partner’s dominance over the other were discussed, but the main focus was touch, the most sensual of the senses, and the specific manner of communication that it entails. Touch can symbolize here a change in thinking about the body and the process of perception entangled in action.

An improvisation is a very rich field of research for philosophers and enables to test certain issues, especially the ones which are difficult or even ‘new’ for classical aesthetics. A good example of such an issue is the question of the body’s participation in aesthetic experience and appreciation, and even in the process of perception, introduced as part of the somatic turn11. This problem will be addressed in more detail in the further part of the paper.

Such observations prompted me to contemplate the topic, which seems especially pertinent nowadays, of mutual inspirations of theory and practice, as exemplified by Shusterman’s somaesthetics and the field of dance. Another important reason why this issue is worth examining in the context of American pragmatism is the fact that one of its leading figures, John Dewey, sees philosophical ideas as tools for solving practical problems while criticizing the contemplative ideal of knowledge and attaching more significance to participating in practice. In other words, he emphasizes the fact that we learn by doing things. And in the context of the cooperation with dancers, this type of learning proves particularly important and effective, to which I can attest myself after having taken part in workshops organized by the dancers. The workshops were their initiative, which has shown, on the one hand, their need for theoretical support and, on the other, their conviction that they also have a great deal to offer to theoreticians and thus the exchange of ideas might be advantageous to both sides. In the following paper I would like to attempt to sum up my observations and offer some preliminary research conclusions concerning the relationship between practice12 and theory in this particular context, based on my experiences of the collaboration with dancers while participating in the meetings and events.

I would like to start by analyzing what is valuable for dancers in the idea of somaesthetics, explaining some of the assumptions of pragmatism (as courtesy to dancers), to conclude by referring to the practical lesson which I was given during the workshops in the context of the somatic turn.

The issue of the interdependence of art and aesthetics is by no means new. The link between them, the way they inspire and determine one another, or could even be said to be mutually dependent, has been repeatedly stressed, par-
ticularly in the context of aesthetic research. Nevertheless, in a broader context of performative\textsuperscript{13} or postcolonial turn it gains new meaning, especially when related to a noticeable tendency defined as the return to practice and action, or even to cultivating “science as practice”\textsuperscript{14}. It is linked to the problematization of the sharp boundary drawn between the world of theory and practice connected with departure from the dualistic thinking.

The aim of the article is not to return to old ways of thinking, with clearly separated spheres of praxis and theory, but to establish new connections resulting from the idea of sustainability, holism and continuity derived from Dewey. That is why I intend to take two directions of my considerations. The old ways of inspiration will appear in the context of describing the value of somaesthetics for dancers. It is worth asking, however, what the novelty of Shusterman’s approach to the relation of theory and practice in the broadest meaning really is. That is why I would like to conclude by considering the problem of participation of the body not only in the process of evaluation of art, but in a wider sense, in action and thinking, presenting it as a particular kind of interpretation of the somatic turn in pragmatic thought.

As I mentioned before, the interest which the perspective of pragmatism has aroused among dancers became obvious during the very first meetings and discussions. As for the reasons why Shusterman’s ideas seem so appealing to dancers, I would like to highlight two particularly relevant features of his thought. First of all, dancers are not especially interested in somaesthetics understood as a discipline broadening the scope of aesthetic reflection, going beyond the realm of art. What is of more concern to them is its practical aspects following from the project of pragmatic and practical somaesthetics. I will examine both these issues further in the later part of the paper.

In her article Anna Wańtuch\textsuperscript{15} explains why it is clear that what somaesthetics proposes is exceptionally pertinent and convincing for dancers, especially contemporary dance. In her opinion the attractiveness of somaesthetic studies in the context of dance is particularly evident in the project of its three levels: analytical, pragmatic and practical, which are complementary to one another\textsuperscript{16}. The fact that multifaceted analytical studies are essential for better understanding of the body’s functioning hardly needs further arguments, although if the project of somaesthetics were to be limited to this aspect, it would hardly differ from other philosophical studies concerning the nature of the body. It is, however, worth mentioning that Shusterman’s analyses include a wide range of aspects.

The somaesthetic idea which is particularly relevant to dancers is the opportunity to improve the somatic experience. On the one hand, dancers demonstrate the potential, not only cognitive but also practical, of the body which can be
fashioned and developed in their creative work. What they need, however, is a critical analysis of various improvement methods which will take into account the practical use. That is why Wańtuch explains that dancers employ various somatic methods, such as Feldenkrais method or Alexander Technique, to which Shusterman frequently refers. Also according to Hanna, since the 1970s dancers' self-awareness has grown considerably and they are increasingly keen to make use of holistic methods of body improvement. Thus, what pragmatic somaesthetic proposes is of particular value to dancers, as it not only describes the methods of body improvement but, through the critical analysis, is also capable of determining their effectiveness. Of course the most important for dancers is practical somaesthetics.

Now I would like to discuss more general issues associated with the somaesthetic project. Expounding his concept of somaesthetics in the paper ‘Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal’, Shusterman proposes the following definition, which he then quotes on many occasions, ‘the critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one’s body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-fashioning.’ Although the formula is quite consistent, its particular components require some expansion. This definition already contains the germ of ideas essential for Shusterman's proposal for practising pragmatic aesthetics, with somaesthetics certainly qualifying as such. First of all, Shusterman points to the ‘living body’, which is, as he argues, the ‘active soma’ capable of feeling, experiencing and acting in the world. Another significant theme is signalled by the expression ‘the critical, meliorative study of the experience’, with the use of the term ‘meliorative’ indicating a rather uncommon, progressive aspect of the study. Finally, he maintains that the feeling body is a locus of creative self-fashioning, which implies that it is not only the source of appreciation but it is also rooted in the practice of life. And here we come to the crucial point in understanding somaesthetics as an interdisciplinary project which goes across the lines presently dividing various fields. Somaesthetics is supposed to be a subdiscipline of aesthetics but in a different sense to existing subdisciplines such as musical aesthetics or environmental aesthetics. Why is that so? The reason is that what pragmatism is about is not the defence of its specific character or its autonomy but the expansion of its boundaries. Somaesthetics could also be considered a subdiscipline of philosophy, but only in a very specific sense, that is, as a kind of embodied way of life, related to the ideals of ancient Confucianism or Asian thought. The detailed discussion of some of the above-mentioned issues will enable us to get to the core of Shusterman's argument, which, although not sufficiently convincing for the proponents of the autonomy of aesthetics, can be inspirational for dancers.
It is obvious that Shusterman’s position is firmly on the side of the antidualistic understanding of the body, which is why he refers to Dewey’s notion of ‘body-mind’ and places it in the centre of experience. The thesis of the antidualistic character of the body is confirmed by dancers and it is quite frequently found in the reflection on dance. The ‘new’ aspects include the possibility, within the realms of philosophical thought, to improve the body’s ‘self-use’ through the cultivation of its self-knowledge, in which Shusterman sees the opportunity to overcome the opposition between practice and aesthetics.

The possibility of self-perfection of experience leads us to two more previously mentioned issues: the meliorative study, which entails the specifically understood progressive structure of the method aimed at improving experience, open to constant development and modification, as well as the expansion of the study within classically understood aesthetics, apparently focused exclusively on artistic issues, towards the art of living. While improving the efficiency of acting, perceiving, and getting to know our bodies, we improve not only the ability to experience art, but also our own lives, which become a creative project of self-fashioning. Here Shusterman refers to the roots of Baumgarten’s aesthetic thought, demonstrating that the author of Aesthetica stood for the cognitive value of sensory perception and established this particular direction of the study not only to achieve ‘better thinking’ but also a better life. In so doing, Shusterman reintroduces a long-forgotten ancient conception of philosophy as an embodied practice of life and establishes somaesthetics as its subdiscipline. These practical philosophical premises make the somaesthetic studies particularly appealing to dancers. The first reason for this is that dancers often demonstrate that dance is also their life project, their idea ‘for’ life. Another is that by exploring the body’s capabilities, they reveal its active creative potential, which they are keen to develop.

To sum up, the most valuable aspects of Shusterman’s project are undoubtedly meliorative approach to the study as well as practical and pragmatic conclusions regarding the methods of self-perfection of the body’s experience. The greatest value of his conception, as I see it, lies in the fact that his project accords with the pragmatic ideal of the truth, according to which the theory is true if it is of use. And this is how somaesthetics is regarded by dancers.

Let us go on to stage two, to the manifestation of pragmatic ideas in dancers’ actions, which will additionally allow us to highlight some difficult aspects. One of them is mutual connection of spheres of action, thinking and feeling, resulting from antidualistic approach towards the body, which in a certain aspect sets a new level of knowledge. That is why I would like to point out a few things in the context of commonly known ideas of pragmatism. First of all, practitioners...
of contemporary dance show that body is not an object, that it possesses both cognitive and practical potential. They also confirm the continuity of sensual, bodily and mental experiences as well as emotions and point out that when they dance, they occur in a unified form\textsuperscript{28}. It can be said that, in a way, they opt for functionality of pragmatic ideas, because they often say that they act, feel, “think with their knees”. But they are also known for following the directive “don’t think, act”\textsuperscript{29}. (Here we can see another extreme, excluding thinking from the sphere of action). In this understanding in dancing practical function of the body is proven and valued. The function we can express in a directive referencing Gilbert Ryle’s\textsuperscript{30} distinction Knowing how and knowing that – which means: one can know “how” to do something, while not necessarily how to put it into words. Let us pause at this topic, because it also refers to somatic turn. Among many thinkers there have been heated discussions about the participation of the body in perception and other actions\textsuperscript{31}. At present Tim Ingold’s task-focused approach appears predominant\textsuperscript{32}. This is confirmed by dancers, who learn a technique by movement repetition and feeling it inside their bodies. One must then realize that dance proves that bodily experience is pre-objective (Maurice Merleau-Ponty\textsuperscript{33}), or pre-linguistic (Maxine Sheets-Johnstone\textsuperscript{34}), but is falling into the trap of dualism. Shusterman offers this particular different understanding – pre-conceptual, pre-reflective – not thought about\textsuperscript{35}, which can be exemplified in dancing.

As we can see, part of the philosophical questions can be analyzed from the perspective of the embodied experience of the dancers. When Shusterman defends its direct character, he argues that there is a level of intelligence in action, when a selection of stimuli takes place, when taking action happens without analyzing it on the level of reflexive consciousness\textsuperscript{36}. It is this kind of intelligence that can be seen in dancers, who are particularly sensitive to stimuli and information coming from the body, in a different way than scientists, they “understand” them “differently”, which does not diminish its value in solving tasks that they face. In this context it is easier to understand Dewey’s proposals about the continuity of mind, impulses and behaviors as well as Merleau-Ponty’s ones about the unity of “perception and action”. What is more, some patterns in dancers’ behavior are not only adopted and copied but also creatively developed, which leads to subsequent changes. It resembles to a certain extent Shusterman’s idea of melioration as well as Ingold’s ecological concepts. There is no time here to explain in depth the idea of melioration, let us move on then to the experience of the workshop, assuming that the idea of contact improvisation is well known\textsuperscript{37}. First of all, the experience of widening the range of body’s sensitivity, of treating skin as a source of contact and impulse to action, of “seeing with the whole surface
of the body”, as Steve Paxton writes, is grossly undervalued. Yet perception is closer to touch, which means interaction in ecological meaning. But through experience different questions can be verbalized, which widened my knowledge as a workshop participant. For example, how afraid I am to trust another person with the weight of my body or how sharp I have drawn my bodily boundaries. Verbal explanations do not solve this problem. (That is why we can talk about a new form of communication through actions). It is reflected in Paxton’s works, who said “that bigger perceptive sensitivity is a result of widening personal space”. It is really close to bursting the established dualistic differentiations and body competences which result from them. Such experiences have opened me to some aspects of pragmatism rather than the opposite.

Undermining of dualistic divisions (such as theory-practice or thinking-acting division), offered by pragmatism, makes us realize that it is necessary to rethink old, not only aesthetic, problems. For instance, if we remove the division between what is objective (Body) and what is subjective (Mind), corporal and spiritual, there is no reason to defend the uniqueness and specific character of an aesthetic experience from fleshly drives or other lower instincts, especially when there exists continuity between them. Distrust towards an aesthetic experience was the result of fear that it might be only a subjective experience (virtual projection of a mind) but also of fear that it might be reduced to lower fleshly sensations. At the initial stage of my analysis I proclaimed the program of somaesthetics research for dance as a sub-discipline specific for this kind of art. I also stated that grounding the aesthetic experience in the body may change the ways of thinking in aesthetics, and dance offers a perfect standpoint to witness this process. Now I see a much greater potential of somaesthetics research around dance, when I consider dance not only as a kind of art but in a broader context. It would allow us to undertake research of a much wider dimension, to approach a number of questions, previously unavailable in the traditional, post-Kantian model of aesthetics. Firstly, it would be aesthesis, i.e. considering new competencies and sensitivities of the body, undertaking the question of perception, as we suggested above. But, to continue, the topic of dance allows us to consider other questions “in between” aesthetics and politics or ethics but also performance studies, postcolonial studies, gender studies and so on.

We can multiply examples proving mutual relations and compatibilities between somaesthetics and embodied experience of dancers. The novelty of the project of somaesthetic ideas is especially visible in a noticeable tendency to break through established domain divisions and to look for new fields of their interconnectivity, often across or on the borders of certain divisions (also by flexing certain methods), but most of all by unsealing established differentia-
tions, as proposed by Cultural studies by Doris Bachman-Medick or Richard Schechner’s Performance studies. Such divisions include practice versus theory, body and mind, senses and reason, experience and cognition or thinking and action or other. Pragmatism offers us our own way to look for new links between established divisions. Nonetheless, the project of somaesthetics goes further in the search of these links within an interdisciplinary project. In this context one can also consider somaesthetics of dance not as a particular field, focused on a genre, but widening an aesthetics reflection onto these links, reflecting what Shusterman put as there is no impossible to reconcile dancing and thinking.

The point here is not to put dance into a distinguished position, even though the potential of such research is clearly visible.

Notes:

1. *Body Constitution* is a programme of research in practice, the year-round-work of number of studios set up to analyze in practice various physical traditions and a programme of practical seminars, open workshops, demonstrations.

2. The Grotowski Institute in Wroclaw is a city-founded institution that runs artistic and research projects responding to the challenges laid down by the creative practice of Jerzy Grotowski. www.grotowski-institute.art.pl.

3. I take into account that Shusterman uses the term practice in a broader meaning (as ethics and politics) not as art, especially when he says that he wants to break division between aesthetics and practice. But I start my article with relation with art and theory, and a little at the end I will talk about a broader perspective.

4. Program of Unit includes, apart from lectures and open discussions, workshops and presentations of achievements within the area of somatic research. Further information on the Somaesthetics Unit can be found on its website: www.deweycenter.uj.edu.pl.


6. Krystyna Wilkoszewska (Jagiellonian University) has established the John Dewey Research Center in Cracow.

7. Katarzyna Skawińska is a dancer, choreographer and the founder of DF Dance Theatre in Cracow.

8. The second part of the event included the lectures on somaesthetics given by the participants of the workshops, Sebastian Stankiewicz and Lilianna Bieszczad. The round table talks, which allowed the dancers and the academics to exchange their experiences as well as summing up the results of the workshops, closed the event.

9. Iwona Olszowska is a dancer, choreographer, Somatic Movement Educator (Body Mind Centering), teacher of contact improvisation.
Tomasz Foltyn is a performer, mover, known from the project ‘Tenderline’. Currently he works in Slovenia with group ‘Kud Ljud’.


I consciously play on the ambiguity of the term practice, especially in the context of American pragmatism.


Ibid., p. 64 and n.

Ibid., p. 64.


28. In this context it is worth mentioning that Arnold Berleant, who was inspired by Dewey’s pragmatic reflection, commenting on the continuity of experience, argued that the distinction between the body, senses and reason, which we have inherited from the Western philosophical thought, is nothing but an artificial notional construct, which we are accustomed to, despite the fact that experience by no means confirms their separation, but, on the contrary, proves their continuity. See for example: Arnold Berleant, *Art and Engagement*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991, *Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.  
36 *Ibid*.  
40 Paxton, “The Grand Union”.  
41 Bachman-Medick, *Cultural turns. Nowe kierunki w naukach o kulturze*.  
Cinematographic Aesthesis. How Does Digital Cinema Transform our Sensitivity?¹

Introduction

The movies we appreciate today are very much like the ones produced several decades ago. They present images in movement, and in the majority of the cases they tell a story; they represent interpreted version of reality; some of them offer a plethora of elaborated special effects that take us to the creative impossibilities of dreams and imagination. At the same time the movies we see today are different. How has film changed these days? When we say: “Let´s see a movie” we all know what we mean, because for over a century of cinematographic art it has provided the necessary material and has captivated us with its unique aesthetic formal and narrative characteristics. In such a way we have learned to appreciate, understand, differentiate and live with delight the world of filmed images and their metaphoric language. In a different respect, current movies present noticeable changes in their creation-production-distribution-consumption processes and even in our own understanding, the cinematographic experience is different. In part, we know this because we can perceive it individually, and also because the digital forms allow us to differentiate diverse ways of appreciation, recognition, as non-homogenous aesthetic experiences.

As a preliminary exercise let´s think of a recent movie production. And ask ourselves: What changes do we see with digital processes in the current cinematography? Within the production areas, the research and the appreciation we hesitate to give definite answers to these questions, more so if we see film as a means that is now incorporated into a huge amount of hybrid media paraphernalia, which obligates us to be up to date in the digital applications. Nonetheless, cinema is still made of the basic components that allow us to recognize and define it as such, but it is difficult to talk about characteristics that are pure and exclusive, as it was possible in the analogic generation. Derived
from this, we can see how digital creations spark ontological concerns, which remind us of the theoretical contributions by André Bazin when we ask, what is (digital) cinema? The search, the experimentation and the aesthetic thought get revived facing this technological phenomenon that is novel, diverse, rapid changing with early obsolescence characteristics. This stirs up other concerns that are not that original, although relevant, about the changes produced in our perception by a type of cinema that incorporates digital processes. We could recognize a certain analogy between the concerns brought in by digital cinema and what happened during the period of experimentation with the first moving images or the solidification of film as an artistic and communicational expression; events that also derived in philosophical discussion and the need for scientific theorization to find out the links between technology and aesthetics.

The use of digital technology also makes us think about the need to find out about the changes that cinema provokes in our cognitive processes. These kinds of questions have been present almost since the early cinema, we can refer to Hugo Münsterberg contributions, who proposed, from the psychological point of view, similar concerns as we have here, by becoming interested in how film (the photoplay) influences the mind of the viewers. Münsterberg (also Bazin) shows us the evolving focus that has defined cinematography as a non-static phenomenon but as an ever changing aesthetic expression.

Let us start, then, by stating that there is innovation and changes generating by digital processes, which are transforming, in a forceful way, cinematographic production, as well as our perception of the movie experience. My intention here is to consider this last perceptive circumstance by asking, how does digital film transform our sensitivity? For the progress of this work I propose the term cinematographic aesthesis in order to explain possible changes in perception towards the digital experience, understood as provoked conditions in our sensitivity. I also distinguish some concerns toward film-making, related to the aesthetic-technological sense. Within the academic context, I refer to the cognitive studies of film in a general way, from which I find recurring aesthetic concerns, whose intention is to explore the viewers experience, the sensations, the feelings and the emotions; areas intimately related to the esthesis notion. Based in the previous, I search to respond to these questions, by explaining certain aesthetic changes in narrative and the interactive experience. Preceding the descriptions, let us focus on the following definitions as they will help us understand the point of the debate on digital cinematography.
Cinema, Esthesis and Transformation

Cinema can be defined as an aesthetic and technological phenomenon, generator of moving images. Because of this, in any change or innovation the first thing that must be analysed is its esthesis. This common denominator turns out to be polysemantic and complex, but it still allows us to explain these aesthetic characteristics from several perspectives. Dominique Chateau describes esthesis as the original meaning of aesthetics, likes its genetic aura. He describes: “The Nebulousness of Greek terms (aisthanemai, aithema, aisthesis, aistheteron, aisthetikos, aisthetos), from which the modern word aesthetics comes, refers us, by the way, to the (five) senses, to sensation, to feeling, to senses, to sensitivity, to perception and, thus, has to do with the relation of the senses with the world”\(^4\). According to Chateau’s definition, we can say that the condition of esthesis describes, mainly, the sensitive capacity of living beings and, as a secondary derivation, it refers to the attributes implicit in the human productions, when these are categorized as aesthetic objects, for example films. In the aesthetic debate, it has been a real problem reaching consensus towards the right study objects, nonetheless, it is generally accepted that its original meaning points to sensitivity or sensibility, as Mandoki\(^5\) proposes, esthesis is a sensitive condition of living beings, not only humans, all kinds of live things, and it is important to understand esthesis as a process, and basically an open condition to the context in which we are immersed, so esthesis is a social alive dimension that does not necessarily mean beauty or pleasure.

Now, facing the digital phenomena, we go back to the aesthetic debates with the challenge of having to update them. The cinematographic phenomena involve aesthetic matters in the whole range of possibilities, in considering the movie a work of art or an aesthetic expression, in paying attention to the matters of human sensitivity like perception, the viewers experience, his/her sensations, feelings and emotions provoked. The film aesthetics is debated from analytic categories and sensitivity conditions each time we have an innovation or a new problem. Aesthetics is dedicated to study the formal changes in movies as works, as well as the aesthetic changes derived from the sensitive experience of the involved subjects; this process which relates the aesthetic characteristics in movies with the sensitive condition of viewers is what we will call cinematographic esthesis. The term defines a process that is mainly perceptible, implied in the film-spectator connection and interactions. It is a process that contains an important relation between the cinematographic aesthetics and the spectator sensibility. By understanding this perceptual relation, I think it is possible to explain likely transformations of perception in face of the digital experience.
Digital development demands updates in aesthetic approaches that allow us to understand how cinematography shows dynamic qualities, not only by its movement effects, but because it is a process that implies transformations in the realm of perception. The idea of transformation announces an evolutive development, a progressive and constant change, variations that can become convincing. In this context, esthesis and transformation are two concepts that allow us to understand how digital unravels as a revolutionary change in cinematographic media that is no longer autonomous in order to transcend and increasingly assimilate to media environments. This demands our recap about creation and appreciation forms, and invites us to pay attention to the new perceptual challenges of the spectator. Therefore I propose to dig into the interactive and narrative forms that appear with the use of digital technology, in order to pin down certain changes or modifications from which we can account for some transformations of the cinematographic esthesis.

Our Digital Cinematographic Experience

We, contemporary adults, share the affinity of being part of transitional generations. In the media environment, it means that our audiovisual experience is determined by certain forms of technological interaction and aesthetic appreciation that fluctuate between analog and digital. Our ways of digital living (and thinking and feeling) generate an individual experience with social qualities that are shared as tastes, preferences, habits and means of communication. If we consider how we interact with and through digital media, including cinema, we can speak of different types of spectators who can be profiled not only by their biological age but by their ways of media interaction. Around that, Prensky – who refers to the education sphere – proposes a distinction between digital natives and digital immigrants. He explains:

It is now clear that as a result of this ubiquitous environment and the sheer volume of their interaction with it, today’s students think and process information fundamentally differently from their predecessors... ... What should we call these “new” students of today? Some refer to them as the N-[for Net]-gen or D-[for digital]-gen. But the most useful designation I have found for them is Digital Natives. Our students today are all “native speakers” of the digital language of computers, video games and the Internet. So what does that make the rest of us? Those of us who were not born into the digital world but have, at some later point in our lives, become fascinated by and adopted many or most aspects of the new technology, are - and always will be – compared to them, Digital Immigrants°.
If we focus on the cinematographic context and get support from Prensky’s description, we can say that the perceptual experience of a digital native from a movie is obviously different to the appreciation of a digital immigrant, at least in terms of interaction and narrative experience. Therefore, we can assert the existence of strong transformations in the cinematographic esthesis around the prevailing phenomenon. To gain clarity as to how a native spectator experiences a movie differently from an immigrant, it is essential to open our analytic spectrum in order to consider the media conglomerate, since it is no longer possible to analyze cinema as a homogeneous film in an isolated or foreign way toward other media environments, including virtual ones. We can use the following diagram as a reference. It is inspired by Prensky’s text (2001).

Table 1. Diagram Digital Immigrants vs. Digital Natives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Digital Immigrants</th>
<th>Digital Natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born before 1995</td>
<td>Born after 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoughtful</td>
<td>Practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer to do one thing at a time</td>
<td>Multimedia and Multitask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer textual information</td>
<td>Prefer graphic information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find it difficult to update apps</td>
<td>Can update apps and do it regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile is for phone calls mainly</td>
<td>Mobile is the full entertainment center for the social network interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use few social networks, prefer emailing and they store information in the computer</td>
<td>Use all kinds of social networks and don’t backup information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google and web but also refer to books searching for information</td>
<td>Google and web searching for information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In table 1 we can appreciate the differences of media interaction depending on the kind of user. People born after 1995 are the so-called digital natives and, we might presume, are the group whose esthesis shows a larger transformation. It is relevant, for example, to pay attention to their preferences around reading formats. While digital natives go for and understand graphic information better, digital immigrants tend to opt for linear text reading, while alternating between analog and digital from time to time.

Another aspect that should be stressed is the media interaction that we can call maintenance. While digital natives get constant upgrades of software and different apps, immigrants long to have equipment that lasts longer and changes less. This implies a valuable reflection around the topics of validity and
Jacqueline Gómez Mayorga

memory, since immigrants will consider that works and discourses should not be altered to guarantee their persistence. By contrast, natives will estimate the constant change as necessary, as well as the update of what is important, useful or valuable. A distinctive habit represented here is that digital natives share information in diverse ways through the alternative options of Web 2.0 (e-mail, Twitter, Facebook, You Tube, Instagram, and others). In the case of immigrants, they will use them just enough to keep up to date, like e-mail and any social network; plus, they will try to save the information in different folders and discs to use it later, an action that a digital native might find absolutely unnecessary. Finally, digital natives will opt for interactive aesthetic experiences that are multi and hypermediatic, indicating that for this kind of people, the concept of autonomous communication media is losing sense, value and purpose. Just the same, the differentiation of real or virtual is irrelevant for them. On the other hand, digital migrants will try to defend the singularities of certain media or arts, as it happens with cinema. They will try to distinguish, with an amount of passion, fiction from reality.

All these possibilities of technological interaction describe a recent phenomenon and, of course, it is arguable, since it is not innovative at all. Nevertheless, it is easier to distinguish tendencies and some specific cultural transformations that result in the use of digital tech. For instance, it allows the perception of peculiar features, like the increased participation of people in different spaces or virtual media environments, where completely real activities are held: educational, professional, labor, economic, ideological, entertainment and others.

From this interactive, multimedia, multi-environment perspective, we can debate important aesthetic issues such as the possibility of cyberaesthetic transformations and the debate around reality perception modes. We can reflect upon what Arnold Berleant argues:

This computer-generated ‘virtual’ world is not entirely new, for we also encounter so-called virtuality outside the computer. Consider the distinctive spatio-temporal-dynamic environments of memory, of history, of imagination, of letter-writing, of the telephone, and of each of the different arts. Each of these perceptual environments constructs its own mode of actuality or reality, and the electronic environment of cyberspace is different only in kind and not ontologically.

In accordance with Berleant’s statement, we also find in cinema, from the beginning, different dynamic-time-space perceptual environments that shape reality. This means that such a quality does not stand for the innovative aspect of digital; nonetheless, in the infographic context that permeates the realm of
media production where current cinematographic phenomenon occurs, it is perceived in a different way, as it is created and lived in another dynamic way.

With the advent of digital tech, one of the biggest worries has been the prophecy around cinema's death due to the substitution of 35mm format. Cinema became a creator of moving images while standing up for a unique aesthetics, whose main quality was photographic film. With the digital twist, film is replaced by photosensitive chips. Additionally, digital processes are integrated in production, postproduction, exhibition and distribution, adding another kind of aesthetic qualities that, paradoxically, tend to equate the preexisting art. Although their authentic contribution is the generation of other perceivable qualities that are just possible thanks to the infodata and ways of interaction. As an aesthetic and technological phenomenon, digital implementation for film production has not only disrupted the creative spirit of production, but has also sparked philosophical and theoretical considerations that allow the fundamental question to arise: What is digital cinema? Stemming from this question, we can pinpoint the importance of understanding transformation in our sensitivity.

Let us go back to Prensky to understand the occurrence of certain kind of aesthetic transformations based on our own technological interaction at the cinematographic experience. In the creative arena, George Lucas, Steven Spielberg, James Cameron, Peter Jackson, and Jaime Humberto Hermosillo in Mexico are considered enthusiastic promoters of digital tech. We could define them as digital natives, although obviously none of them are teenagers. On the other hand, filmmakers such as Martin Scorsese, Werner Herzog, Christopher Nolan, and Carlos Reygadas from Mexico can all be considered digital immigrants since they could use digital tech but yet defend, with a touch of nostalgia, the aesthetics of 35 mm film. We have to consider, besides, that all of the aforementioned filmmakers have achieved excellent applications of digital tech in their movie production, and before that, all of them produced movies with 100% analog processes. Could we notice their particular differences? Let us focus on our cinematographic experience and head to find some kind of answer.

Thinking that we are proper movie lovers, let us try to experiment with the following cinematographic experiences.

1. - In this first case, we look at two long opening sequences: a classic panoramic shot that places us in Paris, but something is different in the movement and visual details. The rapport, clothing, scenery and props allow us to situate in an age gone by, it is the decade of the 30’s in the XX century. We begin a beautiful tour with a long shot around a train station. As if we were ghosts, we trespass the corporeality of the travelers in the platform. They do not notice our presence. We keep going around the station until we reach a huge clock: number four
reveals a gaze behind it. We find the face of a boy inside. It is Hugo who peeks and contemplates the roundabouts of travelers in a daily environment with us. Hugo leads us through the mechanical labyrinth of the sophisticated machinery that allows the mark of time. With him we go along the spaces, in a second sequence, with ludic movements until we reach another clock. Through it, we all observe an antiques dealer. We will discover his identity later. He is Méliès and the movie, on the whole, is a tribute to cinematographic magic.

2. - Now, we are witnesses to a singular experience, cave images, prehistoric illustrations, ancestral graphics. Traces made by humans more than 30,000 years ago. We are spectators, and at the same time, witnesses and interactive visitors. As privileged guests, we walk along a group of archeologists that investigate, describe and interpret the drawings. We soon realize how close we are to these images when we appreciate the minimal details. The sensation is so real, as if we actually are ourselves inside a place that we certainly will not physically visit. Nonetheless, we can search every corner while Herzog explains how these engraved images are traces of the human intention to preserve movement. We validate the captured mobility. Then we go further, to appreciate a graphic sequence. It is an infography that contrasts the ancestral images, but at the same time, share the same synthetic feature. The moving infographics represents every space and outlines the total size of the cave. With a scanning process the scheme can be animated to show us the size and position of every figure in the cave.

3 - Next, we watch the making of a complex task: bringing a character to life through animation. The sequence is thoroughly descriptive in showing Snowy’s design, the amusing dog that escorts Tintin in his adventures. We are behind the cameras for a dialogue with the directors, producers, designers, animators and actor Jaime Bell, who brings Tintin to life. Steven Spielberg and Peter Jackson explain the details of the creative process. At the same time, we appreciate Bell’s images moving among ramps and devices to express movement and corporalities that will be registered by sensors and then, will be used in animation generated by specialized software. As a result we get to see the virtual version that integrates Bell’s sensitivity with Tintin’s graphic form. We testify the complexity of the digital design that involves a translation of graphic images to digital images with the support of modeled mechatronic devices and audiovisual design. The final result is a hyperreal Snowy with harmonious and precise movements that generate pleasurable emotions.

The three sequences mentioned before describe moving pictures that could be either analog or digital. It is in the audiovisual experience where we confirm the existence of visual and narrative details, which are only possible through technology and digital processes. That means the emotional and interactive effect
that defines their success could not be achieved without the presence of digital applications. The sequences belong to Hugo (Scorsese, 2011), Cave of Forgotten Dreams (Herzog, 2010) and The Adventures of Tintin (Spielberg, 2011). The three films are productions meant to be shown in 3D. The use of tridimensional infographics, in the three cases, turns out to be exceptional and it is precisely this technological attribution that makes our perceptual experience susceptible of being transformed. The three examples have narrative components and conventional gender types: fiction, documentary and animation; along with it, we perceive very precise graphic subtleties, which belong to the digital aesthetics: aesthetic images only possible with digital cameras (Arri Alexa for Hugo; Silicon Imaging SI – 3D 2K for Cave of forgotten dreams); immersive interaction in order to go beyond the contemplation of images and to participate in the events when it translates the time-spaces of cinematic realities.

A different quality is perceived in the infographic plot based in the design of the data rather than in the dramatic discourse, to expose schemes and complex synthesis images. One last feature to underscore is the hyperreal and hyperdetailed, designed to allow more perceptual and action freedom. All of the aforementioned assimilate to the conventional aesthetic features that allow us to recognize differences between fiction, archeological documentary and animation. In face of this, can we say that the sensitive experience is the same? Not at all. Digital film experience will finally make sense as much as we are willing to interact. If we consider ourselves native digital movie lovers, we are able to enjoy these three movies with a positive vision of the added aesthetic values. We will open through media environments to find more elements, add information and enrich our experience with it. For example, we will look for the making of, the trailer, interviews, specialized comments and technical details. As digital natives, it will be a priority to enjoy 3D movies and witness its aesthetic contributions. In narrative terms, the graphic synthesis and the economy of linear discourse will not diminish the purpose of the story. On the contrary, it will add clarity and energy. In the same way, it will be a pleasure to appreciate special effects and the mix of Digital images or CGI (computer generated imagery) and any other kind of info visualization. Opposite to that, as digital immigrant spectators, we will show ourselves as conservative and critical toward the application of technology and we will be ready to defend the quality of a dramatic story of the narrative kind. We will make constant comparisons in relation with previous film proposals, longing for any artistic or aesthetic attributions that we consider canonical.

To sum up, we can say that the same movies will be valued differently according to the integration of the digital innovation, personal experience and the
kind of media interaction that every spectator achieves as a digital user. This means that the transformation in the cinematographic esthesis will not happen in the same way or at the same time, but nevertheless there will be changes at the cognitive level though we cannot perceive it. However, these changes are not so radical in the biological since transformations are mainly cultural, caused by the interaction of spectators through technology. According to Grodal, “cultural evolution takes place on top of a slow-paced biological evolution”11. That influences the way we experience the natural world and also our experience of the virtual audiovisual world like cinema.

Based on what we previously discussed, let us pay attention to one last circumstance: Digital Film Studies. The complexity and outreach of digital has demanded a critical reassessment of theoretical knowledge and analysis to determine the course of Film Studies. Research is fundamental in taking into account the presence and media interaction. This means that digital cinema cannot be studied without reference to other media contexts, mainly interactive.

In the 1980’s there was a debate around the usefulness of Film Studies based in Grand theories12. The cognitive proposals made of multidiscipline approaches had a satisfactory response to the demands of contemporary manifestations and features. In the aesthetic arena, there was an evident interest around topics related to the spectator experience and, in time, works focused on perception, sensibility and emotion became recurrent13. Nonetheless, only a few had focused on raising questions about the problems of the digital phenomenon. From the perspective of the digital revolution, L. Manovich’s work is well-known14, also contributions as S. Cubitt15, H. Willis16 or N. Rombes17. And as for cognitive approaches, the majority of researchers and scholars debated about the aesthetic phenomena of the contemporary cinema with a certain attitude of digital immigrants. It is recently that we find a larger commitment to address topics around the digital phenomenon18. In these works we notice a growing interest around what we have called cinematographic esthesis.

One of the issues or basic motivations at present is to inquire around the technology-aesthetics link. We can distinguish some changes in the research methods and the need to leave aside some worn-out constructs to go in search of new concerns, to understand cinema as a changing phenomenon without forcing it inside a specific theoretical corpus. We can also notice a tendency to reexamine previous theories to approach basic topics linked to technology, such as representation, narrative, the spectator’s experience, sociocultural impact and, as one of the main focus, aesthetics with an emphasis in the cognitive-evolutionists perspectives19.
Conclusions

Cinema has been slow in integrating to the digital media phenomenon. It seems paradoxical, as it is the art that has implemented more avant-garde technology. Around this, Bordwell states:

“Cinema was the last medium in popular culture to go fully digital. By 2000, most entertainment industries had let computers make their work easier and more efficient. Media companies had discovered that software could go beyond accounting, tracking inventory, and other back-office operations. It could change the production, distribution, and consumption of their products…. Computers entered cinema more slowly, working their way into different points in the creative process. Special effects were among the first areas affected, as simple programs were used to coordinate the movements of miniatures and the camera”20.

Even if cinema emerges from a unique analog reality, its technique and aesthetics are constantly transforming, even more so with the assimilation of digital processes: cameras, post-production, play and recording formats, projector devices, distribution and consumers channels bring distinctive aesthetic qualities to the film production. To understand the aesthetic transformation of digital cinema and raise the stakes on the transformation of the spectators’ sensibility demands a digital native behavior, as Film Studies cannot develop if they are foreign or isolated from the interactive relation with new media.

It is difficult to speak about only one cinematographic aesthetic experience, because digital demands, or allows, different kinds of perceptual experiences. Nor is it about annihilating our previous experiences, since hybrid qualities give way to flexibility and assimilation. Therefore, the mere expression “let’s go to see a movie” implies a ritual or habit: to visit a movie theater and see the current film. This action remains inside us as an idea. We can say that this is the stereotypical image and as such, it helps to have common references or anchors, canonical cognitive schemas as Grodal proposes21.

Nowadays, “let’s go to see a movie” is still a valid phrase, even if the cinematographic experience, for some years now, can imply different possibilities never experienced before in a concurring way. Let us think, for example, about options we have à la carte: visiting the Cineplex and selecting from a variety of films in several ways to appreciate it 2D, 3D or 4D; watch the movie at home or any other place we please; on TV, on the internet via YouTube, or Netflix; online or by streaming; selecting our preferred device, computer, tablet or cell phone and even selecting the recording system and image reproduction, and even the resolution quality: VCD (352x240 pixels), DVD (720x576), Blue ray or Full HD (1920x1080).22 All of these possibilities have become mere day to day choices,
but are complex processes that have the main virtue of accessibility. Then, the aesthetic limits lay on our own sensible and perceptual experience. Our tastes are fit for native or immigrant spectators.

Giving account of the phenomenon demands the renewal of our ways of understanding and dealing with the aesthetic phenomena in order to explain how technology transforms the cinematographic object and how, at the same time, it has an impact in our sensitive condition or esthesis. The topics and issues related to the sensibility become a priority because digital opens the cinema spectrum to a highly emotional, less rational, possibility. Digital film production aims to raise emotions with the help of sophisticated tech. For that reason, film studies are required to keep the analysis of the spectator experience, his/her sensibility, sensations and emotions.

Filmography


Notes:


22. Resolution is given by the size of the screen (height x wide) in inches to determine the number of pixels it can contain. But an important difference is if this resolution is measured by line numbers (analog) or pixels (digital) to create the image.
From Atmospheric Awareness to Active Materiality

Atmospheric turn or Architecture in Action

The expression ‘atmosphere’, like the atmosphere itself, is omnipresent. Taking a central stage also in architectural discourse and practice, the so-called atmospheric turn has entailed both methodological and conceptual shifts in thinking and making architecture. The beginning of the second millennium was marked by a clear transition in approaching architecture as a ‘critical practice’, challenging the understanding of ‘criticality’ as a non-discursive but ‘projective’ discipline. The debate about what in this context is denominated as ‘post-criticality’ was nourished, among others, by the seminal essay “Notes around the Doppler Effect and other Moods of Modernism” (2002) by Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting, in which the authors define ‘the projective’ in terms of engagement, performance, contingency and atmosphere. What these tropes imply is action, shifting attention from designing ‘objects’ towards creation of scenarios, generation of conditions and agencies, or production of effects – architecture becoming a critical device, a vehicle for events, social interaction and experiential solicitation. Prompting considerations of the operative scope of architecture, its effective and affective qualities as well as transformative agencies in the shaping of situations, we might say then that the ‘critical practice’ invites reflections upon the protocols for the creation of atmosphere.

Mark Wigley in his essay “The Architecture of Atmosphere” (1998) defines it as “(...) a swirling climate of intangible effects generated by a stationary object (...)” and states that to construct a building also means to construct an atmosphere. Nevertheless, Gernot Böhme – who sees atmosphere as a fundamental concept of a new aesthetics, and whose theories have recently influenced many architects – draws our attention to the fact that the knowledge about the production of atmospheres is very seldom explicit and is, in addition, distorted by
dichotomies⁴. Disjunctions between subject and object, body and mind, have also framed architectural debates; as did the dialectic tension between the physical and the immaterial – the latter revealing the loss of interest in materiality as an expressive medium and pointing to the growing fascination with matter as a catalyst and activator of effects and experiences.

To illustrate the self-conscious pursuit of atmosphere Böhme uses as an example the Theorie der Gartenkunst (1777) of Christian Cay Lorenz Hirschfeld⁵, which might be understood as a manual of atmospheres, indicating different elements through whose interaction atmosphere is conjured. Similarly, In The Poetics of Space (1957) Gaston Bachelard explores the realm of the narrative and the transporting effect of words as vehicles for re-enacting sensations, able to convey a notion of involvement, to “surround” us with an atmosphere⁶. Consequently, if we take as a point of departure the assumption of Mikel Dufrenne, who informs us that “[a]ll the elements of the represented world conspire to produce [atmosphere], according to their mode of representation⁷”, we might then ask what determines an atmospheric physiognomy in architecture; and furthermore, how are we to discern the means of creating an atmosphere?

**In Search of Atmospheric Awareness**

What immediately follows these questions is, then, the exploration of works and design processes – for which seeking an effect and affect is implicit and the foregrounding of perceptual and emotional engagement is conscious – with an attempt to trace associations and draw out design protocols, focusing on ways in which atmosphere can be consciously generated or manipulated. Thus, following Gernot Böhme, who refers to the creation of the atmosphere through the character of the materials as magic⁸, the objective is to examine ‘the atmospheric’ as an affective quality, an experiential property as well as a sensory background and materiality, as a means of engendering atmosphere. In other words, unravelling the intrinsic characteristics of atmospheric phenomenon the aim is to illustrate this particular projective genealogy that defines so-called ‘active materiality’.

In meeting this objective the first step is to explore what the term ‘atmosphere’ entails in architectural discourse. Its meaning, like the very nature of atmosphere, seems to be elusive. The expression ‘atmosphere’ having different connotations is used to describe diverse aspects – from ambient conditions to the realm of experience, emotions and mood. It also evokes associations to artificiality, metaphors or poetics. Regardless of whether these affiliations are more or less accurate in the context of atmospheric theories⁹, they indicate that there is a clear transition towards understanding architecture as an active field,
defined through a very complex network of relationships. This reading leads also to the revaluation of embodiment as a basis for the interaction with our surroundings. Therefore, many invocations of atmosphere are akin to the meteorological atmosphere that envelops and, as such, affects those surrounded by it. Moreover, bearing in mind the etymological roots of the term – from Greek ἀτμός [atmos] ‘vapour’ and σφαῖρα [sphaira] ‘sphere’ – atmosphere is very often associated with something airy or hazy and thus with the apparent loss of mass or body of architecture that floats lightly in the air, claiming dematerialisation.

“The making of nothing”\textsuperscript{10} is how Elisabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio refer to their Blur Building rising out of the Lake Neuchatel in Yverdon-les-Bains. The building was conceived for the Swiss Expo 2002 as an immersive installation – as an open-air platform submerged in a responsive to environmental changes artificially produced cloud.

However, even this nothingness driven by a desire to dissolve boundaries and to appear weightless depends, among other factors, on the awareness of the tectonic qualities and performative properties of the materials. Thus, we might say that beyond the previously mentioned dichotomies, materiality has remained central to architecture, even though the conception of its inner logic is continuously submitted to re-contextualization, shifting traditionally established categories. Precisely because atmosphere hovers in the intermediate realm between the material and the immaterial, it calls for a specific manner of understanding materiality.

\textbf{Affective Tectonics}

Already in 1851, Mary Philadelphia Merrifield describes in \textit{The Art Journal Illustrated Catalogue} the Crystal Palace designed by Joseph Paxton for the Great Exhibition in London as – using her actual words – “perhaps the only building in the world in which atmosphere is perceptible”. Like Wigley, she talks about the climate of ephemeral effects – “glowing and varied hues that blaze along”, “a blue haze” that emanates from space and envelopes the spectator producing a “pleasing appearance”\textsuperscript{11}. She is aware that the decisive factor in creating that effect is not just a special character of the space itself, but the combination of all the elements such as the exhibited objects, their colours and textures, the sparkling glass fountain, and their interplay with the ever-changing ambient conditions. We might say, thus, that the Merrifield’s description reveals similarities with the theory of atmosphere formulated by Hermann Schmitz or even more directly with one devised by Gernot Böhme. Schmitz defines atmosphere as a spatial phenomenon. Nevertheless, the space he refers to is not delimited by
static surfaces (Flächen), nor is it reducible to isolated entities. It is rather a sum of effects – an ephemeral occurrence – that leads to an integral and synaesthetic perception of our surroundings, where environmental qualities are implicit and conditions and phenomena are bound together in a reciprocal dependence. While Schmitz approaches atmospheres as somehow “free floating”, Gernot Böhme presents them “(…) as something that proceeds from and is created by things, persons or their constellations (…)”, pointing out the connexions between the concrete properties of objects and the atmosphere they radiate.

The enduring need to interact with the body and the surroundings through experience has nourished a wide range of design techniques that identify the inherent conditions of materials and constantly changing environmental parameters as well as human perception as data upon which projects develop, revealing that the relation between the material and the immaterial is not accidental and extrinsic, but internal and meaningful already in the design process.

Revisiting another project constructed also on the occasion of the exhibition – in this case the Deutsche Werkbund in Köln in 1914 – might be helpful for illustrating this relation – the Glass Pavilion of Bruno Taut, who was a firm believer in the affective power of materials – and to be more precise of glass. Taut’s concerns for a wide host of magical and ambiguous effects that glass makes possible, led him to create spaces of a peculiar sensorial density and polychromatic exuberance, transforming architecture into an amplifier of phenomena, transmitter of sensations, a device for orchestrating emotions. As a materialisation of the ideals of the Expressionists, the Glass Pavilion was conceived as a crystallographic double-glazed dome animated by natural energies, as an immersive space, where all the elements – audible, visible and palpable – were merged together in an intimate fusion. In this context, material is neither seen as an independent element, nor as mere substance expressing tectonic character. It is to be understood rather as an entirely dynamic category, a complex and active system of fields, including the ephemeral ones, such as: light, air, sound, temperature, and conditions – environmental, meteorological, technical, societal or historical. This reading transcends the generative potential of materials and place an emphasis at their performative significance, shifting attention away from expression towards effects and intensities, and tracing conceptual contours of what we might denominate as a relational and somatic materialism. In other words, it defines a new affective tectonics that includes protocols of transmission and interaction. Through this lens, the so-called immaterialities such as sound, light, temperature or scent are not seen as intangible anymore. They do possess a physical, physiological and consequently affective dimension, contributing to the creation of space, which, as Böhme suggests, is to be approached as the
“space of bodily presence”\textsuperscript{15} – i.e. a space of engagement that appears to us as a result of continuous and complex interferences revealed through our perception, in which the material and the immaterial co-exist within the same field and become mutually explanatory. Consequently, to design considering an atmospheric approach means to focus on how a space is going to appear, to be experienced or to be felt.

**Perceptual Becoming**

Sanford Kwinter in his book *Architectures of Time* (2002) builds on Bergsonian lines of thought and approaches space as an *event* that is always in the process of “becoming”, being open to external conditions and multiple experiences\textsuperscript{16}. Thus, atmospheric architecture, from a certain perspective, might be considered as *impure*. It transcends the Euclidian logic and is *contaminated* and at the same time defined by a multiplicity of conditions, objects or percepts that merge and become intra-spatial components rather than external elements – likewise, in the case of Alexander Brodsky’s Ice Pavilion in Lake Pirogovo in Russia (2003), where meteorological conditions and their effects – the formation of ice – seem to complete the architecture. This impurity might be taken literally if we refer to the project *Dusty Relief* for the Museum of Contemporary Art in Bangkok (2002) by R&Sie(n), which uses dust, smog and soot from the polluted biotope as a material for the façade, whose electrostatically charged mesh cladding attracts dust particles, constantly changing its appearance.

But if we think about becoming also in terms of contingency, the work of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe might also be explanatory. Displacing the interest from the solid and fixed form towards a device for the continually changing experience, where the material world is merged with phenomena and imagery, theorists such as Michael Hays or Stan Allen identify some of Mies’s canonical works with affective immersion and ephemeral events of sensuous particularity – i.e. with contingent constructions\textsuperscript{17}. Taking into account Mies van der Rohe’s concern for effects and the performative capacity of materials, we might say that works such as the Barcelona Pavilion (1929) or the New National Gallery in Berlin (1962–1968) come into being as an unfolding immersive experience enhanced through illusory and ambivalent character\textsuperscript{18} – a dissolution of architectural fixity achieved by means of the interplay between the transparent and the reflective, the visible and the invisible, the planned and the unexpected. In the same way as previously mentioned, Bruno Taut, inspired by Paul Scheerbart’s fantasies\textsuperscript{19}, considered glass as the most powerful and triggering material of the Expressionists’ imagery, Jean Baudrillard presents it in *The System of Objects*
(1968) as “the most effective conceivable material expression of the fundamental ambiguity of ‘atmosphere’”\textsuperscript{20}. However, while Baudrillard associates its qualities with a “disavowal of the body”, for Bruno Taut glass is a symbol of all sensory modalities; as it is for Stan Allen, who in the context of Mies’s work talks about “theatre of effects”\textsuperscript{21}, which opens up for a synaesthetic experience and a multi-layered reality, setting up \textit{choreographies} and inviting to movement and discovery.

This might entail an insight into the affective qualities of atmosphere and can be attributed to what James Jerome Gibson defines as \textit{affordances}.\textsuperscript{22} The atmosphere of one place could determine the priorities of users or patterns of behaviour. As Herman Schmitz suggests, it evokes not only feelings and emotions, but also responses – action – and is manifested in bodily impulses.\textsuperscript{23}

In this context, the work of Aldo van Eyck might be explanatory and also anticipates what we denominate as an atmospheric or affective awareness. This awareness is visible, for instance, in the initial sketch for the Tajiri Exhibition in Amsterdam from 1967, in which van Eyck explained how different tangible and intangible elements might interact and influence our attitude, behaviour or interpretation. Richard Sennett in his book \textit{The Craftsman} (2008) uses Van Eyck’s playgrounds built in Amsterdam by the mid-‘70s as a paradigm to define the term “planned instructive ambiguity made by design”\textsuperscript{24}, which consist of the strategic assembly of elements and materials and their interplay with natural phenomena such as rain water or light, as well as ambiguous transitions – for instance a lack of neat separation between grass and sand. Through this strategic constellation and foreseen interaction van Eyck’s playgrounds by design provided their users an opportunity to explore the tactile difference of materials, stimulating inquiry and diverse activities, as well as inviting kids to develop different skills. Through materials that invite users to touch, smell or listen, or which suggest movement and occupancy, atmospheres are charged with possibilities and suggestions.

\textbf{Towards an Immersive Field of Experience}

In this context, Hugo Kükelhaus’ conceptions of architectural space unfolded and illustrated in his book \textit{Inhuman Architecture} – published for the first time 40 years ago – bear re-examination today. His particular way of looking at our surroundings, his way of perceiving and operating with space – approaching it as a relational and affective element, as a living and changing environment, as a device for social interaction and human development – might resonate again with current debates about corporeality, affects, emotions and feelings – questions which have received increased recognition in architecture in recent years. Similarly to some contemporary architects and theorists, such as, for instance,
Juhani Pallasmaa or Peter Zumthor, Hugo Kükelhaus focuses on the tactile, olfactory, and acoustic qualities of materials and architectural elements in search of “phenomenal nature” and “differential states of experience”. Through insights into the nature of somatic experience and the role of body consciousness in thinking and making architecture, Kükelhaus reveals the sensual potentials of our environment and defines a system of values for emotionally and bodily affective architecture – an architecture, which, using his actual words, is “brought into effect through sensory and bodily activity”. Moreover, already at that time, he suggested a shift from object-oriented architecture towards the “field of sensory experience”, where what matters is not the geometry or hierarchical organization, but fields based on multiple relations. These relations are defined by “boundaries as processes” – walls as bodies or organic fields with transforming qualities – active and dynamic elements, interfaces through which different areas, environments begin to interact – boundaries that have to be understood as ambivalent and susceptible limits to ambient changes that reinforce the connexions between the human being and the realm of the phenomena.

Hugo Kükelhaus brought some of these ideas to the attention of Werner Ruhnau, with whom he worked closely together on the Herta KG Project in Herten (1968–1972). Ruhnau defines architecture in terms of “scenic qualities” – dynamic constellations of occurrences in which experience and action are stimulated by variable spatial configurations and material strategies. Like Kükelhaus, he sees the appearance of space as a result of the interaction of all the elements, the visual being just a pretext to stimulate other senses.

At the foyer of the Gelsenkirchen Theatre (1955–1959), huge spongy murals – a result of collaboration with Yves Klein with whom Ruhnau also worked together on “aerial architecture” (1961) – irradiate a blue haze. Glass facades shift from transparency to reflection as they respond to light conditions, both blurring boundaries and constituting a canvas for interior events and the surroundings. A deep blackness of the big auditorium, in combination with the glittering silver surfaces and the hovering constellations of bulbs, which bear a certain resemblance to stellar patterns, envelope a visitor in a dreamlike atmosphere. Ruhnau explains that the whole idea is to make people aware not of architecture but of themselves, of the situation at the given moment. For him architecture constitutes a background – it defines a conductive environment.

The previously mentioned Herta KG project was also conceived as such. Its interior (which no longer exists) was defined as an open landscape organised by means of the assemblage of different objects and disparate materials, such as gravel or thread curtains, that together, in combination with the special quality of the light filtered through the suspended ceiling and illuminated hanging
tubes, filled the space with a peculiar density, evoking an almost phantasmagorical atmosphere. The natural phenomena animated objects like those of Adolf Luther – who experimented with the performative capacity of glass in search of the rendering of the impalpable. His objects, through transparent and reflective surfaces, generated miniature spectacles filling the space with glowing lattices of collected light and mirrored images from their surroundings, giving an impression of movement and mutation. Moreover, in Ruhnau’s architecture the body is both receptor and producer and is involved in a dynamic and kinaesthetic relation with other bodies and surroundings that trigger sensations and stimulate patterns of behaviour – such as the animatronic breathing wall designed by Günter Weseler, which would expand and constantly transform the entrance.

However, these different elements are not seen as independent entities, but rather as intra-spatial components of a larger set-up and they define an immersive field of experience in the sense meant by Hugo Kükelhaus, whose different experiential devices were also part of this unfamiliar landscape. Following Jean Baudrillard we might also say that in atmospheric architecture “objects take on a certain density” and serve as “boundary makers”. Thus, space itself becomes a function of the specificities of these objects and materials whose effects are simultaneously visual, haptic and acoustic and construct a whole host of embedding situations – establishing a new system of meaning and inviting to action.

Conclusion

To conclude: I would suggest that the following quote of Sanford Kwinter concerning the formation of the snow-flake, which he uses in order to explain his theory of Architectures of Time, might also be applied to atmosphere. Paraphrasing his words we might say that “One does not know in advance where or when atmosphere will begin, but one knows it will emerge – apparently spontaneously – from a flux or convergence of flows. The atmosphere, however, is not fixed from the beginning – it is merely an incarnated singularity”.

Being aware of the affective scope of architecture is essential to recognising all factors implied in the design process. According to Herman Hertzberger “(...) The expansion of architectural space in the course of the twentieth century has meant that the materials we use and the way we organize them reveal more than there is to see (...)” Indeed, materials are carriers of effects and phenomena, encoders of our reminiscences and memories, detonators of physical, physiological and emotional contingencies, activators of the aesthetic occurrence. This reading defines materiality as an operative force – as a means of an aesthetic engagement and a phenomenological manifestation.
Notes:

1. Atmosphere has been addressed in the work of architectural practitioners and theorists as diverse as Peter Zumthor, Valerio Olgiati, Philippe Rahm, Herzog & de Meuron, Diller Scofidio + Renfro, AMIDcero9, R&Sie(N), Juhani Pallasmaa, or Mark Wigley.


5. Ibid., p. 123.


19. Paul Scheerbart published his influential *Glass Architecture* in the same year the Glass Pavilion was constructed.


31. This series of experiential devices was initially exhibited as a part of the German Pavilion for the Expo’67 in Montreal and is known as “The Field of Sensory Experience”.


Arche and Arte. The Fundamental Dualism out of the Spirit of Music

Music is no monolith. We witness this with every contact, with every act of experiencing and of analyzing music. There is a multitude of musics, a multitude of genres and forms, a huge number of ways of listening required by various works. We are continually astounded by the perceptual multifacetedness of musical narration. Attempts at finding the essence of that variety lead us ultimately to the basic dichotomy that can no longer be reduced to yet simpler forms. This is a proto-dualism expressed here with the etymologies of *arche* and *arte*.\(^1\)

The dual nature of music will be exemplified with a few cases of different degrees of generality. I will present successively *arche*- and *arte*- split, musical sound, a chord, musical composition, music in general, *axio*- dimension, reason of the phrase “spirit of music”.

*Arche- and Arte- *

The function of the proposed combination of *arche*\-/*arte* consists in a synthesis, in a reduction of the various dualities to a simple proto-form, irrespective of their further possible differentiation.

*Arche*\(^2\) (\(^a\)C) should be understood as a counterpart of prefixes *pre*- and *proto*- . It connotes with the primary, the concrete, the perennial, the original, the ancient, and also with the material, the essential, the primeval, the instinctive, the involuntary, the natural.

*Arte*\(^3\) (\(^a\)T) relates to art, mastery, sophistication, and thus to artificiality, speculation, rationality, indirectness, intellect, abstracts, ideas. It encompasses categories of consciousness, deliberation, calculation, information, ordering, knowledge, reason.
This primary duality has been present since the very beginnings of human reflection on the nature of reality. Ever-present, it runs in creeds and myths, in texts by philosophers, in the various fields of the humanities. Discussed in a variety of contexts, in every aspect of life and of activity, it proves itself to be fundamental and irreplaceable. It is a feature of our mind.

The arche\arte split is observed on every level of musicality. For the same work of music, its code in the score (^aT) and its concert performance (^aC) are two different things. The simple mathematical proportions (^aT) of aliquots (1:2, 2:3, 3:4, etc.) determine the varying tones of instruments that allow their identification by ear (^aC). We construe our worlds both empirically (^aC) and analytically (^aT). We identify facts both sensual (^aC) and rational (^aT), concrete (^aC) and abstract (^aT).

On the other hand, this split is never total. The necessary mutual complementsations of features of these two contradictory levels is in fact their paradoxical characteristic. Each dominating arche carries a certain payload of arte, and vice versa. The code of the score will remain useless when it acquires no audial concretization, in imagination at the very least. A work of music that becomes actualized will remain a mere stimulus if it is not interpreted and generally assimilated in the mind. At the same time, mental processes do not have to be conscious. Most take place latently.

Arche and arte are both separate and complementary. They cannot exist beyond this mutual coexistence. And yet they refuse to be brought together in a unified monad. As separate entities, they function for each other as figure and background, and the direction of this relationship depends on the provenience and the domination of arteic or archeic characteristics. Balanced and separated, they take on the position of contradictive opposites, which consist in a mutual opposition of their respective features.

The qualities of ^aC\^aT are of universal significance that goes beyond music. They are omnipresent and, as such, they also appear in cognitive and creative acts. The ^aC\^aT system is an extraction of sorts, a conceptual reduction of the various dichotomies to a primary ontological form. But it seems equally useful to use the basic concepts of the arteic and the archeic in detailed discussion, since this allows to relate to the primary source of this manner of dichotomy.

Sound

The ontic dichotomy of ^aC\^aT already appears when one differentiates between common (^aC) and musical (^aT) sounds. The musical sound is artificial (^aT).
There are no stable pitches in nature. Musical sounds are produced by deliberately designed and carefully manufactured instruments. Sound constructs such as melodies, harmonies, rhythms, forms are all products of mind. They are not present in nature; consequently, music is not mimetic.

Thus, the sound of music is primarily arteic. Yet, due to the omnipresence of the ontic dichotomy of ^aC\^aT, musical sound will secondarily contain both contradicting elements: that of arche and that of arte. After all, the artificial (^aT) instrument is a material object (^aC). The sound that causes a specific impression of colour (^aC) is a relational (^aT) beam of simple vibrations made evident in acoustic spectrum analysis and visualized in a spectrogram.

Thus, the resonation of a note carries twofold information. It is both the timbre of the object that produces it (^aC) and a place in an abstract pitch scale (^aT). Approximation or specific identification of timbre relates to the material source of sound that is the instrument (^aC). Approximation or specific identification of pitch relates to a conventional location in a pitch scale (^aT). What follows is a few components of the archeic/arteic dualism of the musical sound:

```
                                      SOUND
                                      /       \
                   (^aC)              (^aT)
levels:          concrete       abstract
form:            resonation     note
perceptions:      timbre        tone
connotations:    instrument     pitch
space:           distance       position
```

Example 1. Archeic and arteic aspectual levels of the musical sound

As can be seen, the division of ^aC\^aT concerns a variety of features (listed in the left column. They are (as yet) unordered, uncategorized and non-hierarchical, as the perceptions (^aC) precede the later rationalizations (^aT). The hierarchy in the above list (position on the vertical axis) is deceptive. In a real musical situation, the concrete\abstract dualism can be of no significance, while spatial features may be of more import: the distance from the course of sound (and thus also its dynamics and its colour) and the position on the pitch scale (false or correct taking of a note).
Similarly with chords: since there are more tones here, the archeic-arteic relationships multiply. Arteic above all is the abstract pitch structure of the chord. The chord's colour becomes its phenomenal, audial counterpart. Captured and identified through intuition, it allows, nevertheless, to pinpoint and analytically reproduce the chord's structural qualities. (While this ability is inborn, the skill of naming chords is acquired through musical education). The colours of chordal systems are varied, specific and completely independent of instruments' timbres. The association of “sorrow” with minor chords and “cheerfulness” with major ones – irrespective of their instrumental or vocal concretization – can serve as a simple example. The arteic strand also contains the structural form as visible in the score or in shortened symbolic notation. That, too, can be converted into an audial (i.e. archeic) impression proper for a given type of chord. The structure, although an abstract construct that always requires some sort of concretization, sounds its own colour that is characteristic for that structure alone and independent of the instrumental colour of a particular concretization.

The archeic level is produced by a concrete instrumental performance. The sum total of the timbre of the sources of sound is its phenomenal representation. This is true even in the case of a single polyphonic instrument, when the timbre of a produced chord will be the sum total of the individual spectra of each of the chord’s notes.

A chord’s timbre (\(aC\)) and colour (\(aT\)) combine to create a common perceptive quality. At the same time, a chord is a structure of pitch classes that constitute the chord and a structure of the frequencies of all notes heard. The pitch structure of the chord’s components constitutes the perception of the sound together with the spectre of the component frequencies of each instrument’s timbre. The interval relationships within a chord produce impressions on reception that are independent and different from the ones carried by the spectra of the component tones: namely aliquots of instrumental sounds.

The elementary dependencies \(aC\backslash aT\) within a chord may be presented as follows:
Arche and Arte. The Fundamental Dualism out of the Spirit of Music

Example 2. Archeic and arteic aspectual levels of a musical chord

Composition

The dissociations become even more complex within a work of music. A work develops over many levels. The parameter of time yields the temporal spheres, those of metre, rhythm, vibration, differences of synchronization, proportion of phrases and segments. In general, the wealth of a work's forms can be reduced, as above, to archeic sound and arteic structures of pitch and time. A work of music is usually a construct of numerous combinations and permeations of the arte and arche aspects. These include:
Example 3. Archeic and arteic levels of a work of music in multiaspectual presentation.

This can be exemplified with a fragment of *Ad Matrem* (1971) by Henryk Mikołaj Górecki (1933–2010):
Arche and Arte. The Fundamental Dualism out of the Spirit of Music

In this fragment the archeic level first manifests itself as qualities of sounds and volumes. We hear a series of dull strikes of membranophones (gran cassa, timpani, tamburo militare), followed by clarinet-trombone and oboe-trumpet timbres, and then by a cry of chorus. The three textures are added in turn, helping to cumulate the volume that grows all the way to a final maximum.

In the arteic level, we can identify the isotempo of percussive pulsation, the tritone interval in wind, the half-tone interval in the vocals. The dynamic profile is structured in a geometric (ascendent) way (*pppp-ffff*-silence). The semantic content of the cry “my mother” becomes the arteic crowning of the whole.

**Music**

The dual arteic-archeic code present in the musical mind is replicated in every work, every music, in its every fragment. Because of its fundamentality, it di-
vides the very domain of music into two types: archeic music and arteic music. A work's type is decided by its provenience and the majority of its typical features.

Archeic music comes into being in a spontaneous, natural, intuitive way. It is egalitarian and widely accepted. It makes use of commonly-known means and is easily assimilated. It allows us to experience the impressiveness and the natural processuality of musical utterance. It includes improvised, popular, folk, entertainment and commercial genres, those of simple music-making, either solo or collective, often combined with song and dance. The evolution of performance skills and transmission of tradition take place through imitation. It serves a communicative and socially integrating function; it offers emotional directness. It relates to man's simple and inborn musical dispositions. Its content is studied by ethnologists, sociologists, economists and commented upon by musical journalists.

Arteic music is construed, structuralized, intellectual. It relates to norms and forms, to achievements in composing technique. As it appears in notation, it belongs to the written rather than the oral sphere. It is an expression of man's extraordinary and creative artistic disposition. Its rational and often speculative factor leads to new musical discoveries. These are not always accepted and take more time to be assimilated. They are the reason for the arteic strand in music to become a domain within art. Arteic music produces established genres and forms, at times cultivated by experts, among an elitist audience. It is a reflection of current worldviews; it develops over a path of significant changes, often in stylistic revolutions. We are indebted to the arteic for affective expression and musical order. Its content is studied by theorists of music and musicologists, and commented upon by musical critics.

Example 5. Aspectual features of the archeic and the arteic strands in music
We observe the two-strand developmental course of music throughout its history. There has always been popular and artistic music, secular and religious, egalitarian and elitist. The division can thus be seen from the very origins. The spontaneous song and dance of a tribal community differs from ritualized vocal or instrumental formulae of a witch doctor or a shaman. The music of common celebration at weddings and dances is a different strand from the courtly and the sacred styles. The history of European music offers a particularly strong division between the two, even if we know much less of the latter’s history; its documentation only dates back to the studies by folklorists in mid-19th century.

The awareness of the discreteness of the two strands does not negate the fact of their mutual penetration. Composers have taken on popular themes (beginning with the celebrated popular song *L’homme armé* in the Middle Ages) and produced pastiches thereof. Folk musicians have assimilated composers’ styles and techniques into their own performing practice. We can currently observe the rise of popular sonic music based on the already-assimilated tonalities of sound objects established by composers of electroacoustic and sonorist music.

**Axio-**

The ontic levels of *arche* and *arte* in music have been presented. Is there anything in-between? Yes, there is: the level of value (*axio*-). There, music relates to the subject (the receiver) rather than to the object (the work). The process of evaluation is a personal activity?|action. It sets in motion the emotive sphere. Affects become labels of values. The perception of a work is based on emotions that we localize as expressions and that we ascribe to the music we listen to. The narrative course of expression fills in the perceptive content.

Man is primarily an evaluating creature. The mechanism of self-preservation is based on a constant action of a processor of evaluation. To underestimate both danger and benefit can be existentially threatening. Estimations at such an essential level are performed beyond consciousness, instantly, automatically. We are only able to react basing on axionic information, without recognizing and categorizing the reasons for an evaluation. The process of evaluation precedes all cognitive, creative, producing, communicative, social, etc. acts.

Art – including music – is a *par excellence* axionic domain that superimposes itself on values. Failed artistic achievements simply do not exist. A valueless product of an artist is not a work of art; it does not belong. The first stage of evaluative verification takes place in the very creative act; later stages are the result of social reception.
In relation to the ontic levels of arte and arche, the axionic strand is situated primarily as well as centrally. It is primary since axionic values take precedence. And it is central since it represents the subject that receives ontic data from the proximal archeic and arteic levels. The axio- level that represents values is of a different nature than the dualism of arche\arte. Thus the dualisms discussed above should be complemented with yet another one, ontic-axionic.

Out of the Spirit of Music

Music is a peculiar medium; it exhibits the essence of the arche\arte dualism to a degree not offered by other domains of art. This is due to the peculiar quality of human perception: we are able to recognize structures of sound both subconsciously (^aC) and rationally (^aT) at the same time. When, for instance, we hear a sound and say: a seventh chord, we declare both its sensual (^aC) reception and the rational (^aT) knowledge of its inner structure, complete with the placement of its elements and the size of the distance between them. The same is true of sequences of rhythm: a subconscious grouping mechanism makes it possible to, e.g., establish the exact number of beats in a series of impulses. We hear musical shapes in a synthetic-analytic way: immediately and rationally, intuitively and speculatively.

While the binary ^aC\^aT is omnipresent, it is in music that it reveals itself in its purest state. This suggests its inborn presence in our nature, since music comes from us. The explanatory potential of music in relation to the general ontological and axiological problems discussed above is remarkable. Music is a peculiar sphere in the creative dispositive of the conditio humana. It is the place where that condition is expressed in a way reduced to its very essence. It functions as the axiological model of the play of pure qualities, free of all anecdotal payload.

Coda

The above draft of ontic and axionic qualities superimposed on music does not derive from any inflexible view. In particular, it is not an expression of dualism or monism, cultural elitism or egalitarianism, psychologism, anti-psychologism, etc. It points to the foci rather than to the limits of potential development. Artistic reality is complicated and requires such development at various levels of detail.

Translated by Jan Rybicki
Notes:

1. *Arche* will be notated without the apostrophe to elude associations with the ancient Greek understanding of the term. The following abbreviations will be used: ^aC – archeic, ^aT – arteic.
2. Derived from *archaion* (Gr.) – ancient.
3. Derived from *ars* (Lat.) – art.
4. Questions of this kind are discussed by, among others, Roman Ingarden in his *Ut-wór muzyczny i sprawa jego tożsamości* [The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity], Kraków 1948.
5. Psychoacoustic research dates back to Pythagoras’ study of the mathematical laws of distance between pitches.
6. A formant is a specific layout of frequencies and their energies within the spectrum of an acoustic signal.
7. To be quite precise, one would speak of archeic-derived and arteic-derived music; the factor of provenience being decisive here.
On Authors

Georgia Apostolopoulou
Department of Philosophy, University of Ioannina, Greece
gapostol@cc.uoi.gr

Tiziana Andina
University of Turin, Italy
tiziana.andina@gmail.com

Agnieszka Bandura
Vroclav University, Poland
a.bandura@uni.wroc.pl

Gabriele Bersa
State Scientific High School, Milano, Italy
gabers33@gmail.com

Lilianna Bieszczad
Jagiellonian University, Cracov, Poland
e-mail: lilianna.bieszczad@uj.edu.pl

Julie C. van Camp
California State University Long Beach, Denver, United States
jvancamp5@gmail.com

Pedro Hussak van Velthen Ramos
Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
phussak@gmail.com

Zdeňka Kalnická
Ostrava University, Czech Republic
zdenka.kalnicka@osu.cz

Mariko Kaname
Atomi University, Japan
cao59641@popo2.odn.ne.jp, kaname@atomi.ac.jp
On Authors

Jiun Lee  
Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Republic of Korea  
leezun@ewha.ac.kr

Jacqueline Gómez Mayorga  
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico  
cinexperiencia@yahoo.com

Kagawa Mayumi  
Musashi University Tokyo, Japan  
mayumi_aquar@nifty.ne.jp

Boris Orlov  
Ural Federal University, Ekaterinburg, Russia  
bvo51@rambler.ru

María Eugenia Piñero  
Instituto Superior de Formacion Docente Artistica 805, Argentina  
hanna_doc@yahoo.com.ar

Mihaela Pop  
University of Bucharest, Romania  
pop.mihaela.a@gmail.com

Rıfat Şahiner  
Yıldız Technical University, Turkey  
rsahiner@yahoo.com

Albert van der Schoot  
Universiteit van Amsterdam, Netherlands  
a.vanderschoot@uva.nl

Darko Štrajn  
Ljubljana Graduate School of the University, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia  
darko.strajn@guest.arnes.si

Grzegorz Sztabiński  
University of Lodz, Poland  
grzegorzsztabinski@op.pl
Krzysztof Szwaigier  
The Academy of Music in Cracow, Poland  
zbszwajg@cyfronet.pl

Helen Tatla  
Technological Educational Institution of Athens, Greece  
lenatatla@yahoo.gr

Kikuko Toyama  
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Saitama University, Japan  
kiku100@mocha.ocn.ne.jp

Izabela Wiecezorek  
Aarhus School of Architecture, Denmark  
izabela.wieczorek@earch.dk

Erik M. Vogt  
Trinity College, Hartford, United States  
erik.vogt@trincoll.edu

Park Yeonsook  
Yeungnam University, Kyungpook National University, Republic of Korea  
coollikehot@knu.ac.kr

Anna Ziolkowska-Juś  
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland  
anna.ziolko@poczta.fm